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Judgment
Prayer in this petition is for quashing of FIR No.345 dated 03.09.2005 registered under Sections 452, 420, 506, 467, 468, 471, 148, 149,
120-B IPC at Police Station Udyog Vihar, Gurgaon as well as all the subsequent proceedings arising therefrom on the basis of compromise.
FIR was registered at the instance of respondent No.2 against six accused persons. Dispute was with regard to management and control of the
school for which allegations were made against the accused. Both the parties have entered into a settlement. Three of the accused namely Surinder
Sharma, Neeraj Kumar and Rajinder Kumar filed CRM-M No.18873 of 2014 for quashing of FIR on the basis of compromise. The said petition
was allowed by the High Court on 27.11.2014 and the FIR along with all subsequent proceedings arising therefrom were quashed qua the
aforesaid three persons. Petitioners also filed CRM-M No.43182 of 2014, but the same was dismissed on 27.11.2015 as the complainant did not
appear before the trial Court for making statements in the context of compromise.
Now again the present petition has been filed for quashing of FIR on the basis of said compromise. Notice of motion was issued on
11.04.2016. Respondent No.2/complainant appeared and admitted the factum of compromise. Vide order dated 22.11.2016, she was asked to
file specific affidavit in the context of compromise. In compliance of said order, respondent No.2 has filed an affidavit along with CRM No.3203
of 2017 to the following effect:-
That the deponent is respondent No.2 in the petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C and is competent to swear the present affidavit.
That the deponent has got registered the above said FIR against Prem Chand Sharma S/o Kirshan Kumar, Resident of House No.-46-B, Guru
Ambardass Colony, Ajnala Road, Amritsar, Punjab etc.and Surjeet Rana S/o Prakash Chand Rana R/o Balgaon, P.S. Hamirpur, Distt. Hamirpur,
H.P.
That on the intervention of friends and relatives of the deponent and the accused, a compromise has been arrived at between the parties. The
deponent does not want to pursue the said FIR and has no objection if the FIR registered against the accused Prem Chand and Surjeet Rana is
quashed.
That the compromise between the parties has been arrived at without any force, pressure, undue influence and coercion and the same has been
arrived at out of free will and consent of the parties.
In view of ratio laid down in Jayrajsinh Digvijaysinh Rana Vs. State of Gujarat and another, 2012 (4) R.C.R. (Criminal) 589, petitioners can
maintain the petition for quashing of FIR on the basis of compromise even in the absence of aforesaid two accused persons.
The same ratio of law has been laid down in Parambir Singh Gill Vs. Malkiat Kaur, 2010 (1) R.C.R. (Criminal) 256 and the decision rendered
by this Court in CRM-M No. 18632 of 2014 titled Ashok Kumar Garg and another Vs. State of Punjab and others, decided on 07.08.2015.
In view of aforesaid, I proceeded to decide this case on behalf of the petitioners.
The extent and sweep of inherent powers of the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C., for quashing criminal prosecution on merits as well as
on the basis of compromise between the accused and the victim remained question of interpretation since long. The Hon''ble Apex Court after due
consideration of judgments in Madhu Limaye vs. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1978 Supreme Court 47, Bhajan Lal vs. State of Haryana and others,
AIR 1992 Supreme Court 604 and State of Karnataka vs. L. Muniswamy and others, AIR 1977 Supreme Court 1489, has summed up the
controversy in State through Special Cell, New Delhi vs. Navjot Sandhu @ Afshan Guru and others, 2003(2) RCR (Crl.) 860 (SC). The legal
position summed up in the said judgment is in the following manner:-
Thus, the law is that Article 227 of the Constitution of India gives the High Court the power of superintendence over all courts and tribunals
throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction. This jurisdiction cannot be limited or fettered by any Act of the State
Legislature. The supervisory jurisdiction extends to keeping the subordinate tribunals within the limits of their authority and to seeing that they obey
the law. The powers under Article 227 are wide and can be used, to meet the ends of justice. They can be used to interfere even with an
interlocutory order. However, the power under Article 227 is a discretionary power and it is difficult to attribute to an order of the High Court,
such a source of power, when the High Court itself does not in terms purport to exercise any such discretionary power. It is settled law that this
power of judicial superintendence, under Article 227, must be exercised sparingly and only to keep subordinate courts and tribunals within the
bound of their authority and not to correct mere errors. Further, where the statute bans the exercise of revisional powers it would require very
exceptional circumstances to warrant interference under Article 227 of the Constitution of India since the power of superintendence was not meant
to circumvent statutory law. It is settled law that the jurisdiction under Article 227 could not be exercised ""as the cloak of an appeal in disguise.
Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code starts with the words ""Nothing in this Code"". Thus the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court under
Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code can be exercised even when there is a bar under Section 397 or some other provisions of the
Criminal Procedure Code. However, as is set out in Satya Narayan Sharma''s case (supra) this power cannot be exercised if there is a statutory
bar in some other enactment. If the order assailed is purely of an interlocutory character, which could be corrected in exercise of revisional powers
or appellate powers the High Court must refuse to exercise its inherent power. The inherent power is to be used only in cases where there is an
abuse of the process of the Court or where interference is absolutely necessary for securing the ends of justice. The inherent power must be
exercised very sparingly as cases which require interference would be few and far between. The most common case where inherent jurisdiction is
generally exercised is where criminal proceedings are required to be quashed because they are initiated illegally, vexatiously or without jurisdiction.
Most of the cases set out herein above fall in this category. It must be remembered that the inherent power is not to be resorted to if there is a
specific provision in the Code or any other enactment for redress of the grievance of the aggrieved party. This power should not be exercised
against an express bar of law engrafted in any other provision of the Criminal Procedure Code. This power cannot be exercised as against an
express bar in some other enactment.
Full Bench of this Court in Kulwinder Singh and others vs. State of Punjab and another, 2007(3) RCR (Crl.) 1052 considered the scope of
powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C., to hold that High Court has powers to quash prosecution in order to achieve ends of justice and to prevent
abuse of process of law. These powers are not limited to matrimonial dispute alone, rather these powers are unlimited. However these powers are
to be exercised very sparingly and with utmost care and caution. There is no statutory bar which can affect the inherent powers of High Court
under Section 482 Cr.P.C. The powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C., is to be exercised Ex-Debitia, justitia to prevent abuse of process of Court.
In exercise of inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C., criminal proceedings are not to be quashed where the offence is heinous in nature.
Proceedings can only be quashed where the issue is overwhelmingly and predominantly of civil profile arising out of commercial, financial,
mercantile and civil or matrimonial nature. In a way dispute may involve wrong which is basically private or personal in nature and the parties have
redressed the same by entering into compromise. In Gian Singh vs. State of Punjab and another 2012(4) RCR (Crl.) 543, the Hon''ble Supreme
Court considered necessary imports of all previous precedents and observed in the following manner:-
The position that emerges from the above discussion can be summarised thus: the power of the High Court in quashing a criminal proceeding
or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different from the power given to a criminal court for compounding the
offences under Section 320 of the Code. Inherent power is of wide plenitude with no statutory limitation but it has to be exercised in accord with
the guideline engrafted in such power viz; (i) to secure the ends of justice or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any Court. In what cases power
to quash the criminal proceeding or complaint or F.I.R may be exercised where the offender and victim have settled their dispute would depend on
the facts and circumstances of each case and no category can be prescribed. However, before exercise of such power, the High Court must have
due regard to the nature and gravity of the crime. Heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc.
cannot be fittingly quashed even though the victim or victim?s family and the offender have settled the dispute. Such offences are not private in
nature and have serious impact on society. Similarly, any compromise between the victim and offender in relation to the offences under special
statutes like Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity etc; cannot provide for any
basis for quashing criminal proceedings involving such offences. But the criminal cases having overwhelmingly and pre-dominatingly civil flavour
stand on different footing for the purposes of quashing, particularly the offences arising from commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or
such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or the family disputes where the wrong is basically private or
personal in nature and the parties have resolved their entire dispute. In this category of cases, High Court may quash criminal proceedings if in its
view, because of the compromise between the offender and victim, the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal
case would put accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal case despite
full and complete settlement and compromise with the victim. In other words, the High Court must consider whether it would be unfair or contrary
to the interest of justice to continue with the criminal proceeding or continuation of the criminal proceeding would tantamount to abuse of process
of law despite settlement and compromise between the victim and wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of justice, it is appropriate that
criminal case is put to an end and if the answer to the above question(s) is in affirmative, the High Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to quash
the criminal proceeding.
Taking into consideration totality of facts and circumstances, this Court is of the view that the case can be considered for quashing of FIR
along with subsequent proceedings arising therefrom on the basis of compromise. Resultantly, FIR No.345 dated 03.09.2005 registered under
Sections 452, 420, 506, 467, 468, 471, 148, 149, 120-B IPC at Police Station Udyog Vihar, Gurgaon and all the subsequent proceedings arising
therefrom are hereby quashed qua the petitioners.
