Prakash Chandra and Others vs State of U.P. and Another

A.N. Dikshita, J.—This application u/s 482 Code of Criminal Procedure has been filed by the applicants for quashing the order dated 13-9-1985 passed by Special Judge Dacoity Affected Area, Hamirpur.

Briefly stated the facts are that Crime No. 72/83 under Sections 399/402 IPC read with Section 2(b), 10/12 U.P. Dacoity Affected Area Act and case Crime No. 73/83, 74/83, 75/83 and 76/83 u/s 25 of the Indian Arms Act were registered at Police Station Majhgawan District Hamirpur. The FIR was lodged by Sri. Surendra Singh, the then Station Officer of Police Station Majhgawan, District Hamirpur. It transpires that lateron the case was investigated, by Rameshwar Prasad Chaudhari, a Inspector in the Criminal Investigation Department Kanpur. After necessary investigation, the Investigating Officer submitted a report to the Special Judge, Dacoity Affected Area, Hamirpur for the acceptance of the final report. The complainant Sri. Surendra Singh, the then Station Officer protested against the acceptance of the final report by the learned Special Judge, Hamirpur.

The learned Special Judge, in view of the protest so lodged by Sri. Surendra Singh, proceeded with an inquiry wherein statements of public witnesses namely, Malkhan Singh son of Ram Cbaran and Bhagwan Das S/o Tijwa, besides complainant Sri. Surendra Singh were recorded. The Investigating Officer Sri. Rameshwar Prasad Chaudhary was also examined. The learned Special Judge also perused the statement of the witnesses as well as case diary and other relevant records. The learned Special Judge found that all the public witnesses in their statements recorded u/s 161 Code of Criminal Procedure have supported the allegations, contained in the FIR. However, Investigating Officer in view of some statements of the relatives of the accused came to the conclusion that the accused persons were falsely implicated, but the learned Special Judge has found that the Investigating Officer (Sri. Rameshwar Prasad Chaudhary) has himself stated that in view of a telegram dated 23-7-1983 (9.25 P.M.) and on the statements of other witnesses, who were not members of the police party, the Investigating Officer came to the conclusion that the case is false. The learned Special Judge on the consideration of the statements of complainant, Sri. Surendra Singh, public witnesses-Bhagwan Das and Malkhan, and on the perusal of the case diary found tbht it is a fit case to proceed against the applicants under Sections 399/402 IPC read with Section 2(b), 10/12 U.P. Dacoity Affected Area Act, as well as u/s 25 of the Arms Act. The learned Special Judge after a detailed order has held that it is not proper to aocept the final report so submitted by the Investigating Officer and he preferred to take cognizance of the case under Clause (1)(a) of Section 190 Code of Criminal Procedure Consequently, Sri. Prakash S/o Vishwanath Misra r/o Rahnak P.S. Majhgawan, Phullo S/o Ram Das Khangar r/o Tikari, P.S. Dakor District Jalaun, Lula son of Tijwa Dhimar r/o Atgaon, P.S. Majhgawan, Sheo Narain S/o Babu Ram Kalar r/o Rahnak, P.S. Majhgawan and Kapur Singh S/o Pritam Singh r/o Rahnak P.S. Majhgawan were directed to face trial under the aforesaid provisions.

Heard learned Counsel for the applicants. It has been submitted that the learned Special Judge acted without jurisdiction while taking cognizance of the case as no sanction of the District Magistrate was obtained while taking cognizance u/s 25 of the Arms Act.

Learned Counsel for the applicants has then submitted that the learned Special Judge illegally erred in taking cognizance u/s 190(1)(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The relevant provision is quoted in extenso herein below:

190(1)(a): Cognizance of offences by Magistrates: (I) Subject to the provisions of this Chapter, any Magistrate of the first class, and any Magistrate of the second class specially empowered in this behalf under Sub-section (2), may take cognizance of any offence-

(a) upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence;

In support of this submission, learned Counsel for the applicants has placed reliance on the case of Chandrashekhar and Others Vs. State, . The facts of this case are at variance witb the controversy involved here. As observed above, the learned Special Judge has taken cognizance u/s 190(1)(a). Moreover the provisions of Section 7(1) of the U.P, Dacoity Affected Area Act 1983 are identical as to Section 190(1) (a). The Special Judge seems to have been swayed for this aspect that he is taking cognizance u/s 190(1)(a) Code of Criminal Procedure, but the cognizance in such case is being taken u/s 7(1) which is identical and as such cannot be agitated that the jurisdiction has been wrongly exercised.

The identical provisions providing for procedure and powers of Special Court had been enjoined u/s 7(1) of the U.P. Dacoity Affected Area Act, 1983, and they are reproduced below:

Section 7(1): Procedure and powers of Special Court(1) A Special Court may take cognizance of any scheduled offence.

(a) upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence;

(b) upon a police report of such facts;

(c) upon information received from any person other than a police officer, or upon its own knowledge that such offence has been committed:

Provided that all cases triable by a Special Judge under this Act, pending before any Court immediately before the date of the commencement of this Act in a dacoity affected area, shall stand transferred to the Special Court having jurisdiction over such cases and shall be dealt with and disposed of in accordance with the provisions of this Act.

Then another submission which has been advanced is that Sri. Surendra Singh is himself a police officer and as such no cognizance could have been taken. It has already been shown above that learned Special Judge has taken cognizance under the provisions of Clause (a), Sub-section (1) of Section 190 Code of Criminal Procedure. The present submmission being eliminated deserves to be discarded.

Having given my anxious consideration to the facts involved in the case, I do not find that this is a fit case where inherent jurisdiction exerciseable by this Court u/s 482 Code of Criminal Procedure may be invoked. Neither there is any abuse of the process of Court, nor otherwise it is required instantly to secure the ends of justice. In fact ends of justice requires that the case shall proceed as I do not find any illegality in the impugned order.

In the result, the application fails fend is hereby rejected.