Possari Palaniappa Chetty vs Appavu Chetty and Others

Srinivasa Ayyangar, J.

The respondents'' Vakil reports that he has no instructions in this second appeal. We have heard all that Mr. Seetharama Eao has had to say on

behalf of the appellant. It is found as a fact that the 1st plaintiff has failed to establish that he was the hereditary pujari of this temple and sntitled to

such office. Now the learned Vakil for the appellant has invited us to grant an injunction against the defendants on the ground that the 1st plaintiff

being found to be in possession of the office, such possession may be protected by an injunction issued against persons who have no right to

interfere with the enjoyment of the office. For this purpose he has referred to some cases relating to Immovable property. No doubt in certain

eases, where the right of title to Immovable property was claimed and what was proved was mere possession of property but it was also found

that the defendant was merely a trespasser, it was held that in the absence of any other proof possession may be regarded as sufficient proof of

title, at any rate, against the defendant who was a trespasser and showed no title in himself. We must assume that, in all such cases, though a relief

had not been claimed by the plaintiff originally, in the alternative, on the footing of mere possession alone the Court granted such relief being

satisfied that, if it had been pleaded and prayed for in the alternative, the defendant would have had no defence to the action or that having had a

defence he failed to make it out. The same cannot possibly be said of an office. In this caie if the 1st plaintiff had claimed on the footing of mere

possession of the office, it might have been open to the defendants to show by evidence that such possession as he claimed could not nossibly be

regarded as possession of the office and many new things might have been open to the defendants to allege and prove if they had an opportunity of

alleging or proving in respect of any such case.

In these circumstances, it would be unjust and inequitable to grant any relief to the 1st plaintiff on that footing. There is no other ground. The

second appeal must, therefore, be dismissed.

Reilly, J.

I agree. I will only add that I now see from the record that what the Subordinate Judge finds was the 1st plaintiff''s irregular performance of the

duties of pujari appears to have extended only for a period of three years, as his father died in 1917 and the plaint waa filed in 1920.