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Judgment
Bose, J.—This is an application under Article 226 of the Constitution for an appropriate writ directing the opposite parties Nos. 1 and 3 to forbear from giving effect to a notification issued u/s 553 of the Bengal Municipal Act superseding a municipality known as the Tollygunge Municipality and also for a writ of quo warranto against the opposite party No. 2 to exhibit the authority under which he purports to exercise the powers and perform the duties of the chairman and the commissioners of the said municipality.
The municipality of Tollygunge is constituted under the Bengal Municipal Act, 1932, having its office at 9 Prince Anwar Shah Eoad, Tollygunge, in the suburbs of Calcutta.
The Petitioner No. 1 is the vice-chairman of the said municipality. The Petitioner No. 2 is a commissioner and the Petitioner No. 3 is a rate-payer of the said municipality, and the petition purports to be on behalf of all the rate-payers of the said municipality.
The last municipal election of this municipality was held on March 30, 1949, and the commissioners constituted themselves into two groups, namely the congress group and the independent group. It is alleged in the petition that since April 21, 1949, up to September 1950, the congress group dominated the management and administration of the affairs of the municipality. But from September 15, 1950, the independent group gained effective majority and reconstituted the administration under their control. Upon that about eight commissioners tendered their resignation and they addressed a letter to the Government to supersede the municipality. The Government directed the Additional District Magistrate to investigate the matter and submit a report. The investigation took place in the month of May 1951 and the magistrate submitted his report on May 28, 1951. Prior to the submission of such report the additional district magistrate wrote a letter to the chairman of the municipality requesting the chairman to suggest a suitable date in the first part of August 1951 for holding a bye-election of commissioners in respect of the vacancies caused by the resignation as aforesaid of some of the commissioners.
Certain extracts from the said report have been annexed to the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the Respondents and it appears there from that the Additional District Magistrate has pointed out certain irregularities in the management and administration of the affairs of the municipality and suggested that action u/s 552 or Section 553 should be taken, but according to him, action u/s 552 was the preferable course to adopt. The matter, however, was placed before the Commissioner, Presidency Division, and it appears that on June 7, 1951, the Commissioner, Presidency Division, recommended on the strength of this very report that "supersession of the municipality and its administration by the "Government seem to me to be the proper course in the "circumstances. Any tinkering with this matter in a more soft "way, will be unwise". The result was that although at one stage it was thought desirable to hold a bye-election for filling in the vacancies caused by the resignation of the commissioners the Government published a resolution in the Calcutta Gazette, dated November 26, 1951, superseding the municipality. On December 1, 1951, the Government has taken over the management and administration of the municipality through Mr. R.S. Trivedi, the Executive Officer of the Calcutta Corporation.
The Petitioners have challenged this order of supersession as illegal on the ground that the Government had not sufficient grounds for taking action u/s 553 read with Section 554 and further that the action of the Government has been mala fide.
A copy of the resolution superseding the municipality has been annexed to the petition. The resolution recites that a number of representations were received from residents and rate-payers complaining of serious maladministration and progressive deterioration of the essential services of the municipality, but not a single representation has been annexed to the affidavit.
The reasons which led the Government to pass the resolution are set out in the body of the resolution. After reciting certain instances of serious irregularities it is stated in the resolution that ever since the present commissioners of the municipality came into office in 1949 there has been acute party faction and between May 1949 and September 1950 there were three changes in the chairmanship, and ultimately this party faction culminated in the resignation of as many as eight out of the fifteen commissioners of the municipality, and the administration was since then carried on by the minority group which was not sufficiently representative of the rate-payers. No steps were taken to fill the vacancies caused by these resignations for two reasons: firstly, because the question of supersession of the municipal commissioners was under the consideration of the Government and, secondly, because provision had been made in the Calcutta Municipal Bill which was subsequently passed by the State Legislature authorising the Government to incorporate the area under the Tollygunge Municipality within Calcutta by the issue of a notification to that effect.
The grounds relied on for superseding the municipality may be set out hereunder:
There has been persistent failure to take adequate steps against the so-called lessees of the municipal roadside lands who have been allowed to occupy these lands without any proper documents, and this has been causing loss of revenue to the municipality. Some of the so-called leases are believed to be benami transactions by certain municipal employees.
Drastic reduction was made in the valuation of certain holdings for purpose of municipal assessment and in one case brought to light the chairman was found to have reduced the valuation fixed by the Assessment Review Committee although he had no legal power to do so.
Purchase of stationery and sundry articles was made without calling for tenders or quotations and some of the articles were usually purchased from a firm belonging to the brother of a municipal employee.
Failure of the commissioners to consider proposals for making new private streets u/s 225(3) of the Bengal Municipal Act, 1932, their power under that section being exercised by the chairman himself contrary to law.
Appointment as municipal servant of a person convicted in a criminal case and of another, an employee in the firm of the chairman in a part-time capacity.
Maladministration of the assessment department which left many holdings unassessed for long periods resulting in loss of revenue to the municipality. The municipal commissioners appear to have exercised very little control over this department whose work has been dilatory and erratic.
Failure to maintain properly a number of important registers, viz., stock and store register, register of works and the register of plans received and sanctioned in accordance with statutory rules.
Failure to maintain muster-roll of labour employed for departmental works as required under the Municipal Account Rules.
Failure to maintain log book for consumption of petrol, etc., by the municipal motor vehicles until recently.
Extremely poor state of collection of the municipal rates and taxes which is mainly responsible for the present critical financial condition of the municipality, the average annual collection during the last three years being barely over 55 per cent, of the total demand.
Now Section 553 under which the State Government has purported to act in superseding the municipality finds place in Chapter XXVII of the Bengal Municipal Act which deals with the powers and the extent of the control which the State Government can exercise in relation to municipalities. Section 545 empowers the Commissioner of the division or the District Magistrate or the Magistrate in charge of a subdivision to inspect books and documents and properties in the possession of the commissioners of the municipality and to call upon the commissioners to furnish accounts, statements, reports or copies of documents relating to the proceedings or duties of the commissioners. Section 548 empowers the State Government the annul any proceeding which is not in conformity with law an the rules in force, there under, and to do all things necessary the secure such conformity and also to suspend any resolution which is likely to lead to a breach of the peace or to cause injury on annoyance to any person. Section 549 provides that if it appeal to the State Government that the commissioners have made default in performing any duty imposed on them by or under the Bengal Municipal Act or any other Act, the State Government may by order in writing fix a time for the performance that duty and if such duty is not performed within the period fixed the Government may appoint the District Magistrate perform it and may direct that the expense of performing it shall be paid within a time fixed, out of municipal fund. It is the clear from this Section 549 that if the commissioners has committed any default in the discharge of their statutory duty an opportunity has to be given to them in the first instance to make good the default. Section 550 contemplates that if the commissioners have shown their incompetency to perform or have persistently made default in the performance of their duties imposed on them by or under the Act in respect of any department of the municipality under their control, the State Government may by written order direct the commissioners to show cause to the satisfaction of the State Government as to why a suitable person should not be appointed to take charge of the department for a specified period and to exercise the powers and perform the duties of the chairman and the commissioners in respect of that department. Thus this section provides for supersession of a particular department, the affairs of which are not properly managed by the commissioners of the municipality, and it may be noted that such supersession can take place only after proper opportunity has been given to show cause against the action proposed to be taken. Section 552 provides that if the commissioners have shown their incompetency to perform or have persistently made default in the performance of their duties imposed under the Act or have exceeded or abused their powers, the State Government may dissolve the body of commissioners and direct a fresh general election to be held, and it is after making all these provisions, and as a last resort Section 553 of the Act confers power upon the State Government to supersede the entire body of the commissioners of the municipality. This Section 553 may be set out hereunder:
If, in the opinion of the State Government the Commissioners have shown their incompetency to perform, or have persistently made default in the performance of the duties imposed on them by or under this Act or by any other law, or have exceeded or abused their powers, the State Government may, by an order published with the reasons for making it, in the official Gazette, declare such Commissioners to be incompetent, or in default, or to have exceeded or abused their powers, as the case may be, and supersede them for a period to be specified in the order. Provided that except in case of misappropriation of municipal funds or persistent default in the performance of duties by the Commissioners the State Government shall not ordinarily exercise powers under this section until action has been taken under 552.
Section 554 lays down the consequences that ensue after an order of supersession is made.
Now an analysis of Section 553 makes it clear that it is only when particular commissioners are found to be incompetent to perform the duties of their office or have been guilty of persistent default in the discharge of their statutory duty that the State Government can supersede the particular body of commissioners for a specified period, but such power of supersession shall not normally be resorted to until action has been taken in terms of Section 552 of the Act. It is only in case when the commissioners are found to have committed misappropriation of the municipal funds or have made persistent default that recourse can be had to Section 553 without in the first instance taking steps in terms of the provisions of Section 552.
The scheme of the various provisions of Ch. XXVII of the Act appears to be that it is when all the various methods provided in Sections 549, 550 and 552 have been exhausted that the more serious and drastic step of supersession u/s 553 is intended to be taken by the State Government, though, however, there is no bar to the State Government, taking action straightaway u/s 553 in a proper case, without in the first instance proceeding u/s 552, or the other preceding sections of that Chapter.
The term "persistent" means "pushing on, specially against "opposition; tenacious" (Chambers 20th Century Dictionary p. 683). Persistent default, therefore, connotes the idea of successive defaults in spite of warning or protest and opposition. The different sections in Chapter XXVII also furnish a clue to the meaning of the words "persistent default" as used in Sections. 550, 552 and 553. It is only after Section 549 refers to the case of first or single default that the words "persistent "default" are used in the subsequent sections.
Further, the incompetency or persistent default must be in respect of duties imposed by the Act or any other law and not in respect of any and every act or duty.
The expression "the commissioners" has been defined in Section 3(53) of the Act, as meaning "persons for the time being "appointed or elected to conduct the affairs of any municipality "under this Act". So it is in this sense that the words "the "commissioners" as used in Section 553 are to be understood. The default or incompetency, therefore, must be of the commissioners for the time being, and for the default or incompetency of the past commissioners, the penalty of supersession cannot be visitor on the present commissioners.
Mr. Ranadeb Chawdhury, the learned Counsel for the Petitioners has contended that the reasons or grounds stated in the order of supersession do not justify the Government in taking steps u/s 553 of the Act. He submits that the incompetence or default alleged in the resolution of supersession is not of the "kind contemplated in the section.
Mr. Chowdhury has argued that some of the defaults or act complained of had their origin during the administration (sic) past bodies of commissioners and the present body (sic) commissioners cannot be blamed for that. As an instance (sic) that Mr. Chowdhury refers to the ground No. 1 and the facts an circumstances in relation thereto as set out in the affidavit. Mr. Chowdhury points out that certain road-side lands were settled with diverse parties in 1932 by the then commissioners. As these parties asserted title under non-agricultural tenancy Act, the present body of commissioners obtained legal opinion of the Junior Standing Counsel but as the opinion has been adverse to the municipality no steps were taken by the present commissioners.
With regard to ground No. 2 it is pointed but that there is no case of drastic reduction but only in one case Rs. 50 was reduced. The chairman is a member of the Assessment Review Committee and this committee made the reduction. There is no irregularity about the matter. Reference is made to Sections. 148 and 149 of the Bengal Municipal Act to show that the ground is baseless.
With regard to ground No. 3 it is submitted that the commissioners have no control over the chairman who is authorised under Rule 145 of the Account Rules to make the purchases of the stationery and so the commissioners have made no default. This explanation is far from convincing. If the chairman is acting in a manner detrimental to the interest of the municipality he can be removed u/s 61 of the Act.
With regard to ground No. 4 it is pointed out that there is no provision in the Act or rules for formation of Works Committee and the report of the Additional District Magistrate is that the matters were not put up within 90 days but later on. The duty is of the chairman and default is that of the chairman, if at all, and not of the commissioners. Further the default took place prior to the coming into office of the present chairman. It may be pointed out, however, that the present commissioners were there when the alleged default took place. Whether the congress group dominated or the independent group controlled the affairs the fact remained that the present commissioners have been the commissioners since 1949, and it is a childish excuse that as it was the duty of the chairman, therefore, they had no responsibility in the matter.
With regard to some of the other grounds the argument put forward is that the defaults complained of are in respect of matters with regard to which no duties are imposed by the Act or the rules and so these are not proper grounds for taking steps under Section, 553. It is submitted that some of the registers and books are being maintained though the report of the Additional District Magistrate states that they are not being maintained.
One of the grounds is that there has been extremely poor collection of rates and taxes and another ground is that holdings have remained unassessed for long periods resulting in loss of revenue to the municipality. The answer of the Petitioners is that the collection has increased during the administration of the present commissioners, and reliance is placed on letters dated July 10, 1951 and July 17, 1951 and also on the affidavits. The Petitioner has relied on certain affidavits which have been put in by way of supplementary affidavits in reply affirmed on February 22, 1952 and March 29, 1952. These supplementary affidavits cannot be accepted by the court and so no reliance can be placed on the statements in these two affidavits.
In the affidavit in reply affirmed on February 15, 1952 it has been attempted to be shown that the financial position of the municipality improved under the administration of the present commissioners. But in spite of this improvement in the financial position the State Government was of the opinion that the commissioners are not competent enough to manage the affairs of the municipality well and has decided to supersede the commissioners. It is the opinion of the State Government with regard to incompetency that matters, and not the opinion of this Court or the opinion of the commissioners. It is the State Government that is selected by the Legislature to come to a decision as to whether the commissioners are incompetent or whether they are guilty of persistent defaults or not, and if this decision is to come in good faith, this Court has no power to interfere. This Court cannot investigate into the adequacy or sufficiency of the grounds.
It was suggested that the State Government has acted mala fide at the instigation of the resigning commissioners but it is clear that there is no real foundation for any such suggestion. Even before the present commissioners came into office the Government had reasons to suppose that the affairs of the municipality were not being managed properly and so an investigation was directed and the Magistrate in charge of municipal department had held an investigation and submitted his report on April 18, 1949 and the present commissioners were given a warning on the basis of the report as to the unsatisfactory state of collection of rates and taxes. The counter affidavit and the annexure "B" thereof make that quite clear. Even after the resigning commissioners had written to the Government requesting the Government to supersede the commissioners of the municipality and until so late as September 14, 1951 the Government had not decided to make an order of supersession but was contemplating the advancement of a loan to the municipality of a sum of Rs. 05,000 for repairing two roads within the jurisdiction of the municipality. It is towards the end of November 1951 that the Government finally decided that action should be taken u/s 553 of the Act. It appears to me that the charges of mala fide is baseless.
In the case of F.W. Duke v. Rameswar Malia (1899) ILR 26 Cal. 811, (814-815), (818-819). Maclean C.J. in construing certain sections of the Bengal Municipal Act, 1884, made the following observations:
The learned Judge in the lower appellate court has gone into the question of necessity, and has arrived at the conclusion that the works directed by the municipality to be executed were not necessary. That is the basis of his decision. In this he has erred and he ought not to have gone into the question of necessity or no necessity. The question of necessity or otherwise is left by the legislature to the decision of the municipality and though no doubt a civil court can restrain a corporation from doing anything ultra vires, the question of necessity is not to be so decided
..."If the municipality decides having "proceeded in accordance with the provisions of the above sections that certain works are necessary, that conclusion in the absence of mala fide or fraud or considerations of that nature cannot be successfully challenged and cannot be gone into in a civil court, otherwise every person, who is directed by a municipal body to do certain things on sanitary grounds, could at once institute a suit in a civil court and challenge the necessity of the works directed. That is not what the legislature contemplated (or is it reasonable to suppose that any such course could have been contemplated.
Banerjee J. observed:
But the law makes them the judges upon the point. So long as they had materials before them it was for them alone to say whether upon those materials they were satisfied that there was risk of the kind the section contemplates.
This decision was given in 1899 and the propositions laid down in this case have been affirmed in different languages in subsequent cases.
It is not necessary to refer to all these cases but it is sufficient to refer to a decision of the Judicial Committee in AIR 1949 136 (Privy Council) . In this case the Privy Council had to construe Section 4(7)(a) of the Electricity Act, 1910, the relevant portion whereof was in the following terms:
Section 4(1)-The provincial Government may if in its opinion, the public (sic) terest so requires, revoke a license in any of the following cases, namely:
(a) Where the licensee in the opinion of the Provincial Government makes wilful and unreasonably prolonged default in doing anything required of him by or under this Act;
The Judicial Committee observed:
Their Lordships now turn to the question of construction of Section 4(7)(a). Their lordships are unable to see that there is anything in the language of the Sub-section in the subject matter to which it relates upon which to found the suggestion that the opinion of the Government is to be subject to objective tests. In terms the (sic) evant matter is the opinion of the Government-not the grounds on which the opinion is based. The language leaves no room for the relevance of a judicial examination as to the sufficiency of the grounds on which the Government acted in forming the opinion. Further the question on which the opinion of the Government is relevant is not whether a default has been wilful and unreasonably prolonged but whether there has been a wilful and unreasonably prolonged default. Upon that point the opinion is the determining matter and-if it is not for good cause displaced as a relevant opinion-it is conclusive. But there the area of opinion ceases. The phrase "anything required under the Act" means "anything which is required under the Act". The question what obligations are imposed on licensees by or under the Act is a question of law. Their Lordships do not read the section as making the Government the arbiter upon the construction of the Act or as to the obligations it imposes. Doubtless the Government must in expressing an opinion for the purpose of the section also entertain a view as to the question of law. But its view on law is not decisive. If in arriving at a conclusion it appeared that the Government had given effect to a wrong apprehension of the obligations imposed on the licensee by or under the Act the result would be that the Government had not expressed such an opinion as is referred to in the section.
The Privy Council has. made it clear that the opinion formed is not conclusive on the question of construction of the Act or as to the obligations it imposes, and if the opinion is based on a wrong apprehension of the obligations imposed by a particular section of the Act then it is not an expression of opinion. as is referred to in the section.
Mr. Justice Das of the Supreme Court in Khusaldas Advani''s case (1950) 1 S.C.R. 621 (713), refers to this Hubli Electricity Co.''s case and observes:
Could anything be more objective than the requirements of public interest or the wilful and unreasonably prolonged default? And yet in construing the section their Lordships observed. and the learned Judge quotes a portion of the passage that I have set out from the observations of Lord Uthwatt.
Thus whether the commissioners have shown their incompetency or they have exceeded or abused their powers or they have been guilty of persistent default cannot be enquired into by this Court and the opinion of the State Government is conclusive provided their apprehension of the scope and implications of Section 553 is correct.
Mr. Chowdhury has submitted that the State Government has not properly appreciated the meaning of the words "persistent "default" as used in the section and so the opinion of the State Government is based on erroneous construction of the section The resolution, however, does not specify expressly which are the grounds based on incompetency or excessive exercise of the powers or which are the grounds based on "persistent default" of the commissioners. It may be that the state of collection of rate and taxes is relied on by the State Government as both a case of incompetency and persistent default on the part of the present commissioners. Merely because the words "persistent default have not been used in connection with the grounds other than ground No. 1 does not make these grounds any the less cases of persistent default. As I have pointed out before that the mere fact that collection has improved at the hands of the present commissioners does not prevent the State Government from still forming an opinion that the commissioners are incompetent and are guilty of persistent defaults. The letter dated May 14, 1949, annexed to the counter-affidavit and the letters, dated June 14, 1951 and July 10, 1951 annexed to the affidavit in reply and the affidavits filed show that interviews and discussions had taken place about the subject of collection of rates and taxes and the Government had expressed its dissatisfaction about the state of collection and warnings were given but the chairman or the commissioners asserted that the collection had improved. The Government was apparently not satisfied with the explanation and perhaps thought that the commissioners had not come up to the mark or to the expectation of the Government and had failed to improve the collection in spite of warnings and so the Government decided to take action u/s 553. It may be that the grounds disclosed were not strong enough or were not sufficient to justify the Government in taking action u/s 553 but as the Government has been made the sole Judge about the matter, the opinion of this Court cannot be substituted in place of the opinion of the Government. Further it may be that some of the grounds are not grounds as contemplated by the section, but I find it difficult to hold that there were no materials at all before the State Government to justify an opinion under the section being formed. If there is material however slight the order cannot be interfered with.
It has been contended by Mr. Chowdhury that the State Government in exercising its powers or functions u/s 553 acts judicially or quasi judicially and therefore no order could be passed without giving an opportunity to the commissioners of being heard or to show cause against the action proposed to be taken. Mr. Chowdhury relies on Section 550 of the Bengal Municipal Act which provides that before a particular department of the municipality can be superseded for inefficient administration, opportunity has to be given to the commissioners to show cause against the action proposed, and it is submitted therefore that when the entire body of commissioners is sought to be superseded it is all the more imperative that such an opportunity should be given and such provision must be implied though there is no express provision to that effect in the section. It is difficult to follow why although a provision for showing cause was inserted in Section 550, no such provision finds place in Section 553. It may be that before a limb of the body could be clipped, it was thought proper to give an opportunity to the body to defend itself, but when the body itself was condemned no such opportunity was thought necessary.
It has been held in the case of Khusaldas Advani (supra) and in numerous other cases that the question whether there is a duty to act judicially in exercising a particular power under the statute is to be determined not by reference to the particular provision but with reference to all the relevant provisions in the statute. That is no doubt so, but it is significant that there is no provision for showing cause in Section 553 or Section 552 although there is such a provision in Section 550. Moreover I am not inclined to hold that the mere provision for stating the reasons of the order makes the function a judicial or quasi judicial function. The provision is made for protection against arbitrary action or mala fide exercise of the power. It appears to me that the intention of the framers of the Act was that the State Government could satisfy itself on materials or information however procured and its decision honestly made on such materials would conclude the matter. To quote the words of Lord Radcliffe in Nakuda Ali v. Javaratnc (1951) A.C. 66 (77)-
It is long step in the argument to say that because a man is enjoined that he must not take action unless he has reasonable grounds of believing something he can only arrive at that belief by a course of conduct analogous to the judicial process.
See also the last paragraph of the judgment at p. 78.
Mr. Chowdhury relied on the case reported in Avadesh Protap Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh (1952) AIR (All.) 63 (69). But in that case the right to property was in question. The proprietor was being deprived of the possession and management of his estate and there was express prevision for furnishing the proprietor with the grounds on which it was proposed to disqualify him and also for giving him an opportunity to show cause why a declaration should not be made. Upon these facts it was held that the Government had the duty to act quasi judicially in the matter of making the declaration. Moreover, as far as can be gathered from the report of the case, there was no such expression as "if the State "Government is of opinion" or "if it appears to the State "Government" which would make the opinion of the State Government conclusive. Moreover, the right of the commissioners to hold office is not a natural or common law right but a right created by statute-the Bengal Municipal Act. So no presumption can arise that the Government must act quasi judicially. Mr. Chowdhury also referred to R.V. Manchester Legal Aid Committee (1952) 1 All. E.R. 480 and cases cited in this case, but these cases are not of assistance in deciding the case before me. Patrt Shaw v. R.N. Ray ILR (1952). 1 Cal. 1. I am unable to hold, therefore, that the State Government in acting u/s 553 is under any duty to act judicially. Das J. in Civil Revision Case No. 810 of 1951 negatived the contention that in making an order of supersession u/s 131 of the Bengal Local Self-Government Act (III of 1885) the Provincial Government had any duty to act judicially or quasi judicially. There being no duty to act judicially or quasi judicially, no duty to give a hearing before passing the order of supersession can be implied. The cases show that it is only when there is a duty to act judicially or quasi judicially that an obligation to follow the fundamental principles of judicial procedure is cast upon the person whose duty it is to act judicially.
It was further contended by Mr. Chowdhury that as the State Government has taken extraneous and irrelevant matters into consideration in passing the order of supersession, the order is not one which is made u/s 553 and should therefore be cancelled. It is submitted that para. 2 of the resolution dated November 26, 1951 annexed to the petition shows that the consideration that there is a provision in the Calcutta Municipal Bill for incorporating the Tollygunge Municipality with the Calcutta Corporation weighed with the State Government in making the order of supersession and as this is an extraneous consideration, the order is not sustainable.
In para. 13 of the counter-affidavit it is denied that this fact was at all made a ground of the order of supersession. But whether this denial can be relied on or not it is clear from the recitals in para. 3 of the Order or resolution itself that it is for incompetency and persistent default of the commissioners and on the grounds set out in para. I of the Order or resolution that the order of supersession is based. The recitals in para. 2 of the Order did not form the basis of the Order. The fact that there was a provision for incorporation weighed with the Government in not ultimately holding a bye-election in respect of the vacancies caused by the resignation of some of the commissioners, I am, therefore, unable to hold that the order of supersesssion was actuated by any extraneous consideration.
Mr. Chowdhury submitted that as the Respondent No. 2 has not appeared to show cause, a writ of quo warranto should issue against him. It is true that he has not entered appearance in this proceeding but the State Government has contested the proceeding and lias shown cause in answer to the Rule. The materials before the Court, especially the two orders in. annexure ''B'' to the petition, show that the Respondent No. 2 is acting under the authority of these two orders and as I am of the view that these are valid orders, no writ can issue against the Respondent No. 2.
In my view this petition must fail. The Rule is accordingly discharged. The Petitioners must pay the costs of the appearing Respondents. Hearing fee is assessed at 10 gold mohurs.