P.K. Periasamy vs The Secretary

S. Nagamuthu, J.—The petitioner was formerly working as Joint Director of Handlooms and Textiles. He was to retire on attaining the age of superannuation on 30.04.1998. While he was in service, the first respondent issued a charge memorandum to him in Letter No. 6371/E2/94-16 dated 24.06.1997 under Rule 17(b) of the Tamil Nadu Civil Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, levelling as many as five charges. The petitioner denied all the charges by promptly submitting an explanation. But before his due date of retirement, enquiry could not be completed. Therefore, his service beyond 30.04.1998 was extended and he was placed under suspension with effect from 30.04.1998. The petitioner participated in the enquiry. The Enquiry Officer ultimately held that Charge No. 3 was not proved, however all the other charges were proved. Based on the above findings of the Enquiry Officer, the first respondent issued G.O. (Ms) No. 151, Handlooms, Handicrafts, Textiles and Khadi (E2) Department, dated 12.12.2011, imposing punishment of dismissal from service. Challenging the same, the petitioner is before this Court with this writ petition.

I have heard the learned counsel appearing on either side and perused the records carefully.

According to the petitioner, out of the five charges, Charge No. 1 relates to the alleged failure of the petitioner to deduct the income tax from the contractors and also the failure to supervise the works of Thiru. R. Venkatapathy, Assistant Executive Engineer, Public Works Department. The learned counsel for the petitioner would point out that precisely in respect of the very same allegation, on an earlier occasion, a charge memorandum was issued by the Government in Letter No. 17376/E2/92-3 dated 01.02.1993. The learned counsel for the petitioner would point out that the petitioner denied the charges and therefore, enquiry was ordered into the same, and the Enquiry Officer ultimately held that the alleged charges were not proved. The Enquiry Officer''s report is dated 04.04.1997. Thereafter, all further proceedings relating to the said allegations were dropped. Referring to the same, the learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that after 04.04.1997, in the present charge memorandum, the first respondent has again framed the first charge. The learned counsel for the petitioner would take me through the Charge No. 3 in the earlier charge memorandum dated 01.02.1993 and the Charge No. 1 of the present charge memorandum. A cursory reading of the same would go to show that both the charges relate to the very same allegation. When the earlier Enquiry Officer had held that the said allegations were not proved and that the said report had been accepted by the Government, as rightly contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner, the present first charge is not at all maintainable in law.

Charge No. 2 relates to the loss to the tune of Rs. 3,44,945.55 caused by the petitioner by purchasing chemicals and dyes between the period 10.10.1988 and 20.06.1991 from one Vanavil Dye Chem Agencies and others, without purchasing the same from the manufacturers. The crux of the charge is that the petitioner had purchased the dyes and other chemicals from the local dealers and thus these materials had not been purchased on the market value, as fixed by the manufacturers. The petitioner has denied this allegation. According to him, he purchased the dyes only by following the instructions of the Government, from the local dealers of the manufacturers. Therefore, according to him, it is not illegal. In my considered opinion, the petitioner''s contention cannot be accepted. The Enquiry Officer, having considered the instructions given by the Department and the prevailing cost of these materials during the relevant time, has held that this charge has been proved. It has been accepted by the Government also. This Court, while exercising its writ jurisdiction, cannot convert itself into a Court of appeal so as to substitute its findings in the place of findings of the Enquiry Officer by re-appreciating the entire evidence. That course is not at all possible in the Writ Court. Unless it is shown prima facie that the findings of the Enquiry Officer which came to be accepted by the Government is perverse in as much as it is based on no evidence, it is not possible for this Court to examine the correctness of the findings of the Enquiry Officer. Here in this case, applying such stand if we look into the findings of the Enquiry Officer and the impugned Government Order, it would go to show that they have come to the conclusion that the petitioner had violated the guidelines of the Department, to purchase dyes and other chemicals from the manufacturers. Admittedly, he has purchased it not from the manufacturers, but from the local dealers. Thus, I have no reason to interfere with the findings of the Enquiry Officer which was accepted by the Government holding that the petitioner is guilty of this charge.

So far as Charge No. 3 is concerned, as I have already pointed out, the Enquiry Officer has held that the said charge had not been proved and that has been accepted by the Government also. Therefore, I am not dealing with the same.

Charge Nos. 4 and 5 relate to medical reimbursement bills. The allegation is that the petitioner had claimed more money than what he was eligible for. It is too technical. If a claim is made, it is for the authorities to verify as to whether the claim is permissible or not. Assuming that these two charges are proved, this cannot be a ground to dismiss the petitioner from service along with Charge No. 2.

Now turning to the quantum of punishment imposed on the petitioner, the learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that assuming that these two charges have been proved and the alleged Charge No. 2 has also been proved, even then punishment of dismissal is shockingly disproportionate. The learned counsel for the petitioner would therefore submit that punishment can be modified and reduced. But the learned Government Advocate would stoutly oppose this contention. According to him, even if loss is caused to the Government Exchequer to a minimum level, still the matter needs to be viewed very seriously. Therefore, according to the learned Government Advocate, punishment of dismissal from service is proportionate which does not require any interference at the hands of this Court.

I have considered the submissions in respect of the quantum of punishment. As already I have stated, Charge No. 2 has been proved and Charge Nos. 4 and 5 though proved, were not serious. For these charges, whether dismissal from service is proportionate or not is the question. Proportionality in the matter of punishment is guaranteed under Article 14 of the Constitution of India. If the quantum of punishment is found to be shockingly disproportionate, it would be the duty of this Court to correct the same. In this case, it is not as though the petitioner had misappropriated the money or property pertaining to the Department. The charges are too technical and it cannot be stated to be grave also. Having regard to the nature of the charges and the gravity of the charges, and having regard to the fact that the petitioner had been put in long number of years of service with no blemish records, and that the disciplinary proceedings itself was dragged on for 13 years which itself would have caused lot of mental agonies to the petitioner, and going by the age of the petitioner as of now, I hold that the dismissal from service as a measure of punishment is really shocking and therefore the same needs interference. Going by all these facts and circumstances, I am of the view that converting punishment into one of compulsory retirement would meet the ends of justice.

In the result, the writ petition is disposed of in the following terms:

1) The impugned order imposing punishment of dismissal is set aside and instead, there shall be a punishment of compulsory retirement with effect from 30.04.1998;

2) It is further directed that the petitioner shall be entitled for all the terminal benefits including pension, which shall be settled by the first respondent, within a period of four months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.

However, there shall be no order as to costs.