Pramod Kumar Singh vs Tata Iron and Steel Co. Ltd

Gautam Kumar Choudhary, J

In both the civil miscellaneous petitions common questions of fact and law is involved, therefore, they are being heard together and will be disposed of by the common order.

The issue at hand is whether a stranger to the decree, who claims to be in possession of the decretal property, can raise an objection under Order XXI Rule 97 of the CPC and further whether the executing Court is obligated to hear and dispose of the objection raised by the stranger under this provision.

Title Suit No.115/70 was decreed in favour of the opposite party-Company, Tata Steel Limited on 06.09.1994 which attained finality.

The decree was put in execution vide Execution Case No.6/1996 and the decree is yet to be finally executed.

The petitioners- Dinesh Kumar Singh and Sandeep Singh preferred an objection to the execution of the decree in Civil Misc. Case No.14/2024 on the basis of the claim of possession. Objection on identical ground was raised by one Pramod Kumar Singh & Others in Civil Misc. Case No.16/2024 which has been dismissed by the learned Executing Court inter alia on the ground that Order XXI Rule 97 of the CPC was not attracted as the petitioners were stranger to the decree. The learned executing Court noted that such a petition was not maintainable by stranger also in view of Rule 115B of Civil Court Rule of the High Court of Jharkhand (Amendment), wherein it has been provided that the executing Court must not issue notice to a third party claiming rights in a mechanical manner. Executing Court relied on Nand Lal Sharma Vs. Raj Kumar Sharma, 2014(3) JLJR 13 Jhr., wherein it has been held that an objection petition in the execution proceeding is not maintainable at the instance of a third party, who had no right , title or interest in the property.

It is argued by the learned counsel on behalf of the petitioners that the law has been settled by Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sameer Singh & Anr. Vs. Abdul Rab & Others, (2015) 1 SCC 379, that the executing Court has the authority to adjudicate all the questions pertaining to right, title or interest in the property arising between the parties. It also includes the claim of a stranger who apprehends dispossession or has already been dispossessed from the immovable property. The provisions contained in Order XXI Rules 97, 98, 99 of the CPC are self-contained and they enjoin the executing Court to adjudicate on the title of the objector, to avoid multiplicity of proceedings. Prior to 1976 amendment, the grievance was required to be agitated by filing a suit but after the amendment the entire enquiry has to be conducted by the executing Court. It is contended that the ratio as laid down in this case been followed by the Apex Court in Ved Kumari (Dead) Vs. Municipal Corporation of Delhi, (2023) 13 SCC 651.

It is argued by the learned counsel on behalf of the opposite parties that the documents relied upon by the petitioners on the claim of their possession is the recent survey which was started in 1994 and was finally published in 2000 showing his possession since 1975. These documents are subsequent to the filing of the Title Suit No.115/70 which was decreed in favour of the opposite party- Company, Tata Steel Limited on 06.09.1994. It is argued that Order XXI Rule 97 of the CPC can be invoked by a stranger to the decree in bona fide possession of the same and obstruction should be recorded in the execution proceeding. Unless there is an obstruction by a stranger, there cannot be adjudication. Mere filing of an objection petition, will not be sufficient for invoking Order XLI Rule 97 of the CPC. Specific reference is made in Shamsher Singh & Another Vs. Lieutenant Colonel Nahar Singh (dead), (2019) 17 SCC 279, Para 16.

ANALYSIS

One disturbing fact that stares at our face is that the suit was filed in the year 1970, it was decreed in 1994, it attains finality, yet the fruits of the decree, eludes the decree holder.

Petition dated 1st October 2024 under Order XXI Rules 97 & 101 of C.P.C in the Execution case No.6 of 1996 is not filed by the decree holder, but in CMP No.1153 of 2025 filed by stranger to the decree on the ground that part of the land decreed in the suit was in illegal possession of their uncle Prahlad Singh, who died issueless and his property devolved on them, who perfected their right by way of adverse possession. Identical plea is taken without success by the petitioners in C.M.P. No. 1139 of 2025 that petitioners are sons and legal heirs of the Late Prabhu Nath Singh, who was in possession of the scheduled land.

Question that naturally arises, can the petitioners, who were strangers to the decree raise plea of title by adverse possession over the decretal property by filing a petition under Order XXI Rule 97? Or, Such a plea can be taken after being dispossessed under Order XXI Rule 99?

Answer to the question is fraught with wide ramification. On the one hand, the scheme of the Code provides that such a plea is not available to a stranger, who is not in real physical possession and can be raised by him only after being dispossessed under Order XXI Rule 99. This is intended to guard against such objectors, who without any semblance of title attempt to encroach upon the decretal property or are set up by the Judgment debtor in the execution proceeding to delay or frustrate the execution. If the title in all such cases start being adjudicated by the executing court, then for all practical purpose execution proceeding can never be concluded. One or another party can come forward and claim possession and the executing court will be forced to decide their title. The decision so rendered will be amenable to challenge in first appeal and second appeal as a decree.

On the other hand, the possession of bona fide objectors having title also need protection, if the decree is obtained deliberately behind their back and they face imminent dispossession, therefore, their objection needs to be heard and decided under Order XXI Rule 97 of the CPC, it will be inequitable to seek their remedy under Order XXI Rule 99 of the CPC only after their dispossession.

There is every possibility for misuse of the provision contained in Order XXI Rules 97 to 103 of the C.P.C. However, carefully a legislation may be drafted, and notwithstanding the salutary objects for which its provisions are enacted, there always remains a possibility of misuse, as no provision can be completely insulated from manipulation by unscrupulous litigants. Order XXI Rule 97 or 99 of the C.P.C is not an exception and therefore, discretion by the Court in its application is to be exercised with care and circumspection.

In order to comprehend the scheme within which the objection can be raised by a stranger it will be desirable to extract the relevant provisions of Order XXI of the C.P.C which are as under: -

Rule 97-Resistance or obstruction to possession of immovable property

(1) Where the holder of a decree for the possession of immovable property or the auction purchaser is resisted or obstructed by any person obtaining the possession of the property, he may make an application to the court complaining of such resistance or obstruction.

(2) Where any adjudication is made under sub-rule(1) , the court shall proceed to adjudicate upon the application in accordance with the provision hereinafter contained.

Rule 98-Orders after adjudication-- Upon determination of the question as referred to in R 101, the Court shall, in accordance with such rule in determination make an order allowing the application and directing that applicant be put in possession or pass other order in the circumstance of the case, it may deem fit.

Where upon such determination the court is satisfied that the resistance or obstruction was without any just cause by the judgment debtor or by some other person at his instigation or on his behalf or by any transferee, where such transfer was made during the pendency of the suit or execution proceeding, it shall direct that applicant be put into possession of the property and when the applicant is still resisted or obstructed the court may also at the instance of the applicant, order the judgment debtor or any person on his behalf to be detained in the civil prison.

Rule 99- Dispossession by decree holder or purchaser

Where any person other than the judgment debtor is dispossessed of immovable property by the holder of the decree or by an auction purchaser he may make an application to the court complaining of such a dispossession.

The court shall proceed to adjudicate upon the application in accordance with the provisions herein contained

Rule 101-Questions to be determined – All questions including questions relating to right, title or interest arising between the parties to a proceeding on an application under rule 97 or 99 shall be determined by the court dealing with the application and not by a separate suit.

From the plain reading of Rules 97, 98, 99 and 101, together it is apparent that under Rule 97 of the CPC, the application of the decree-holder or the auction-purchaser is maintainable if he complains with regard to the resistance or obstruction made by third party in obtaining the possession of the property. It is ordinarily the holder of the decree for possession of immovable property or auction purchaser of such property can take recourse to Rule-97. When a complain of such obstruction is made, the Court should issue notice to the obstructer and enquire into his claim and not summarily order his eviction by force. A writ of delivery of possession claimed by the decree holder is in fact an application under Order XXI Rule 97 of CPC which could not be decided without hearing the objector, who may be a third party claiming independent rights.

When a person claiming title to the property in his possession obstructs the attempt by the decree holder to dispossess him from the suit property, the executing Court is competent to consider it and pass appropriate order under Order XXI Rule 103 of CPC.

When stranger to a decree in possession of the decretal property resist execution of the decree and claims title over it, the same is to be considered by the executing Court in terms of Order XXI Rule 97 of the CPC. Executing Court cannot insist that such an objector should first vacate the decretal property and then file a petition under Order XXI Rule 99 of the CPC. Thus, a party claiming title, who is apprehending his dispossession over the decretal property has right to resist execution under Order XXI Rule 97 of the CPC. This is sum and substance of the ratio relied by the Apex Court in Sameer Singh & Another Vs. Abdul Rab & Others, (2015) 1 SCC 379 and other cases as has been relied upon on behalf of the petitioners.

However, in order to raise such an objection by a stranger and resist the execution, there must be some semblance of title and possession over the decretal property. Otherwise, a decree for recovery of possession can never be executed, for the reason that any stranger could come forward, or set-up by the judgment debtor, to resist the execution of the decree and the executing Court then will be forced to examine the title of the rank trespassers over the decretal property. This will not be in tune with the object of 104th Amendment Act, 1976 of the CPC which came into effect on 01.02.1977.

It has been held in Shamsher Singh v. Nahar Singh, (2019) 17 SCC 279, in view of the statutory scheme which is delineated by the amended provisions of Rule 101, the submissions of the counsel of the opposite parties that by simply proving the fact that it was in possession prior to being dispossessed by decree-holder, he should be put back in possession cannot be accepted. The opposite parties had to prove its right, title or interest in the property to be put back in possession.

Coming to the present case, in order to see whether the petitioners in both these civil miscellaneous petitions had some semblance of title or possession over the suit property, they were directed by this Court vide order dated 08.12.2025 to file document in support of their possession by way of supplementary affidavit.

Petitioners were directed by this Court vide order dated 08.12.2025 to file document in support of their claimed possessory right over the part of the decretal property.

Petitioners by way of supplementary affidavit have filed in C.M.P. No.1153 of 2025 stating therein in para-2 that petitioners are legal heirs and nephew of Prahlad Singh, son of Palakdhari Singh and the land in question is shown in adverse possession of Prahlad Singh since 1959 in the Khatiyan published in 1992 with respect to land.

What is significant to note that in the supplementary affidavit in C.M.P. No.1139 of 2025, petitioners claimed to be the sons/heirs and descendants of Prabhu Nath Singh. The photocopy of the Khatiyan as well as online Khatiyan has been annexed as Annexure- 4 series published in the year 2000, wherein nature of land has been stated to be Anabad Bihar Sarkar which was leasehold by Tata Iron and Steel Companies Limited and in illegal possession of Prabhu Nath Singh. The Khatiyan is with respect to Plot No.404/1778 under Jamshedpur Notified Area, Ward No.13, area 0.11.50 acre and Plot No.404/1842, area 0.06.30 acre. Thus, there is prima facie evidence of their possession over the decretal property.

Other documents have also been filed on behalf of the objector, therefore, it was incumbent on the part of the executing Court to hear the parties and to dispose of the objection petition within the period as stipulated in Rahul S. Sah Vs. Jinendra Kumar Gandhi, (2021) 6 SCC 418 after determination of question rendered in Rule 101 of Order XXI of the CPC, passed appropriate order.

Therefore, impugned order passed in Civil Miscellaneous Case No.16/2024 is set aside.

C.M.P. No.1139 of 2025 is allowed. Pending Interlocutory Application, if any, stands disposed of.

So far C.M.P. No.1153 of 2025 is concerned, not a chit of paper has been filed with regard to claim of actual title or possession of these petitioners over the decretal property. It has been claimed that they happen to be the nephews of one Prahalad Singh and the finally published record of rights (Khatiyan) in 1992 with respect to Plot No.451, the illegal possession of Prahalad Singh has been shown from 1959. However, no document has been filed showing physical possession of these petitioners over the land in question. Filing of electricity bill or phone bill is of no consequence.

In order to adjudicate proprietary or possessory title, there need to be some basic pleadings and documents on the basis of which such claim is made. In the absence of it, there cannot be any adjudication. If such petitions are allowed to be entertained by the executing Court, no execution proceeding can ever be concluded. It is for this reason that Rule 115B of the Civil Court Rule provides that Court exercise jurisdiction under Section 47 of the CPC or under Order XXI of the CPC must not issue notice on an application by third party claiming rights in a mechanical manner. I, therefore, do not find any infirmity in the order passed in Civil Misc. Case No.14/2024 arising out of Execution Case No.6/1996.

C.M.P. No.1153 of 2025 stands dismissed. Pending Interlocutory Application, if any, stands disposed of.