Premlal vs Ganga Bai And Ors

Sanjay K. Agrawal, J

Heard on admission.

The suit filed by the plaintiff for partition of her ⅓ share in the suit property against her brother Premlal was decreed by the trial Court holding that

she is entitled for ⅓ share in the suit property of her father Mohanlal and further that the document alleged to have been executed by the plaintiff in

favour of defendant No.1 vide Ex.D-1 - ikrarnama / relinquishment deed being compulsory registrable is not registered under the Registration Act and

it is of inconsequential and granted the decree. In appeal preferred by the appellant, the judgment and decree of the trial Court has been affirmed by

the first appellate Court.

Learned counsel for the appellant / defendant No.1 submits that both the Courts below have perversely held that the document Ex.D-1

relinquishment deed / ikrarnama executed by the plaintiff in favour of defendant No.1, is inadmissible in evidence and it does not confer any right or

title in favour of defendant No.1 that involves the substantial question of law.

The question for consideration would be, whether the relinquishment deed of share in favour of defendant No.1 is inadmissible in evidence for want

of registration as it is compulsorily registrable as held by the two Courts below concurrently?

In the matter of Sita Ram Bhama v. Ramvatar Bhama AIR 2018 SC 3057, the Supreme Court relied upon its earlier decision in the matter of

Yellapu Uma Maheswari and another v. Buddha Jagadheeswararao and others (2015) 16 SCC 787 in which it has been held as under: -

It is well settled that the nomenclature given to the document is not decisive factor but the nature and substance of the transaction has to be

determined with reference to the terms of the documents and that the admissibility of a document is entirely dependent upon the recitals contained in

that document but not on the basis of the pleadings set up by the party who seeks to introduce the document in question. A thorough reading of both

Exts. B-21 and B-22 makes it very clear that there is relinquishment of right in respect of immovable property through a document which is

compulsorily registrable document and if the same is not registered, it becomes an inadmissible document as envisaged under Section 49 of the

Registration Act. Hence, Exts. B-21 and B-22 are the documents which squarely fall within the ambit of Section 17(1)(b) of the Registration Act and

hence are compulsorily registrable documents and the same are inadmissible in evidence for the purpose of proving the factum of partition between

the parties. We are of the considered opinion that Exts. B-21 and B-22 are not admissible in evidence for the purpose of proving primary purpose of

partition.

Then the next question that falls for consideration is whether these can be used for any collateral purpose. The larger Bench of the Andhra

Pradesh High Court in Chinnappareddigari Peda Mutyala Reddy v. Chinnappareddigari Venkata Reddy 1967 SCC OnLine AP 4 : AIR 1969 AP 242

has held that the whole process of partition contemplates three phases i.e. severancy of status, division of joint property by metes and bounds and

nature of possession of various shares. In a suit for partition, an unregistered document can be relied upon for collateral purpose i.e. severancy of title,

nature of possession of various shares but not for the primary purpose i.e. division of joint properties by metes and  bounds. An unstamped

instrument is not admissible in evidence even for collateral purpose, until the same is impounded. Hence, if the appellant-defendant want to mark these

documents for collateral purpose it is open for them to pay the stamp duty together with penalty and get the document impounded and the trial court is

at liberty to mark Exts. B-21 and B-22 for collateral purpose subject to proof and relevance.

In the instant case, though the document has been allowed to be marked as Ex.D-1, but it is inadmissible in evidence even for collateral purpose

until same is impounded and the plaintiff did not take any steps during the pendency of suit for getting that document (Ex.D-1) impounded. Even

otherwise, execution of document Ex.D-1 by the plaintiff in favour of defendant No.1 is also not found established by the trial Court as well as the first

appellate Court.

In view of the above, I do not find any substantial question of law for the decision of this appeal. The second appeal deserves to be and is

accordingly dismissed, in limine. No order as to cost(s).