Poolchand and Others vs State of Rajasthan

D.P. Gupta, J.—These six petitions arise in similar circumstances & raise common questions and it shall be proper to dispose them of by a common order The questions which are canvassed in these petitions arise out of nationalisation of Ajmer Udaipur, Ajmer Bhilwara, and other connected routes. Mohammed Shafi, petitioner in writ petition No. 1635 of 1975 was an operator of Udaipur Bhilwanra route, while Devilal, petitioner in writ petition No. 1634 of 1975 was an operator of Ajmer Bhilwara route Messrs Mohammed Ishak Mohd. Imail, petitioners in writ petition No. 1632 of 1975 are operators of Bhilwara Neemuch routs and Pokardasa petitioner in writ petition No. 1633 of 1975 is an operator of Ajmer Shergadhvia Nasirabad, Ramsar route, Messrs Phoolchand Ramswaroop is an operator of Bhilwara Banera route. The routes to which the permit''s of petitioners Mohammed Shafi and Devilal relate are wholly covered by the nationalisation scheme relating to Ajmer Udaipur and Ajmer Bhilwara and other connected routes (hereinafter called ''the notified routes'') while the route of the permit of petitioner Messers Mohmmed Ishak Mohd. Ismail overlaps the notified route from Bhilwara to Chittorgarh and the permit of the said petitioner has been curtailed for operating from Bhilwara to Chittorgarh same would now be valid only from Chittorgarh to Neemuch Similarly the route of the permit of petitioner Pokardas overlaps the notified route from Ajmer to Nasirabad, which portion thereof has been curtailed and the permit of that petitioner would now be valid only from Nashirabad to Shergarh. So far as petitioner Phoolchand Ramswaroop is concerned, his permit overlaps the nationalised route from Bhilwara upto Shahpura Choraha & the same has been curtailed in respect of the aforesaid portion. Thus the permit of the last mentioned petitioner is valid for the portion from Shahpura Choraha to Banera.

It may be mentioned here that a scheme for the nationalisation of Ajmer-Udaipur, Ajmer-Bhilwara, Bhilwara-Udaipur and connected routes was proposed by the Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation, hereinafter referred to as ''the Corporation'', on June 1, 1973 and the proposed scheme was published in the Rajasthan Gazette dated June 4, 1973 u/s 68C of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (hereinafter referred to as ''the Act''), inviting objections in respect thereof. The petitioners and several other person filed their objections which were considered by the Joint Legal Remembrancer No. 2 to the Government of Rajasthan, who also recorded the evidence of parties in respect of such objections. The Joint Legal Remembrancer, by his order dated September 27, 1975, approved the proposed scheme of total exclusion, subject to the modifications mentioned in his order. The final scheme of nationalisation has been published u/s 68 D of the Act in Rajasthan Gazette dated October 9, 1975, and shall hereinafter be referred to as the app-roved Schema.

I shall first deal with the general contentions which have been argued by Mr. R.R. Vyas, appearing on behalf of all the petitioners. The first ground raised by Mr. Vyas is that neither the Corporation nor the State Government applied its mind objectively in making the proposal and in finalising the nationalisation scheme in as much as the fact of each and every overlapping route was not considered by them. This objection of the learned Counsel for the petitioners does not appear to be well founded, in as much as the petitioners themselves have produced copies from the records of the Corporation of noting of the officials of the Corporation which go to show that the proposal for natinalisition of the notified routes was considered by the Corporation at various levels and it was only when the Administrator of the Corporation came to the conclusion that the proposed nationalisation scheme shall provide an efficient, adequate, economic cal and properly co-ordinated passenger road transport service on the routes in question and he was of the opinion that it would be in public interest that the bus services on the notified route be run and operated by the Corporation alone to the complete exclusion of all other persons that the proposed nation: alisition scheme was published u/s 68C of the Act. Similarly the matter also appeals to have been considered at great length by the Joint Legal Remembrancer, who was duly authorised to consider and approve the scheme for and on behalf of the State Government, The question of curtailment of existing Partially overlapping services was also fully considered by him in the light of the objections that the proposed scheme did not provide a properly co ordinate service It may also be pointed out in this connection that the Joint Legal Remembrancer has modified the proposed scheme and has himself allowed exemption in respect of the areas within the municipal limits for the routes coming from outside the municipal limits, treating the area within municipal limits as one unit. This contention of the learned Counsel, therefore, fails.

The related argument which has been raised by the learned Counsel for the petitioners may also be considered here, namely, that the approved scheme does not satisfactorily resolve the question that curtailment of direct practically overlapping services would not be in public interest. The learned Counsel submitted that the considerations in respect of the provisions of Section 68C and Section 47 of the Act ought to be the same and while deciding as to whether the approved schema provides for a well co-ordinated passenger road transport service or not the question of providing directed services between the two permit of and also the question of saving of time by journeys not being broken should have also been taken into consideration. It may be observed in this respect, that curtailment of direct services resulting in transiphment at certain points has not been held to be (sic) to the provisions of a well-co-ordinated passenger road transport service. In CPC C.P.C. Motor Service, Mysore Vs. The State of Mysore and Another, their Lords lips of the S.C. were pleased to observe that the liklihood of transhipment from State-owned buses to private omnibuses at the border, where the route operated upon by the State transport under, taking and private operators bifurcated, is not destructive of co-ordination, Their Lordships further observed that u/s 68C ''public interest'' is the dominant consideration and transhipment by itself would not connote a lack of cc ordination because where the State omnibuses came to halt, the private omnibuses would take the passengers set down. The same view also was taken by a Division Bench of this Court in Malik Ram Kalra Vs. State of Rajasthan and Others, and it was observed:

...All that he could argued was that as some of the existing overlapping services would be discontinued, that was likely to cause inconvenience to the travelling public. We are usable to think, however, that if a scheme provides for complete exclusion of other road transport Services, it should be presumed that it would, as a matter of course, suffer from lack of co-ordination within the meaning of Section 68C of the Act.

The grievance of the petitioners is that about 300 services on 58 routes shall be curtailed as a result of the coming into effect of the approved scheme and as such the same should not be considered to be in public interest. The question with which I am concerned is not that of benefit to certain private operators but the matter has to be viewed in the perspective of the larger public interest and mere curtailment of existing routes, which may necessitate transhipment from the vehicles of the Corporation to the vehicles of the private operators at the points of bifurcation & vice versa cannot be held to be the basis for rejecting the approved Scheme as not being in public interest. The plying of the vehicles of the Corporation to the complete exclusion of of private owned public service vehicles may cause some inconvenience at certain points of bifurcation, yet it must be held that the same is for the common good and in the interest of public in general.

Another argument advanced by the petitioners was that the Corporation lacked resources, as it did not possess sufficient number of vehicles which were required to implement the entire approved scheme at a time. A pointed reference has been made by the learned Counsel Mr. Vyas, to the effect that the Corporation is employing vehicles of private operators taken on contract basis and a proforma of such contract has also been placed on record. The argument of the learned Counsel for the petitioners is that the intention behind bringing rationalisation of Road transport services into force was merely to oust the private operators, which was an extraneous consideration and the approved scheme should be held to be invalid on this ground. It can-not be denied that it was the duty of the Corporation to consider that the time when it prepared the proposed nationalisation scheme as to whether it would be possible for it to implement the scheme as a whole. It was held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Shrinivasa Reddy and Ors. v. State of Mysore and Anr. AIR 1950 SC 350 that the integrity of the approved scheme could not be broken by the State Transport undertaking and it has not the power to carry out the approved scheme piecemeal, as in that event the power of implementation could be abused by the State Transport Undertaking by exercising discrimination against some of the operations and in favour of the others, included in the approved Scheme However, in the present case, Mr. Rajnarain Munshi appearing on behalf of the Corporation, has stated at the Bar that the approved Scheme has been fully implemented by the Corporation as per the order of the Joint Legal Remembrancer. It has also been stated by Mr. Rajnarain that the Corporation has taken the buses of private operators on contract not because the Corporation lacks in resources of its own to implement the approved scheme but the same was done on the request of the private displaced operators themselves who pleaded with the Corporation that in case their vehicles would lie idle they would suffer immense losses, which could be mitigated to a large extent if the Corporation took over suitable vehicles on hire. In Capital Multi-purpose Co-operative Society Bhopal and Others Vs. The State of M.P. and Others, , their Lordships of the Supreme Court were pleased to observe as under when a similar question was raised before them:

...It will thus be clear that nationalised road transport under Chapter IV - A would be run either by the Central Government, or a State Government or any of the other three authorities mentioned there which ire all under the control of the State Government or the Central Government. In these circumstances, with the resources of the Government behind those authorities it would in our opinion be futile for any objector to say that the Central Government, the State Government or the authorities backed by it could not have equipment and finances to carry out the schemes. It seems to us that, the very fact that a scheme is proposed suggests that the Central Government or a State Government or the authorities would carry it out.

In the aforesaid case, their Lordships also observed that there could be no question of considering the comparative merits of the State Transport Undertakings and the private operators Merely because the Corporation takes vehicles of certain displaced private operators on hire, it cannot be presumed that Corporation lacked resources of its own for the purpose of implementing the approved Scheme, The contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioners, therefore, that the nationalisation scheme should be rejected on the ground of lack of resources on the part of the Corporation, cannot be upheld.

Another related argument advanced by the learned Counsel for the petitioner was that under the contracts which are entered into by the Corporation, the vehicle is neither owned nor possessed by the Corporation, and no permit could be issued in respect of such a vehicle in favour of the Corporation u/s 42 of the Act. If the vehicle of the private operator is taken on hire by the Corporation, the vehicle remains in the possession of the Corporation so long as it is run for the purposes of the Corporation It was held by the Supreme Court in K.M. Viswanatha Pillai Vs. K.M. Shanmugam Pillai, that a permit holder need not necessarily be the owner of a vehicle What Section 42(1) of the act requires is that a transport vehicle should not be used in a public place except in accordance with the terms and conditions of the permit. Thus it does not appear that there would be any contravention of the provisions of Section 42 of the Act if the Corporation utilises the vehicles of private operators taken by it on hire, for purposes, of implementation of the approved Scheme.

Another submission made by learned Counsel was that the petitioners were not afforded a reasonable opportunity of hearing by the Joint Legal Remembrancer. The grievance of the petitioners is that their counsel who appeared on their behalf before the Joint Legal Remembrancer submitted certain writ on objectors on merits as also other legal objections which arose for determination and that the last three pages of the written objections were submitted by the counsel before the Joint Legal Remembrancer on September 27, 1975 at about 3 P.M. and that the Joint Legal Remembrancer delivered his order on that very day after some time, during the course of the same sitting. As the notice to show cause in respect of these writ petitions was issued to the respondents, the Additional Government Advocate has filed an affidavit of the Joint Legal Remembrancer who has stated that having heard the oral arguments of the parties and having considered the written arguments submitted on behalf of the petitioners, he prepared a typed script of his order before lunch on September 27, 1975 and that on that very day at about 3 p.m. Shri Udharam, learned Counsel for the petitioners, filed only three more pages of written arguments, which in his opinion did not contain any new material requiring any modifications in the typed script already prepared by him and that he, therefore, dictated the concluding paragraphs and then pronounced the final order on that very day.

I have looked into the objection contained in the last three pages of the written arguments, alleged to have been filed by Shri Udharam Advocate, before the Joint Legal Remembrancer on September 27, 1975. Those last three pages of the written arguments contained only two objections, to which I shall presently refer, but. I have no doubt that those two objections are covered by decisions of this Court and the Supreme Court and the learned joint Legal Remembrancer was right in stating that there was nothing new contained in those last three pages of written arguments which required further consideration on his part. It appears from the copies of the record produced before this Court that the petitioners were accommodated by the Joint Legal Remembrancer to the fullest extent, who heard orally the arguments of the Learned Counsel for the petitioners and the other objectors and also accepted the written arguments which were submitted by the learned Counsel for the objectors. I am unable to appreciate the leisurely manner in which the petitioners conducted their case, in submitting written arguments piece meal at their sweet will and pleasure. However, at any rate, it cannot be said that in this matter the petitioners were not afforded full opportunity of hearing by the Joint Legal Remembrancer, as the contentions raised in the last three pages of the written arguments submitted by their learned Counsel on September 27, 1975, already stated concluded by the decisions of this Court and the Supreme Court. The proceedings before the Joint Legal Remembrancer were therefore perfectly in accordance with law and no fault can be found in the manner in which he conducted the proceedings before him.

One of two objections which were raised in the last three pages of the written arguments submitted by the learned Counsel for the petitioners before Joint Legal Remembrancer related to the curtailment of Bhilwara-Neemuch route, from Bhilwara to Chittorgarh. The same paint has been canvassed before me in the writ petition of Mohammed Ishak Mohammed Ismail. The submission of the learned Counsel, in that respect is that Bhilwara Neemuch is an inter-Statal route and on account of the proviso to Section 68D(3) and the provisions of Section 68J or the Act, the State Government was not competent to consider or approve a nationalisation scheme in respect of an inter Statal route. The proviso to Section 68D(3) of the Act provides that no scheme which relates to any inter State route shall be deemed to be an approved scheme unless the same has been published in the official Gazette with the prior approval of the Central Government. Further Section 68J provides that the powers conferred on the State Government under Chapter IV A, including the power of approving the scheme, shall be exercised only by the Central Government in relation to an inter Statal route or area. Now a perusal of the approved scheme, as published in the Rajasthan Gazette dated October 9. 1975, shows that the said scheme does not relate to any inter-Statal route but it relates to the plying of vehicles on Ajmer-Udaipur, Ajmer-Bhilwara, Bhilwara-Udaipur and other related routes within the State of Rajasthan. The services plied by the Rajasthan operators, on those portions of the inter-State routes which lie within the State of Rajasthan, are no doubt affected but that cannot have the effect of converting the approved scheme into a scheme in relation to an inter-State route or area. The approved scheme remains a scheme of nationalisation in respect of routes within the Rajasthan State only and the same affects the plying of vehicles on overlapping routes, only in so far as their portions which lie in Rajasthan are concerned, and although other portions of such overlapping routes may lie in another State, but those portions of the overlapping routes are not affected at all by the approved scheme. The matter stands concluded by a Bench Division of this Court in Malik Ram Kalra Vs. State of Rajasthan and Others, The route in question in that case was from Jhunjhunu to Delhi and relying upon the decision of the Supreme Court in S. Abdul Khader Saheb Vs. The Mysore Revenue Appellate Tribunal, Bangalore and Others, , it wash held in the aforesaid case that the State Government could nationalise inter-State route even though a portion of it overlaps an inter-State route, because that does not make the approved scheme as one relating to an inter-State route. Merely because a portion of Bhilwara-Udaipur route overlaps Bhilwara-Neemuch route, it cannot be said that the approved Scheme relates to an inter-State route. I am, therefore, unable to accept the contention of the learned Counsel on this score.

The other objection which was contained in the last three pages of the written argument related to the curtailment of Ajmer-Ramsar via Nasirabad route. in respect of the portion from Ajmer to Nasirabad. The argument is that Ajmer-Nasirabad portion of Ajmer-Ramsar route was made ineffective by & nationalisation scheme published u/s 68D of the Act, relating to Ajmer-Kota route and under the approved scheme the very same portion from Ajmer to Nasirabad of the Ajmer Ramsar route has been curtailed, and thereby the earlier approved Scheme relating to Ajmer-Kota route published u/s 68D(3) of the Act has been contravened & the approved Scheme is invalid in that respect. It was also pointed out in this connection that proceeding for modification of the aforesaid Ajmer-Kota nationalisation scheme are still pending, The very same argument has also been advanced before me in the writ petition of Pokardas. I am not at all impressed with this argument of the learned Counsel for the petitioners, inasmuch as the present approved scheme of nationalisation, which provides for the curtailment of Ajmer Nasirabad portion of Ajmer-Ramsar route, has also been brought into effect after fully complying with the provisions of Section 68D of the Act. The petitioners and other operators, who felt aggrieved, were afforded full opportunity of making their objections or representations & were also fully heard in ''he matter. Merely because some proceedings for the modification of the Ajmer Kota nationalisation scheme; u/s 68 of the Act are pending, the same can have no effect upon the present approved scheme- A similar question came up for consideration before their Lordships of the Supreme Court in M/S Standard Motor Union Private Ltd. v. State of Kerala and Ors. AIR 1969 SC 273 and their Lordships made the following observations in this respect:

The appellant''s contention is that the impugned scheme is invalid as the modifications of the earlier schemes were made with-out complying with the provisions of Section 68E. In our opinion, this contention is baseless. The new scheme has been proposed and approved after following the procedure laid down In Sections 68C and 68D In so far as the new scheme modifies the earlier schemes; the modification could be made u/s 68E As the procedure laid down in Section 68C and 68D was followed the conditions of Section 68E were satisfied. Section 68E does not require that the new scheme should expressly say that it cancels or muddies the earlier schemes. On the promulgation of the new scheme the earlier schemes stand modified by implication pro tanto.

The argument of learned Counsel stands fully answered by the aforesaid deception of their Lordships of the Supreme Court. In the present case also, there can be no difficulty in holding that the approved scheme would have the effect of impliedly modifying the previous Ajmer-Kota nationalisation scheme in so far as the approved scheme provides for the curtailment of Aimer Nasirabad portion of Ajmer-Ramsar route. As these two objections, which were contained in the fast three pages of the written arguments submitted by the learned Counsel for the petitioner before the point Legal Remembrancer, are fully covered by the decisions of this Court and the Supreme Court, it cannot be held that the Joint Legal Remembrancer committed an error in failing to decide these objections.

In the case of Messrs Phoolchand Ramswaroop (writ petition No. 1631 of 1975) a further argument was advanced by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the learned Joint Legal Remembrancer held that the municipal limits of a town as well as a distance of four kilometers there from should be excluded from curtailment and that the route of the permit of the petitioner in that case was from Bhilwara to Banera and from Bhilwara bus-stand, the municipal limits of Bhilwara town extend to a distance of about 31/2 kilometers towards Mandal and that Mandal Choraha and Shahpura Choraha are situated within the municipal limits of Mandal town, which lies at a distance of two kilometers from Mandal Choraha. The learned Counsel submitted that avoiding to the aforesaid decision of the Joint Legal Remembrancer, four kilometers from Mandal Choraha towards Bhilwara and four kilometers from the outskirts of Bhilwara city towards Mandal town should have been excluded and as the distance between the outside limits of Bhilwara Municipality and Mandal Choraha is only seven kilometers, the entire portion from Bhilwara to Mandal of the Bhilwara-Banera route should have been excluded from curtailment Learned Counsel submitted that in this view of the matter the approved scheme was contrary to the order passed by the Joint Legal Remembrancer. I have gone though the order of the (sic) Legal Remembrancer dated September 27, 1975 (Annexure P. 10), So far as Bhilwara Banera route is concerned it has been mentioned in the aforesaid order:

The services plying from Bhilwara to Deoli, Shahpura and Banera shall be curtailed on Bhilwara-Shahpura Choraha portion which are 16 in number. Therefore, to provide the services RSRTC should ply 32 single trips between Bhilwara and Shahpura Choraha with three buses.

The notified scheme also makes provision for plying of 32 single trips by the Corporation between Bhilwara and Shahpura and it has also been provided that no person shall be allowed to ply on the notified routes or overlapping whole or any portion thereof. Thus the petitioner''s route has been curtailed from Bhilwara to Shahpura Chauraha and it does not appear there is any provision in the scheme in this respect which is in conflict with or is contrary to the order of the Joint Legal Remembrancer.

Then it was further argued by the learned Counsel that order of the Joint Legal Remembrancer was itself self contradictory in this respect in as much as Bhilwara to Shahpura Choraha portion of Bhilwara-Banera route should have been curtailed, taking into consideration the fact that the distance between these two places from the outskirts of Bhilwara city was only a seven kilometers and as the petitioner was entitled to pay to the extent of 4 kilometers from outside the municipal limits of Bhilwara city as well as of Mandal town and as Mandal Choraha and Shahpura Choraha formed part of Mandal Municipal limits. In the first place, the contention of the learned Counsel does not appear to be factually correct, inasmuch as it has been mentioned in para 52 of the written arguments submitted before the learned Additional Legal Remembrancer that the distance from Bhilwara to Mandal Choraha is 7 1/2 miles, which is equivalent to 12 kilometers and if the Bhilwara Bus Stand may be considered to be 3 1/2 kilometers within the Bhilwara Municipal limits as alleged by the petitioner, then the remaining distance would be more than 8 kilometers, Secondly, on a consideration of the order of the Joint Legal Remembrancer. I am not prepared to agree with the interpretation sought to be placed in this respect by the learned Counsel for the petitioner. The Joint Legal Remembrancer has held that the area within the municipal limits should be treaded as one unit for the reason that within the Municipal limits, the bus stand can be established at any point. He has further observed that the Transport Authority should not curtail a route for a short distance of the three or four kilometers, besides or in addition to the general exemption of the area within municipal limits. This observation was made by him with reference to the circumstance that some routes bifurcate from the Schema routes at a distance of three or four kilometers of the municipal limits of either termini. It cannot, therefore, be held from the order of the joint Legal Remembrancer that he was of the view that 4 kilometers from every town falling on the route should be exempted in addition to municipal limits of such towns, but the Joint Legal Remembrancer apparently had in mind cases where a route was sought to be curtailed within three or four kilometers of the municipal limits of either termini thereof. If the petitioner''s route would have bifurcated from the Schema route within 3 or 4 kilometers of municipal limits of the Bhilwara town, then only the exemption suggested by the Joint Legal Remembrancer would have been applicable to that route, but in the present case, the bifurcation of the petitioner''s route from the notified route lay more than 8 Kilometers outside the Bhilwara municipal limits and that is why the Join Lega1 Remembrancer himself made it perfectly clear in that very order that the exemption suggested by him was not applicable to the route of the petitioner and that the services plied on the Bhilwara Banera route would be curtailed from Bhilwara to Shahpura Chauraha. I do not find any conflict between the order of the joint Legal Remembrancer and the approved scheme, nor there is any inconsistency or contradiction within the impugned order of the Joint Legal Remembrancer.

Learned Counsel for the petitioner then submitted that generally the permits issued in favour of the Corporation do not specify the vehicles covered by those permits. No such permit has been produced in any of these cases and it is not necessary to decide such a hypothetical contention which does not arise in any of the cases before me, It is not the case of the petitioners that such a situation exist in respect of the notified route in question and I am not concerned at present with the situation which might exist on some other route. Moreover, once the approved nationalisation scheme is he''d to be valid and the same is implemented, then the right of the petitioners in respect of plying of their vehicles on the notified route or portions thereof comes to an end and thereafter cannot be heard in respect of any defect regarding the plying of the vehicles of the Corporation on the notified route. Reference in this connection may be made to the decisions of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Kalyan Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors. AIR 1962 SC 1183 and Sobhraj Odharmal Vs. State of Rajasthan, . In Sindhu Transport v. State S.B Civil Writ Petition No. 16 of 1974 a learned Single Judge of this Court alto took the same view that whatever may be reasonableness of the registration number of vehicles in the permits issued to the Corporation the petitioners have no locus standi to throw a challenge to the permit of the Corporation as a valid promulgation to an approved scheme has the effect of stopping the rights of private operators to ply their vehicles and they have no subsisting personal rights in respect of plying of vehicles on the notified route or portions thereof It may be noticed that the approved scheme has been implemented with effect from October 20, 1975, and as all the objections in respect of the alleged invalidity of the approved scheme have been rejected, the last mentioned objection cannot be entertained.

In S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1636 of 1975. Nazar Mohammed was an existing operator of Bundi-Lakheri route and he has challenged the order of the Joint Legal Remembrancer passed on September 27, 1975 in respect of Bundi Indergerh via Khatker, Lakheri route on the very same grounds which have already been considered by me above, Learned Counsel for the petitioner has no other argument to advance in respect of this case.

Learned Counsel for the petitioners submit that other grounds which have been taken in writ petitions have already been decided by the various decisions of this Court and as such he has not expressly argued them before me.

In view of the aforesaid discussion, all the six writ petitions have no merit and they are dismissed. But in the circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.