Prahalad Lohra vs State Of Jharkhand

Heard Ms. Vani Kumari, learned counsel for the appellant and Mr. Azeemuddin, learned A.P.P., appearing for the State.

This appeal is directed against the judgment of conviction dated 27.05.2006 and order of sentence dated 29.05.2006 passed by Sri Ramesh Kumar

Srivastava, Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court No.I, Gumla in Sessions Trial Case No. 247/2005 whereby and whereunder the appellant has

been sentenced to undergo R.I. for three years for the offence u/s 493 of the IPC with a fine of Rs.10,000/-. In default of payment of fine further

imprisonment of three months.

Chainpura P.S. Case No.60/2005 has been registered under Section 376 of the IPC on written report (Ext.-1) of the prosecutrix, namely, Marry

Tirkey (P.W.-1). As per the prosecution story, physical relationship has been established with the prosecutrix by the appellant on the assurance of

marriage. Thereafter, incident has been narrated.

After completion of investigation, the police has submitted charge-sheet against the appellant under Section 376 of the IPC. Thereafter, cognizance

has been taken. Case has been committed to the court of sessions and ultimately, charge has been framed under Section 376 of the IPC to which

appellant pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried.

To substantiate the prosecution story altogether six witnesses have been examined.

P.W-1, Marry Tirkey is the prosecutrix.

P.W.-2, Ramveer Lohra is the son of the accused.

P.W.-3, Deep Narayan Lohra is the neighbour.

P.W.-4, Dr. Anoopa Kuzur is the doctor who has examined the prosecutrix.

P.W.-5, Jamuna Prasad Sahu (A.S.I.), is I.O of the case.

P.W. 6, Vinod Minz, is the local of area.

On conclusion of prosecution evidence, the statement of the appellant has been recorded under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973

which is quoted hereinunder:-

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After appreciating the evidence, appellant has been acquitted from the charge of 376 of the IPC but he has been convicted under Section 493 of the

IPC.

Heard learned counsel for the parties.

From perusal of record, it appears that the prosecutrix has alleged the commission of crime on the assurance of marriage. P.W.-1, in her cross-

examination, has deposed on the same line that they have not got married or the prosecutrix has no confusion regarding the fact that she was never

married to the appellant. None of the prosecution witness has even suggested that they got married rather evidence has come that they were in live-in

relationship.

Section 493 of the IPC reads as under:-

“493. Cohabitation caused by a man deceitfully inducing a belief of lawful marriage.â€"Every man who by deceit causes any woman

who is not lawfully married to him to believe that she is lawfully married to him and to cohabit or have sexual intercourse with him in that

belief, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine.â€​

The ingredient of section is clear that the prosecutrix to belief that she is lawfully married to the accused. The false belief, which has been caused by

the accused, is the necessary ingredient for convicting the accused under Section 493 of the IPC. In the present case, it is never alleged that such

belief was existing in the mind of the prosecutrix. Even the question put to the appellant under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. (supra) suggests that no

such allegation has been imputed against the appellant.

In view of above discussion and the material available on record, the conviction of the appellant under Section 493 of the IPC is wholly unjustified and

not sustainable and accordingly, he is acquitted from the charge of Section 493 of the IPC.

Consequently, the judgment of conviction dated 27.05.2006 and order of sentence dated 29.05.2006 passed by Sri Ramesh Kumar Srivastava,

Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court No.I, Gumla in Sessions Trial Case No. 247/2005 is set aside. Accordingly, the appeal stands disposed of.

Since the appellant is already on bail, he is discharged from the liability of his bail bonds.