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Judgment
21 paragraphs · 2,132 wordsSatyabrata Sinha, J.—The Petitioners who are 249 in numbers have filed this application claiming, inter alia, the following reliefs:
(a)(i) A Writ of and/or in the nature of Mandamus commanding the Respondents to do their statutory duty in accordance with law and to forbear from giving any and/or any further effect to the notification on December 30, 1954 and notification dated January 18, 1969 for acquisition of lands in the mouza''s Palashgachi, Bhad-urpur, and Bashdob under Santipur P.S. Nadia, being Annexures-B and E hereto ;
(ii). Further commanding the Respondents to derequisition the said lands in mouza Palashgachi, Bhadurpur and Bashdob under P.S. Santipur, Nadia ;
(b) A Writ of and/or in the nature of Certiorari directing the Respondent to certify and bring before the Hon''ble Court the entire records of the case including the said order of Acquisition notification Sections 4, 6 and 11A of the Land Acqusition of 1894 that conscionabie justice may be rendered to the Petitioners by quashing and/or setting aside the acquisition order in Annexures ''B'' and ''E'' hereto.
The basic fact of the matter is not in dispute.
The State of West Bengal issued a notification under s 4 read with Section 17(4) of the Land Acquisition Act for the purpose of its use by the Forest Department. A writ petition was filed by some persons questioning the validity and/or legality of the said Notification. D.N. Sinha, J. (as the learned Chief Justice then was) by a judgment and order dated February 24, 1958 quashed the aforementioned notification. After the said decision, another notification u/s 4 of the Land Acquisition Act was issued. From the notification dated January 18, 1969 as contained in Annexure ''A'' to the affidavit-in-opposition filed by the Respondents No. 5, 6, and 8, it appears that upon giving an opportunity of hearing to all concerned in terms of Section 5A of the Land Acquisition Act a declaration u/s 6 of the said Act was made after excluding certain lands from the purview of acquisition. According to the Petitioners, they had been in possession of the lands in question for a long time. Their names allegedly have been recorded in the Record of Rights and they have also been paying the water rates for irrigating the said land. The Petitioners contend that they were sought to be forcibly dispossessed from the lands in question whereupon they made an enquiry and came to learn that the lands were sought to have been acquired under the provision of Land Acquisition Act way back in the year 1969. It is stated that although there are unimpeachable documents to show that they had been in possession of the lands in question, no notice either under Sections 8, 9 or 11 was served on them. According to the Petitioners even no award has been made.
The case of the Respondents, on the other hand, is that the Forest Department was handed over possession in the year 1955 and after declaration u/s 6 of the Land Acquisition Act had been set aside by this Court, a fresh notification u/s 4 was issued and upon giving an opportunity of hearing to the Petitioners in terms of Section 5A, a declaration u/s 6 was made. It is stated that the lands in question belong to one Ganguly family. One Dinobandhu Ganguly filed a writ petition in this Court and pursuant to an order made by this Court an award dated May 17, 1984 was made in his name.
According to the Respondents, the Forest Department had planted trees worth more, them Rs. 50 lakhs and the Petitioners have encroached upon a portion thereof and by practising fraud got their names recorded in the Record of Rights and have been paying water rates.
Mr. Kashikanta Moitra, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the Petitioners submitted that keeping in view of the fact the Petitioners have annexed various documents with their affidavit-in-reply to show that ttieir names have been recorded in the Record of Rights and they have been paying Water Rates to the Irrigation Department; there cannot be any doubt whatsoever that they are occupiers and/or persons interested within the meaning of Land Acquisition Act and, thus, any action taken without serving any notice must be held to be illegal. The learned Counsel submits that a bare perusal of the affidayit-in-opposition filed by the Respondents-State would show vague statements have been made as regards making of an award. According to the learned Counsel there is nothing on record to show that any notice had been served on the Petitioners or any award has been made in respect of the lands in question. Section 11A of the Land Acquisition Act, contends Mr. Moitra, mandates making of an award within the period stipulated therein failing which, the entire proceedings would abate. Attention of this Court has also been drawn to the proviso of Section 6 of the said Act. It was further submitted that the Petitioners were occupiers and, thus, were entitled to notice in terms of Sub-section (3) of Section 9 of the said Act.
Mr. Dilip Dey, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the State and Mr. Roy Chowdhury, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the Respondent Nos. 6 to 8, on the other hand, submit that the acquisition of the land in question had been made validly and the Forest Department had been in possession of the said lands since 1969. It was contended that this writ application has been filed after a period of 26 years but the Petitioners have not given sufficient explanation for the delay.
It is contended that the Forest Department had to acquire the said lands for maintaining echological balance and with that it had planted trees worth Rs. 50 lakhs but the Petitioners have been cutting the said trees for which First Information Reports have been lodged against some of them in the year 1993 and 1996. Xerox copies of the said complaints have been produced before this Court.
It is true that the Petitioners who are 249 in numbers had produced certain documents to show that their names had been recorded as unauthorised occupants. The main Khatian has been produced before this Court by Mr. Roy Chowdhury, from a perusal whereof it appears that the lands in question have been recorded in the name of the Forest Department of the State. However, in the Khatian produced by the Petitioners, it appears that their names had been recorded as unauthorised occupants. The said Record of Rights appears to have been made in the year 1991. The Petitioners themselves having relied upon the said Record of Rights cannot resile from the fact that they were not lawful occupiers of the lands in question. The Petitioners, thus, being encroachers and/or being trespassers cannot claim any right, title or interest in the property in question. The question as to whether the Petitioners had any right, title and interest at the relevant time or not is essentially a question of fact. The fact remains that the Petitioners'' were in know of the proceedings. In fact, the Petitioners themselves have annexed copies of the notifications published in the year 1954 and 1969 with the writ petition. The said notification of the year 1954 which has been quashed is also subject matter of challenge before this Court. The Petitioners have also annexed a copy of the judgment and order passed by- D.N. Sinha J. dated February 24, 1958 in C.R. No. 1223 of 1955. The Petitioner No. 1 was also the Petitioner No. 1 in the earlier writ petition. Other Petitioners appear to be successor in interest of the Petitioners of 2-9 of the earlier writ petition.
It is also worthwhile to note that the Petitioners had not traversed the assertions made by the Respondents in their affidavit-in-opposition to the effect that they were heard in the proceedings at the stage of Section 5A of the Act. The said fact has also been mentioned in the declaration u/s 6 of the Act as contained in Annexure ''A'' to the Affidavit-in-opposition. it is, therefore, wholly unlikely that the Petitioners were not aware that any declaration had been made u/s 6 of the Act.
This Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India cannot enter into a disputed question as to whether the Forest Department of the State had been in possession of the lands in question since 1969 or not and as to whether they had been in possession earlier in the year 1955 pursuant to the said notification in the year 1954. it is also not within the domain of this Court to consider the question as to whether the Ganguly family had the right, title and interest or possession in respect of the properties in question or not.
It may be true that in the affidavit-in-opposition the Respondents have not given details of the writ petition filed by the awardee nor details had been given as to the award. However, according to the Respondents, an award had been made in favour of the aforementioned Dinobandhu Ganguly on or about May 17, 1984.
There cannot be any doubt whatsoever that if the lands in question had been acquired validly and an award has been made, the Respondent Nos. 6 to 8 are entitled to possess the same without any interruption from any quarters whatsoever an also entitled to evict any person who trespassed into the properties. Further this writ petition has been filed 26 years after the declaration was given u/s 6. As indicated hereinbefore- in the said declaration itself it has categorically been stated that the person interested where given an opportunity of hearing and some lands had been excluded from the purview of the acquisition proceedings. There cannot be any doubt whatsoever that the performance of acquisition has a public purpose. A writ Court does not interfere with any proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act once it is satisfied that the acquisition was made for public purpose. Reference in this connection may be made to Ramniklal N. Bhutta and Anr. v. State of Maharashtra and Ors. (1977) 1 S.C.C. 134. Once a proceeding has been validly made, the Petitioners were at best entitled to compensation. For the said purpose they could either take recourse to filing of a suit as against the two owners or Section 30 of the Land Acquisition Act.
In Ranjit Kumar Haider v. Calcutta Metropolitan Development Authority C.L.T. 1995 (2) H.C. 406, a division bench refused to grant an order of stay in favour of the tresspassers as the land was required for public purpose. Relerence in this connection may also be made to Nirmalendu Chakraborty v. State of West Bengal 1977 (1) C.L.T. 352.
The Petitioners, furthermore, on their own showing were aware that the lands in question had been recorded in the name of the State. The Petitioners did not question the said orders. In any event, the Petitioners even on the basis of the entries made in the Record of Rights are mere trespassers. Such entries in the Record of Rights do not confer any right, title and interest upon the Petitioners. Having known that the lands had been recorded in the name of the State, it was obligatory on the part of the Petitioners to file an appropriate suit and/or approach this Court questioning the validity or otherwise of the land acquisition proceedings within a reasonable time. They failed to do so. Records of the case have also been produced before this Court, but from a perusal thereof it does not appear that the Respondents have committed any illegality, irrationality ''or procedural impropriety in its decision making process.
In Bhoop Singh Vs. Union of India and others, the Supreme Court has held that no writ application should be entertained if the same has been filed after a long time. In this case, the land acquisition proceedings are sought to be challenged after 26 years. On this ground also, no relief can be granted to the Petitioners.
The decision of the Supreme Court in Government of Tamil Nadu and another Vs. Vasantha Bai, has no application in the instant case inasmuch as therein the Apex Court was concerned with a matter relating to the exclusion of period of stay in computing the period of two years in terms of Section 11A of the Land Acquisition Act.
For the reasons aforementioned it is not a fit case in which this Court should exercise its discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. This writ application is accordingly dismissed but in the facts and circumstances of this case there will be no order as to costs.
