Prem Rattan Wadhwa vs State of Haryana

R.L. Anand, J.

Prem Rattan Wadhwa petitioner has filed the present petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. for the quashment of the proceedings pending against him under Section 7 read with section 17(1)(i)(a) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act.

It has been pleaded by the petitioner that on 21.2.1986 at about 6.15 P.M. the shop of the petitioner was inspected in village Mahespur by Sh. S.P. Mali, Govt. Food Inspector, Kalka and it was noticed that the petitioner had kept in his possession 7 gunny bags each having 90 kgs. wheat atta for public sale. After serving notice Ex. PA, the Food Inspector purchased 600 gms. of the said wheat atta against payment of Rs. 1.20 vide receipt Ex.PD. The sample of the atta was got analysed from the Public Analyst and it was found to be adulterated as the sample contained total ash 2.36% and ash insoluble in dilute HCl 1.02% against the maximum prescribed standards of 2.0% and 0.15% respectively and grit 0.9% and taste was also found gritty.

According to the petitioner after recording the precharge evidence, the learned Magistrate framed the charge against the petitioner on 23.3.1987. The grouse of the petitioner is that since the date of the framing of charge, no witness has been examined recorded even though more than 61/2 years have elapsed from the date of framing of charge and more than ten years have passed from the seizing of atta. Making grounds for the quashment of the proceedings, the petitioner has pleaded that there is inordinate delay and laches in the prosecution and it amounted to harassment to the petitioner warranting interference for this court under section 482 Cr.P.C. The petitioner is not responsible for the delay in the launching the prosecution as well as for the disposal of the matter by the trial court. No prosecution witness has been examined so far. With the above main allegations, the petitioner has prayed for the quashment of the proceedings.

Notice of the petition was given to respondents. Dr. S.K. Gupta, Civil Surgeon, Ambala has filed written statement on behalf of the respondent. According to the respondents before framing charge statement of Sh. S.P. Malik, Food Inspector, Kalka was recorded on 20.2.1987 by the learned CJM, Ambala. According to the respondents there is no delay on the part of the prosecution to launch the prosecution and the trial of the case is in progress and no harassment has been caused to the petitioner. The petitioner has got tested the second sample from the Central Food Laboratory and the result of the same has been received by the learned CJM, Ambala. The sample has been found substandard and minor and negligible discrepancy in percentage of the contents of ash, ash insoluble and grit cannot be ignored and in this regard reliance has been placed by the respondents on FAC 1976 II page 44. With the above defence, the respondents have prayed for the dismissal of the petition.

I have heard Shri Rameshwar Malik, Advocate on behalf of the petitioner and Shri S.S. Pattar, AAG, Haryana, on behalf of the respondents.

Article 21 of the Constitution gives a right to a citizen for speedy trial. Whether the provisions of section 482 Cr.P.C. should be invoked in a particular case or not will depend on the facts of each case. In 1997 Supreme Court Cases (Crl.) 1, Phoolan Devi v. State of M.P. and others, the scope of Article 21 and 32 of the Constitution were considered by the Hon''ble Supreme Court and it was observed by their Lordships that ''long continuance of prosecution/trial by itself not enough to quash the same. It has to be ascertained in each case as a question of fact whether the State alone or the petitioner also responsible for the delay in completion of trial''.

In the light of the above guidelines given by the Hon''ble Supreme Court I will have to advert to the facts in hand. The sample in this case was taken on 21.2.1986. As per Section 16A of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, all offences under subsection (1) of Section 16 of the said Act shall be tried in a summary manner by the Magistrate. There is a proviso to the above Rule vide which a discretion has been given to the Magistrate to convert the summary procedure into warrant one if it appears to the Magistrate that the nature of the case is such that sentence of imprisonment for a term of one year has to be passed or that for any other reason it is desirable to try the case as a warrant one. When the learned Magistrate decides to frame the charge against the petitioner he wanted to dilute from the ordinary procedure and the charge in this case was framed against the petitioner on 20.3.1987. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner stated at the bar that in the year 1990, the learned Magistrate again opted to adopt the summary procedure and thereafter again he decided to dispose of this case as a warrant case. This hide and seek policy on the part of lower courts while dealing with such sensitive cases has not been swallowed by this Court. No doubt the law has given a right to the court to exercise its discretion for the change of the procedure from summary to warrant and once the learned Magistrate had adopted that procedure to be followed very strong reasons are supposed to be given by the Magistrate as to why he is resorting to the earlier procedure i.e. summary one and what compelled him to again adopt a warrant procedure. How long the fate of a litigant can be allowed to hang in balance for the acts of the court. This type of casual approach on the part of the Magistrate cannot be supposed to be encouraged by the High Court, otherwise the very purpose of Article 21 is likely to be infringed which gives a constitutional right to the citizen for speedy justice. Even from the reply filed by the State, this court has not been able to draw any inference from which the petitioner can be blamed. The only argument which was advanced by the learned counsel for the respondents before this Court was that with the carvation of revenue district Panchkula the criminal proceedings were transferred from Ambala to Panchkula where the seat of CJM has been created by the High Court. This submission of the learned counsel for the respondents cannot be accepted for the reason the installation of the court at Panchkula is a recent phenomena and at the most delay of one year can be condoned for the benefit of the State. But where is the justification for the lingering on of the proceedings from 1986 especially when the charge has been framed against the petitioner in 1987. These devices of cases have also been cropped up before this Court in the various pronouncements from stages to stages. The learned counsel for the petitioner has invited my attention to 1993(1) PLR 543 Parmanand v. State of Haryana, where this High Court in a case under Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, has held that period of 5 years if elapsed since initiation of criminal proceedings and that no effective steps have been taken up by the prosecution to examine prosecution witnesses, the accused will be deemed to have been prejudiced in preparation of his defence by reason of delay and His Lordship was pleased to quash the proceedings. Reliance in this judgment was placed on 1992(1) Recent Criminal Reports 41 and 1990(3) RCR 302 (FB).

I have already stated at the very outset that every case depends upon its own facts. I feel that no fault can be attributed to the present petitioner for delay in the present proceedings under Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. The lapse of 8 years certainly would prejudice the case of the petitioner. In this view of the matter, I allow the petition and quash the proceedings pending before the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Panchkula against the petitioner under Prevention of Food Adulteration Act.