High CourtsDivision Bench(1984) 08 SHI CK 0018

Prem Singh vs The Himachal Pradesh Road Transport Corporation and Another

High Court Of Himachal Pradesh · Decided on 13 August 1984 · Citation: (1984) 13 ILR HP 466

HON’BLE JUDGES
P.D. Desai, C.J · H.S. Thakur, J
CASE NUMBER
Civil Writ Petition No. 382 of 1984

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Judgment

12 paragraphs · 1,606 words

P.D. Desai, C.J.—The order of the disciplinary authority at Annexure-C as well as the appellate order at Annexure-F are both not speaking orders. The order at Annexure-C contains no more than a general description of the process adopted in arriving at the conclusion when it states that the disciplinary authority agreed with the findings of the Enquiry Officer upon a careful consideration of the Enquiry Report and the relevant records of the case. So far as the order at Annexure-F is concerned, it is really not the appellate order at all. It is merely a terse and laconic communication stating that the appeal was considered by the appropriate authority and that it was rejected. Apart from the fact that no reasons, if any, are communicated, the vital defect is that the order in original is not annexed to the communication. The result of a statutory appeal in a penalty proceeding must be not only recorded in the form of an order but such order must also be communicated ipsissima verba. It cannot be conveyed in a lingo which is typically officialese.

2.

No judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding can terminate I by an order which is not supported by reasons. As explained in Union of India (UOI) Vs. Mohan Lal Capoor and Others, at pages 97-98, reasons are the links between the materials on which the conclusions are based and the actual conclusions recorded. They disclose how the mind is applied to the subject matter of decision. They supply the nexus between the facts considered and the conclusions reached. The requirement of recording a reasoned order insures against a lackadaisical approach on the part of the competent authority. A reasoned order is necessary also because the right of appeal against such an order can be exercised effectively only if it is supported by reasons. If the reasons are known, the order can be properly challenged on merits before the appellate authority on all material aspects.

3.

The requirement of giving reasons applies with still greater force to quasi-judicial proceedings which terminate in an order of penalty. The order of the disciplinary authority, in such cases, even if it is based on concurrence with the report of the Enquiry Officer, must indicate clearly that mind was independently applied to all the material aspects of the case. The order must demonstrate that the substance of the charge(s) was present to the mind, that the material evidence in support of or opposition to the charge(s) was considered and weighed, that all objections-legal as well as technical-raised in the course of the inquiry were taken into account, that the finding of guilt as well as recommendation as to the penalty, if any, were weighed against the totality of the material on record and that the ultimate decision was reached upon the satisfaction of the disciplinary authority himself. Besides, the order must also indicate that while imposing the penalty, all the relevant factors, including the nature of misconduct, adequacy of the penalty on the facts and in the circumstances of the case etc., were taken into consideration. The power to take the disciplinary action having been vested in the disciplinary authority, it is essential that his function is not regarded an empty or illusory formality and this can be ensured by insistence upon the furnishing of reasons.

4.

So far as the order of the appellate authority is concerned, since a statutory appeal is only a continuation of the hearing of the original proceeding and since the principle of merger also applies to proceedings such as departmental inquiries and inquiries held under special statutes, the same reasons, which have been given above in connection with the requirement of giving of reasons by the disciplinary authority, will apply. There are additional grounds, however, for the appellate authority being required to record a reasoned decision. In a case like the present, where no fresh opportunity of hearing is required to be afforded at the stage of imposition of penalty, the appellate authority is the only forum before whom the delinquent would have a chance to challenge the findings recorded against him by the Inquiry Officer and concurred in by the disciplinary authority and make submission on the quantum of penalty or, where the disciplinary authority differs from the findings recorded by the Inquiry Officer, the conclusions recorded by the disciplinary authority upon reappraisal of the material on record and the penalty consequently imposed. In the appeal memo and/or at the hearing of the appeal, therefore, the delinquent would ordinarily raise several grounds bearing upon legal and factual issues. In order to insure against the statutory appeal being treated in a cavalier fashion by failure of application of mind to the material issues raised for consideration of the appellate authority, it is essential to read the requirement of recording a reasoned decision dealing justly and fairly with all the grounds raised in the appeal into the relevant provisions conferring the right of appeal. Besides, it must be appreciated that such an appellate decision is not immune from judicial scrutiny subject to certain limitations. In order, therefore, to enable the Court to consider whether or not the order is amenable to correction in judicial review, it is essential for the appellate authority to give reasons in support of its order.

5.

It is pertinent to point out that in a series of judgments the Supreme Court has now taken the view that the requirement of giving reasons, so far as the decision of a quasi-judicial authority is concerned, is a part of the rules of natural justice. In The Siemens Engineering and Manufacturing Co. of India Ltd. Vs. The Union of India (UOI) and Another, the following pertinent observations are to be found (at page 1789):

If Courts of law are to be replaced by administrative authorities and tribunals as indeed, in some kinds of cases, with the proliferation of administrative law, they may have to be so replaced, it is essential that administrative authorities and tribunals should accord fair and proper hearing to the persons sought to be affected by their orders and give sufficiently clear and explict reasons in support of the orders made by them. Then alone administrative authorities and tribunals exercising quasi-judicial functions will be able to justify their existence and carry credibility with the people by inspiring confidence in the adjudicatory process. The rule requiring reasons to be given in support of an order is, like the principle of audi alteram partem, a basic principle of natural justice which must inform every quasi-judicial process and this rule -must be observed in its proper spirit and mere pretence of compliance with it would not satisfy the requirement of law.

In Mrs. Maneka Gandhi Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Another, at page 630, the same principle has been reiterated and an order withholding reasons for impounding the passport of the Petitioner in that case was held to be not only in breach of the statutory provision but also as amounting to denial of opportunity of hearing to the Petitioner and, therefore, in violation of the rules of natural justice embodied in the maxim audi alteram partem. In Mahindra and Mahindra v. Union of India AIR 1979 SC 798, an order made by the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Commission was found to be defective on the ground that it was a non-speaking order. The Supreme Court observed that the order made by the Commission in that case consisted merely of bald directions given by the Commission and did not set out any reasons whatsoever why ''the Commission had decided to issue those directions. It had a sphynx-like face, which goes ill with the judicial process. The Supreme Court observed:

It is now settled law that where an authority makes an order in exercise of a quasi-judicial function, it must record its reasons in support of the order it makes. Every quasi-judicial order must be supported by reasons. That is the minimal requirement of law laid down by a long line of decisions of this Court ending with N.M. Desai v. Textiles Ltd. Civil Appeal No. 245 of 1970, D/17-12-1975 and The Siemens Engineering and Manufacturing Co. of India Ltd. Vs. The Union of India (UOI) and Another,

It would thus appear to be a proposition which is now beyond any doubt or dispute that administrative authorities and Tribunals exercising quasi-judicial power are required to make speaking orders and that such requirement must be observed in letter and spirit and not merely by rendering a lip-service.

6.

In the present case as earlier pointed out, the disciplinary authority and the appellate authority have both failed to record reasons. The order of the appellate authority is, in fact, not even communicated to the Petitioner which is yet another patent error. Under ordinary circumstances, the Court would have quashed the order at Annexure-C as well as that at Annexure-F. However, since this is the first case of its kind, which has come to our notice, arising out of the disciplinary proceedings instituted by the Respondent-Corporation, we are inclined to give an opportunity to the said Respondent to place on the record of the case the reasons, if any, recorded by the disciplinary authority in support of the order at Annexure-C and the formal reasoned order, if any, passed by the appellate authority on the appeal preferred by the Petitioner. Let the Respondent-Corporation avail of the opportunity on or before September 3, 1984. The original record of the disciplinary and of the appellate authority will also be produced on the next day of hearing.

7.

Adjourned to September 3, 1984.

8.

Dasti order on usual terms.