Piara Singh vs State of Punjab

V.K. Bali, J. (Oral)

Appellants herein, namely, Piara Singh and Gulzar Singh, have filed this appeal against the order of conviction and sentence recorded against them by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Amritsar, dated January 30, 1987, vide which Piara singh was sentenced to undergo RI for four years and to pay a fine of Rs. 1000/ in default whereof, to further undergo RI for three months, under Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code. He was also held guilty under Section 324 read with Section 34 IPC and sentenced to undergo RI for a period of one year and to pay a fine of Rs. 500/, in default whereof, to further undergo RI for a period of two months. Gulzar Singh appellant was held guilty under Section 307 read with Section 34 IPC and sentenced to undergo RI for a period of four years and to pay a fine of Rs. 1000/ in default whereof to further undergo RI for three months. He was further held guilty under Section 324 IPC and sentenced to undergo RI for a period of one year and to pay a fine of Rs. 500/, in default whereof, to further undergo RI for two months. The sentences recorded against the appellants herein were, however, ordered to run concurrently. The prosecution story, in brief, needs necessary mention before the contentions raised by Mr. Jindal, learned counsel for the appellants, are considered by this Court.

On June 4, 1986 a marriage party had left for Valtoha in the morning from village Kalas. In the marriage party, Kashmir Singh complainant alongwith Mukhtiar Singh and Jota Singh also went to village Valtoha. Appellants Piara Singh and Gulzar Singh were also members of the marriage party. When the marriage party was at village Valtoha, there was an exchange of hot words between Mukhtiar Singh injured and the appellants, over playing of gramophone records. The matter was, however, pacified due to intervention of various persons present in the Barat. The marriage party reached back village Kalas on the same day at about 6/7 PM. After reaching the village, members of the marriage party started going towards their houses. Complainant Kashmir Singh and Mukhtiar Singh and Jota Singh also started for their houses. When Mukhtiar Singh was going ahead of Jota Singh and Kashmir Singh was at a distance of about ten yards and they were at a distance of two killas from the Haveli of Darshan Singh, Piara Singh appellant herein raised a lalkara exhorting Gulzar Singh to catch hold of Mukhtiar Singh and teach him a lesson for preventing the playing of records. Thereafter, Piara Singh appellant, who was holding a knife in his right hand, gave a knife blow to Mukhtiar Singh from its back side. Gulzar Singh accused also gave a blow to Mukhtiar Singh with the knife which hit him on his back below the shoulder. On alarm being raised by Mukhtiar Singh, Kashmir Singh and Jota Singh rushed and saved Mukhtiar Singh from the assailants. The appellants then ran away from the spot with their respective weapons.

In view of the fact that the injured as also PW2 Kashmir Singh have deposed in tune with the prosecution version and there is nothing in their cross examination that might detract from the prosecution version, Mr. Jindal, learned counsel for the appellants, realising that it was not a case for acquittal on any ground whatsoever, confined his arguments only on the nature of offence. His solitary contention, therefore, is that even if the prosecution version is believed in toto, from the medical evidence and other attending circumstances, no case under Section 307 IPC shall be made out against the appellants. The other connected contention of the learned counsel is that applicability of Section 34 IPC is totally ruled out from the facts as given by the prosecution. Mr. Masih, learned Assistant Advocate General, Punjab, has however joined issues to the contentions of Mr. Jindal, noted above.

I have heard learned counsel for the parties and, with their assistance gone through the records of the case. There appears to be considerable merit in the contentions raised by learned defeence counsel. PW8 Dr. J.K. Sachdeva, after describing two injuries noticed by him on the person of Mukhtiar Singh clearly stated in his examinationinchief itself that injury No. 2, which admittedly was the only injury which was serious in nature could be dangerous to life and could cause death of the injured in the ordinary course of nature if treatment was not given to him. Injury No. 2 has been attributed to Piara Singh and the other injury which is simple in nature, has been attributed to Gulzar Singh appellant. In Tej Ram v. State of Punjab, 1978 CLR P&H 76 it was held that, "the injury in question had ruptured the lung of the victim and was described by the examining doctor as "dangerous to life and if not treated, i.e., to say that but for timely and medical aid the injured was likely to die. This is certainly not the type of the injury as would attract the provisions of Section 307 of the Code which envisages an injury sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. The injury described by the doctor was a lesser injury which would fall within clause Eighthly of Section 300 of the Indian Penal Code and be punishable under Section 326 thereof." The same very view has been taken by this court in two other decisions in Gurjant Singh v. State of Punjab, 1983(1) RCR 319 and Narmail Singh v. Nihal Singh, 1979 PLR 151. Following the dictum of law laid down in the decisions, referred to above, I hold that none of the appellants can be convicted under Section 307 IPC.

Coming now to the applicability of Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, it may be recalled that there was a minor scuffle between the appellants on the one side and Mukhtiar Singh on the other on playing of records in a marriage party. But for that, there was no illwill or grudge entertained by the appellants and it is only after the marriage party had come back to the village and in fact all those who had accompanied the Barat, were going to their houses, that the appellants herein inflicted knife blows to Mukhtiar Singh. It is true that common intention can develop at the spur of moment but from the facts and circumstances of this case, it cannot be definitely said that both of them shared common intention to cause death of Mukhtiar Singh. They shall, therefore, be liable for their individual acts.

In view of the discussions made above, this appeal is partly allowed. JUDGMENT of conviction and sentence recorded against the appellants under Section 307 and 307/34 IPC is set aside. Appellant Piara Singh is held guilty of having committed an offence punishable under Section 326 IPC and is sentenced to undergo RI for a period of two years as also to pay a fine of Rs. 1000/ and in default thereof to further undergo RI for a period of three months. AppellantGulzar Singh is also held guilty under Section 324 IPC and sentenced to undergo RI for six months and to pay a fine of Rs. 1000/ and in default thereof, to undergo RI for one month. However if the amount of fine is recovered from the appellant(s), the same shall be paid to injured Mukhtiar Singh.