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37 paragraphs · 817 wordsWallis, C.J.—In the first of these cases--Appeal No. 192 of 1915, the Sub-ordinate Judge has dismissed a suit brought by the principals
against an agent and his son to recover a specified sum of money particulars of which are set out at length in the plaint, and those particulars show
that what they are really seeking to do is to make the first defendant account for the moneys which they entrusted to the first defendant.
The main ground of complaint taken by the plaintiffs in their plaint is that the first defendant lent moneys of the principals to persons to whom he
was not authorised to lend them, and Mr. Krishnasami Ayyar for the appellants has taken the point that this case is governed by Article 90 of the
Limitation Act, which provides for
other suits by principals against agents for neglect or misconduct,
and not by Article 89 which deals with suits
by a principal against his agent for moveable property received by the latter and not accounted for.
Now the use of the word ''other'' in Article 90 shows that that Article does not include suits which properly come within Article 89, and we
think that this is really a suit for a mere money account which comes within Article 89.
Mr. Krishnasami Ayyar has relied upon Great Western Insurance Co. of New York, v. Cunliffe (1874) 9 Ch. Ap. 525. In that case it was
sought, in taking an account by a principal against his agent, to hold the agent responsible for the loss which had occurred to the principal by the
agent''s failure to insure certain goods, that is to say, for failing to carry out the instructions of the principal by spending moneys of the principal in a
particular manner, and Lord Justice James held that that did not come within an ordinary money account. In an ordinary money account the
accounting party is asked to account for the moneys which have come to his hands and to pay over the balance, and where the account is on the
footing of wilful default, he may be held liable, not only for the moneys which have come to his hands, but also for moneys which ought to have
come to his hands; and if he is shown, in taking such an account, to have applied moneys in a way in which he was not authorised to apply them,
the result is that he is not allowed credit for that sum in taking account. That is the ordinary practice in taking accounts and it seems to us that there
is no reason for holding that the matters pleaded in this case should not come into an ordinary money a acount. As I have said, Great Western
Insurance Co. of New York v. Cunliffe (1874) 9 Ch. Ap. 525 itself and also the illustration put there of an attempt to make a solicitor liable for his
negligence in the conduct of an action when taking an account in respect of his client''s moneys--those are cases of a different nature from the
present.
Therefore, in our opinion, in this case, Article 89 was rightly applied.
Then the question arises as to whether this case was properly disposed of with regard to that Article; Now the Judge has simply held the suit to
be barred on the authority of a decision of my learned brother and myself in Venkatachalam Chetty v. Narayanan Chetty 26 Ind. Cas. 740. All we
decided in that case was that termination of agency is a question of fact for purposes of Article 89 of the Limitation Act and the agency must be
considered as having terminated when the authority to the agent is revoked, or the agent renounces the agancy or the business of the agency is
completed, which is practically another case of revocation or determination of authority. Now that mast be a question of fact in each case to be
decided upon the evidence.
We do not think the case is sufficiently clear upon the pleadings to enable us to dispose of the case without taking evidence, and we have,
therefore, decided to call for a finding upon fresh evidence as to whether the suit is barred under Article 89. W think it necessary, however, to say
that we consider this question depends upon the question when the authority of the agent to represent the principal ceased, and that it does not
depend upon the question as to the agent''s obligation to take back a salary chit and pass his accounts with the principal. Fresh evidence may be
taken. The finding will be submitted in two months from this date and seven days will be allowed for filing objections.
[The connected appeal was then taken up, but the decision, in that appeal does not contain any law point.--Ed.]
Seshagiri Aiyar, J.--I agree.
