Ponnuswamy Nadar vs Narayanan Nadar

S. Ratnavel Pandian, J.—This appeal has been preferred by the unsuccessful plaintiff in O.S. No. 43 of 1968 on the file of the Subordinate

Judge, Nagercoil. The said suit was filed by him for declaration of his title to and possession of the plaint schedule property and a permanent

injunction restraining the defendant from interfering with his possession, and if the defendant managed to get possession by force and was found to

be in possession for directing him to deliver possession of the property to the plaintiff with mesne profits after giving declaration of title, and for

costs.

The plaint allegations were as follows: The plaint schedule property is a portion of Section No. 1398/65-A in Kaliel Village, the total extent of

which is 250 acres. The said 250 acres belonged to one Mr. Mohamed Mustaffa, son of Mas-than Rowther. He executed an agreement of sale

dated 16th September, 1957 in favour of the plaintiff in respect of the said 250 acres, for a total consideration of Rs. 62,500 and the plaintiff also

paid an advance of Rs. l,801 to Mustaffa. From the time of the said agreement, the plaintiff was requesting Mustaffa to give the property on sale

for a total consideration of Rs. 50,000 which request Mustaffa also promised to consider, and it was under the said circumstances the

consideration was recited as Rs. 62,500 in the agreement. The defendant was an intimate friend of the plaintiff and he was also a lessee of

Mustaffa. While, so, upto 25th September, 1958 the plaintiff had paid to Mustaffa total sum of Rs. 27,876. Sometimes, the plaintiff had sent

amounts to Mustaffa through the defendant. By that time, Mustaffa also was pleased to reduce the sale amount to Rs. 50,000. Because of the

confidence in Mustaffa, the plaintiff also did not get any receipts, excepting a few receipts obtained in the name of the defendant and whose

receipts are with the defendant. The plaintiff is a Government servant and he retired on 7th December, 1967. So, he requested Mustaffa to execute

a sale deed ostensibly in the name of the defendant. So, on 29th September, 1958 Mustaffa executed a sale deed in the name of the defendant. On

the date of sale, the plaintiff made three separate payments of Rs. 1,600, Rs. 2,000 and Rs. 524. After the date of sale, the plaintiff has also paid

to Mustaffa various sums, totalling Rs. 18,000. While so, in October, 1958, when the plaintiff met Mustaffa, he wanted to verify the account

regarding the amounts paid till then. On reconciliation, it was found that a sum of Rs. 524 had not been credited by Mustaffa. Mustaffa promised to

rectify the accounts. Even regarding the payments made after 29th September, 1958, the plaintiff had paid some amounts through the defendant.

Even after the agreement of sale, the plaintiff had begun negotiations with various persons to sell various portions of the property. Even on the date

of sale executed by Mustaffa, the plaintiff made the defendant execute a sale in favour of one Joseph Muthian with regard to an extent of 9 acres.

On the same day, the plaintiff caused a formal sale to be executed by the defendant in favour of the plaintiff himself in respect of 25 acres. In the

said 25 acres, the plaintiff had already planted in June, 1958 rubber, with the knowledge and consent of Mustaffa. The said 25 acres were taken in

order to enable him to make an application for licence. Apart from the two sale deeds abovementioned, the plaintiff caused the defendant to

execute five more sale deeds in that year. In the year 1959, the plaintiff brought about altogether ten sale deeds and according to the directions of

the plaintiff, the defendant executed those sale deeds. In 1960, as per the plaintiff''s directions, the defendant executed three more sale deeds. An

extent of 45 acres 20 cents, described in the plaint schedule, stands ostensibly in the name of the defendant. Because of confidence, the plaintiff did

not take care to have the sale deed dated 29th September, 1958 obtained from Mustaffa and the tax receipts, with him. The plaintiff has also spent

a lot of money on the plaint schedule property for planting rubber. Through the defendant also, a lot of money has been spent. In addition to the

above, the plaintiff has also paid to the defendant moneys for the friendship and work done by him for the plaintiff. The defendant had not spent

any money of his own for getting the sale or for improving the property. While so, the plaintiff had reason to suspect some bad motive in the

defendant. He asked the defendant to execute a formal deed acknowledging the benami nature of the document of sale of the year 1958, but the

defendant refused. On 16th January, 1968 the plaintiff issued notice to the defendant demanding him to execute a formal deed, for which the

defendant replied on 31st January, 1968 raising false and untenable contentions. Hence the suit. The plaintiff also alleged that the plaint schedule

property would yield a profit of Rs. 2,000 per annum at the time of the presentation of the plaint.

The defendant filed a written statement contending as follows: The defendant purchased the entire property from Mustaffa on 29th September,

1958 with his own money and has become the owner thereof. The plaintiff acted only as a broker and on the same date 29th September, 1958 the

defendant executed a sale deed in respect of 25 acres for Rs. 2,000 in lieu of the work done by the plaintiff as a broker. The defendant is not

aware of any transaction between the plaintiff and Mustaffa. He never took any money to Mustaffa for the plaintiff. The plaintiff did not make any

payment to Mustaffa and he had nothing to do with the sale in favour of the defendant. On 29th September, 1958, the defendant sold 9 acres of

land to a Joseph Muthian for Rs. 1,500. The plaintiff is estopped from denying the defendant''s title. The defendant has executed various sale

deeds to various parties out of his own volition and had received moneys therefore, and he is in possession of 45 acres 20 cents as owner and the

plaintiff has no right over the same. The defendant planted rubber in about 25 acres and he has put up building. In the remaining area he has

planted other trees and has spent more than. Rs. 75,000. The plaintiff wanted the defendant to sell property and the defendant refused and so the

plaintiff has filed this suit to blackmail him. The plaintiff is not entitled to any relief. The defendant denies all the other allegations made in the plaint.

On the above pleadings, the following; issues were framed:

Whether the defendant is a benamidar for plaintiff of the suit properties?

Whether the agreement with Mohamed Mustapha pleaded in paragraph 3 is true?

Whether Mustaffa agreed to reduce the sale price to Rs. 50,000 at the request of plaintiff?

Whether the consideration for the sale was paid by the plaintiff?

Whether the sale deeds were executed by the defendant at the behest of plaintiff?

Whether plaintiff is estopped from denying the title of defendant?

Whether the improvements in the suit property were effected by plaintiff or defendant?

To what relief is plaintiff entitled?

What is the order as to costs?

On a consideration of all the documents filed in the case and the evidence adduced by the parties, the learned Subordinate Judge found all the

issues against the plaintiff and dismissed the suit. Hence, the plaintiff has filed this appeal.

Mr. Chellaswami, learned Counsel for the appellant, mainly contends that the purchase of the properties was only benami in the name of the

respondent for his benefit, and that he obtained Exhibit B-1, the sale deed dated 29th September, 1958, from Mohamed Mustaffa, the vendor, in

the name of the respondent. According, to the appellant, he paid the sale price to the vendor and as such the respondent has no manner of right

over the suit properties. Therefore, the crucial question or the crux of the case is whether Exhibit B-1 is a benami transaction or not.

In Minakumari Bibi v. Bejoy Singh Dudhuria ILR (1917) Cal. 662. Sir Lawrence Jenkins, has observed that though in cases of alleged benami

transactions, there may be a ground for suspicion yet a Court''s decision must rest not on suspicion or conjecture, but upon legal grounds

established by legal testimony. In cases of this character, the determination of the question depends not only on direct oral evidence but also upon

circumstances and surroundings of the case concerned. It has been held repeatedly that the burden of proof lies heavily on the person who claims

against the tenor of the deed, that is, the alleged beneficiary, to show that the ostensible vendee was a mere name-lender and the property was in

fact purchased only for his benefit. Such burden would be discharged by such a plaintiff by satisfying the well-known criteria viz.: (1) the source of

purchase money relating to the transaction; (2) possession of the property; (3) the position of the parties and their relationship to one another; (4)

the circumstances, pecuniary or otherwise, of the alleged transferee; (5) the motive for the transaction; (6) the custody and production of the title

deeds; and (7) the previous and subsequent conduct of the parties. Each of the above-said circumstances, taken by itself, is of no particular value

and affords no conclusive proof of the intention to transfer the ownership from one person to the other. But a combination of some or all of them

and a proper weighing and appreciation of their value would go a long way towards indicating whether the ownership has been really transferred or

where the real title lies. In every benami transaction, the intention of the parties is the essence. The true test to determine whether the transaction is

benami or not is to look to the intention of the parties viz., whether it was intended to operate as such or whether it was only meant to be

colourable; if colourable, the transaction is benami, otherwise the transaction is not benami. On the other hand if the parties intended that it should

take effect, the transaction cannot be said to be benami.

In Surasaibalini v. Phanindra Mohan (1965) 1 I.T.J. 526 : (1965) 1 S.C.J. 583 : AIR 1945 S.C. 1364 it, has been held as follows:

The Court will presume an ostensible title to be the real title unless a plaintiff who seeks to assert the contrary pleads and proves that the ostensible

owner is not the real, owner. In other words, the onus is on the person who alleges a transaction to be benami to make it out. Of course, the

source of the funds from which the purchase is made, coupled with the manner of its enjoyments, would be a real material factor for establishing

the case of benami, but the mere proof of the source of the purchase-money would not finally establish '' the benami nature of the defendant''s title.

Even where a plaintiff purchases property with his own funds in the name of B, the Surrounding circumstances, the mode of enjoyment, might still

indicate that it was intended to be a gift to B, and it Would then not be a case of benami notwithstanding that the purchase money did not proceed

from the defendant.

The principles relating to a benami transaction have been clearly laid down in Abdul Lajij Kazi v. Abdul Huq Kazi (1925) 28 C.W.N. 62 From the

principles laid down in the decisions, it is clear that the person who impugns the apparent character of the transaction, viz., the appellant herein,

must show something or other by letting in legal evidence establishing that the transaction in question is a benami one, and the issue cannot be

disposed of by a mere conjecture or suspicion as to the various circumstance surrounding the transaction, since the very object of a benami

transaction is secrecy. Section 101 of the Evidence Act, provides that any one who desires a Court to give judgment as to any legal right or liability

dependent on the existence of facts which he asserts, must prove that those facts exist. The evidence adduced in cases of this character should

stand the test of strict scrutiny and satisfy the tests mentioned above. In other words, the evidence must be reliable and acceptable impelling the

Court to take a view contrary to the recitals in the impugned document. The consideration of such evidence should be in a proper manner and in

the right perspective. Now, having the principles in mind we shall discuss the evidence, oral and documentary, under the various heads:

(1) Source of purchase-money : Exhibit B-1 is the sale deed dated 29th September, 1958 executed by Mohamed Mustaffa, the vendor,

examined herein as P.W. 1 in favour of the defendant, who, according to the plaintiff, is only an ostensible vendee. This Exhibit B-1 recites that the

total consideration Rs. 20,000 has been paid by the defendant himself, Exhibit-A-21, the entry at page 81 of the ledger for the year 1133 M.E.

(Avani) to 1135-Panguni, stands in the name of defendant. The vendor Mohamed Mustaffa has been examined as P.W. 1 on behalf of the plaintiff.

He was examined on commission on 7th September, 1969 first and then on 23rd October, 1969 and subsequently on various other dates. While

he was examined on 7th September, 1969, in the chief examination he would state that he and the plaintiff entered into an agreement Exhibit A-1

dated 16th September, 1957, by which P.W. 1 agreed to sell the property for Rs. 62,500 and he received an advance of Rs. 1,801. In Exhibit A-

1 it is stipulated that the plaintiff should pay the entire amount within six months from the date of the agreement and obtain receipts then and there

and should register the sale deed within the stipulated time. It may be noted that this document Exhibit A-1 is signed only by Mohamed Mustaffa

and not by the plaintiff. According to P.W.1''s evidence, on 7th September, 1969, he received Rs. 30,000 after the date of the agreement and he

executed Exhibit B-1 in favour of the defendant as required by the plaintiff. Subsequently, the sale consideration was reduced from Rs. 62,500 to

Rs. 30,000 which he received. At this stage, P.W. 1 wanted to look into the accounts and so the case was adjourned to 23rd October, 1969. On

23rd October, 1969 when his chief examination was continued with reference to the documents, he would state that the entry dated 29th

September, 1958 for Rs. 2,000 in Exhibit A-19, the day book, refers to the amount mentioned in the sale deed. In Exhibit A-21, which is the entry

at page 81 of the: ledger, there is a debit entry in the name of the defendant for Rs. 2,000. But there is no corresponding entry in the day book for

that amount. Then on the same date of 23rd October, 1969 since the witness was not supporting the case of the plaintiff, the plaintiff''s counsel

sought the permission of the Court to treat the witness as hostile and the permission was granted. We are not able to understand under what

provision of the Evidence Act the permission was granted to treat the witness as hostile, and allowing the plaintiff''s counsel to cross examine him.

There was no previous statement of the witness from which he had resiled so as to grant such permission.

Then, while he was cross-examined on 7th December, 1969 by the plaintiff''s counsel, he would state that the moneys received from the

defendant were credited in his account and to a suggestion put by the learned Counsel, he would state that "" It is not correct to say that Rs. 2,000''

credited to the defendant''s account on the date of sale was received from the plaintiff, but it was received only from the defendant"". In the course

of the cross-examination by the defendant''s counsel, his evidence is that he knew the plaintiff for the last 25 years and that there were no money

transactions between him and the plaintiff and those transactions were entered in his account. On 22nd June, 1134 H.E., the plaintiff had borrowed

Rs. 2,000 from him and he has returned the same. According to him, he has written letters to the defendant, demanding the sale consideration

subsequent to the execution of the sale deed in his favour. He had also issued receipts for the amounts-received. Exhibit B-4 dated 7th December,

1958 for Rs. 3,000, Exhibit B-5 dated 22nd January, 1959 for 2,000 and Exhibit B-6 dated 9th March, 1959 for Rs. 7,000 are all receipts for

the said amounts. received by him from the defendant to wards the sale consideration. Exhibit B-7 is the last receipt issued by him to the defendant

in full settlement of the amount. Further, he would swear that as per the recital in Exhibit B-1 he had also been asking the defendant orally and

through letters, to make the payments and that he is aware of the fact that the defendant had sold portions of the property purchased from him, to

various other persons. Speaking about his accounts, he admits that he had not produced the accounts before the Income Tax authorities. But, he

has produced some other accounts before those authorities and the accounts so produced do not contain anything about the plaintiff transaction

and he would admit that he has not produced those accounts into the Court now. It is admitted by P.W. 1 that he gave possession of the property

under Exhibit B-1 to the defendant and that he (P.W. 1) was in possession of the property till then and that there is no connection between the

agreement Exhibit A-1 and the sale deed Exhibit B-1. Therefore, P.W. 1 himself has given a go-bye to the case of the plaintiff that the sale

consideration was paid by him. But, on the other hand, he himself admits that he received the sale consideration as per Exhibits B-4 to B-7 only

from the defendant.

The plaintiff, examining himself as P.W. 3, in the case, would reiterate his plaint allegations and state that he was the village officer during the

period when Exhibits A-1 and B-2 came into existence and he retired from service only on 5th December, 1967, that as he was a Government

servant he purchased the properties in the name of the defendant benami, and that the defendant executed a sale deed in his favour in respect of 25

acres of land. When cross-examined as to the source of income for purchase of these lands, he states that he had one acre of his Tamarind tope as

his family property. He purchased a property in 1120 M.E. and sold it in the year 1953 for Rs. 17,000 and that he gave this amount as loan for

interest and thus it accumulated in 1958 to Rs. 25,000. He admits that there is no promissory note or any other account relating to them and

according to him, these money-lending transactions were only oral. Up till 1960 there was no bank account in his name. Further, he states that he

got Rs. 15,000 about four months prior to the transaction from various persons and Rs. 45,000 from one Peer Kannu, Muthiah, P. Muthian, P.

Sinian and K. Ponmuthu. But, none of these persons has been examined in this case. No receipt has been produced by him for the alleged

payments to Mustaffa. So the evidence given by P.W. 3 is not at all acceptable to hold that he gave the money to P.W. 1. D.W. 9 is the

defendant. He states that the plaintiff was only a broker and he gave 25 acres of land under Exhibit B-13 to the plaintiff, which the plaintiff sold for

an exorbitant price of Rs. One lakh in the year 1968 under Exhibit B-15. According to him, he has got properties both in Kaliel and Arumanai,

beside cash. On the other hand, P.W. 3 himself admits in his evidence that he was receiving a salary of Rs. 24 per month in 1118 M.E., and that it

was subsequently revised to Rs. 125 per month. The entries in the ledger and the day book are marked as Exhibits A-2 to A-44. Exhibit A-2 is in

the plaintiff''s name and Exhibit A-2.1 is in the name of the defendant. The entries Exhibits A-5, A-6, A-9 to A-12, A-14 to A-18, A-20, A-23 to

A-27, A-29, A-32 A-33, A-43 and A-44 are in the name of the plaintiff. The entries Exhibits A-17 and A-32 standing in the name of the plaintiff

would show that the amounts noted therein were received through one Nannan who is none other than the defendant. Exhibits A-38, A-39, A-41

and A-42. are in the name of the defendant. The amounts received under Exhibits A-39 and A-41 were through one Swamikkan. Exhibits A-37

and A-40 are entries showing the receipt of the amounts through one Wilson, to whom the defendant had sold some properties. Since, as I have

already mentioned, there were separate money transactions between P.W. 1 and the plaintiff, it cannot be conclusively held that the ledger and the

day book marked in this case relate to the transaction under Exhibit B-1. The ledger has two separate folios for the transactions of both the

parties, which would show that P.W. 1 was having transactions with both the plaintiff and the defendant separately. We also scrutinised carefully

the entries in Exhibit A-19 the day book. All the entries appear as though they are made by the same hand. As pointed out above, on 7th

September, 1969 P.W. 1 has not produced the account and after the case was adjourned and he was further examined in continuation of the chief

examination on 23rd October, 1969 P.W. 1 has produced the accounts. This creates a suspicion that these accounts could have been prepared by

him during the interval. This suspicion is strengthened by his admission in the cross-examination by the defendant''s counsel, that he has not

produced the accounts to the Income Tax authorities. So, we are of opinion that the accounts produced by P.W. 1 in support of the case of the

plaintiff, are only self-serving evidence. The evidence of P.W. 2 also does not support the case to any extent on this aspect. From the foregoing

discussions, we hold that the purchase-money was paid by the defendant and not by the plaintiff.

(2) Possession of Property : P.W. 1 the original owner of the property, has stated, as mentioned supra, that till the date of registration of

Exhibit B-1 he was in possession of the property and that he handed over the same to the defendant. The recital in Exhibit B-1 also would show

that from the date of the execution of the document the said Mustaffa, the Vendor, had handed over absolute possession of the properties to the

defendant, the vendee. The plaintiff himself has admitted that the patta has been transferred only in the name of the defendant but he would add that

he paid the kist. It has been admitted by P.W. 3 that the patta in respect of the lands purchased by him under Exhibit B-13 dated 29th September,

1958 i.e., on the date of Exhibit B-1 itself has been transferred in his name and that he paid the kist for the same till he sold the properties to

another. If really P.W. 3, the plaintiff had paid the entire sale consideration under Exhibit B-1 and paid the kist, nothing would have prevented him

from getting the sale executed in his favour especially when he had purchased 25 acres of land on the same date from the defendant, the alleged

benamidar. Exhibits B-27 to B-39 are the revenue tax receipts standing in the name of the defendant. The explanation given by P.W. 3 that he paid

the kist, but handed over the kist receipts to the defendant, is ridiculous. Exhibit B-26 dated 18th March, 1959 is the licence issued by the Rubber

Board to the defendant. After the purchase of the properties, the defendant had also sold various portions of the properties to D.Ws. 1, 3, 4, 5, 6,

7 and 8 and one Rev. Father Efram O.C.G. under Exhibits B-14, B-19, B-21 to B-25 and B-15 respectively. The plaintiff has not made any

objection in respect of the sales made by the defendant to those persons. The suit notice in this case under Exhibit A-50 was given only on 16th

January, 1968 to which the defendant sent a reply notice under Exhibit A-51 on 30th January, 1968. Therefore from the date of Exhibit B-1 up to

the suit notice Exhibit A-50 in 1968, i.e., for nearly a decade, the plaintiff has not taken any action to get the properties from the defendant. The

cumulative effect of all these circumstances would unequivocally prove that the defendant has been and is in possession of the property, enjoying

the same from the date of Exhibit B-1.

(3) Position, of the parties and their relation with one another:--Admittedly the parties are not related. P.W. 3 the plaintiff, would state in his

chief-examination, that he was having confidence in the defendant and so he purchased the suit properties in the name of the defendant since the

plaintiff was a Government Servant. Apart from that, there is no satisfactory evidence to prove any other relationship between the plaintiff and the

defendant, so as to appreciate the case o the plaintiff that because of confidence in the defendant he got the sale deed in the name of the defendant.

(4) Circumstances pecuniary or otherwise, of the alleged transfer and, (5) the motive for the transaction:

The suit properties are of an extent of 40 acres 20 cents, comprised Section No. 1398/65-A in Kaliel Village. The entire area of the suit survey

number is 250 acres, which originally belonged to one Seethankan and Ors. P.W. 1 purchased these properties under Exhibit B-3 dated 16th July,

1106 M.E., from the original owners. P.W. 1 executed an agreement for the sale of the properties on 16th September, 1957 under Exhibit A-1,

with a condition that the sale must be completed within a period of six months. It cannot be disputed that the plaintiff did not purchase the said

properties within the said period of six months. Then only Exhibit B-1 came into existence. As I have already discussed above under the heading

source of purchase-money "" there is no satisfactory and reliable evidence to show that the plaintiff was having sufficient income to purchase the

properties. The plaintiff relies only on his ipse dixit which is nothing but a self-serving piece of evidence, on which no Court could place any

reliance. P.W. 3 would explain his not having purchased the properties in his own name, by saying that he was a village officer, i.e., a Government

servant and retired from service only on 5th December, 1967. From the above answer, he wants the Court to believe that he being a Government

servant was prevented from purchasing properties, without obtaining the permission of the Government. However, it is admitted by him that on the

very same date of the execution of Exhibit B-1 he has purchased 25 acres of land in the same Survey number from the defendant under Exhibit B-

He has also purchased properties in the name of his wife and children. Then, he sold the properties for an exorbitant price. In the cross-

examination he admits that he did not get any permission from the Government for the purchase of 27-90 acres of ]and while he was in service.

Exhibit A-1 dated 16th September, 1957 has been executed while he was in service. He, being a village officer, would have been definitely

thorough with the procedure adopted by Government servants while purchasing properties, the mode of transfer of pattas, payment of kist etc. If

really the plaintiff had paid the amount for the purchase of the properties, he would have definitely got some receipts or some agreement from the

defendant, to secure his rights. Thus, the evidence on each and every aspect belies his case that the property was purchased in the name of the

defendant benami.

In order to determine the benami nature of a transaction, reliance must not only be placed on the surrounding circumstances and the position of

the parties and their relations to one another, but also on the motive which governs their actions and subsequent conduct. In fact, the absence of

motive does not decisively negative the benami nature; but it plays an important role. The motive alleged by the plaintiff viz., that he being a

Government servant, it was not open to him to purchase properties in his name and therefore he got them in the name of the defendant, is not quite

satisfactory. Whatever may be the reason blueness of the motive alleged by the plaintiff, it is belied by the very conduct of the plaintiff in purchasing

25 acres of land from the defendant himself under Exhibit B-13 on the same day as Exhibit B-1. P.W. 3 alleges motive for the defendant to refuse

to re-transfer the properties in his name, stating that he gave the properties to the defendant on lease for some time and then he took possession of

the properties, and that, due to this disputes arose between them and the defendant is creating trouble and then only he came to know the mind of

the defendant. No lease deed, adangal extract or any other scrap of paper has been produced by the plaintiff to evidence that the defendant had

taken the properties on lease from the plaintiff. The plaintiff has not examined any other witness to speak that the defendant had taken properties

on lease from him.

(6) Custody and production of title deeds : The defendant has produced Exhibit B-1 and the prior documents, Exhibit B-2 patta and Exhibit B-3

the sale deed in the name of P.W. 1. The patta also stands transferred in the name of the defendant. The important point to be noted is that in

benami transactions, the real beneficiary would be in possession of the title deeds. The plaintiff has merely alleged that he asked the defendant to

execute a resale of the properties in his name. It is highly improbable that a village officer would have permitted the defendant, the alleged

benamidar, to keep the sale deed with him, if really the plaintiff was the real purchaser.

(7) Previous and subsequent conduct of parties: As already mentioned, the suit sale deed Exhibit B-1 was executed in the year 1958. The suit

notice was issued in the year 1968, after a decade. Even when the defendant sold the properties to various persons, the plaintiff had not raised any

objection. Even on the very same date of Exhibit B-1, the plaintiff himself has purchased 25 acres of land from the defendant. The kist receipts also

stand in the name of the defendant. The explanation of P. W. 3 that he paid the kist amounts and. handed over the kist receipts to the defendant, is

rather ridiculous. If a person pays the kist amount on behalf of another, the kist receipts would clearly show that fact. In this case, when the kist

receipts stand only in the name of the defendant, the explanation given by the plaintiff is not acceptable.

The explanation that he paid the kist amounts and. handed over the kist receipts to the defendant, is too big a pill to swallow. The defendant has

also obtained a licence under Exhibit B-26 from the Rubber Board even in the year 1959. Thus, the previous conduct of the parties also supports

the case of the defendant and belies the case of the plaintiff.

Thus, viewing the case from each and every angle, there is not even an iota of evidence to support the claim of the plaintiff. On an overall

appreciation of the entire evidence adduced by both parties, in the light of all relevant and surrounding circumstances, we have no hesitation to hold

that the impugned sale deed Exhibit B-1 is not a benami transaction.

We accordingly confirm the findings of the lower Court and dismiss the appeal with costs.