Prem Parkash vs Daya Nand

G.C. Garg, J.—Daya Nand, respondent herein, filed an application u/s 13 of the Haryana Urban (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, (hereinafter called ''the Act'') for ejectment of the petitioner from a shop on the ground that it was a part of the house and that the entire building including the shop had become unfit and unsafe for human habitation. The building was beyond repairs and was needed for reconstruction. The further case of the landlord was that the entire back portion except the shop in dispute had already collapsed and this had effected the walls of the shop as well as the roof. The shop was thus unfit and unsafe for human habitation. The stand of the tenant was that the shop was not a part of the house and it was a different building. The allegation that the shop was in a dilapidated condition was false and baseless and was consequently denied. The tenant further stated that the shop was in a good condition and fit for human habitation. The Rent Controller by order dated 29-10-1987 dismissed the petition. The Appellate Authority by order dated 8-10-1988 allowed the appeal of the landlord and ordered ejectment and passed an order of eviction on the ground that it had become unfit and unsafe for human habitation. Hence the present revision petition at the instance of the tenant.

The only ground that survives in the present revision petition is whether the tenant is liable to ejectment on the ground that the shop has become unfit and unsafe for human habitation. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the evidence on the record was not sufficient to return a finding that the shop in dispute was an integral part of the house and rather it was clear from the evidence on record, that the demised shop was an independent unit and let out as such. The learned counsel took pains to take me through the entire documentary and oral evidence but the documents on the record in the shape of site plan, Ex. AW 4./A. and the, statement of Daya Nand, AW 5, clearly go to prove that the shop in dispute is a part of the house shown by the letters, A, B, C, D in the site plan. Simply because the demised premises was rented out to the petitioner, it would not: show that it formed a distinct unit and not a part of the bigger building which has already fallen and needs reconstruction. It looks very difficult neigh impossible to raise construction over the site show by the letters, A, B, C, D without including the shop in dispute. From the statement of Ganga Ram, XEN, his report Ex. A-6 and the site plan, Ex. A-5, it is clearly deducible, as already observed, that the entire portion, A, B, C, D except the shop in dispute has already fallen and in any case is in a dilapidated condition. Even during the course of arguments the learned counsel for the petitioner did not challenge this aspect of the matter and clearly admitted that the entire other portion except the shop in dispute was in a dilapidated condition and required reconstruction.

It has been held by this Court in Sardarni Sampuran Kaur v. Sant Singh (982) 84 P. L. R. 449, that even if the portion under, the occupation of the tenant was in sound condition and a substantial portion of the composite building had become unfit and unsafe for human habitation, the tenant was liable to eviction as the condition of building was to be viewed as a whole and not in parts or blocks in occupation of tenants. As notice above, the entire portion of "the house is in a dilapidated condition except the shop in occupation of the tenant. measuring about 9'' X 8'' which is alleged to be in good condition. The entire portion of the house measures about 40/2'' X 22''. No exception, thus can be taken to the finding returned by the Appellate Authority that the tenant was liable to eviction on the ground that the shop in question had become unfit and unsafe for human habitation.

Apart from this it was clearly, admitted by the tenant and his witnesses that it is an old construction of more than 50 years and roof of the entire shop rested on nine wooden batons. Again admittedly two of the batons had cracked, and the third was also in the process of falling; and that these batons have been made to rest on a wooden post erected by the tenant. The witnesses further admitted that if the wooden post was taken out, a part of the roof would fall. The evidence of the expert produced by tenant further goes to show that the walls of the shop are completely naked. Even the tenant himself had filed an application in 1983 u/s 12 of the Act seeking permission to get the necessary repairs effected but withdrew that application on 24-5-1985 after the filing of the petition for ejectment on the ground that it had become unfit and unsafe for human habitation. This fact lends support to the conclusion arrived at by the Appellate Authority that the shop even as an independent building has become unfit and unsafe for human habitation,

Learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon Piare Lal v. Kewal Krishan Chopra 1988 H. R. R. 502, but this judgment has no application to the facts of the present case. In the reported case the roof of a part of one room in the rear had fallen down and there was no evidence on the record to show that the entire building or a substantial portion thereof was in a damaged condition. It was in these circumstances held that mere falling of a roof in one room in the rear side, was not sufficient to warrant a finding that the entire building had become unfit and unsafe for human habitation.

Looked from any angle, the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner does not find favour with me.

For the reasons aforesaid, the revision petition fails and is dismissed.

Learned counsel for the petitioner prayed for one year''s time to vacate the premises keeping in view the fact that the premises is a business premises and a suitable time be thus granted. After considering the submission of the learned counsel I allow the tenant six months time to vacate the premises provided all arrears of rent and the entire rent for the future period are paid or deposited within six weeks.