AI Structured Summary
Not yet generated for this judgment
Judgment
Ramaprasada Rao, J.—In this tax case four assessment years are involved, 1949-50, 1951-52, 1953-54 and 1954-55. The Income Tax
Officer instituted proceedings against the applicant u/s 28(1)(b) so far as the assessment years 1949-50 and 1954-55 were concerned and u/s
28(3)(c) for the assessment years 1951-52 and 1953-54. As a result of such proceedings, penalties were imposed for the assessment years in
question for such non-production of accounts and concealment of income. It is not in dispute that the assessments for the years in question were
completed and became final. Such assessments sprung from the returns voluntarily submitted by the applicant as an individual and the revenue also
treated him as an individual during the material times when assessment proceedings were originally initiated. The Income Tax Officer, in exercise of
his jurisdiction u/s 28 of the Act, levied varied amounts of penalty for the irregularities mentioned above on September 27, 1958, and March 31,
1959, under Sections 28(1)(b) and 28(1)(c). It may be noted, however, that the applicant contended that the levy of penalty was not justified and
for the first time also contended before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner that during the assessment years in question the applicant was
wrongly assessed in the status of an individual and that he ought to have been assessed in the status of a Hindu undivided family, and since the
Hindu undivided family became disrupted in 1956, the levy of penalty on the Hindu undivided family after its disruption was illegal and even the
initiation and the conclusion of the proceedings against the applicant as an individual and as if he was liable to pay the penalty would equally be
illegal. The applicant relied upon an order of the Income Tax Officer dated December 30, 1961, u/s 25A, by which the revenue was satisfied that
there has been a complete partition in the family with effect from April 23, 1956. While passing the order u/s 25A, the Income Tax Officer was
satisfied that there was evidence to show that the properties and the business built up by the applicant came out of joint family nucleus. Based on
such a finding and record made by the revenue u/s 25A, the applicant canvassed the legality and propriety of the penalty proceedings and the
sustenance of such penalty by the department. The applicant was unsuccessful before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, and so too before the
Tribunal. The Tribunal, however, dealing with the contentions of the applicant, held that, on merits, the levy was justified and on the question of law
raised by the applicant it was of the view that the applicant should not be allowed to raise this question as he knew the existence of the Hindu
undivided family on the relative dates, when he submitted returns as an individual, and he having induced the revenue to pass orders as if his status
was that of an individual, he cannot be allowed to reprobate and take up the position that the earlier assessments were wrong and the person
involved in the assessment had the status of a Hindu undivided family. On this sole ground the Tribunal refused to interfere. On a request by the
applicant, the following question has been referred to this court for us to render our answer thereon :
Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, having regard to the order dated December 30, 1961, u/s 25A, the levy of penalty u/s
28(1)(b) of the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922, for the assessment years 1949-50 and 1954-55 and u/s 28(I)(c) of the said Act for the assessment
years 1951-52 and 1953-54 is valid ?
The impugned penalty notices were issued to the applicant in the status of an individual. The merits thereto are not canvassed in this reference.
The legality and sustenance of the same is questioned. The levy of penalty is questioned by the applicant on the main ground that on the date when
the penalty was levied by the revenue either u/s 28(1)(b) or Section 28(1)(c) of the Act, the family was not joint and such a factum of disruption of
the family as envisaged by a deed of partition dated April 23, 1956, having been recorded by an order dated December 30, 1961, u/s 25A(1) of
the Act, the levy of penalty is not valid. It was so contended on the authority of S. A. Raju Chettiar and Others Vs. Collector of Madras and
Another, . and MAHANKALI SUBBA RAO, MAHANKALI NAGESHWARA RAO AND ANOTHER Vs. COMMISSIONER OF Income
Tax, HYDERABAD., . , that the taxing officers had no jurisdiction to levy of penalty. The argument proceeds that the order u/s 25A(1) of the Act
irretrievably recognises a Hindu undivided family until April 23, 1956, and thereafter "" the person "" of a Hindu undivided family being absent no
proceedings to impose penalty can be initiated or penalty levied in consequence thereof on such a non-existing person. The fact that, during the
assessment years in question, the applicant purported to submit returns as an individual or the consequential assessments made on him during the
material period as an individual would not make any difference, if, as a matter of fact, there is no dispute that the assessments should have been
made in those years on the Hindu undivided family and not on the individual as such. Mr. K. Srinivasan refers to the order made u/s 25A(1)
wherein it is stated that the assessee has produced evidence to show that the house properties and the business built up by the applicant have come
out of family nucleus. Strong reliance is placed on the remand report of the Income Tax Officer dated March 11, 1961, to support the argument
that the income assessed in the hands of the applicant during the relevant years should be deemed to be the income of the Hindu undivided family.
Whilst thus the applicant intends to avoid the penalty, the revenue contends that an order u/s 25A(1) being prospective in operation and since
penalty proceedings are in effect to impose additional tax, the applicant cannot complain. Mr. Balasubrahmanyan proceeds that the ratio in
COMMISSIONER OF Income Tax, MADRAS Vs. K. M. N. N. SWAMINATHAN CHETTIAR., . applies to the instant case. His further
argument is that, for the assessment years 1949-50 and 1954-55, penalty was imposed because of non-production of accounts and for the years
1951-52 and 1953-54 on the basis of concealment of income. Such contumacies ought not to be ignored without being noticed by the revenue, as
u/s 28 penalty is imposed as part of machinery for assessment of tax liability and, though it is designated as penalty, it is additional tax. Mr.
Balasubrahmanyan, however, rightly conceded that the reasoning of the Tribunal that the levy of penalty cannot be challenged because the
applicant filed returns earlier as an individual and allowed assessments to be made as if "" the person "" concerned is an individual and therefore it
cannot be presumed that there was ever a joint family at all during the relevant years, is not supportable.
Under the Income Tax Act, a person includes a Hindu undivided family. Section 3, which is the charging section, enables the revenue to tax the
total income of the previous year of every Hindu undivided family. No option is given to the officer to elect and assess individual coparceners as is
available to him in the case of individual members belonging to an association of persons. Once the factual existence of a Hindu undivided family is
conceded either directly or indirectly, it is not open to the income tax Officer to assess individual members thereof during the continuance of such
an united family. That such a Hindu undivided family existed till April 23, 1956, is indisputable, since the order u/s 25A(1) though invariably
posterior to the date of disruption of the joint family, virtually concedes the existence in fact of such a family until the date of partition. The order u/s
25A(1) recording that a partition has been effected is only declarative of the united existence of the Hindu; family till the date of partition. To mean
otherwise, would lead to anomalous results. The order u/s 25A(1), which is necessarily based on a deed of partition and the evidence adduced in
support thereof, is bound to be on a date later than the partition deed. Once the order is recorded, it is indisputable that the revenue recognises
that, prior to the date of partition, there was a Hindu undivided family and, after the partition it ceased to exist. In this case, the order u/s 25A(1)
was passed on December 30, 1961, recording a partition on April 23, 1956. It follows that the family of which the applicant was a member was a
Hindu undivided family till April 23, 1956. The assessments made on the applicant during the relevant years as an individual is distinct and separate
and is not relatable or referable to the Hindu undivided family of which he was a member. Admittedly, he was not assessed as a karta of the family,
nor did he represent himself as such. No doubt, it appears strange, in the peculiar circumstances of this case, as to how an order u/s 25A(1) was
recorded at all. But having been so recorded, it has to be fully implemented. Therefore, his conduct, however contumacious it may be, cannot be
attributed to the Hindu undivided family, which was concurrently in existence at that time as a legal person under the fiscal law who can be charged
to tax as a distinct legal entity. There is no estoppel by conduct in such cases. The reasoning of the Tribunal is, therefore, not sound.
If such is the only plausible interpretation and the legal consequence of an order recorded u/s 25A(1), can penalty be imposed on a Hindu
undivided family which did not exist factually on the date of initiation of such proceedings and on the date when the order for levy of penalty is
made ? The query has to be answered in the negative. Though, as laid down by the Supreme Court in C.A. Abraham, Uppoottil, Kottayam Vs.
The Income Tax Officer, Kottayam and Another, ., and in Commissioner of Income Tax, Bombay City Vs. Bipinchandra Maganlal and Co. Ltd., .
, the penalty imposed under a taxing statute upon a person in view of his dishonest or contumacious conduct is in the nature of an additional tax, yet
the fundamental concept which springs from the above is that the "" person "" on whom the "" additional tax "" is levied or sought to be levied must be
the same person and should be in existence on the date of the order. As pointed out by the Supreme Court in Additional Income Tax Officer,
Cuddapah Vs. A. Thimmayya and Others, ., the Income Tax Act contains no machinery authorising the Income Tax Officer to re-open, u/s 34 of
the Act, an assessment of a Hindu undivided family relying upon an order recorded u/s 25A(1) subsequent to the passing of the assessment order
and seek to subvert orders which have become final. In principle, the jurisdiction to levy penalty in such circumstances is not in any way different.
Viewing penalty as additional tax, the Income Tax Officer may not be in a position to impose such penalty on a Hin4u undivided family which he
has solemnly recorded as having been partitioned. The decision in Commissioner of Income Tax v. K. M. N. N. Swaminathan Chettiar relied upon
by Mr. Balasubrahmanyan is not applicable. That was a case where the individual, who was a coparcener in the quondam Hindu undivided family
and who was served with a notice u/s 34, submitted a return as karta of the family. This fact was noticed by the learned judges and the decision
apparently rested on such a factual finding. Again the Income Tax Officer cannot, after being apprised of an order u/s 25A(1), initiate or levy the
penalty or sustain it. The orders for imposing penalty u/s 28(1)(b) for the years 1949-50 and 1954-55 were made on September 27, 1958, and
March 31, 1959, respectively. So also the orders u/s 28(1)(c) for the years 1951-52 and 1953-54 were made on September 27, 1958, and
March 31, 1959, respectively. By then the family became divided, because the deed of partition was on April 23, 1956. While canvassing the
propriety of the levy of penalties as above, the applicant raised before the revenue that he was wrongly describing himself as assessee and that the
income ought to have been assessed as on a Hindu undivided family.
As already stated, this was enquired into and found in favour of the assessee resulting in the order u/s 25A(1). After such a decision on status it
is highly irregular to levy and sustain the penalty as an individual, on the only ground that the applicant''s behaviour is blameworthy and indeed has
no moral basis. In a tax law, morality has no place and it is the strict rule of fiscal law that has to prevail. In our view, even though the applicant has
given the go-by to the voluntary state of affairs as maintained by him prior to the penalty proceedings, yet he can do so if he can. On the strength of
the order u/s 25A(1), what is the available remedy to the applicant if he is to suffer the penalty ? He cannot file a suit against the other members of
the joint family as Section 67 prohibits him : see the decision in Kalwa Devadattam and Others Vs. The Union of India (UOI) and Others, . . He
cannot avail himself of the provisions of the Act regarding rectification of assessments as such assessments were made on him as an individual.
Should he still be bound to pay the penalty ? In our view he need not, if he could legally avoid it. As pointed out by a Division Bench of this court
in Gnanambika Mills Ltd. Vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, Madras, . : "" It should be remembered that though penalty may be in the nature of
additional tax, the levy is of a penal character. We have already pointed out that the nature and scope of enquiry and the findings that should be
arrived at in the two proceedings are not common and that though the findings in assessment or reassessment orders may be relevant and may even
be prima facie evidence in proceedings u/s 28, they are by no means conclusive in the latter proceedings.
Ubi jus ibi remedium. The applicant has a right to invoke the order u/s 25A(1) to maintain that penalty cannot be sustained on a non-existent
Hindu undivided family. Reliance was, therefore, rightly placed by Mr. Srinivasan on the ratio in S. A. Raju Chettiar v. Collector of Madras. The
learned judges observed :
In order that proceedings u/s 28 of the Income Tax Act for imposing a penalty on a Hindu undivided family may be initiated, two requirements
have to be satisfied : (i) the family must be in existence when the proceedings are initiated, and (ii) it must also be in existence on the date the order
imposing the penalty on that family as a ''person'' is passed.
In the instant case at least the second requirement is absent. Again, Subba Rao C.J., as he then was, speaking for the Division Bench in M.
Subba Rao & Nageswara Rao v. Commissioner of Income Tax, held :
............that, though Section 25A of the Income Tax Act makes the divided members of a Hindu undivided family jointly and severally liable for
the tax payable by the undivided family there is no provision in the Income Tax Act authorising the taxing authorities to levy a penalty on the
members of a family after they have become divided in respect of concealment of income of the family, and that the penalty imposed could not,
therefore, be recovered from the two members after the disruption of the family.
We have in more places than one pointed out that to sustain such a penalty would be to ignore totally the impinge, content and legal effect of the
order recognising the partition in the family as evidenced by the deed of partition dated April 23, 1956.
In the result the query is answered in the negative and in favour of the assessee with costs. Advocate''s fee Rs. 250.
