Pritam Kumar and another vs Nagar Palika (Municipal Committee)

Rajendra Nath Mittal, J.—This revision petition has been filed by the plaintiffs against the order of the Additional District Judge, Hissar dated 18th October, 1984.

Briefly the facts are that plaintiff No. 1 had placed Khokha No. 97 and plaintiff No. 2, Khokha No. 91 on the sites taken by them on teh-bazari at the rates of Rs. 60 p.m. and Rs. 36 p.m. respectively from Nagar Palika (Muncipal Committee), Ratia defendant. It is pleaded that the defendant was threatening to disposses the plaintiffs from the Hookahs. Consequently they filed a suit for injunction that the defendant be restrained from dispossessing them from the Khokhas otherwise than in due course of law. They also filed an application for temporary injunction under rules 1 and 2 of Order 39 of the CPC for granting them ad-interim injunction. The defendant contested the suit and in the written statement pleaded that the plaintiffs were licensees and it had the right to revoke the licence. It was further pleaded that after revocation of the licences the plaintiffs had no legal right to remain in possession of the sites. It also contested the application for ad-interim injunction.

The trial Court, vide order dated 22nd October, 1982, confirmed the ex-parte injunction restraining the defendant from removing the Khohas of the plaintiffs otherwise than in due course of law. The defendant went up in appeal before the Additional District Judge, Hissar who accepted the same, set aside the order of the trial Court and dismissed the application for ad interim injunction. The plaintiffs have come up in revision to this Court.

It is contended by Mr. Goel that the petitioners were in lawful possession of the property and the defendant-respondent has no right to evict them except in due course of law. He further contends that the appellate Court erroneously held that the petitioners had no right to remain in possession of the property after the licence had been revooked. In support of his contention he placed reliance on Sadhu Ram v. Gram Panchayat, Pastana 1984 P.L.J. 217, and Madan Mohan v. Arm Kumar 1984 P.L.J. 239.

I have duly considered the argument but regret my inability to accept it. It is not disputed that the plaintiffs were paying Rs. 60 and Rs. 36 per mensem respectively to the defendant as teh-bazari which is evident from the receipts produced by them on the record. It has been settled by a Division Bench of this Court in Sardar Singh v. New Delhi Municipal Committee (1968) 68 P.E.R.D. 169, that where some sort of permission or licence is given by the Committee by accepting teh-bazari fee it cannot be held that any legal right was granted. The licence is not of the nature which can not be revoked. It is further held that bare licence without more was revocable at the will and pleasure of the licensor. The learned Bench placed reliance on Administration Municipal Committee, Rohtak Vs. Milap Chand Lurinda Ram, , wherein Kapur, J. (as he then was) held that when the permission was withdrawn, the licensee become a trespasser and the structure which was erected with permission on the public road become one without permission of the Committee in writing. It was also observed that the Committee could then remove that construction without any delay by resorting to the provisions of sub-section (2) of section 173 of the Punjab Municipal Act. Same view was taken by Goyal J., in Smt. Geeta and another v. Ashok Kumar (1982) 84 P.L.R. 291. The learned Judge observed that the licensee after revocation of the licence would have no right to seek temporary or permanent injunction against the licensor restraining him from entering upon the property. The matter was examined by a Full Bench of the Delhi High Court in Chandu Lal Vs. Municipal Corporation of Delhi, . In that case the Delhi Municipal Corporation held an auction for the grant of licence of Kiosks and the petitioner was given the same in that auction. One of the terms of the auction was that the licence would be for 11 months in the first instance and thereafter for such terms of renewal as may be mutually agreed from time to time It was further mentioned that the licence was liable to be cancelled without assigning any reason and the Corporation was entitled to resume possession after revocation of the licence. The Municipal Corporation of Delhi cancelled the licence of the petitioner who instituted a suit for the grant of decree for permanent injunction restraining the Corporation for interfering, disturbing or dispossessing him from the Kiosks. He also filed an application for ad-interim injunction. The Full Bench, after considering the matter observed thus :

Temporary injunction sought by the petitioners could be granted, if their case was covered by the three well-established principles, namely, (1) on making out a prima facie case. (2) on showing balance of convenience in their favour, in that the refusal of the injunction would cause greater inconvenience to them and (3) whether on refusal of the injunction they would suffer irreparable loss. Granting an injunction is a matter of discretion and in its exercise the Court has to satisfy itself whether the petitioners have a triable case. Before invoking the jurisdiction of the Court to seek temporary injunction the petitioners were bound to show that they have a legal right and that there was an invasion of that right. They have failed to show a legal right. Facts and circumstances, on the contrary, prima facie show that the petitioners on the revocation of the licence are tresspassers, there exists no justification for allowing them to continue perpetuating their unlawful act.

(emphasis supplied by underlining)

From the aforesaid cases it emerges that in the case of a licence I if the licensor revokes the licence, the licensee is left with no legal right in the property and is, therefore, not entitled to temporary or permanent injunction against the licensor. Sadhu Ram''s and Madan Mohan''s cases (supra) to which reference has been made by the learned counsel for the petitioners do not relate to the licensees. Thus they are distinguishable and the ratio therein is not applicable to the facts of the present case.

For the aforesaid reasons I do not find any merit in the revision petition and dismiss the same with no order as to costs.