P.K. Ray vs State Of Chhattisgarh

The instant petition has been preferred against the order dated 21.3.2016 (Annexure P1) passed by Respondent 2/Registrar, Trade Union, whereby he has allowed the amendment in the bylaws of the Trade Union.

According to the pleadings of the Petitioners, the South Eastern Koyala Majdur Congress (INTUC) is a registered Trade Union and Petitioner 1 is the General Secretary of the Union. The Union is affiliated with the Indian National Trade Union Council (INTUC). As per the bylaws of the Union, election of the office bearers had taken place on 11.6.2014 for a period of 3 years. Petitioner 1 was elected as General Secretary of the Union and Respondent 3 was elected as President of the Union. After the said election, due to some dispute, Respondent 3, with mala fide intention and contrary to the bylaws, vide resolution dated 2.5.2015 and 20.5.2015, expelled Petitioner 1 from the post of General Secretary. Against the said dispute, Petitioner 1 filed an appeal before the Industrial Court. Vide its order dated 19.1.2016 (Annexure P2), the Industrial Court granted relief to Petitioner 1. Thereafter, on 4.2.2016, a General Council Meeting took place in presence of the officials of the Central and State INTUC observers in which a decision was taken to expel Respondent 3 from the post of President of the Union. It was also decided to expel Respondent 4 from the post of Working President of the Union. Petitioner 2 was appointed in place of Respondent 3 as President. As per the decision taken in the General Council, Respondents 3 and 4 were expelled from the primary membership of the Union and also from their respective posts by letter dated 5.2.2016, which was duly received by Respondents 3 and 4. The expelling notices were also got published in the newspaper on 6.2.2016 and 7.2.2016. Thus, Respondents 3 and 4 were already aware that they have been expelled from their respective posts. Despite that, without any authority, on 8.2.2016, a meeting of General Council was convened by them and they suo motu passed the resolution amending the bylaws of the Union in arbitrary manner. As, on 8.2.2016, they had already been expelled from their respective posts and membership of the Union, therefore, they had no authority to amend the bylaws which were earlier approved by the Registrar, Trade Union as well as by INTUC. Minutes of the General Council Meeting dated 4.2.2016 along with Form E showing the name of Petitioner 1 P.K. Ray as General Secretary and Petitioner 2 Dr. Sanjeeva Reddy as President of the Union were sent to the Registrar of Trade Union. Amended bylaws were also sent by Respondent 3 to the Registrar Trade Union. Vide the impugned order dated 21.3.2016 (Annexure P1) the Registrar Trade Union has not registered the Form E submitted by the Petitioners and allowed the amendment in bylaws as submitted by Respondent 3. An appeal has been filed by the Petitioners before the Industrial Court against the non-registration of Form E by the Registrar Trade Union under Section 28J of the Trade Unions Act, 1926 (henceforth ‘the Act of 1926’). One part of the impugned order which relates to rejection of Form E submitted by the Petitioners has been challenged before the Industrial Court under Section 28J of the Act of 1926 and second part of the order which relates to allowing the amendment of bylaws has been challenged by the Petitioners before this Court by the instant writ petition.

In their return, Respondents 3 and 4 have stated that neither the Registrar of the Trade Union nor has the Industrial Court recognised the legality and validity of the meeting of the General Council said to be held on 4.2.2016. The Registrar of Trade Union has specifically held in his order dated 21.3.2016 that the meeting of the General Body dated 4.2.2016 and the decision taken in that meeting are contrary to the bylaws of the Trade Union and, therefore, the decision dated 4.2.2016 has been rejected. Respondent 3 as President of the said Trade Union convened a meeting of the General Council of the Trade Union on 8.2.2016 in which the Petitioners were also invited, but, they did not attend the meeting. In the meeting, the decision has been taken to amend the bylaws. This fact has also been recognised by the Registrar and the order of Registrar has attained finality and it is not challenged anywhere. Vide the impugned order dated 21.3.2016 (Annexure P1) the Registrar has passed a well reasoned and speaking order and allowed the amendment in the bylaws which was accepted by the General Body of the Trade Union on 8.2.2016. Therefore, the Petitioners are not entitled for any relief.

Respondents 1 and 2, initially, in their reply dated 13.7.2018, particularly, in paragraphs 8 and 9 of the reply, supported the case of the Petitioners and pleaded that due to bona fide mistake the Registrar has considered the application for amendment in the bylaws, but, has not considered Form E submitted by the Petitioners. Later on, vide additional return dated 8.3.2022, Respondents 1 and 2 withdrew their earlier pleadings made in paragraphs 8 and 9 of the return dated 13.7.2018 and supported the impugned order passed by the Registrar Trade Union.

Learned Counsel appearing for the Petitioners submitted that Respondents 3 and 4 knew the fact that they were already expelled from their respective posts of the Union, but, despite that, they convened a meeting of the General Council on 8.2.2016 and passed resolution amending the bylaws of the Union. As they had no authority to convene the meeting and pass such resolution regarding amendment of the bylaws, the Registrar Trade Union wrongly allowed the amendment of bylaws. The action of the Registrar Trade Union is totally ab initio illegal and is not liable to be sustainable in law. The proposed amendment sought by Respondents 3 and 4 are totally against the provision of constitution of the Trade Union. It was further submitted that Respondents 3 and 4 have not challenged the decision taken by the General Council meeting on 4.2.2016, whereby they have been expelled from their respective posts on 5.2.2016. Therefore, the decision taken in the General Council meeting dated 4.2.2016 has attained finality. The Registrar Trade Union deliberately and willfully allowed the said amendment.

Learned Counsel appearing for the State/Respondents 1 and 2 supported the impugned order dated 21.3.2016 (Annexure P1) passed by Respondent 2/Registrar Trade Union.

Learned Senior Counsel appearing for Respondents 3 and 4 opposed the arguments advanced by Learned Counsel for the Petitioners. It was submitted by the Learned Senior Counsel that as vide the impugned order dated 21.3.2016 (Annexure P1) the Registrar Trade Union has already held that the proceedings convened on 4.2.2016 were found against the bylaws, therefore, the proposed amended Form E and proposed amendment in the bylaws were not accepted. Therefore, all the proceedings convened in the meeting dated 8.2.2016 were according to the bylaws and Respondents 3 and 4 had full authority to convene the said meeting and the Registrar has rightly allowed the amended bylaws as submitted by Respondents 3 and 4 pursuant to the resolution dated 8.2.2016.

I have heard the arguments raised on behalf of the parties and perused the petition, replies, additional replies and the documents annexed thereto with utmost circumspection.

Undisputedly, initially, an election was held on 11.6.2014, whereby Respondent 3 Gopal Narayan Singh was elected as President of the Union and Petitioner 1 P.K. Ray was elected as General Secretary of the Union. Due to some dispute, Petitioner 1 has been expelled from the post of General Secretary of the Union. In appeal, vide its order dated 19.1.2016 (Annexure P2), the Industrial Court has allowed the appeal and reinstated Petitioner 1 to his post as General Secretary.

According to the Petitioners, in the General Council meeting dated 4.2.2016, in presence of the officials of the Central and State INTUC observers, Respondents 3 and 4 were expelled from their respective posts of President and Working President of the Union. Therefore, as contended by Learned Counsel for the Petitioners, Respondents 3 and 4 had no authority to convene the meeting on 8.2.2016 and amend the bylaws. Thus, the order passed by the Registrar Trade Union accepting the amended bylaws is not sustainable.

Contrary to this, it was the contention of Learned Senior Counsel for Respondents 3 and 4 that the Registrar, vide the impugned order dated 21.3.2016 (Annexure P1), has especially held that the meeting of the General Body dated 4.2.2016 and the decision taken in that meeting are contrary to the bylaws and, therefore, they have been rejected. The finding of the Registrar in this regard has not been challenged by the Petitioners. Therefore, the meeting convened by Respondents 3 and 4 on 8.2.2016 is in accordance with the bylaws as they were the President and Working President, respectively. Thus, the amendment in the bylaws proposed by them is rightly accepted by the Registrar.

From the above rival contentions put forth and from perusal of the impugned order dated 21.3.2016 (Annexure P1), it reveals that before the Registrar Trade Union, the Petitioners have submitted a new amended Form E pursuant to the General Council Meeting dated 4.2.2016 and amended bylaws and before the Registrar Respondents 3 and 4 have also submitted their amended bylaws claiming themselves to be President and Working President of the Trade Union. Thus, it is clear that before the Registrar, a dispute arose that who were the lawful office bearers of the Trade Union. At this juncture, it would be appropriate to reproduce the provisions of Section 28J of the Trade Unions Act, 1926, which run as under:

“28J. Dispute as to officer of registered Trade Union.—

(1) If there is any dispute as to who is the lawful officer of a registered Trade Union, any person claiming to be such an officer or the Registrar may refer the dispute to the Industrial Court in such manner and on payment of such fee not exceeding ten rupees as may be prescribed:

Provided that no fee shall be payable by the Registrar.

(2) On a reference being made under sub-section (1), the Industrial Court shall, after hearing the parties to such dispute and recording such evidence as it may consider necessary, decide the dispute and declare who is the lawful officer. The decision of the Industrial Court shall be final and shall not be called in question in any court of law.

(2a) The costs of and incidental to the provisions of this section shall be in the discretion of the Industrial Court and the Industrial Court shall have full power to determine by whom the whole or any part of such costs shall be paid.

(2b) If any proceeding under this section the Industrial Court is, after hearing the person making the reference, satisfied that the ground on which the claim has been preferred is false or vexatious, the Court may after recording its reasons for holding such claim to be false or vexatious, make an order for the payment of costs by way of compensation which shall not be less than fifty rupees and not exceeding two hundred rupees to such person or persons, as it may specify in the order.

(3) No Civil Court shall entertain any suit or other proceedings in respect of any dispute which has been referred to the Industrial Court under sub-section (1) and is pending before such Court and if any such suit or proceeding is pending in a Civil Court on the date of the reference the Civil Court shall, on receipt of a notice from the Industrial Court, cease to exercise jurisdiction in respect thereof and shall forthwith transfer the record of such suit or proceeding to the Industrial Court.”

In Mohanlal S/o Nandramji v. Registrar of Trade Unions, (1983) LIC 1883, a Division Bench of Madhya Pradesh High Court, Indore Bench observed as under:

“6. In the circumstances if the respondent No.2 approached the respondent No.1 that the petitioner ceased to be the General Secretary of the Union and the respondent No.3 was elected in his place and this fact was disputed by the petitioner the Registrar had no authority to decide the dispute and accept the application of the respondent No.2. The Registrar either should have referred the dispute to the Industrial Court himself or should have directed the respondent No.2 to do so. In the circumstances the impugned order No.32/2/Chaturth/1983/4887-88 D./- 2-2-1983 (Ann. P.5) passed by the respondent No.1 registering the name of the respondent No.3 as the General Secretary of the Union cannot be sustained in law and must be quashed. We however make it clear that the term of the office of the petitioner having already expired, nothing in this order shall be construed so as to extend the term of his office as General Secretary of the Union.”

In R.K. Kathal v. Registrar, Trade Union, 2008 (3) MPLJ 30, a Division Bench of Madhya Pradesh High Court observed as follows:

“20. On a bare reading of the said provision it is clear as noon day, if there is any dispute as to the lawful officer of the registered Trade Union any person claiming to be such officer or the Registrar may refer the dispute to the Industrial Court in such a manner as may be prescribed. On a reference being made, the Industrial Court shall, after hearing the parties to such dispute and recording such evidence as it may consider necessary, decide the dispute and declare who is the lawful officer. The decision of the Industrial Court shall be final and shall not be called in question in any Court of law. Civil suit is barred in respect of any dispute which has been referred to the Industrial Court under sub-section (1) of section 28-J. In the case at hand, the dispute is writ large with regard to the office bearers. The same, in our considered opinion, is within the ambit and sweep of section 28-J of the Act. None of the provisions of the Act empowers the Registrar, Trade Unions to deal with an election dispute. The power conferred on him pertains to registration of Trade Unions, issue of certificate and cancellation of such a certificate. The moment a cavil is raised or controversy is put forth with regard to the status of office-bearers the Registrar may refer the dispute or the office-bearers can raise a dispute before the Industrial Court, whose decision is final. Power of the Civil Court has been ousted. Needless to state, the same would be subject to judicial review of this Court.”

A Single Bench of Calcutta High Court in O.N.G.C. Workmen’s Association v. State of West Bengal, (1988) 1 CalLT 178 observed thus:

“10. In my opinion, by construing the provisions of Sections 8 and 28 of the Trade Unions Act and looking to the reported decision cited from the bar supporting the cases of the respective parties, it is beyond any doubt that the Registrar of Trade Unions has no quasi-judicial authority to hold any inquiry by allowing parties to examine witnesses, and to allow the party to cross-examine such witnesses and to decide the dispute as to who are the real office bearers.”

In the instant case, as the amended Form E has been submitted by the Petitioners before the Registrar Trade Union claiming themselves as the office bearers of the Union and the amended bylaws have also been submitted by Respondents 3 and 4 claiming themselves to be legal office bearers of the Trade Union, a dispute was present before the Registrar that who are the lawful office bearers of the Trade Union. Therefore, the Registrar ought to have referred the dispute to the Industrial Court as contained in Section 28J of the Act of 1926 and it would be decided by the Industrial Court in the manner as prescribed under Section 28J(2)(2a)(2b) of the Act of 1926. Despite that, the Registrar Trade Union declined Form E submitted by the Petitioners holding Respondents 3 and 4 as lawful office bearers and accepted the proposed amendment of the bylaws, which, in considered view of this Court, is not sustainable for the reasons discussed above.

Consequently, the impugned order dated 21.3.2016 (Annexure P1) passed by Respondent 2/Registrar with regard to acceptance of the amended bylaws pursuant to the resolution dated 8.2.2016 is set aside and the instant writ petition is allowed.