Prabir Kumar Mukherjee vs Kolkata Municipal Development Authority and Others.

The case of the petitioner, inter alia, is that on April 6, 1988,

he was appointed as an Assistant Engineer in the Kolkata

Municipal Development Authority (KMDA, for short). On December

13, 2005, he was promoted to the post of Executive Engineer and

was associated with the construction of 30 million gallon per day

at Kalyani Water Treatment Plant. He was also discharging other duties attached to his office. With effect from July 27, 2009, he

was again promoted to the post of Superintending Engineer and

subsequently, with effect from December 31, 2012, he was

promoted to the post of Additional Chief Engineer. From May 1,

2014, he has been acting as Chief Engineer-in-charge, Water

Supply Sector. From August 27, 2014, he has also been

functioning as the Chief Engineer-in-charge, Material Sector.

On June 3, 2015, the Chief Executive Officer, KMDA i.e., the

respondent no. 2 issued a charge-sheet against the petitioner alleging that while serving as the Superintending Engineer from

July 27, 2009 to December 30, 2012, he invited an online tender

for certain purposes near Sodepur Railway Station under Panihati

Municipality at an arbitrarily high rate of an estimated amount of

Rs. 2,81,76,400/- and issued the work order to M/s. Protomac

Construction treating the organization as the lowest bidder with

tender amount of Rs. 2,79,70,421/-. That was detected by the

Chief Engineer, Water Supply and a revised notice inviting tender

with an estimated amount of Rs. 1.75 crores was invited in

cancellation of the earlier one.

The petitioner in his reply denied the charges against him. He

requested the respondent authority to supply copies of all the

documents as mentioned in Annexure - A-II to the said charge-

sheet as well as some other documents and records. It has been

the allegation of the petitioner that the charges levelled against him

are not on the face of them maintainable as he has no power or

authority to sanction or accept any tender of a value exceeding

rupees two crores. The said tender was accepted and approved by

the Works and Tender Committee which consisted of four senior

IAS Officers, all the DGOs and all the Chief Engineers of KMDA

and KMW. The petitioner states that four IAS officers were i)

Finance Secretary to the Government of West Bengal, ii) the

Principal Secretary, Urban Development Department, Government

of West Bengal, iii) the Principal Secretary, Municipal Affairs

Department, and iv) Chief Executive Officer, KMDA. His notes,

suggestions etc., were never placed by the petitioner before the

members of the said Committee. He has no authority in accepting

or rejecting any tender exceeding rupees two crores in value. As

the IAS officers are not technical persons members of the

engineering cadre had been made permanent invitees and the decision was taken by the Board for deliberation. The petitioner

was not a member of the said committee.

An enquiry proceeding was initiated and the petitioner

appeared before the inquiring authority on August 17, 2015 and

pleaded not guilty to the charges framed against him. The

inquiring authority had directed the petitioner to submit the

written submission after obtaining the copy of the documents

detailed in Annexure III to the charge-sheet from the disciplinary

authority. The inquiring authority requested the disciplinary

authority to supply to him the documents, the petitioner also

requested the inquiry authority to be represented by an advocate.

On the next date of hearing i.e., on December 28, 2015, the

inquiring authority informed the petitioner that the Disciplinary

authority had intimated him that the petitioner was not entitled to

be represented by a lawyer. The petitioner found that several

documents mentioned in Annexure III to the charge-sheet were yet

to be received by him on the said date. The inquiring authority

recorded that the presenting officer expressed his inability to

supply to the copies of those documents to the petitioner and the disciplinary authority had not forwarded the copies of the said

documents to the Inquiring authority.

It is a grievance of the petitioner that the disciplinary

authority never informed him that his prayer for engagement of an

advocate had been rejected and he learnt it from the inquiring

authority at the second sitting of the enquiry that the disciplinary

authority had rejected his prayer.

The petitioner also states that the presenting officer Sri

Abhijit Saha was an Inspector of Police, State Vigilance

Commission and he is a trained police personnel and also trained

in the art of prosecution. On the contrary, the petitioner is an

engineer by profession and was not conversant with legal matters.

The petitioner suspects that the disciplinary proceeding against

him was initiated at the instance of some designing persons to

deprive him of his right of lawful promotion to the post of Chief

Engineer on the ground that a disciplinary proceeding was pending

against him. He also has alleged that the respondent authorities

are not willing to conclude the proceeding within a reasonable time

and wish to prolong and drag it so that the petitioner might be

denied his legitimate promotion.

The inquiring authority in the order dated January 28, 2016,

had recorded that the enquiry would not proceed further if the

documents wanted by the petitioner were not supplied to him. On

two successive dates of hearing, thereafter, the petitioner was

intimated by the inquiring authority that documents were not

supplied to him. Consequently, on February 29, 2016, the

inquiring authority observed that no further date would be fixed

and the petitioner would intimate the inquiring authority as soon

as he would receive the documents and thereafter the next date of

hearing would be fixed.

The petitioner earlier filed a writ petition, inter alia, praying

for a direction upon the respondent to rescind or revoke the

disciplinary proceedings drawn against him and to drop the

departmental proceeding. A learned single Judge of this Court by

an order dated April 28, 2016, disposed of the writ petition

observing that disciplinary proceedings should not be permitted to

continue endlessly. A period of more than 10 months had elapsed

from the receipt of the charge-sheet without any progress having

been made against the disciplinary action. The respondents were

directed to ensure that the documents relevant for the enquiry

were furnished to the petitioner within three weeks from the date whereupon the inquiry officer would conclude the enquiry within

six weeks therefrom without any adjournment to the parties,

except on unavoidable grounds. The disciplinary action should be

concluded within three months from the date of the order.

After this, the petitioner alleges the inquiring authority

concluded the enquiry in a haste without observing the rules of

natural justice. In spite of direction by this Court for concluding

the disciplinary action within three months from the date of order

of the High Court the disciplinary authority did not pass any final

order in the proceeding. A learned Advocate for the petitioner

requested the respondent no. 2 to pass a final order to the effect

that the disciplinary proceeding initiated against the petitioner had

been dropped or abandoned. By another letter dated August 16,

2016, the learned advocate for the petitioner again requested the

respondent to treat the purported disciplinary proceeding as

dropped.

On September 6, 2016, the respondent no. 2 who is the

disciplinary authority in the present case issued a show-cause

notice to the petitioner from which it is evident that the

disciplinary authority had agreed with the findings of the inquiring authority and proposes to impose a major penalty of reducing the

pay of the petitioner by three stages lower in the current pay band

for a period of three years under Regulation 76 (IV) of the KMDA

Service Regulations, 1975. During the period of penalty, he will not

earn any increment of pay. On the expiry of such period, the

reduction will have the effect of postponing future promotion of his

pay. The petitioner was asked to give his reply within 15 days from

the date of receipt of the show-cause notice.

The petitioner submitted his reply on September 19, 2016,

contending that the entire disciplinary proceeding was initiated

without jurisdiction. That the findings of the inquiring authority

were perverse and not based on any evidence. The petitioner was

not given any reasonable opportunity of defence. He alleged that in

his reply to the show-cause notice he also contended that after the

expiry of the period of three months, as directed by this Court, the

respondents had no authority or jurisdiction to proceed with the

disciplinary action. They have not considered the promotion of the

petitioner to the post of Chief Engineer which has been lying

vacant. Previously two juniors were promoted from the rank of

Additional Chief Engineer and they have also retired. But he

continues to be ignored on the plea of pendency of the disciplinary proceeding. As a matter of fact, apprehending that the petitioner

might not be considered for the promotion, his learned Advocate

had addressed letters to the respondent no. 2 in November and

December, 2015, requesting him to ensure that the case of

promotion of the petitioner to the post of Chief Engineer might be

considered in accordance with law. The petitioner is the senior

most Additional Chief Engineer and has been discharging the duty

of Chief Engineer-in-charge with effect from May 1, 2014.

The petitioner alleges that the respondents got sufficient time

to conclude the disciplinary proceeding but they have not done so

and have not passed any final order. But the disciplinary authority

kept the proceeding pending and in the process the respondents

have been continuing with promoting junior engineers to next

higher posts. The petitioner considers the series of steps taken by

the respondents to be violative of the fundamental rights under the

Constitution.

Therefore, by this writ petition, the petitioner has prayed for

a writ in the nature of mandamus commanding the respondents to

promote the petitioner to the post of Chief Engineer and to treat

the disciplinary proceeding against the petitioner as dropped or abandoned and to act in accordance with law. He has also prayed

for a declaration that the petitioner is entitled to be promoted to

the post of Chief Engineer with effect from September 2015.

On behalf of the respondents, the Chief Executive Officer of

KMDA, i.e., the respondent no. 2 has filed an affidavit wherein it

has been said that on receipt of certain complaints against the

petitioner, the Anti-Corruption Bureau of the State Vigilance

Commission made necessary investigation into the matter and on

perusal of the report of investigation and related documents

including the statement of the concerned employee, the Vigilance

Commission was of the view that there are materials for proceeding

against him, departmentally under the West Bengal Service

(Classification Control and Appeal) Rules, 1971. After preparing

the draft charges they sent the same to the respondent no. 2 by a

Memo dated May 13, 2015.

It has been alleged against the petitioner that while acting as

the Superintending Engineer, East Circle, he had invited an online

tender for designing supply and water supply carrier pipes near

Sodepur railway station at an arbitrarily high rate and had issued

work order in favour of M/s. Protomac Construction in a very lackadaisical manner which reflected lack of devotion to duties and

displayed gross misconduct.

Upon compliance of the required formalities, the disciplinary

proceeding was initiated against the petitioner and an enquiry was

started under Regulation 82 of the KMDA Service Regulation,

1975. The disciplinary authority appointed Sri Pranab Kumar Paul,

Deputy Commissioner of Departmental Enquiry, State Vigilance

Commission, Government of West Bengal as an inquiring

authority.

In terms of the direction given by this Court in the earlier

writ petition the disciplinary proceeding was required to be

concluded by July 27, 2016. The inquiring authority being the

Deputy Commissioner for departmental enquiries upon conclusion

of the enquiry submitted his report and findings to the State

Vigilance Commission which was forwarded by the Joint Secretary

of the State Commission to the disciplinary authority by a Memo,

dated July 14, 2016.

The respondent no.2 further states that the report submitted

by the inquiring authority was quite voluminous which had taken a few weeks for the disciplinary authority to go through the same

and to consider the findings on merit. The disciplinary authority

was satisfied that the inquiring authority had come to the

conclusion in his findings upon his judicious analysis and

documents. He having agreed with the findings with the inquiring

authority and held the delinquent officer to be guilty of the charges

and deserved a harsh punishment considering the serious nature

of charges.

Therefore, a second show-cause notice to the petitioner was

issued proposing to impose a major punishment of reduction of

pay by three stages lower in the current pay band for a period of

three years. The petitioner was given an opportunity to defend

himself by showing cause within 15 days of receipt of the said

notice as to why the punishment proposed would not be imposed

on him for the charges established against him in the enquiry. The

reply of the petitioner which was received on September 19, 2016,

not only contained voluminous documents but also involved

certain technical specifications and financial implications. For

dealing with the said reply in a better manner, the disciplinary

authority sent the same to the inquiring authority by a Memo,

dated November 3, 2016. The same was sent to the Joint Secretary, State Vigilance Commission for taking necessary action

from their end. Since no response to the memo was received from

the Joint Secretary till January 30, 2017, a reminder was issued

for doing the needful at the earliest as the timeframe fixed by the

Court had already expired.

The Joint Secretary, State Vigilance Commission by his

Memo dated February 10, 2017, informed the KMDA authorities

that all those documents had already been returned to the KMDA

and that the disciplinary authority was solely authorized and

competent to determine the penalty to be imposed upon the

charged officer and, therefore, requested him to take necessary

action on the strength of that. After receiving this communication

from the State Vigilance Commission, the respondent authorities

took some time to examine the explanation of the petitioner as also

the documents annexed to his reply. Upon consideration thereof,

the disciplinary authority agreed with the findings of the inquiring

authority and found him guilty of the charges of misconduct

having been duly established against him. The disciplinary

authority dared not to pass the final order due to the pendency of

the present petition where the petitioner questioned the

continuance of the proceeding itself. However, after it has been clarified by this Court in its order, dated April 6, 2017, that

pendency of the writ petition shall not debar the respondents to

pass by any order or final order in considering the case of the

petitioner without prejudice to the rights and contentions of the

parties, the disciplinary authority passed the final order on April

11, 2017, imposing the punishment as proposed by him in the

show-cause notice.

The respondent no.2 mentions these explanations in

justification for not being able to complete the disciplinary

proceeding within the time fixed by this Court. The delay in

completing the disciplinary proceeding is neither intentional nor

deliberate. The respondent no.2 tendered unqualified apology

before the Court.

I have heard Mr. Maitra, the learned Senior Counsel for the

petitioner and Mr. Bose, the learned advocate for the respondents

and have given my anxious consideration to the respective cases.

Although the writ petition contains a host of allegations on

merit against the disciplinary proceeding initiated against the

petitioner and the conduct of it, relief sought by the petitioner is not directed against the report of the enquiry or the order of the

disciplinary authority on merit. The petitioner''s prayer in respect of

the disciplinary proceeding is confined to treating the same as

dropped or closed or abandoned.

It is not understood why the Chief Executive Officer has filed

an affidavit merely explaining the delay in concluding the

departmental proceeding. On April 6, 2017, this Court directed the

respondent no.2 to file a report in the form of an affidavit in

response to the allegation made in the writ petition. It was further

directed that the report most specifically disclose the reasons for

not being able to complete the proceeding within the timeframe as

fixed by this Court. It did not mean that the affidavit should be

confined only to disclosure of reasons for the delay. The

respondents are, however, certainly entitled not to respond to the

material allegations in a petition in spite of being given an

opportunity to controvert the same. But in that case the material

allegations in the writ petition go unchallenged.

If one wants to examine the merits of the allegations in the

writ petition, there are plenty of them. If one is required to deal

with the grievance of the petitioner that documents were not supplied to him in time, or he was not allowed by the respondents

to have the assistance of an Advocate, etc. the points certainly lean

very heavily in favour of the petitioner.

Even if the KMDA Service Regulations do not permit the

representation of a delinquent officer by a lawyer unless there is

any specific bar to the contrary the authorities might have allowed

to him to be so represented as the presenting officer, the petitioner

was right in taking the point, was a senior police officer who was

more acquainted with the intricacies of both the prosecution as

well as the defence. It matters little that he was not a lawyer, for he

had the requisite training and expertise in this particular field,

both in the conduct of an enquiry as well as in the art of

examination and cross-examination of witnesses.

That there was an obvious dilly-dallying in providing the

copies of the necessary documents to the petitioner cannot be

doubted and it will be evident from the minutes of the proceeding

themselves. Ultimately this Court had directed the respondents to

furnish the relevant documents to the petitioner within three

weeks. By that time examination of the prosecution witnesses had

been closed. Such a belated supply of records must have rendered the petitioner significantly handicapped in both preparing his

statement of defence as well as the cross-examining the

prosecution witnesses.

But since the petitioner has not prayed for setting aside the

enquiry report or the order passed by the disciplinary authority on

merit, I refrain from making any further observation on the merits

of the case. The specific prayer is for a direction upon the

respondents to treat the disciplinary proceeding as abandoned or

withdrawn. Here the petitioner has primarily based his case on the

non-compliance of the order passed by this Court about the time

schedule fixed by it.

I have very closely considered the explanation given by the

respondent no. 2 in his affidavit. It does not really inspire much

confidence nor it does the explanation appear to be very either

convincing or acceptable. The reasons for the delay, as mentioned

in the affidavit, leave much to be desired as the conduct of the

respondents. On April 28, 2016, this Court had directed the

inquiry officer to conclude the enquiry within six weeks from the

date of furnishing the relevant documents to the petitioner which

was to be done within a period of three weeks from the date of the order. The petitioner has alleged that the Inquiry Officer was a

party to that writ petition and he was also served with a copy of the

order.

It appears that the respondents were crucially aware of the

outer limit fixed by this Court for conclusion of the entire

disciplinary proceeding. There was undoubtedly some delay on the

part of the inquiry officer in submitting his report but the Vigilance

Commission by a Memo dated July 14, 2016, had forwarded it to

the disciplinary authority. The stand taken in the affidavit of the

respondent no. 2 that the disciplinary authority had less than two

weeks to complete the disciplinary action may factually correct,

but the disciplinary authority cannot take advantage of it as

justifying its further delay. In the scheme of the timeframe fixed by

this Court, the time given to the disciplinary authority to conclude

the entire proceeding was four weeks. If there had been a delay of

two weeks in receiving the copy of the enquiry report and if the

disciplinary authority could conclude the disciplinary action within

a further period of two weeks beyond the timeframe fixed by this

Court, the petitioner perhaps would not have had much to impugn

the action of the respondent no. 2.

The statement made in Paragraph 10 of the affidavit and the

subsequent steps taken by him most certainly are not expected of

the disciplinary authority when the time fixed by this Court was

running out. They should have taken all the steps as expeditiously

as possible and not in a lackadaisical manner. The plea taken by

the respondent no. 2 that the report of the inquiry officer was

voluminous is not very easily an acceptable defence. The enquiry

report as annexed to the writ petition runs into 24 pages, each

page containing about 25 lines. The first few pages of the enquiry

report i.e., about 9 pages deal with the usual preliminaries, the

charge against the petitioner and the defence case, etc. These are

imperatives in any enquiry report. Though the disciplinary

authority has most certainly to go through the whole report, the

consideration of these preliminaries is not really a very time

consuming matter. The respondent no. 2 has also stated that he

had to consider the findings of the inquiry officer on merit. Such

findings have occupied not more than 16/17 pages of the report. It

is not understood why the disciplinary authority had taken a few

weeks to go through the findings and to consider the same on

merit. The explanation on this point is inadequate.

After the disciplinary authority agreed with the findings of

the Inquiry Officer, he issued a second show-cause notice to the

petitioner on September 6, 2016. In other words, the respondent

no. 2 had taken about seven weeks to go through and consider the

findings of the inquiry officer which runs into not more than 17/18

pages. The respondent no. 2 had given 15 days'' time to the

petitioner to show cause against the proposed punishment.

The petitioner kept himself to the time fixed by the

respondent no. 2. I would say he had given his reply even before

the expiry of 15 days.

The respondent no. 2 has again taken the plea that the reply

by the petitioner was voluminous. It is true that the reply was a

lengthy one, but it was quite natural under the circumstances,

particularly, in a case of a disciplinary proceeding being faced by a

very senior engineer of an organization where the delinquent officer

has to give reply to the enquiry report and in the process he had to

refer to different points and different items as emerging from

evidence adduced at the enquiry, both oral and documentary.

The next step taken by the respondent no. 2 was very

unusual and not expected of him as the disciplinary authority. He

thought as per his own statement in the affidavit that for dealing

with the said reply it would be sent to the inquiring authority again

and by a memo dated November 3, 2016, he did exactly the same.

Thereafter, for about three months the disciplinary authority did

not take any action of follow it up. It was only on January 31, 2017

that the KMDA authority decided to issue a reminder to the

Inquiring authority. In reply to the reminder, the inquiring

authority informed the KMDA authorities that the disciplinary

authority was solely authorized and competent to determine the

penalty to be imposed upon the petitioner and requested him to

take a decision.

If the disciplinary authority could take a decision on the

inquiry report and if he could agree with the findings, it is not

understood why the reply by the petitioner should require an

external help. The reply as annexed to the writ petition does not

really disclose that the petitioner had referred to any technical

engineering aspect of the matter which a non-technical man like

an administrative head was not competent to deal. It most

certainly refers to various aspects and items of the tender and reference was made to prices of different materials, evidence

adduced etc. If the disciplinary authority had felt any difficulty

because of the alleged technicalities involved in it there was no

point in sending it to the inquiring authority either. After all he too

does not appear to be a technical person; at least there is no

evidence to that effect.

That apart, why must the disciplinary authority send the

reply of a delinquent officer to the inquiring authority for dealing

with the same? The job of an inquiring authority ends with the

submission of the enquiry report and irrespective of whether the

reply of the delinquent officer contains any matter touching on any

technical aspect, it has to be dealt with by the disciplinary

authority and him alone. It is all the more so when the inquiring

authority had found the petitioner guilty of the charges. Why was

the reply then sent to the inquiring authority? Underlying in the

exercise was there not an effort to obtain a response from the

inquiring authority so that the reply of the petitioner may be

effectively countered and rejected. I have no hesitation in holding

that in this respect the disciplinary authority had abdicated his

authority in favour of the inquiry officer which he must not have

been done, either under the Regulations of the KMDA or under the service jurisprudence in general. Even if he had sent it to the

inquiring authority why did he wait for about 12 weeks to send a

reminder, when he was far out of the timeframe fixed by this

Court? I definitely discover a certain degree of laid back attitude in

the conduct of the proceeding, particularly in the manner the

respondent no. 2 had acted.

The act of the disciplinary authority was also not supportable

for a very different reason. The reply given by the petitioner was

against the report of the inquiring authority. The validity of that

report was to be decided by the disciplinary authority alone. The

respondent no. 2 had sent it to the inquiring authority against

whose finding the petitioner had made observations. If under these

circumstances the inquiring authority is requested to deal with the

reply of the petitioner, he is to decide the validity of the reply which

is against his own report. By this, the respondent no. 2 had sought

to make the inquiring authority as the judge in his own cause.

Otherwise, there was no justifiable explanation why the response

to a report should be dealt with by the maker of the report himself,

particularly when the inquiring authority was not expected to find

any fault with his own report.

Even if one accepts the explanation of the disciplinary

authority that because of the pendency of the writ petition the final

order was not passed, the inordinate delay at every step prior to

that clearly evinces that the timeframe fixed by the Court in the

earlier writ petition was not seriously attempted to be complied

with. If the reasons mentioned in the affidavit were really posing

problem to the disciplinary authority to conclude the proceeding

within the timeframe fixed by the Court, there was nothing

preventing him from approaching the Court at an appropriate

stage for extension of time to conclude the proceeding. That would

have been in fitness of things, a more appropriate response of the

respondents for establishing their bona fides. The respondents

have not taken any steps towards that which goes a long way to

raise a suspicion that they did not take the Court''s order very

seriously.

On the other hand, the petitioner has done everything within

his power. He even gave his reply within the scheduled date and

time. There was no lapse on his part. It cannot also be said that by

responding to the disciplinary authority''s letter, dated September

6, 2016, he had waived his right to raise the issue of delay

subsequently. He in his reply specifically reminded the respondent no. 2 about the timeframe fixed by the Court and the effect of not

complying with the same including the lack of jurisdiction on the

part of the respondent no. 2 to take further steps in the

disciplinary proceeding. After expressing his very firm views in the

matter, he had given his reply without prejudice to his rights and

contentions both in respect of the validity of the disciplinary

proceeding as well as the effect of not complying with the

timeframe fixed by this Court. Therefore, it is within the right of

the petitioner to agitate the issue of non-compliance of the court''s

order which he has done in the present case.

If one reads carefully the order passed by the Court on April

28, 2016 in the earlier writ petition as a whole, one would find it

hard to say that the direction of the Court that the disciplinary

action "should be concluded within three months from the date"

was merely directory or expressed the desire of the Court by which

time the disciplinary proceeding should be completed. Most

certainly it was more than that. The tone of the judgment has been

set out right from the paragraph 2 of the same where the learned

Judge emphasized the importance of concluding the disciplinary

proceeding within a stipulated period and the impermissibility of

continuing with it endlessly. In the said order, the expression ''should be'' has been used twice, viz., when the learned single

Judge had held in respect of the disciplinary proceeding in general

that they should be concluded within three to six months and

when it was said that the disciplinary action in the present case

should be concluded within three months from the date. In both

the cases the Court had used the expression in the sense of an

unalterable imperative. It cannot be said that Court was

expressing something which should be desirable under normal

circumstances. On the contrary, it was expressing its anxiety that

for a period of more than 10 months the disciplinary proceeding

did not make any progress. Judged in that background the

expression ''should be'' has an unmistakable sense of "must" in it.

The Court did not express any desire about the conclusion of the

disciplinary proceeding. Because of its failure to make any

progress for a very substantial period the Court decided to fix the

outer limit by which the disciplinary proceeding was to be

concluded. The direction was mandatory and not directory in

nature.

In the context of what the learned single Judge had earlier

directed, had there been a slight or negligible delay in concluding

the disciplinary proceeding the Court could have ignored it and might not have taken an exception to the delay occurred in

concluding the disciplinary proceeding. As per the timeframe, the

disciplinary authority was entitled to get two more weeks after the

submission of the enquiry report. But what he had done

afterwards was unsupportable on both the counts. It was bad from

the point of view of merit as well as in not sticking to the timeframe

fixed by him.

Any reasonable man thus will be left with no option than to

conclude that the disciplinary authority violated the Court''s order

in not being within the timeframe fixed by the Court, and too by a

gross delay. I quite agree with the stand taken by the petitioner

that after such an unreasonable delay the disciplinary authority

lacked the authority to pass the final order. Its conduct leads to

but one conclusion that the proceeding against the petitioner must

be treated to be closed or abandoned. I declare that any steps

taken by the respondent authorities beyond the timeframe fixed by

the Court was not in terms of the Court''s order beyond the

jurisdiction of the disciplinary authority and, therefore, is bad in

law. I further direct the disciplinary authority as well as the

respondent no. 1 not to give any effect or further effect to the order or orders passed by them subsequent to the expiry of the period

fixed by the Court.

It is further declared that in the absence of any other

disqualification and if the petitioner has fulfilled the eligibility

criteria in all respects, he shall be entitled to be considered for

promotion to the post of the Chief Engineer. If the said post is lying

vacant, the respondents shall consider the case of the petitioner

along with others within a reasonable timeframe. I make it clear

that in view of the petitioner''s persistent grievance that he has

been superseded repeatedly on the plea of pendency of a

disciplinary proceeding against him, this direction for

consideration of the case of the petitioner within a proximate

future is to be treated as mandatory. It is clarified that the

direction to consider the case of the petitioner for promotion has

nothing to do with the ultimate decision of the respondent no. 1 in

this regard. They shall be free to take the appropriate decision

strictly in accordance with law and the procedure laid down

therefor. But the fact that the petitioner was once proceeded

against and he was found guilty in the present enquiry proceeding

shall not be a relevant factor in considering his case for future

promotion.

The writ petition is thus allowed.

There shall be no order as to costs.

Urgent Photostat certified copy of this order, if applied for, be

supplied to the parties on priority basis upon compliance of all

requisite formalities.