Prahlad Rai and Another vs Emperor

Agarwala, J.—The petitioner Prahlad Bai has been sentenced to nine months'' rigorous imprisonment and to pay a fine of Rs. 1000 for contravening an order of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate of Rajmahal prohibiting the sale of certain commodities above a certain rate. The other petitioner, Nathmal Marwari is an employee of Prahlad Rai, and has been sentenced to three months'' rigorous imprisonment and to pay a fine of Rs. 300 for the same offence.

In exercise of powers conferred by Rule 81(2)(b), Defence of India Rules, the Sub-Divisional Officer, made an order prohibiting the sale of sugar at more than Rs. 15 a maund, flour at Rs. 8-14-0 a maund, white kerosene oil at Rs. 5-4-3 a tin and red kerosene oil at Rs. 4-18-6 a tin. It is-alleged that the petitioners sold four tins of kerosene oil at Rs. 8 a tin, flour at Rs. 18-8-0 a maund and sugar at Rs. 22-8-0 a maund. A cash memo was issued to the purchaser showing the prices charged to be those fixed by the Sub-Divisional Officer, although, in fact, the prices charged were as stated.

The only question that has been argued before us is that the conviction is wrong in the absence of proof that the order of the Sub-Divisional Officer was published in the manner required by Rule 119, Defence of India Rules, that is to say, in the manner which the Sub-Divisional Officer considered to be best adapted for bringing his order to the notice of the persons to be affected by it. We have been referred to decisions of this Court and of other Courts on this question. The prosecution offered no direct evidence of the method of publication, or of the method prescribed by the Sub-Divisional Officer for publication of his order. But the prosecution are entitled to ask the Court to come to a finding of fact not only on evidence which they lead but on evidence which is otherwise brought on the record. The material finding in this case is that the petitioners issued a cash memo wrongly showing that the prices they had charged were the prices actually prescribed by the Sub-Divisional Officer.

From that fact it is clearly inferable that the petitioners knew of the order made by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, that is to say, that they not only knew that the Sub-Divisional Magistrate had made an order fixing the prices of the various commodities at the rates already referred to, but that knowledge of that order had been brought to the notice of the petitioners in the manner contemplated by the Sub-Divisional Officer. This circumstance, that the petitioners knew the controlled rate at which the articles should have been sold, distinguishes this case from the other cases which have been referred to.

Furthermore, we are asked in this case to interfere with the convictions in the exercise of our revisional jurisdiction. That jurisdiction is exercised at our discretion, and only for the purpose of relieving persons who have, not had a fair trial, or whose convictions have been arrived at by non-observance of material provisions of the law, or by such misdirections as must have occasioned a failure of justice.

We are satisfied in this case that the petitioners actually knew what the controlled prices of the commodities were in which they were dealing, and, therefore, there is no justification whatsoever for interfering with the convictions and sentences which have been passed on them. I would, accordingly discharge this rule.

Meredith, J.

I agree.

The petitioners never challenged the fact of the publication at the trial, and the finding, which was, in my opinion, fully justified, was that they knew of the controlled rates and sold in deliberate contravention of them. There is not the slightest reason for holding that there has been any miscarriage of justice in this case, and, in my judgment, there is no ground at all for interference in revision.