Photkooram vs State of M.P. and Others

Pritinker Diwaker, J.—Challenge in the present petition is to the order dated 10.12.1994 (Annexure A-9) passed respondent No. 3 whereby after holding departmental enquiry a major penalty of dismissal from service has been imposed on the petitioner. Petitioner has also challenged the order dated 21.2.1995 (Annexure A-11) passed by respondent No. 2-Deputy Inspector General of Police, SAF, Bhilai, District Durg in departmental appeal. Facts of the case in brief are that while wording as constable No. 636 in 30th Battalion, SAF Jagdalpur, on 23.10.1993 the petitioner was put under suspension along with one Kartik Ram Nag on the allegation that in the intervening night of 21/22.10.1993 he along with said Kartik Ram and head constable Narendra Kumar left the place of duty, went out of the police line, consumed liquor and thereafter the petitioner and Kartik Ram committed the murder of head constable Narendra Kumar. Petitioner and Kartik Ram were subjected to session''s trial No. 201/1993 for committing an offence u/s 302/34 I.P.C. However, vide judgment and order dated 30.11.1994 they were acquitted by the trial Magistrate.

Both, the petitioner and Kartik Ram were subjected to charge-sheet dated 6.12.1993 (Annexure A-2) levelling the following two charges:

(Vernacular matter omitted....Ed.)

After getting reply of the petitioner the Enquiry Officer was appointed who after giving full opportunity of hearing to the petitioner and the other delinquent employee imposed the major penalty of dismissal from service on 10.12.1994 vide Annexure A-9. Against the order passed by the disciplinary authority, the petitioner preferred a departmental appeal which was dismissed by the appellate authority on 21.2.1995 (Annexure A-11). These two orders have been assailed by the petitioner on the following grounds:

(I) On the same set of charge the petitioner was prosecuted u/s 302/34 I.P.C. and thus in all fairness the respondents ought not to have proceeded with the departmental enquiry and should have waited till the outcome of sessions trial.

(II) Once in the sessions trial the petitioner has been acquitted, for all practical purposes, the charges levelled against him in the departmental enquiry also go and the petitioner ought to have been reinstated in service by the department.

(III) In the departmental enquiry no proper opportunity was afforded to the petitioner as required under the law.

(IV) In view of Police Regulation No. 241, the moment the petitioner is acquitted in criminal trial, departmental proceedings should have been dropped forthwith and the petitioner should have been reinstated.

(V) Disciplinary Authority has erred in law in imposing the extreme punishment of dismissal from service which is not commensurate with the act or the petitioner.

(VI) The appellate Authority has failed to consider the points raised by the petitioner in appeal and has decided the same in a mechanical manner.

Counsel for the respondents submits that the departmental enquiry was conducted against the petitioner on serious allegations of misconduct and there is no bar under the law to hold the same. He submits that acquittal of the petitioner in criminal case does not result in his automatic exoneration from the allegation of misconduct made in the departmental enquiry and it is permissible under the law to impose penalty in the disciplinary proceedings even if the delinquent employee has been acquitted of the criminal charges. He submits that in the departmental enquiry charge of murder against the petitioner was not there and at the subsequent stage it was dropped and the main allegation against the petitioner was of committing the misconduct which was duly proved by the department. He further submits that the enquiry has been conducted after giving full opportunity to the petitioner and following due procedure required under the law. According to the State counsel after enquiry copy of the enquiry report was supplied to the petitioner, his reply was sought and thereafter punishment order was issued to him. State counsel further submits that the findings recorded in the departmental enquiry are neither perverse nor vitiated under the law and therefore the petitioner has rightly been punished. He submits that the similarly placed constable Kartik Ram Nag was also subjected to departmental enquiry on the same charge, he too was punished by the disciplinary authority and his appeal too was dismissed by the appellate authority. He submits that thereafter said Kartik Ram Nag had preferred Writ Petition (S) No. 1081/2005 before this Court which vide order dated 15.7.2010 was dismissed by a detailed order and in this view of the matter the petitioner also is not entitled for any relief.

Heard counsel for the parties and perused the documents record.

From the order dated 15.7.2010 passed in WP (S) No. 1081/2005 (Kartik Ram Nag v. State of Madhya Pradesh and others) it is apparent that vide elaborate order, this Court has dismissed the petition preferred by the delinquent employee who was subjected to departmental enquiry along with the petitioner herein for the same set of charges for which the petitioner was punished. Kartik Ram Nag too was acquitted by the trial Court but it has been held by this Court that he was rightly subjected to departmental enquiry and has been punished proportionately.

In order to appreciate the submissions based on provision contained in Regulation 241 of the Police Regulations, it is apt to reproduce the aforesaid provision:

Cases of acquittal-When a Police Officer has been tried and acquitted by a criminal Court, he must as a rule be reinstated. He may not be punished departmentally when the offence for which he was tried constitutes the sole ground of punishment. If, however the acquittal, whether in the Court of original jurisdiction or of appeal, was based on technical grounds, or if the facts established at the trial show that his retention in Government service is undesirable, the Superintendent may take departmental cognizance of his conduct, after obtaining the sanction of the Inspector-General.

A perusal of the aforesaid provision contained in Police Regulation would show that even in cases of acquittal, If the facts established at the trial show that retention of the employee in Government service is undesirable, the Superintendent of police may take the departmental cognizance of his conduct, after obtaining the sanction of the Inspector-General. What regulation 241 lays down on is that an employee may not be punished departmental when the offence for which he was tried constitutes the sole ground of punishment. The first part of the aforesaid provision that when a Police Officer has been tried and acquitted by a criminal Court, he must as a rule be reinstated, cannot be read in isolation divorced from the other parts of the regulation. The submission of learned counsel that acquittal by a criminal Court must invariably and under all circumstances result in reinstatement, if accepted, would render rest of the provisions under Regulation 241 otiose and meaningless. Therefore, such an interpretation of Regulation 241 would be against all canons of interpretation based on settled principles. The rule of general application embodied in Regulation 241 is subject to exceptions embodied in the Rule itself. Therefore applying the principle of purposive construction, in the opinion of this Court, Regulation 241 cannot be interpreted to mean that under all circumstances, acquittal would result in restatement even if in appropriate cases, it is found that retention of the Govt. servant is undesirable. The challenge to the departmental action and order of penalty based on application of Regulation 241, in the present case, cannot be accepted because inhibition against departmental action would be applicable when the offence for which Govt. employee was tried constitutes the sole ground of punishment.

In the present case, if the charge levelled against the petitioner is carefully read, it consists of three limbs. The first part of allegation against the petitioner is that he left the Camp without due permission. The second part is that he consumed liquor after having come out without permission and the third part is an allegation of committing murder. The criminal charge solely related to allegation of murder and the criminal Court was not called upon to inquire into allegation of leaving the Camp without sanction or consumption of liquor. In the present case while the departmental enquiry was going on, petitioner was acquitted of the criminal charge of committing murder. The Disciplinary Authority duly took into consideration this aspect and insofar as allegation of commission of murder is concerned, the same was taken out of the purview of departments enquiry. The Disciplinary Authority considered the material on record with regard to only two parts of the allegations namely-leaving the Camp without permission and secondly consuming liquor. Therefore, it cannot be said that the offence constituted the sole ground of punishment.

It needs to be noted that the entire submissions based on applicability or otherwise of Regulation 241 has been made without any specific grounds raised in this behalf based on any averments of facts. One of the grounds raised in the petition is as follow:--

Grounds

X X X

(G) That the principle that no enquiry can be held in respect of a charge which was the subject-matter of prosecution is applicable also when employee is discharged instead of being acquitted. But the disciplinary authority is conduct the inquiry in same offence and passed order is bad in law and unjustified.

A perusal of the aforesaid ground taken by the petitioner shows that the petitioner raised a ground that no enquiry can be held where acquittal has taken place, would also extend and apply in case of discharge. It has also been pleaded that Disciplinary Authority conducted the enquiry in respect of the same offence. No specific ground with reference to Regulation 241 has been raised. During the course of argument, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that there is no material on record to show that while proceedings with the enquiry, after the acquittal, the sanction of Inspector General was obtained. As stated earlier, there are no such factual foundation in the pleading to this effect, therefore, there was no occasion for the respondent to state on affidavit this aspect. A copy of the enquiry report was supplied to the petitioner along with covering memo dated 7.11.1994 (Annexure A-5) issued by the Commandant. Criminal Court passed the judgment of acquittal on 30th November, 1994. Thereafter, a show-cause notice was issued to the petitioner on 1.12.1994, placed on record as Annexure A-7. In reply to the said show-cause notice, though the petitioner stated that in view of acquittal, the departmental action is liable to be dropped, it was nowhere stated that the permission of Inspector General was not obtained before proceedings with the matter.

In any case, as it has already been held by this Court that the offence alleged does not constitute the sole ground of punishment, in the present case, the oral argument that Regulation 241 operated as bar is to be rejected. Learned counsel for the petitioner sought to rely upon order dated 24th July, 2007 passed by this Court in M.C.C. (S) No. 34/2005 (Pahari Sharan Pandey v. The State of M.P. and another).

In that case, it was found that the charge in criminal case as well as in departmental inquiry were one and the same, therefore, it was concluded that in view of provision contained in Regulation 241 of the Police Regulation, departmental action was unsustainable. The aforesaid decision is distinguishable on facts. One more submission of learned counsel for the petitioner in this regard needs to be dealt with. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that charge No. 1 constituted one single charge that the petitioner came out of the Camp without permission with other colleagues and consumed liquor and, thereafter committed murder of his colleague. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the allegation was of committing murder and therefore upon acquittal, the entire charge was liable to be dropped and it was not permissible for the Disciplinary Authority to split the charge and continue enquiry and punish on one part of the allegation alleging leaving of Camp without permission and consuming liquor. I am not inclined to accept this submission. A bare perusal of the charges levelled against the petitioner would show that misconducts alleged at different stages were subject-matter of enquiry. As I have discussed earlier, the misconduct was on three aspects. Firstly-leaving the Camp without permission; secondly-consuming liquor and thirdly-committing murder. In view the judgment of criminal Court acquitting the petitioner from the charge of murder, it was permissible for the Disciplinary Authority to take out of purview of enquiry the aspect of murder and continuing enquiry with regard to allegation regarding leaving Camp and consuming liquor. There is no such bar under the rules governing departmental enquiry.

The next submission of learned counsel for the petitioner, based on acquittal, de hors Regulation 241 applicability aspects, shall now be dealt with. Learned counsel for the petitioner relying upon decision of the Supreme Court in the cases of Capt. M. Paul Anthony Vs. Bharat Gold Mines Ltd. and Another, & G.M. Tank Vs. State of Gujarat and Another, vehemently argued that if the allegation in the criminal case and the departmental enquiry was looked into, they were one and the same. It is also submitted that the allegation arose out of the same incident and same series of facts and circumstances. It is also highlighted that the same set of witnesses were examined in criminal case as well as in departmental enquiry. Therefore, it is urged, the departmental enquiry ought not to have been conducted further after acquittal by the criminal Court vide order dated 30th November, 1994. In order to appreciate the aforesaid submission, it is relevant to deal with the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in various decisions dealing with the aspect of permissibility of departmental action on the face of acquittal from criminal charges. In the case of State of Rajasthan Vs. B.K. Meena and others, Supreme Court after considering its earlier decision dealing with the aspect of permissibility of disciplinary proceedings, simultaneously along with criminal proceedings propounded as under:

17...The approach and the objective in the criminal proceedings and the disciplinary proceedings is altogether distinct and different. In the disciplinary proceedings, the question is whether the respondent is guilty of such conduct as would merit his removal from service or a lesser punishment, as the case may be, whereas in the criminal proceedings the question is whether the offences registered against him under the Prevention of Corruption Act (and the Indian Penal Code, if any) are established and, if established, what sentence should be imposed upon him. The standard of proof, the mode of enquiry and the rules governing the enquiry and trial in both the cases are entirely distinct and different. Staying of disciplinary proceedings pending criminal proceedings, to repeat, should not be a matter of course but a considered decision...

Applying the aforesaid principle, while dealing with the situation of permissibility of departmental action in the case of acquittal from criminal charges in the case of State of Karnataka and Another Vs. T. Venkataramanappa, it was held under:--

The prosecution evidence in the criminal complaint may have fallen short of those standards but that does not mean that the State was in any way debarred from invoking Rule 28 of the Karnataka Civil Service Rules, which forbids a Government servant to marry a second time without the permission of the Government. But, here, the respondent being a Hindu, could never have been granted permission by the Government to marry a second time because of his personal law forbidding such marriage. It was thus beyond the ken of the Tribunal to have scuttled the departmental proceedings against the respondent on the footing that such question of bigamy should normally not be taken up for decision in departmental enquiries, as the decisions of competent Courts tending to be decisions in rem would stand at the highest pedestal. There was a clear fallacy in such view because for purposes of Rule 28, such strict standards, as would warrant a conviction for bigamy u/s 494 I.P.C., may not, to begin with, be necessary.

In subsequent decision in the case of Capt M. Paul Anthony (supra) reviewing earlier case laws on the subject, following principle was expounded:

As we shall presently see, there is a consensus of judicial opinion amongst the High Courts whose decisions we do not intend to refer to in this case, and the various pronouncements of this Court, which shall be copiously referred to, on the basic principle that proceedings in a criminal case and the departmental proceedings can proceed simultaneously with a little exception. As we understand, the basis for this proposition is that proceedings in a criminal case and the departmental proceedings operate in distinct and different jurisdictional areas. Whereas in the departmental proceedings, where a charge relating to misconduct is being Investigated, the factors operating in the mind of the disciplinary authority may be many such as enforcement of discipline or to investigate the level of integrity of the delinquent or the other staff, the standard of proof required in those proceedings is also different than that required in a criminal case. While in the departmental proceedings the standard of proof is one of preponderance of the probabilities, in a criminal case, the charge has to be proved by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt. The little exception may be where the departmental proceedings and the criminal case are based on the same set of facts and the evidence in both the proceedings is common without there being a variance.

In yet another decision in the case of Union of India and others Vs. Shri Bihari Lal Sidhana, ) again dealing with the aspect of disciplinary action in case of acquittal from criminal charges, it was held as under:--

It is true that the respondent was acquitted by the criminal Court but acquittal does not automatically give him the right to be reinstated into the service. It would still be open to the competent authority to take decision whether the delinquent Government servant can be taken into service or disciplinary action should be taken under the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules or under the Temporary Service Rule.

In the case of Commissioner of Police, New Delhi Vs. Narender Singh, , it was held under:

It is not in dispute that the standard of proof required in recording a finding of conviction in a criminal case and in a departmental proceeding are distinct and different. Whereas in a criminal case, it is essential to prove a charge beyond all reasonable doubt, in a departmental proceeding preponderance of probability would serve the purpose. (See Kamaladevi Agarwal Vs. State of West Bengal and Others,

It is now well settled by reason of a catena of decisions of this Court that if an employee has been acquitted of a criminal charge, the same by itself would not be a ground not to initiate a departmental proceeding against him or to drop the same in the event an order of acquittal is passed.

In a later decision in the case of Noida Entrepreneurs Assn. Vs. Noida and Others, the Supreme Court after taking into consideration various decisions highlighting conceptual difference between departmental proceedings and criminal proceedings, held as under ( Paras 15 to 17 of AIR, Lab IC 15);

In Capt. M. Paul Anthony Vs. Bharat Gold Mines Ltd. and Another, this Court indicated some of the fact situations which would govern the question whether departmental proceedings should be kept in abeyance during pendency of a criminal case. In para 22 conclusions which are deducible from various decisions were summarized. They are as follows: (SCC p.691, para 22): (Para 22 of AIR, Lab IC).

22.... (i) Departmental proceedings and proceedings in a criminal case can proceed simultaneously as there is no bar in their being conducted simultaneously, though separately.

(ii) If the departmental proceedings and the criminal case are based on identical and similar set of facts and the charge in the criminal case against the delinquent employee is of a grave nature which involves complicated questions of law and fact, it would be desirable to stay the departmental proceedings till the conclusion of the criminal case.

(iii) Whether the nature of a charge in a criminal case is grave and whether complicated questions of fact and law are involved in that case, will depend upon the nature of offence, the nature of the case launched against the employee on the basis of evidence and material collected against him during investigation or as reflected in the charge-sheet.

(iv) The factors mentioned at (ii) and (iii) above cannot be considered in isolation to stay the departmental proceedings but due regard has to be given to the fact that the departmental proceedings cannot be unduly delayed.

(v) If the criminal case does not proceed or its disposal is being unduly delayed, the departmental proceedings, even if they were stayed on account of the pendency of the criminal case, can be resumed and proceeded with so as to conclude them at an early date, so that if the employee is found not guilty his honour may be vindicated and in case he is found guilty, the administration may get rid of him at the earliest.

The position in law relating to acquittal in a criminal case, its effect on departmental proceedings and reinstatement in service has been dealt with by this Court in Union of India and others Vs. Shri Bihari Lal Sidhana, . It was held in para 5 as follows: (SCC pp. 387-88): (Para 5 of AIR, Lab IC)

It is true that the respondent was acquitted by the criminal Court but acquittal does not automatically give him the right to be reinstated into the service. It would still be open to the competent authority to take decision whether the delinquent Government servant can be taken into service or disciplinary action should be taken under the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules or under the Temporary Service Rules. Admittedly, the respondent had been working as a temporary Government servant before he was kept under suspension. The termination order indicated the factum that he, by then, was under suspension. It is only a way of describing him as being under suspension when the order came to be passed but that does not constitute any stigma. Mere acquittal of Government employee does not automatically entitle the Government servant to reinstatement. As stated earlier, it would be open to the appropriate competent authority to take a decision whether the enquiry into the conduct is required to be done before directing reinstatement or appropriate action should be taken as per law, if otherwise, available. Since the respondent is only a temporary Government servant, the power being available under Rule 5(1) of the Rules, it is always open to the competent authority to invoke the said power and terminate the services of the employee instead of conducting the enquiry or to continue in service a Government servant accused of defalcation of public money. Reinstatement would be a charter for him to indulge with impunity in misappropriation of public money.

The standard of proof required in departmental proceedings is not the same as required to prove a criminal charge and even if there is an acquittal in the criminal proceedings the same does not bar departmental proceedings. That being so, the order of the State Government deciding not to continue the departmental proceedings is clearly untenable and is quashed. The departmental proceedings shall continue.

The legal position settled by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid decisions was summarized in its recent decision in the case of The Managing Director State Bank of Hyderabad and Another Vs. P. Kata Rao, ) as under:--

There cannot be any doubt whatsoever that the jurisdiction of superior Courts in interfering with a finding of fact arrived at by the Enquiry Officer is limited. The High Court, it is trite, would also ordinarily not interfere with the quantum of punishment. There cannot, furthermore, be any doubt or dispute that only because the delinquent employee who was also facing a criminal charge stands acquitted, the same, by itself, would not debar the disciplinary authority in initiating a fresh departmental proceeding and/or where the departmental proceedings had already been initiated or to continue therewith.

The legal principle enunciated to the effect that on the same set of facts the delinquent shall not be proceeded in a departmental proceedings and in a criminal case simultaneously, has, however, been deviated from. The dicta of this Court in Capt. M. Paul Anthony Vs. Bharat Gold Mines Ltd. and Another, ) however, remains unshaken although the applicability thereof had been found to be dependent on the fact situation obtaining in each case.

In order to draw support to his submissions that in view of acquittal from criminal charges, petitioner is entitled to be reinstated and the findings recorded in the departmental enquiry are unsustainable, heavy reliance has been placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of G.M. Tank Vs. State of Gujarat and Another,

In the opinion of this Court, petitioner is not entitled benefit of the aforesaid judgment, inasmuch as in that case after taking into consideration the peculiar facts and circumstances therein that the charges in domestic enquiry and criminal Court were one and the same, evidence, witnesses and circumstances were one and the same and that same witnesses were examined in criminal case whose examination were made by the criminal Court to come to the conclusion that the prosecution has not proved the guilt beyond reasonable doubt leading to acquittal. However, in view of above discussion with reference to the facts and circumstances of the present case with regard to the charge, evidence etc., it cannot be said that the charges, facts and witnesses were one and the same.

In the present case, the charge-sheet which contained allegations of misconduct against the petitioner was in three parts. Firstly-that the petitioner left the Camp without due permission; secondly-that he consumed liquor and thirdly-that he committed murder. The Enquiry Officer conducted detailed enquiry. Prosecution witnesses were examined and the petitioner was allowed to cross-examine prosecution witnesses. Petitioner was also afforded opportunity to lead defence witnesses. The Enquiry Officer considered oral and documentary evidence on record both of the prosecution and defence and after consideration of evidence on record came to the conclusion that as far as the petitioner is concerned both the charges have been found proved. Insofar as the petitioner is concerned, it was recorded that though the petitioner has no role to play in committing murder of Head Constable Narendra, it was recorded as finding of fact that the petitioner left the Battalion premises/Camp and consumed liquor in the house of Tangru Ram & Gagru Ram. A copy of the enquiry report was sent to the petitioner along with covering memo dated 7.11.1994 giving him an opportunity to submit any documentary evidence in defence or to make statement in his defence. After obtaining the defence of the petitioner pursuant to the aforesaid memo, the disciplinary authority took into consideration the entire case which is reflected from the show-cause notice dated 1.12.1994. A perusal of the said show-cause shows that the Disciplinary Authority considered the evidence of the prosecution witnesses. Taking into consideration that insofar as allegation of committing murder of Head Constable is concerned, the same being subject matter of prosecution of the petitioner and Kartik Ram in a criminal Court on allegation of commission of offence u/s 302/34 of the I.P.C., that allegation was kept out of the purview of the departmental authority. In the opinion of this Court this approach of the Disciplinary Authority can neither be said to be illegal nor contrary to the provision of any law. Disciplinary Authority after taking into consideration the evidence on record, report of the Enquiry Officer came to specific conclusion that the petitioner left the Battalion Camp without permission and consumed liquor thereby exhibiting a grave indiscipline and misconduct.

The petitioner was given another opportunity to show-cause against such conclusion and proposal to impose penalty of dismissal from service. Petitioner submitted his reply on 9.12.1994 (Annexure A-8), vide order dated 10.12.1994, the disciplinary authority in its order recorded that the aspect of committing the murder of Narendra has already been taken out of the purview of departmental enquiry. It has also been categorically recorded that the Disciplinary Authority is considering the allegations of misconduct that the petitioner left the Battalion Camp without permission and consumed liquor. It has also been held that the acquittal of the petitioner from criminal charge of commission of murder of Narendra does not come in the way of holding enquiry on the allegation of misconduct. In the opinion of this Court, applying the aforesaid well settled principles as enumerated by the Supreme Court in catena of decisions drawing distinction between criminal and departmental proceedings, it cannot be said that the Disciplinary Authority committed any illegality or exceeded his authority in holding the charges proved and punishing the petitioner.

A perusal of the order passed by the criminal Court on 30th November, 1994 would show that the charge on which the petitioner was tried was to the effect that the petitioner and Kartik Ram Nag with a common intention caused death of deceased Narendra. The question framed by the trial Court was whether on 21.10.1993, petitioner and Kartik Ram Nag murdered Narendra. Tangru Ram, Gagru Ram & Mangli Bai were examined as prosecution witnesses and they did not support the case of the prosecution and they were declared hostile. The criminal Court recorded finding that Tangru Ram & Gagru Ram did not support the case of the prosecution and therefore there is no eye-witnesses to prove that the petitioner and Kartik Ram Nag committed murder of deceased Narendra.

In the departmental enquiry, in respect of the allegation that the petitioner left the Camp without permission and consumed liquor, reliance was placed upon the statement of K.S. Rathia in the departmental enquiry, who stated that Company Commandant-B.S. Negi lodged report that the petitioner, Kartik Ram Nag and Narendra consumed liquor and had a dispute. Tangru Ram gave statement in the enquiry that petitioner and Kartik Ram came to his house. He also stated that thereafter Narendra, Photku Ram & Kartikram went to the house of Gagru Ram and there also demanded liquor. Gagru Ram also stated that Kartik Ram had come to his house in the night along with the petitioner and consumed liquor in his house. Todi Bai also stated that Kartik Ram had come to the house of Gagru Ram and consumed liquor. Dashri Bai, wife of Gagru Ram also stated that the petitioner along with Kartik Ram & Narendra had come to her house, demanded and consumed liquor. It would thus be clear that the allegation regarding consuming liquor in the house of Tangru Ram & Gagru Ram is supported not from the statements of Tangru Ram but also the statements of Todi Bai & Dashri Bai. All the statements were recorded in the departmental enquiry. Even if the statements of Tagnru Ram & Gagru Ram are ignored, there is evidence on record that Kartik Ram came to the house of Tangru Ram & Gagru Ram along with other persons and consumed liquor.

The aforesaid material evidence on record were considered by the Enquiry Officer as well as by the Disciplinary Authority to hold the charges proved against the petitioner that he left the Battalion Camp and consumed liquor in the house of Tangru Ram & Gagru Ram. It is well settled from the principles of law expounded by the Supreme Court in aforementioned judgments that the standard and degree of proof required in departmental enquiry is distinct and different from that required in a criminal proceedings, which is of much higher degree. Mere acquittal in criminal proceedings would not result in automatic termination of departmental proceedings or mechanical exoneration from allegation of misconduct being settled law, examination of facts and circumstances of the present case and that the allegation for which punishment has been imposed in the departmental enquiry namely leaving the Camp and consuming liquor is proved by testimony of number of prosecution witnesses other than prosecution witnesses, namely Todi Bai & Dashri Bai, it cannot be said that the petitioner was entitled to be exonerated from the allegations in departmental enquiry on the ground that same set of witnesses were examined in criminal as well as departmental proceedings. The aspect of murder having been kept out of the purview of departmental enquiry and there being evidence on record to prove the act of the petitioner which amounted to misconduct, this Court is of the considered opinion that present is not a case where the petitioner is entitled for exoneration from charges in departmental enquiry only on the ground of his acquittal from the criminal charge of murder of Narendra.

The submission that the enquiry report is perverse cannot be accepted. A perusal of inquiry report shows that the Enquiry Officer has drawn its conclusion based on testimony of number of witnesses and not only on the basis of statements of Tangru Ram & Gagru Ram. It is also not correct to say that Disciplinary Authority did not apply its mind to the enquiry report or acted mechanically. A perusal of the order of Disciplinary Authority would show that the Disciplinary Authority not only recorded detailed reasons contained in show-cause notice but also considered in great detail the evidence on record, effect of criminal case in the departmental enquiry and then came to the conclusion after giving reasons for accepting the enquiry report. Though the Disciplinary Authority was not required to give detailed reasons and rewrite examination of all the witnesses, in the present case, Disciplinary Authority has examined the case in minute details and then came to the conclusion with regard to the guilt and a proper opportunity to show-cause against the proposed penalty was given to the petitioner. Thereafter, taking into consideration the act of indiscipline, keeping in view that the petitioner happens to be member of a disciplinary force, imposed the penalty of dismissal from service.

It has been submitted by learned counsel for the petitioner that the impugned order of dismissal is against the letter and spirit of provision contained in Regulation 226 of the Police Regulations. A perusal of the Regulation 226 would show that dismissal has been considered to be an extreme penalty, however, there is no restriction under the said rules that in cases of grave misconduct extreme penalty of dismissal cannot be imposed. The regulation lays down certain guidelines but does not in any manner restrict the discretion of the Disciplinary Authority to impose penalty of dismissal once it has been found that the delinquent employee is guilty of an act of serious and grave indiscipline. It cannot be forgotten that the petitioner belongs to a disciplined force. While leaving the working premises during the hours of duty, may not be a serious matter in other branches, but in a discipline force this itself may amount to serious action, coupled with the fact that the petitioner consumed liquor in the house of other person when he was supposed to be on duty in the Battalion Premises. In the opinion of this Court, it has been considered as an act of grave misconduct. If on that count the Disciplinary Authority proceeded to impose the penalty of dismissal from service, this Court does not find violation of provision contained in Regulation 226 of the Police Regulations. In the ultimate analysis, this Court is of the opinion that there is no illegality in the order of penalty. The Appellate Authority has also dismissed the appeal recording reasons, though in brief. Having considered minutely each and every submission raised by the petitioner in this petition, no ground warranting interference is made out. Petition is liable to be dismissed and is accordingly dismissed. No order as to cost.