Prabhu Missir vs Dome Mahto

Pande, J.—This is an appeal from a decree dated 27th May 1948 of the Subordinate Judge, Second Court, Shahabad, which reversed the decree dated 5th May 1942 of the Munsif, Second Court, Arrah, in an action for a declaration that the orders of the Rent Reduction Officer were without jurisdiction.

The suit giving rise to the present appeal relates to two occupancy holdings bearing khata Nos. 482 and 488 in village Kutchri within milki lakheraj tenure of the plain, tiff. Both the holdings were recorded as occupancy raiyati jote of the defendant. Khata No. 482 having an area of 4.26 acre at an annual rent of Rs. 19-6-6 Was recorded under khewat No. 1/2 of which the plaintiff was the recorded tenure-holder. Khata No. 488 having ail area of 3.50 acre at an annual rent of Rs. 14-8-6 was recorded under khewat No. 1/6 of which Mt. Vidya Kuer widow of Bashisht Missir was the recorded tenure-holder. Mt. Vidya Kuer died in the year 1348 and her interest in the tenure has devolved upon the plaintiff as reversionary heir of her husband. The record of rights was published in the month of February 1912. The plaintiff instituted a suit against the father of the present defendant in the Court of Munsif, Arrah, which was registered as Suit No. 260 of 1913 for a declaration that the entry in the record of rights in respect of khata No. 482''was incorrect. He claimed that the land was his zirat and had been in his khas cultivation and that the defendant had no concern whatever with that holding. The suit was decreed on compromise on 14th April 1914. By the compromise the holding was recognised to be occupancy raiyati holding of the defendant. The recorded jama was, however, increased from Rs. 19-6-6 besides cess to Rs. 84-15-0 inclusive of cess. It was also agreed that the arrear rent for the period 1318 to 1820 amounting to Rs. 104-18-0 will be paid in two instalments as specified in the petition of compromise. There was no suit in respect of khata No. 488. But by the compromise petition it was also agreed that the defendant who was in possession of the holding would continue to hold it as occupancy raiyat. In this case also the jama was increased from 14-8-6 besides cess to Rs. 25-8-6 inclusive of cess.

In the year 1937, Section 112A was enacted by the Bihar Tenancy (Amendment) Act, 1937. Clause (a), Sub-section 1 of Section 112A provides that the Collector may cancel all enhancement of rents of occupancy holdings made u/s 29 or under Clause (a), (b) or (d) of Section 30 between 1st January 1911 and 81st December 1936. The defendant made an application to the Collector for cancellation of the aforesaid increase in rents of the two holdings alleging that the increase in rent was really an enhancement u/s 29, Bihar Tenancy Act. The Rent Reduction Officer who was appointed by the Provincial Government to discharge the functions of the Collector u/s 112A accepting the contention of the defendant treated the in-creased rents as an enhancement u/s 29, Bihar Tenancy Act, and by his order dated 4th April 1939 cancelled the enhancements. The plaintiff instituted the suit against the order of the Rent Reduction Officer which is said to be without jurisdiction and therefore inoperative. The lower Court decreed the suit.

On appeal the decree of the first Court was reversed by the Subordinate Judge and the suit was dismissed. The plaintiff has preferred this appeal. The only point that arises for determination is whether the order of the Rent Reduction Officer was without jurisdiction. It has been urged that the rents fixed by the compromise were in settlement of a bona fide dispute regarding rights of the properties to the land in suit and therefore the rents settled by the compromise can in no sense be treated as an enhancement u/s 29, Bihar Tenancy Act.

An examination of the record discloses a material point which does not appear to have been noticed in the Courts below. The suit in which the compromise was entered was in regard to Khata No. 482 only which falls within the tenure of the plaintiff. There is no evidence that a similar suit was instituted in regard to Khata No. 488 also which falls under a different tenure of which Mt. Vidya Kuer was the recorded tenure-bolder at the time. Therefore the agreement between the plaintiff and the defendant in regard to that holding as embodied in the compromise petition cannot in any sense be said to be a part of the consideration of the settlement of the dispute in that suit.

In fact there is nothing to show that the correctness of the entry in the record of rights, in regard to that khata was at all challenged by the suit. That being the position, the agreement and the compromise petition in regard to increase in the rent of this holding may reasonably be treated as an enhancement by contract between the plaintiff and the defendant. Mt. Vidya Kuer''s interest has, no doubt, on her death devolved upon the plaintiff. But that does not in any way affect the legal position in regard to the agreement between the parties in respect of Khata No. 488.1 am, therefore, of opinion that the Rent Reduction Officer was perfectly justified in treating the increased rent of this holding under the compromise as an enhancement u/s 29 and in cancelling that enhancement under the provision of Section 112A(1)(a), Bihar Tenancy Act.

There remains the question regarding the other holding, Khata No. 482. The learned advocate in support of his argument referred to the Full Bench decision in Askaran Baid Vs. Deolal Singh, . That case is an authority for the proposition that an agreement which is by way of bona fide settlement of dispute does not come within the mischief of Section 29, Bihar Tenancy Act. But the question whether the increase in rent of the holding in question was an enhancement u/s 29 is a question of fact or perhaps a mixed question of fact and law, to be determined by the authority vested with power under the statute to cancel enhancement under the provision of Clause (a) of Sub-section (1) of Section 112A.

The expression "jurisdiction" has been variously defined in books and reported cases. It seems sufficient, to state here that the expression means

the power or authority which is conferred upon a Court by the Legislature to hear1 and determine cases between parties and to carry the judgment into effect; the power to enquire into the facts, to apply the law, to pronounce the judgment and to carry it into execution.

It is not disputed that the Rent Reduction Officer had the territorial jurisdiction to decide the case in question. It is also not disputed that he had jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the case. All that is said is that the Court took an erroneous view of the increase in rent as fixed by the compromise decree in treating it as an enhancement u/s 29, Bihar Tenancy Act. In the decision of the Full Bench case in Hriday Nath Roy v. Ram Chandra AIR 1921 Cal. 34 his Lordship Mookerjee, Acting C.J., pointed out:

Since jurisdiction is the power to hear and determine, it does not depend either upon the regularity of the exercise of that power or upon the correctness of the decision pronounced, for the power to decide necessarily carries with it the power to decide wrongly as well as rightly.

As an authority for this proposition reference may be made to the celebrated dictum of Lord Hobhouse in Malkarjan v. Narhari (01) 25 Bom. 337:

A Court has jurisdiction to decide wrong as well as right. If it decides wrong, the wronged party can only take the course prescribed by law for setting matters right; and if that course is not taken, the decision, however wrong, cannot be disturbed.

In view of the above principle of law laid down by high authorities the decision of the Rent Reduction Officer, even if it be assumed to be erroneous, cannot be said to be without jurisdiction. The same principle will apply to the case of the other holding bearing Khata No. 488, if it be assumed, though I see no justification for it, that the rent fixed for that holding also formed part of consideration of the settlement of the dispute in the suit relating to Khata No. 482.

For the above reasons it must be held that the decision of the lower appellate Court is perfectly correct and cannot be disturbed.

I would, accordingly, dismiss the appeal with cost.

Sinha, J.

I agree.