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Judgment
40 paragraphs · 2,012 wordsAnoop Chitkara, J
This petition coming on for admission this day, the Court passed the following:
CASE NUMBER BEFORE JUDICIAL MAGISTRATE
Number 354-I/2011, Decided on 10.12.2015, by learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Lahaul-Spiti at Kullu, H.P.
SESSIONS COURT APPEALS' NUMBER
Criminal Appeal No.01 of 2016, decided on 20.5.2016, by learned Sessions Judge, Kullu, H.P.
Challenging the dismissal of the above captioned appeal, whereby learned Sessions Judge, Kullu, affirmed the order passed by learned Chief Judicial Magistrate granting the monthly maintenance as well as accommodation in the shared household, the father-in-law has come up before this Court.
Respondent No.1 Shanta Devi, had approached the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, under Section 12 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, after now called as 'DV Act'. She has sought restrained from physical, verbal and emotional abuse and also alternative accommodation as well as financial contribution from her father-in-law. Her husband had died in an accident in 2009 and at that time she along with her husband and son were residing in the same joint ancestral property. However, they had been provided a separate room and kitchen.
Shanta Devi, respondent No.1 alleges that after the death of her husband, her in-laws, with a view to oust her from the property, started abusing her and inflicted violence upon her. Under such circumstances, she had approached the Court under Section 12 of DV Act.
In the trial, the aggrieved widow asserted her stand and also examined the doctor to prove the physical injuries.
The petitioner-respondent in his response admitted the wedding, death of his son (husband of Shanta Devi) in accident and also that she had been provided a separate room along with kitchen. However, his claim is that she is in habit of filing false cases and she had also lodged an FIR under Section 498-A and 325 IPC. Furthermore, she had left the matrimonial home on her own will. He admitted that his monthly income is Rs.10,000/- (ten thousand) and denied that from his orchard he earns Rs.10,00,000/- (ten lacs) per annum. He also led evidence to prove that the aggrieved lady is getting Rs.1300 per month as salary from Government Primary School, Khargan. After considering the entirety of facts and circumstances, learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, allowed the petition and awarded the following relief.
A. The petitioner/aggrieved person is awarded a monthly maintenance @ Rs.4,000/- (Rupees four thousand only) per month from the respondents from the date of filing of this petitioner payable by 10th of each month.
B. The respondents are directed to provide the petitioner with (already stated to be locked), one bathroom and one kitchen in the shared household situated at Post Office Neuli, Tehsil and District Kullu, H.P. The respondents are further restrained from ousting the petitioner from the shared house hold in future.
C. The respondents are hereby restrained from inflicting any act of domestic violence i.e. physical, verbal or economic abuse upon the petitioner in future.
Challenging the said order, the petitioner (father-in-law) filed appeal before learned Sessions Judge, Kullu. However, vide above order dated 20.5.2016, the learned appellate Court dismissed the said appeal. Aggrieved by such dismissal, he came up before this Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C., by filing the instant appeal.
I have heard learned counsel for the parties and gone through the records.
To wriggle out of the statutory liability fastened upon him under Ss. 2(a), (f), (s), and 17 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, the Father-in-law, took objections that his son had solemnized the marriage against his wishes; after the death of his son in an accident, his widow, the aggrieved person voluntarily left the home; and she has threatened to implicate her in-laws and their family members by foisting false cases.
Per S. 2(f) of DV Act, a "domestic relationship" means a relationship between two persons who live or have, at any point of time, lived together in a shared household, when they are related to consanguinity, marriage, or through a relationship in the nature of marriage, adoption or are family members living together as a joint family;
Per S. 3 (d) (iv) of DV Act, economic abuse includes: -
(a) deprivation of all or any economic or financial resources to which the aggrieved person is entitled under any law or custom whether payable under an order of a court or otherwise or which the aggrieved person requires out of necessity including, but not limited to, household necessities for the aggrieved person and her children, if any, stridhan, property, jointly or separately owned by the aggrieved person, payment of rental related to the shared household and maintenance;
(c) prohibition or restriction to continued access to resources or facilities which the aggrieved person is entitled to use or enjoy by virtue of the domestic relationship including access to the shared household. Explanation II. - For the purpose of determining whether any act, omission, commission or conduct of the respondent constitutes "domestic violence" under this section, the overall facts and circumstances of the case shall be taken into consideration.
S. 17 of DV Act reads as follows,
S. 17. Right to reside in a shared household. :- (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, every woman in a domestic relationship shall have the right to reside in the shared household, whether or not she has any right, title or beneficial interest in the same.
(2) The aggrieved person shall not be evicted or excluded from the shared household or any part of it by the respondent save in accordance with the procedure established by law.
In S R Batra v. Taruna Batra, (2007) 3 SCC 169, Hon'ble Supreme Court holds,
[24] Learned counsel for the respondent Smt. Taruna Batra stated that the definition of shared household includes a household where the person aggrieved lives or at any stage had lived in a domestic relationship. He contended that since admittedly the respondent had lived in the property in question in the past, hence the said property is her shared household.
We cannot agree with this submission.
[25] If the aforesaid submission is accepted, then it will mean that wherever the husband and wife lived together in the past that property becomes a shared household. It is quite possible that the husband and wife may have lived together in dozens of places e.g. with the husband's father, husband's paternal grand parents, his material parents, uncles, aunts, brothers, sisters, nephews, nieces etc. If the interpretation canvassed by the learned counsel for the respondent is accepted, all these houses of the husband's relatives will be shared households and the wife can well insist in living in the all these houses of her husband's relatives merely because she had stayed with her husband for some time in those houses in the past. Such a view would lead to chaos and would be absurd.
[26] It is well settled that any interpretation which leads to absurdity should not be accepted.
[27] Learned counsel for the respondent Smt. Taruna Batra has relied upon Sec. 19(1)(f) of the Act and claimed that she should be given an alternative accommodation. In our opinion, the claim for alternative accommodation can only be made against the husband and not against the husband's in-laws or other relatives.
[28] As regards Sec. 17(1) of the Act, in our opinion the wife is only entitled to claim a right to residence in a shared household, and a shared household' would only mean the house belonging to or taken or rent by the husband, or the house which belongs to the joint family of which the husband is a member. The property in question in the present case neither belongs to Amit Batra nor was it taken or rent by him nor is it a joint family property of which the husband Amit Batra is a member. It is the exclusive property of appellant No. 2, mother of Amit Batra. Hence it cannot be called a 'shared household'.
[29] No doubt, the definition of 'shared household' in Sec. 2(s) of the Act is not only happily worded, and appears to be the result of clumsy drafting, but we have to give it an interpretation which is sensible and which does not lead to chaos in society.
In the present cases, even as per the petitioner, father-in-law, the aggrieved wife of his late son, had lived together in the shared ancestral household. It is further admitted that she was provided a room and a kitchen, and at the time of death of her husband, the couple along with their son were residing in the shared household. Furthermore, the aggrieved person appears to have meagre source for her livelihood.
In Gaji Ram v. Badalu, 2014 LawSuit (HP) 1082, a case with almost identical facts, a co-ordinate bench of this Court holds as follows:
[2]. The allegation set out by the respondent in the complaint was that her marriage had been solemnized with Doli Ram in the year 1988 as per Hindu rites and customs and one girl was born out of the said wedlock. Doli Ram died in the year 1993 and thereafter the respondent alongwith her minor child was staying in the matrimonial home, which was in her possession prior to the death of her husband. Further allegations were that after the death of her husband, his family members, who were petitioners herein started maltreating, misbehaving and abusing her with a view to compel her to leave the room and kitchen which were in her possession and thereafter about two years back, she had been thrown out of the house.
[3]. The petitioners filed their reply taking preliminary objections regarding maintainability, estoppel and that the respondent has suppressed material facts. On merits, it was averred that after the death of her husband, the respondent started residing at her parents house alongwith her daughter and did not reside in the matrimonial home.
[13]. But would that mean that respondent cannot be held entitled to a monthly rent of Rs.2,000/- in lieu of a right to a shared accommodation? To my mind, the respondent would still be entitled to maintenance from the petitioners who are none other than the family members of her deceased husband. The petitioner No.1 is her father-in-law and petitioner No. 2 is her mother-in-law and petitioners No. 3 to 5 are her brother-in-laws. Since the factum of marriage has not been denied the petitioners owe not only a moral obligation but a legal duty to maintain the respondent by providing her basic amenities of life i.e. food, clothing and shelter, if not anything more.
Be that as it may. It is clarified that at the time of filing of the petition in the year 2013, the aggrieved women was getting salary of Rs.1300/-. The father-in-law had approached this Court in the year 2016 and this Court has finally decided this matter after five years. However, the possibility of change in circumstances like enhancement of her salary and other legally significant changes can also not be ruled out. Thus, in case of such material changes, it shall be open for the respondent to move necessary application, in accordance with law. At that stage, this order shall not come into way for its modification.
Mr. Maan Singh, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner had argued that the parties are trying to compromise the matter and finally settle it for all times. Given such endeavor, it shall be open for the parties to enter into compromise and bring that in the notice of learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, who shall pass appropriate orders, keeping in view the terms and conditions of such compromise.
A perusal of the orders passed by the District Judiciary, i.e., Ld. Chief Judicial Magistrate and Ld. Sessions Judge, captioned above, are well reasoned and call for no interference. Given above, in the facts and circumstances peculiar to this case, the petition filed by the original male respondent is dismissed.
