Prithvi Chand & Another vs State Of H.P.& Others

 Anoop Chitkara, J

Seeking quashing of FIR captioned above, father-in-law and mother-in-law of the complainant-5th respondent, have come up before this Court

under Section 482, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

Facts necessary to decide the present petition are that on 10th May 2018, 5th respondent-Anju Kumari gave a written complaint to SHO of the

aforesaid Police Station. She alleged that on 20th March 2017, her marriage with Ravi Kumar (son of petitioner) was performed as per Hindu rites.

She lived with her husband only for five days, and during this period, they cohabited and established sexual relations. She stated that at that time, she

could not make out that Ravi Kumar and his parents are cheating on her by this marriage. After realizing the entire episode, she feels that Ravi Kumar

and her parents had solemnized the marriage intending to cheat her. After five days of the wedding, Ravi Kumar left for Australia and stated that he

would join the job. In his absence, Prithvi Chand and Prakash Devi started taunting and troubling her. During the absence of Ravi Kumar, her father-

in-law and mother-in-law started taunting her so that she, on her own, leaves their house. They started building pressure upon her to hand over her

land to them under the pretext that they need to construct a house over it. They also started manipulating and instigating her son, born out of her

previous marriage. She informed the Panchayat and told them that now they are not telling their son's address and phone number (husband of the

complainant). After that, they removed her from their house and now living in Delhi. They keep on talking to their son and do not reveal his number to

the complainant. Her husband, Ravi, also does not call her. Whenever she visits her in-law's house, her father-in-law and mother-in-law threatened

her and levelled false allegations against her. When she stayed in her marital home, her father-in-law and mother-in-law made phone calls and

threatened her. She also stated that her husband had not given any maintenance expenditure, forcing her to sustain with incredible difficulty. Despite

various opportunities, her husband is not taking her call and, on his own, not calling her back. She stated that she fully believes that the accused

persons performed the marriage intending to deprive her of her property. Based on such allegations, the police registered the FIR mentioned above.

ANALYSIS & REASONING:

The complainant herself stated that her husband, Ravi Kumar, is not giving any money, and due to which she is unable to sustain herself. It means

that she is not a wealthy lady. The crux of allegations leveled against the petitioner's father-in-law and mother-in-law are that they have solemnized

marriage intending to grab her property. In the complaint, the complainant does not even hint about the property, which she owns, or its value. On the

contrary, her allegations that she is sustaining with great difficulty contradict her stand. As per the complainant's averments in the FIR, the wedding

had taken place on 20th March 2017, and after five days, Ravi Kumar had left her. She also states that she is residing with her parents. The

allegations that her father-in-law and mother-in-law are not giving the phone number of Ravi Kumar would not make out an offense of cruelty under

Section 498-A IPC or of a criminal conspiracy under Section 120-B IPC. The allegations against the petitioners are too general to make out any case.

Even if the entire allegations in the FIR are taken on its face value, still no case is made out against the petitioners. It appears that the complainant,

whose second marriage also failed because her husband deserted her, also tried to involve her father-in-law and mother-in-law by leveling allegations.

Still, such allegations do not make out any case under Section 498-A and 120-B IPC.

JUDICIAL PRECEDENTS ON QUASHING UNDER SECTION 498-A IPC:

In Preeti Gupta v. State of Jharkhand, (2010) 7 SCC 667, Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that [30] “It is a matter of common experience

that most of these complaints under Section 498-A Indian Penal Code are filed in the heat of the moment over trivial issues without proper

deliberations. We come across a large number of such complaints which are not even bonafide and are filed with oblique motive. At the same time,

rapid increase in the number of genuine cases of dowry harassment are also a matter of serious concern. [32] Unfortunately, at the time of filing of

the complaint the implications and consequences are not properly visualised by the complainant that such complaint can lead to insurmountable

harassment, agony and pain to the complainant, accused and his close relations. [33]. The ultimate object of justice is to find out the truth and punish

the guilty and protect the innocent. To find out the truth is a herculean task in majority of these complaints. The tendency of implicating husband and

all his immediate relations is also not uncommon. At times, even after the conclusion of criminal trial, it is difficult to ascertain the real truth. The

courts have to be extremely careful and cautious in dealing with these complaints and must take pragmatic realities into consideration while dealing

with matrimonial cases. The allegations of harassment of husband's close relations who had been living in different cities and never visited or rarely

visited the place where the complainant resided would have an entirely different complexion. The allegations of the complaint are required to be

scrutinized with great care and circumspection. Experience reveals that long and protracted criminal trials lead to rancour, acrimony and bitterness in

the relationship amongst the parties. It is also a matter of common knowledge that in cases filed by the complainant if the husband or the husband's

relations had to remain in jail even for a few days, it would ruin the chances of amicable settlement altogether. The process of suffering is extremely

long and painful.â€​

In Geeta Mehrotra v. State of U.P., 2012(10) SCC 741, Para 28, Hon’ble Supreme Court holds that “We, therefore, deem it just and legally

appropriate to quash the proceedings initiated against the appellants Geeta Mehrotra and Ramji Mehrotra as the FIR does not disclose any material

which could be held to be constituting any offence against these two appellants. Merely by making a general allegation that they were also involved in

physical and mental torture of the complainant-respondent No. 2 without mentioning even a single incident against them as also the fact as to how they

could be motivated to demand dowry when they are only related as brother and sister of the complainant's husband, we are pleased to quash and set

aside the criminal proceedings in so far as these appellants are concerned and consequently the order passed by the High Court shall stand

overruled.â€​

STAGE OF QUASHING FIR:

In Ashok Chaturvedi v Shitul H. Chanchani, 1998(7) SCC 698, Hon’ble Supreme Court holds that the determination of the question as regards

the propriety of the order of the Magistrate taking cognizance and issuing process need not necessarily wait till the stage of framing the charge. The

Court holds, “…This argument, however, does not appeal to us inasmuch as merely because an accused has a right to plead at the time of framing

of charges that there is no sufficient material for such framing of charges as provided in Section 245 of the Criminal Procedure Code, he is debarred

from approaching the court even at an earliest (sic earlier) point of time when the Magistrate takes cognizance of the offence and summons the

accused to appear to contend that the very issuance of the order of taking cognizance is invalid on the ground that no offence can be said to have

been made out on the allegations made in the complaint petition. It has been held in a number of cases that power under Section 482 has to be

exercised sparingly and in the interest of justice. But allowing the criminal proceeding to continue even where the allegations in the complaint petition

do not make out any offence would be tantamount to an abuse of the process of court, and therefore, there cannot be any dispute that in such case

power under section 482 of the Code can be exercised.

In Girish Sarwate v. State of A.P., 2005(1) R.C.R.(Criminal) 758, the Full Bench of Andhra Pradesh High Court observed that the High Court need

not wait for completion of investigation and taking cognizance by the Magistrate.

JUDICIAL PRECEDENTS ON JURISPRUDENCE OF QUASHING:

The law is almost settled by various pronouncements of the Hon'ble Supreme Court that when the FIR and the investigation do not make out any

case or the prosecution is inherently and patently illegal, and the matters that fulfill the criteria for quashing, the High Court resorting to S. 482 CrPC

can quash such FIR and consequent proceedings. In R.P. Kapur v State of Punjab, AIR 1960 SC 866, a three-member Bench of Hon’ble

Supreme Court holds, “[6]. ...It is well established that the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court can be exercised to quash proceedings in a proper

case either to prevent the abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. Ordinarily, criminal proceedings instituted

against an accused person must be tried under the provisions of the Code, and the High Court would be reluctant to interfere with the said proceedings

at an interlocutory stage. It is not possible, desirable or expedient to lay down any inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of this inherent

jurisdiction. However, we may indicate some categories of cases where the inherent jurisdiction can and should be exercised for quashing the

proceedings. There may be cases where it may be possible for the High Court to take the view that the institution or continuance of criminal

proceedings against an accused person may amount to the abuse of the process of the Court or that the quashing of the impugned proceedings would

secure the ends of justice. If the criminal proceeding in question is in respect of an offence alleged to have been committed by an accused person and

it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar against the institution or continuance of the said proceeding, the High Court would be justified in quashing

the proceedings on that ground. Absence of the requisite sanction may, for instance, furnish cases under this category. Cases may also arise where

the allegations in the First Information Report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not

constitute the offence alleged; in such cases no question of appreciating evidence arises; it is a matter merely of looking at the complaint or the First

Information Report to decide whether the offence alleged is disclosed or not. In such case, it would be legitimate for the High Court to hold that it

would be manifestly unjust to allow the process of the criminal Court to be issued against the accused person. A third category of cases in which the

inherent jurisdiction of the High Court can be successfully invoked may also arise. In cases falling under this category the allegations made against the

accused person do constitute an offence alleged but there is either no legal evidence adduced in support of the case or evidence adduced clearly or

manifestly fails to prove the charge. In dealing with this class of cases, it is important to bear in mind the distinction between a case where there is no

legal evidence or where there is evidence which is manifestly and clearly inconsistent with the accusation made and cases where there is legal

evidence which on its appreciation may or may not support the accusation in question. In exercising its jurisdiction under S. 561-A, the High Court

would not embark upon an enquiry as to whether the evidence in question is reliable or not. That is the function of the trial magistrate, and ordinarily it

would not be open to any party to invoke the High Court's inherent jurisdiction and contend that on a reasonable appreciation of the evidence the

accusation made against the accused would not be sustained. Broadly stated that is the nature and scope of the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court

under S. 561-A in the matter of quashing criminal proceedings, and that is the effect of the judicial decisions on the point (Vide : In Re: Shripad G.

Chandavarkar, AIR 1928 Bom 184, Jagat Chandra Mozumdar v. Queen Empress, ILR 26 Cal 786, Dr. Shankar Singh v. State of Punjab, 56 Pun LR

54 : (AIR 1954 Punj 193), NripendraBhusan Roy v. GobinaBandhu Majumdar, AIR 1924 Cal 1018 and Ramanathan Chettiyar v. Sivarama

Subramania, ILR 47 Mad 722 : (AIR 1925 Mad 39).â€​

In Madhavrao Jiwaji Rao Scindia v Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre, 1988 (1) SCC 692, a three judges’ bench of the Hon’ble Supreme

Court holds “[7]. The legal position is well-settled that when a prosecution at the initial stage is asked to be quashed, the test to be applied by the

court is as to whether the uncontroverted allegations as made prima facie establish the offence. It is also for the court to take into consideration any

special features which appear in a particular case to consider whether it is expedient and in the interest of justice to permit a prosecution to continue.

This is so on the basis that the court cannot be utilised for any oblique purpose and where in the opinion of the court chances of an ultimate conviction

is bleak and, therefore, no useful purpose is likely to be served by allowing a criminal prosecution to continue, the court may while taking into

consideration the special facts of a case also quash the proceeding even though it may be at a preliminary stage.â€​

CONCLUSION:

This Court has inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to interfere in this kind of matter.

An analysis of the entire allegations and the investigation does not contain legally admissible evidence and thus, does not make out any prima facie

case against the petitioners.

Given the entirety of the case and judicial precedents, I am of the considered opinion that the continuation of these proceedings will not suffice any

fruitful purpose whatsoever.

In Himachal Pradesh Cricket Association v State of Himachal Pradesh, 2018 (4) Crimes 324, Hon’ble Supreme Court holds “[47]. As far

as Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 135 of 2017 is concerned, the appellants came to this Court challenging the order of cognizance only because of the

reason that matter was already pending as the appellants had filed the Special Leave Petitions against the order of the High Court rejecting their

petition for quashing of the FIR/Chargesheet. Having regard to these peculiar facts, writ petition has also been entertained. In any case, once we hold

that FIR needs to be quashed, order of cognizance would automatically stands vitiated.â€​

Given above, this is a fit case where the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is invoked to

quash the proceedings mentioned above. The FIR mentioned above is quashed qua the petitioners, and all the consequential proceedings qua the

petitioners are also quashed and set aside. The bail bonds of the petitioners are accordingly cancelled and discharged. All pending application(s), if

any, stand closed.

In the facts and circumstances peculiar to this case, the petition is allowed in the aforementioned terms.

Copy Dast.