Ponnuswami Naicker vs K. Anandan

Sivasubramaniam, J.—The unsuccessful tenant in R.C.O.P. 3 of 1979 on the file of the Rent Controller, Kancheepuram, and the appellant in

R.C.A. 30 of 1982 on the file of the Subordinate Judge, Kancheepuram, is the revision petitioner herein, wherein an order for eviction was passed

against the revision petitioner. The revision petitioner is the tenant and the respondent is the landlord. The landlord filed a petition in R.C.O.P. 3 of

1979 before the Rent Controller, Kancheepuram seeking eviction on the following grounds: The petition building along with another portion of the

building originally belonged to one Ameer Basha. The tenant was in occupation of the said building paying a rent of Rs. 20 per month. The landlord

purchased the building from the said Ameer Basha on 27.1.1976. After the landlord purchased the building, the tenant was paying a rent of Rs. 50

per month. The landlord is carrying on business in a rented building and he is not in possession of any other building for carrying on his possession.

As the owner of the building, where he is carrying on the business now insisted upon his vacating the premises, he filed the present petition for

eviction. He has contended that he requires the building for his personal occupation and that he wants to demolish the building and reconstruct the

same along with another portion of the building which is in the occupation of another tenant. Therefore, he filed the present petition under S. 10(3)

(a)(iii) and S. 14(1)(b) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 18 of 1960.

The tenant resisted the application contending inter alia, that the landlord is in possession of other buildings and that the requirement of the

landlord is not bona fide.

The learned Rent Controller, after having considered the entire evidence on record, came to the conclusion that the requirement of the landlord

is bona fide and, therefore, ordered eviction. As against the said decision, the tenant filed an appeal in R.C.A. 30 of 1982 before the Subordinate

Judge, Kancheepuram and the same has been dismissed confirming the order of the learned Rent Controller. Aggrieved against this order, the

tenant has filed the present revision petition.

Mr. Venkataraman, learned counsel for the revision petitioner-tenant, raised a legal contention that the landlord has filed the petition under S.

10(3) (a) (iii) of the Act requiring the premises for his personal occupation and also under S. 14(1) (b) of the Act for purpose of demolition and

reconstruction. This is, according to the learned counsel for the petitioner, is unsustainable in law, since both these prayers are mutually exclusive. If

really the landlord requires the premises for his personal occupation, than the question of demolition and reconstruction would not arise. The very

fact that he intends to demolish and reconstruct the premises shows that there is no immediate necessity for the landlord to require the building for

his personal occupation. In this view of the matter, the learned counsel submits that these two reliefs are mutually exclusive, and, therefore, the

landlord is not entitled to any relief. I am unable to agree with such contentions in so far as the facts of the present case are concerned. The main

basis, on which the landlord has come forward with this petition for eviction, is that he is carrying on the business in a rented building and that he

purchased the petition building for purpose of his personal occupation, since he is already under threat of eviction by his landlord. While seeking to

evict the tenant, the landlord has stated the manner in which he is going to occupy the petition premises. He has come forward with the case that he

is going to demolish the petition building along with the other portion occupied by another tenant and put up a new building so as to enable him to

carry on his business. It is seen from the evidence that without such a demolition and conversion of these two portions into one, it is not possible

for the landlord to achieve the purpose for which the present application is made. It is no doubt true that the relief sought for under S. 14() (b) of

the Act is unnecessary in this case, since he has to succeed only on his showing that his requirement is bona fide as far as his personal occupation is

concerned. Once that is proved, from the mere fact that there is a reference in S. 14(1)(b) of the Act, in the petition and an allegation to the effect

that he is going to demolish the building to suit his purpose, it cannot be stated that the remedy available to him under S. 10(3)(a) (iii) of the Act is

taken away on the principle that the two reliefs are mutually exclusive. It is unnecessary to go into the question whether such a prayer will amount

to mutual exclusion.

A similar question arose before the Supreme Court in the case reported in R.P. Mehta v. I.A. Seth1. In that case, the landlord sought for

eviction of the building under S. 13(1)(g) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act of 1947 which is almost similar to the

provision in S. 10(3)(a) (iii) of the Tamil Nadu Act 18 of 1960. There, the landlord alleged that he wanted to demolish and reconstruct the building

for the purpose of personal occupation. In the Bombay Act, there is a similar provision under S. 13(1)(hh) enabling a landlord to seek for eviction

on the ground of demolition and reconstruction. A similar objection was taken by the tenant that in as much as the landlord''s intention was to

demolish and reconstruct the building, he is not entitled to succeed on the plea of owner''s occupation available under S. 13(1)(g) of the Bombay

Act. In dealing with this question, the Supreme Court has laid down the following principle:--

We agree with the courts below that the respondent''s case falls under clause (b) when he bona fide requires the premises for his own occupation.

The mere fact that the intends to make alterations in the house either on account of his sweet will or on account of absolute necessity in view of the

condition of the house, does not effect the question of his requiring the house bona fide and reasonably for his occupation, when he has proved his

need for occupying the house. There is no such prohibition either in the language of clause (g) or in any other provision of the Act to the effect that

the landlord must occupying house for residence without making any alterations in it. There could not be any logical reason for such a prohibition.

Under ordinary law, the landlord is entitled to eject his tenant whenever he likes, after following certain procedure except in cases where he has

contracted not to eject him before the happening of a certain event. The Act restricts that general right of the landlord in the special circumstances

prevailing in regard to the availability of accommodation and the incidental abuse of those circumstances by landlords in demanding unjustifiably

high rents.

The said principle would squarely apply to the facts of the present case. The Rent Control Act provides sufficient protection to the tenants against

being harassed by threat of ejectment in case they are unable to satisfy the landlord''s demands. Various restrictions have been placed on the right

of the landlord to evict the tenant. If the tenant is evicted under the provisions of S. 14(1)(b) and S. 10(3)(a) (iii) of the Act, remedies are available

under S. 10(5)(a) of the Act, to get restoration of possession, if the landlord does not himself occupy it within one month of the date of obtaining

possession. Similarly if the tenant is evicted under the provisions of S. 14(1)(b) of the Act, S. 16 of the Act gives a similar remedy. Therefore, I do

not find any infirmity in the relief asked for by the landlord. The authorities below have concurrently held that the requirement of the landlord is

bona fide and I do not find any reason to interfere with the said concurrent findings. Therefore, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs.

Learned counsel appearing for the revision petitioner submits that the revision petitioner has been in occupation of the petition building for a long

time as it is not possible to secure an alternative accommodation and, therefore prays for a reasonable time for eviction. By consent of parties, five

months time is granted from this date, for the petitioner to vacate and surrender possession of the premises to the landlord.