Pothen George vs N. Subramoma lyen

Kumara Pillai, J.—Second Defendant is the Appellant. The only two points raised in the appeal are (1) that the capitalisation allowed by the lower Court is not warranted by the stipulations in Ext. A and hence even when interest is awarded on the defaulted interest the limitation imposed by S. 31 of the Travancoro CPC Cod" has to govern the money claim in the suit, and (2) that the paddy due under the plaint document has to be valued at the nirak rate on the due date.

On the question whether Section 31 of the Travancoro CPC has to govern the suit, there is dispute between the parties. The Code was in force when the suit was instituted. We feel no doubt that the limitation imposed by Section 31 of that Code is a matter affecting substantive right and not one of mere procedure. The decision in 1943 Trav LR 509 (A), is also to the same el foot, llenco wo hold that Section 31 must govern the money portion of the claim in the suit.

The next aspect to be considered is whether there is any provision in Ext. A to treat the defaulted interest as a principal. There is no such provision in the document. The only provision is that interest in default will carry future interest at the stipulated rate. But still the defaulted interest remains as interest in relation to tin; principal amount of Rs. 729/- and hence the limitation imposed by Section 31 CPC must come into effect. It follows therefore that the money claim in the; suit has to be limited to Rs. 729 plus a moiety of the same on the date of the suit. The moiety representing interest will carry future interest at the rate stipulated in Ext. A, To this extent the appeal is allowed and the decree relating to the money claim is modified.

Then there is the paddy claim. This is not governed by Section 31 , CPC Further it is seen that the paddy claimed by way of interest is only less than the principal amount of paddy. The only other aspect .is about the commutation of paddy into money. The law in force is that paddy" should be valued at the nirak rate on the due date. The principal amount of paddy became due in the year 1114 and hence the rate in force on that date will be the commutation rate for that paddy. Similarly the paddy claimed in the suit by way of interest will also be valued at the rate prevailing on the dates when such paddy became due. The decree relating to the paddy claim is modified in these terms.

The appeal is allowed only to the extent indicated above and is dismissed in other respects. In the circumstances of this case wo direct the parties to bear their costs of this appeal.