P.K. Surawadhaniwar and Others vs Union of India and Others

S.R. Nayak, C.J.

Although, the pleadings of the petitioners are as vague as it could be, what we gather after hearing Shri Tamaskar, learned counsel for the petitioners is the following:

(i) the Food Corporation of India (FCI) has issued a Circular No. 22/ 1992 dated 23/30.12.92, marked as Annexure P/4, produced at page No. 30 of the material paper book. In this circular, a classification is made for extending the selection grade scale. Only top most 30% of the employees in a cadre, who have put in 12 years or more of service in such cadre, have been chosen for extending the selection grade scale and remaining 70% of the employees in such cadre are left out for the benefit of the selection grade scale. According to Mr. Tamaskar, this provision in the circular tantamounts to an invidious discrimination and is violative of Article 14 postulates. In other words, according to Shri Tamaskar, all the employees in a cadre, who have completed 12 years of qualifying service should have been given the benefit of selection grade scale irrespective of length of service put in by individual employees in such cadre and/ or relative seniority of employees in such cadre.

(ii) The next contention of Shri Tamaskar is that, as stated in pare 5.3 of the writ petition, Shri P.N. pandey and six others, whose details are set out in sub-paragraphs, thereof, are juniors to the petitioners, but, the respondents have given the benefit of selection grade to them, but, similar treatment is not meted out to the petitioners thereby violating equality clause of Article 14 of the Constitution.

These were the only two contentious urged before us by Shri Tamaskar, and no other point was urged before us for decision.

Before we proceed further it is appropriate to note down the reliefs sought in this writ petition. The following reliefs are sought by the petitioners:

7.1 declare that restricting the selection grade/Time Scale grade, only to 30% of the employees in the cadre, with same period and qualification in Annex. P4. to be ultravires of the Constitution.

2 direct the respondents to extend the benefit of Time-Scale/ Selection Post, to all those employees, in the cadre and pay-scale, who have completed Twelve-years and above, as per circular Annex. P4, by issuing a writ of Mandamus.

3 to issue a writ in the nature of Mandamus directing the respondents to create and publish promotional posts of Assistant Managers (P & P) Cadre and such other promotional posts as are available under the other cadres.

4 Circular No. 8 of 92 dt. 23/3/92 may also be struck down in the light of S.C. decision/observation.

5 to issue a writ in the nature of Mandamus directing the respondents to order/release, promotions to the posts of Assistant Managers (P & P), from the employees working in P&P Cadre after setting aside the circular No. 8 of 1992 dated 23/3/92, so far as it relates to procedure for promotions.

6 to issue yet another writ of Mandamus, directing the respondents to grant promotional benefits within the seniority of P&P Cadre as per the guide lines of circular dated 19/6/1992.

The impugned circular dated 28/30.12.92 (Annexure P/4) reads as under:

We are of the considered opinion that no ground is made out to quash the impugned circular dated 28/30.12.1992. It is true that the selection grade scale in terms of the impugned circular is granted only to senior most 30% of employees in a cadre who have all completed 12 years of qualifying service. In other words, the F.C.I has made a classification of employees in a cadre into two groups, the first group consisting of 30% of the senior most employees and the other group consisting 70% of the left out junior employees in such cadre. The question for consideration is whether this classification made by the F.C.I. which is a "State" within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India could be condemned as invalid on any permissible ground. It is true that since the guarantee of equal protection embraces the entire realm of ''State action'', it would extend not only when an individual is discriminated against in the matter of exercise of his rights or in the matter of imposing liabilities upon him but also in the matter of granting privileges, benefits etc. However, it is equally well-settled that the principle of equality does not mean that every law must have universal application for all persons who are not by nature, attainment or circumstances in the same position, as the varying needs of different classes of persons often require separate treatment. What Article 14 prohibits is class legislation and not reasonable classification for the purpose of legislation. It is well settled that the executive government is not under an obligation to extend benefits, pecuniary or otherwise, to all persons falling within a very broad group; within such broad group also, it is permissible for the State to make a reasonable classification of the members constituting of such group. If the State takes care to reasonably classify persons for legislative purposes and if it deals equally with all persons belonging to a "well-defined class", it is not open to the charge of denial of equal protection on the ground that the law does not apply to other persons. What is necessary is that there must be a nexus between the basis of classification and the object of the law under consideration. Article 14 does not insist or command that classification should be ''scientifically perfect or logically complete''. It is very important to note that when a law is challenged as denying equal protection, the question for decision is not whether it has resulted in inequality, but whether there is some difference between covered and left-out groups which bears a just and reasonable relation to the object of legislation. Mere differentiation or inequality of treatment or inequality of burden does not per se amount to discrimination within the inhibition of the equal protection clause of Article 14. To attract the operation of the clause it is necessary to show that the selection or differentiation is unreasonable or arbitrary; that it cannot be sustained on any rational basis. Only if left out 70% of employees and covered 30% of employees in a cadre could be regarded as persons belonging to a "well defined class", than only it would attract the wrath of Article 14 and not otherwise. It cannot be said that the classification made by the State is not based on an intelligible differential. The F.C.I., it appears to our mind, taking into account financial burden and other relevant considerations has chosen to extend the benefit of the circular (Annexure P/ 4) only to 30% of senior most employees in a cadre and not to all employees in such cadre who have put in qualifying service of 12 years. In that view of the matter, we do not find any substance in the first contention of Shri Tamaskar, learned counsel for the petitioner. Therefore, we uphold the constitutionality of the impugned circular (Annexure P/4) dated 28/ 30.12.1992.

This takes us to the second contention of the Shri Tamaskar. At the outset, it needs to be noticed that the service particulars given by the petitioners in para 5.3 with regard to Shri P.N. Pandey and six others are as vague as they could be, and from these facts we have no reason to hold that the petitioners are seniors in the same cadre to which Shri P.N. Pandey and six others belong. Furthermore, it need to be noticed that the particulars given in para 5.2, if we may say so, are misleading. It was submitted at the Bar by learned standing counsel appearing for the F.C.I. that the petitioners after making entry into the service of the Corporation in the year 1971,1972 and 1973, earned two promotions. It was said that the petitioners were initially appointed as Assistant Grade -III ministerial cadre being science graduates and thereafter they were promoted to the higher post of Assistant Grade-II and Assistant Grade-I.

In para 6.2 of the return filed by the respondents No. 2 to 4 it is mentioned that the petitioner were appointed in the services of the Food Corporation of India, not in the services of the Government of India; hence their contention made in para 5.2 regarding entry in Government of India service is incorrect. It is further mentioned that the contents of para 5.3 of the petition are also totally false. It is specifically stated that the persons named in that paragraph are not juniors to the petitioners. It is also stated that the petitioners and the persons named in that paragraph are belonging to the different cadres. These facts are not disputed by Shri Tamaskar before us. It is also not clear from the pleadings of the petitioners when the selection grade was granted to Shri P.N.Pandey and others. If it is granted, it should have been granted under certain office orders. Such orders are not challenged before us.

Be that as it may, there is no necessity for us to dilate on it. The claim of the petitioners to selection grade payscale is entirely based on the impugned circular. The crux of the matter is whether the petitioners who do not come under the zone of 30% of the senior most employees in the cadre concerned are entitled to claim, as a matter of right, that they should also be granted the benefit of the selection grade pay-scale on par with 30% of senior most employees in their cadre simply because they have also put in 12 years of service in the said cadre irrespective of the length of service they have put in. This question does not detain the Court for long.

We have already stated above that the classification made by the F.C.I., is a reasonable classification. It can be sustained on the touchstone of the Article 14 of the Constitution. It cannot be said that the 30% of the employees are chosen for the treatment and the left out 70% of the employees in the cadre concerned should be regarded as persons belong to a "well defined class" for the purpose of Article 14 of the Constitution. Secondly, even assuming that some employees, similarly circumstanced with the petitioners have been granted selection grade erroneously and illegally by the administration of the F.C.I., that circumstance itself without anything further would not be a justification for the Court to grant relief to the petitioner also. It is well settled that under no circumstance, a writ of mandamus can be issued to Government or a public authority to do anything in breach of public law obligation. The F.C.I., is bound by its policy decision contained in the impugned circular. Since we have upheld the validity of the impugned circular, issuing writ of mandamus would not arise.

In the result and for the foregoing reasons, this petition is dismissed. No costs.