Prem Kaur vs Prem Singh and Others

B.S. Yadav, J.—This is Plaintiff''s second appeal arising out of the suit filed by her for redemption of the suit land. The facts are not in dispute now. Briefly stated, Jiwra va owner of 6 Bighas 17 Biswas of agricultural land in lieu of with the suit land was allotted in consolidation protecting. Jiwra fed mortgaged the land on 10th July, 1943 in favour of the Defendant! for Rs. 2050/ After the death of Jiwna his estate was inherited by his widow Naraini. Naraini has also died and the Plaintiff succeeded to the said estate as ber daughter. The Plaintiff fiitd "n application u/s 4 of the Punjab Keden ption of Moitgeges Act, 1913 (for short the Act) on 5th June, 1072 before the Collector. The Collector dismissed that petition on 13th July, 1973 as it was stated on behalf of the Plaintiff that she did not want to prosecute the application. Thereafter the Plaintiff filed the present suit on 7th December, 1973 for possession of the laid land by way of redemption.

The Defendants contested the suit and took up various pless. It is not necessary to narrate those pleas because in this appeal the short question that survives for decision is whether the Plaintiffs suit was within limitation.

Admittedly, the suit was filed after 30 years cf the creation of mortgage. The suit for redemption could be filed within 30 years from the date of the mortgage. The trial Court held the suit to be within limitation on the ground that in view of Section 12 of the Act a party whose application for redemption had been dismissed under any of the sections enumerated therein it could file tht suit within ore year to establish his tights in respect of the mortgage snd as the suit had been filed within that period from the dismissal of the Plaintiff''s application by the Collector, it was within limitation. The trial Court accordingly granted a preliminary decree in favour of the plain-tiff for possession of the suit land by redemption on payment of Rs. 2050/-. A date was also fixed by which the Plaintiff was required to deposit the above amount failing which the suit was to stand dismissed.

Feeling aggrieved, the Defendants filed an appeal which was heard by learned District Judge, Ropar. Relying upon Shiv Lal and Others Vs. Chet Ram and Others, , wherein it was laid down that Section 12 of the Act did not enlarge the period of limitation fixed for redemption of mortgage, it was held that Plaintiff''s suit was barred by limitation as it was filed after 30 years from the date of mortgage. Consequently, the above finding of the learned trial Court was set aside and the appeal was accepted and the Plaintiff''s suit was dismissed Not feeling satisfied the Plaintiff has come to this Court in second appeal.

The Learned Counsel for the Plaintiff argued that the Plaintiff is entitled u/s 14 of the Limitation Act to exclude the time during which she had prosecuted the application for redemption before the Collector. The Learned Counsel for the Respondents argued that the said section will be applicable only if the proceedings before the Collector are considered as civil proceedings and the Collector is considered to be a Court. It is not necessary to decide in this appeal whether those proceedings can be termed as civil proceedings or the Collector while entertaining such application can be said to be acting as a Court because I am of the opinion that Section 14 is otherwise not applicable to the present case.

Section 14(1) of the Limitation Act, which is relevant for the purposes of this appeal, reads as follows:

14(1) In computing the period of limitation for any suit the time during which the Plaintiff has been prosecuting with due diligence another civil proceeding, whether in a court of first instance or of appeal or revision, against the Defendant shall be excluded, where the proceeding relates to the same matter in issue and is prosecuted in good faith in a court which from defect of jurisdiction or other cause of like nature, is unable to entertain it.

In the present case it cannot be said that from some defect in jurisdiction or other cause of like nature the Collector was unable to entertain the Plaintiff''s application for redemption of the mortgage. The Collector had full jurisdiction to decide that application. The Collector dismissed the Plaintiff''s application because it was not prosecuted before him on her behalf. Therefore, in computing the period of limitation prescribed for filing the present suit, the time which the Plaintiff spent in prosecuting the application before the Collector, cannot be excluded. Therefore, it will have to be held that the Plaintiff''s suit was time-barred.

In view of the above discussion, the present appeal fails and the same is hereby dismissed with no order as to costs.

Appeal dismissed.