High Courts

Piar Kaur vs Prithvi Pal Singh

Punjab And Haryana At Chandigarh · Decided on 16 September 1998 · Citation: (1998) 4 RCR(Criminal) 683 : (1998) 2 RCR(Rent) 524

HON’BLE JUDGES
V.S.Aggarwal, J
CASE NUMBER
C.O.C.P. No. 344 of 1998
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Judgment

23 paragraphs · 1,463 words

V.S. Aggarwal, J.

1.

The short question that comes up for consideration and seeks answer is as to if the respondent can be termed to have committed any contempt of Court.

2.

The relevant facts are that petitioner Piar Kaur is resident of Amritsar. She owns house at Tonga Colony, Green Avenue, Amritsar. Her contention is that respondent was inducted as a licensee. A licence deed was executed. On the expiry of the period of licence, the respondent did not hand over vacant possession of the house to the petitioner. He filed a civil suit for permanent injunction to restrain the petitioner not to interfere in his possession. The petitioner had put in appearance and submitted the written statement. During the pendency of the suit, the respondent agreed to vacate the house on the intervention of certain respectables of the locality. In court, the statements have been recorded. The respondent had made the following statement :

"Statement of Prithvipal Singh son of Mohinder Singh, aged 54 years, resident of 302, Green Avenue.

It is stated that I took the house No. 46C situated in Tanga Colony, Green Avenue, Amritsar, from Smt. Piar Kaur on license @ Rs. 1650/ p.m. I will vacant this house after 7 months from today and continue to pay rent to Piar Kaur during this period. If I do not vacate the house after 7 months, Piar Kaur have full rights to get the house vacated in any other way. The period of 7 months will begin from 31st July, 1997. My suit may be dismissed as withdrawn."

3.

Statement of the petitioner too was recorded and she had on objection in accepting what the respondent had told the Court. Thereupon, the suit as such had been dismissed. The order of the Court reads as under :

"Present : Parties with the respective counsels.

Both the parties gave their statement and they will be bound by their statement. In view of the statement given by the plaintiff, suit is dismissed as withdrawn. File be consigned to record room.

20.12.1996. Sd/ Civil Judge, Amritsar."

4.

After the expiry of seven months period when the respondent did not vacate the property, the petitioner claimed that the respondent had violated the order of the Court and, therefore, invokes sections 10 and 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act.

5.

In the reply filed, respondent has contested the application. It has been pointed out that it was not an undertaking given by the respondent to the Court to vacate and hand over the possession of the property. Plea was raised that even the petitioner has submitted an application in the trial Court under JUDGMENT 39 Rule 2A of the Code of Civil Procedure and the said application has since been dismissed. The respondent did raise a plea that he is a tenant in the property and further the remedy of the petitioner is to file a suit for possession.

6.

On the basis of these facts, it was urged that it was basically a compromise and there was no undertaking given to the Court. Therefore, the proceedings for contempt could not be initiated. The attention of the Court was drawn to certain precedents. Reference can well be made to some of them. The counsel relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Chhaganbhai Norsinbhai v. Soni Chandubhai Gordhanbhai and others, AIR 1976 SC 1909. In the said case following undertaking had been given :

"The defendant gives solemn undertaking to this Hon''ble High Court that he will vacate suit premises by handing over the key of the premises to the Court of the Civil Judge, Junior Division, Anand, in pursuance of the decree within one and a half months after receipt of the notice from the plaintiffs that the plaintiff Dr. I.G. Soni has returned from abroad and intends to start medical practice in the suit premises."

7.

It was held by the Supreme Court that it was not a consent order but an express undertaking given to the Court. Thus, contempt of Court had been committed. A bare reading of the statement that was made in that case clearly reveals that it was an undertaking given to the Court and, therefore, facts of the cited case would not come to the rescue of the petitioner.

8.

A Division Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Surjit Singh Sahni v. Union of Bank of India, 1993(1) Punjab Law Reporter 262 was also concerned with a similar situation. In the cited case, following order on the statement of counsel had been recorded :

"Admitted. Mr. Chadha on behalf of his clients states at the bar that the petitioner shall deposit the insurance premium which falls due in the month of July, 1982. It may, however, be observed that the payment of premium would not effect the merits of the controversy and the petitioners would be entitled to show that they were and are not liable to pay the premium. It is because of this contention of the learned counsel that the petition has been admitted, otherwise, the petitioner having paid the premium, as directed by this Court, this petition would have been dismissed as having become infructuous."

9.

It was held that it was merely a compromise and not an undertaking given to the Court. The conclusion drawn was as under :

"...It must further be proved that the breach of disobedience was wilful or contumacious and the act of the contemner, therefore, signified disrespect to the Court. A reading of the order indicates that no undertaking was given in the Court. Only a statement was made and the same would not take the character of an undertaking. The learned Judge was wholly unjustified while saying that the appellant had committed breach of an undertaking given to the Court."

10.

In other words, it was held that no contempt of Court as such had been committed.

11.

The decision of the Supreme Court in this regard can also be taken note of. In the case of Babu Ram Gupta v. Sudhir Bhasin and another, AIR 1979 Supreme Court 1528, there was a compromise decree passed with the consent of the parties. The Supreme Court held that disobedience of compromise decree or consent order does not amount to contempt of Court. The findings of the Supreme Court are as under :

"......indeed, if we were to hold that noncompliance of a compromise decree or consent order amounts to contempt of court, the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure relating to execution of decrees may not be resorted to at all. In fact, the reason why a breach of clear undertaking given to the court amounts to contempt of court is that the contemner by making a false representation to the Court obtains a benefit for himself and if he fails to honour the undertaking, he plays a serious fraud on the court itself and thereby obstructs and course of justice and brings into disrepute the judicial institution. The same cannot, however, be said of a consent order or a compromise decree where the fraud, if any, is practised by the person concerned not on the court but on one of the parties. Thus, the offence committed by the person concerned is qua the party not qua the court, and, therefore, the very foundation for proceeding for contempt of court is completely absent in such cases. In these circumstances, we are satisfied that unless there is an express undertaking given in writing before the court by the contemner or incorporated by the court in its order, there can be no question of wilful disobedience of such an undertaking. In the instant case, we have already held that there is neither any written undertaking filed by the appellant nor was any such undertaking impliedly or expressly incorporated in the order impugned. Thus, there being no undertaking at all the question of breach of such an undertaking does not arise."

12.

The said decision of the Supreme Court was followed by a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Anant Ram v. Murari Lal, 1989(1) RCR(Rent) 661 : 1989 Haryana Rent Reporter 471 : 1989(1) RCR 446 (P&H).

13.

The question herein is no different. A consent order was passed and statement was made by the respondent. In fact, it was specifically mentioned that if the respondent did not vacate the property within seven months, the petitioner can get the house vacated in any other way. There was no undertaking given to the Court. Keeping in view the same, it cannot be termed that it is violation of any undertaking given to the Court or direction given thereto. The petition is without merit and consequently, the rule is discharged.