P.S. Muthukrishna Chettiar vs Meenakshi Ammal and Another

Jagadisan, J.—This is a Second Appeal against the Judgment and Decree in A.S. No. 310 of 1954 on the file of the District Court of South

Arcot, con5rminT the decree in O.S. No. 83 of 1953 on the file of the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Cuddalore.

Meenakshi Ammal, the plaintiff in the suit, O.S. No. 83 of 1953, sued her husband, the first defenant and his brother, the second defendant, for

partition and separate possession of a half share in the suit properties and for past and future mesne profits. In an earlier suit, O.S. No. 137 of

1950 on the file of the Sub-Court, Cuddalore, Meenakshi claimed separate maintenance from her husband, the first defendant, alleging desertion

on his part. That suit ended in a compromise between the two spouses and a compromise decree was passed on 21st December, 1951. The

amount of maintenance payable by the husband to the wife was fixed at Rs. 150 per mensem and a charge on the properties in that suit was

created in favour of the wife for the due payment of the maintenance amount. The razinama between the parties also provided that the properties

comprised in that suit, O.S. No. 137 of 1950 were to be enjoyed in common by the husband and the wife as co-owners and that the income

should be utilised for the maintenance of the wife as well as for the maintenance of the husband. The compromise further provided that if the

husband and the wife could not amicably enjoy the properties in common, the wife could have a division of the properties, effected by metes and

bounds and obtain a moiety thereof. The parties to the compromise also agreed that neither of them could alienate any item of the properties-

without the concurrence of the other. All the terms of the razinama were reduced; to writing and were incorporated as part of the razinama decree.

But the operative part of the decree however only ran as follows:

...this Court doth in pursuance of the said deed of compromise order and decree among other terms contained in the compromise set out as below

as follows: (1) That the maintenance payable by the 1st defendant to the plaintiff is fixed at Rs. 150-0-0 per mensem and the same shall be paid

from 5th July, 1950, by 1st defendant. (2) That the properties mentioned in; the compromise and also the properties of the 1st defendant alienated

to the various persons shall be a charge for the payment of the above maintenance. (3) That the properties in the hands of defendants (2) and (3)

be proceeded against last in case there is any need for realising the maintenance-from those properties.

The suit out of which this appeal arises was filed by Meenakshi to enforce partition as per one of the terms of the razinama alleging that she

could no longer continue-amicably with her husband.

The first defendant, the husband, remained ex parte at the trial of the suit. The second defendant is the divided elder brother of the first

defendant. He claimed to have purchased the suit property on 17th December, 1952, from the first defendant by a registered sale deed for an

alleged consideration of Rs. 5,000. His main defence to the suit was that the compromise decree required to be registered compulsorily under the

provisions of the Indian Registration Act, and not being registered Was inadmissible in evidence, and that the plaintiff can have no relief granted to

her on foot of the compromise.

Both the Courts below held that the compromise decree was not compulsorily registrable, that it was therefore admissible in evidence, and that

the plaintiff''s claim was well founded. The plaintiff was therefore granted a preliminary decree for partition as prayed for. An enquiry into mesne

profits, past and future, was directed to be held under Order 20, Rule 12, Civil Procedure Code. This Second Appeal has been preferred by the

second defendant.

The only question that arises for determination is whether Exhibit A-2, the razinama decree in O.S. No. 137 of 1950 requires compulsory

registration under the provisions of the Indian Registration Act. Clauses (a) to (e) to Section 17(1) of the Act provide for compulsory registration

of certain kinds of documents and instruments. Section 17(2), in so far as it is material, is as follows:

Nothing in Clauses (b) and (c) of Sub-section (1) applies to:

....

(vi) any decree or order of a Court except a decree or order expressed to be made on a compromise and comprising Immovable property other

than that which is the subject-matter of the suit; or proceedings.

Clause (vi) set out above was amended by the Transfer of Property (Amendment) Supplementary Act of 1929. Prior to the amendment Clause

(vi) stood as follows:

any decree or order of a Court and any award.

The amendment omitted the words ''and any award'' and introduced the words

Except a decree or order expressed to be made on a compromise and comprising Immovable property other than that which is the subject-matter

of the suit or proceeding.

The scope of the 1929 amendment was to limit the operation of Clause (vi) to any decree or order of a Court except a decree or order which

was the result of a compromise and which comprised Immovable property extraneous to the suit or proceeding, which ended in the compromise.

In other words a compromise decree or order comprising Immovable property not forming the subject-matter of the suit or proceeding ending in

the compromise is not exempt from registration, but compulsorily registrable provided the decree or order fell within the mischief of one or other of

the categories of instruments u/s 17(1), Clauses (a) to (e) of the Act.

The compromise in O.S. No 137 of 1950 related only to the properties forming the subject-matter of that suit. The suit was to enforce a claim

for maintenance and the plaintiff Meenakshi specifically prayed for a charge on several items of Immovable properties described in the plaint

schedule. It cannot therefore be said that the compromise came within the exception provided for under Clause (vi) so as to attract compulsory

registration. It must however be remembered that all the terms of the razinama were not brought into the operative part of the compromise decree.

The provision in the compromise enabling the plaintiff to get a division by metes and bounds of a half share in the suit properties was a term in the

razinama but was not a term of the executable portion of the compromise decree. The question for consideration is whether the words ''decree or

order of a Court'' in Clause (vi) of Section 17(2) includes only the operative part of the decree and not the terms of the razinama which though not

formally included in the operative part yet were made part of the decree, inasmuch as the compromise was recorded by the Court and a decree on

foot thereof was granted and issued.

In Hemanta Kumari Debi v. Midnapur Zamindari Co. Ltd. (1919) 37 M.L.J. 525 : 19191 L.R. 46 IndAp 240 , Lord Buckmaster delivering

the judgment of the Board, and referring to Clause (vi) of Section 17(2) of the Act and to the provisions of the CPC for recording a compromise

observed as follows:

In the first place, it is plain that the agreement or compromise, in whole and not in part, is to be recorded and the decree is then to confine its

operation to so much of the subject-matter of the suit as is dealt with by the agreement. Their Lordships are not aware of the exact system by

which documents are recorded in the Courts in India, but a perfectly proper and effectual method of carrying out the terms of this section would be

for the decree to recite the whole of the agreement and then to conclude with an order relative to that part that was the subject of the suit, or it

could introduce the agreement in a schedule to the decree; but in either case, although the operative part of the decree would be properly confined

to the actual subject-matter of the then existing litigation, the decree taken as a whole would include the agreement. This in fact is what the decree

did in the present case. It may be that as a decree it was incapable of being executed outside the lands of the suit, but that does not prevent it being

received in evidence of its contents.

To the extent to which the Judicial Committee held that a compromise decree taking in its fold even properties extraneous to the suit does not

require registration, the amendment of 1929 introduced into the Act has superseded its effect. But 24 CWN 177 (Privy Council) , is still authority

for the position that the decree or order mentioned in Clause (vi) not merely covers the operative part of the decree but also the compromise, if

any, between the parties which has been recorded by the Court and which in some way was incorporated or made part of the decree.

In Thazhathitathil Poovvanayi Ayissa and Others Vs. Puthan Purayil Kundron Chokru, , a Full Bench of this Court held that a compromise

made after decree affecting any Immovable property of the value of over Rs. 100 and embodied in a petition presented under Order 21, Rule 2,

CPC which was recorded by the Court is exempt from registration. At page 695 it was observed as follows referring to 24 CWN 177 (Privy

Council) .

Their Lordships point out that the word ''decree'' in Section 17 of the Registration Act must be read in connexion with the purpose of the statute,

which is to provide a method of public registration of documents, and there is therefore no reason why a limit should be imposed on the meaning of

the word so as to confine it to the operative portion only of the decree.

In Rajah D.K. Thimmanayanim Bahadur Varu, Rajah of Kalahasti and Others Vs. Rajah Damara Kumara Venkatappa Nayanim Bahadur

Varu and Others, , Phillips, Offg. C.J., observed thus at page 715:

It is contended for appellants that the compromise itself is inadmissible in evidence for want of registration under the provisions of the Registration

Act. u/s 17(2)(vi) of that Act a decree or order of Court need not be registered. The part of the compromise allowing this charge is not embodied

in the decree and the argument is that, as it is not so embodied, in order to be admissible in evidence it must be registered. This point has been

considered on several occasions. In 24 CWN 177 (Privy Council) , it was held that, when a compromise was recorded in a decree, not only those

portions thereof which became operative under the decree, were exempt from registration but also the other provisions which were not embodied

in the decree.... The compromise of 1893, is, therefore, admissible in evidence....

In view of the decisions cited above it is clear that the razinama dated 21st December, 1951, Exhibit A-2 incorporated in the decree in O.S. No.

137 of 1950 does not require to be compulsorily registered under the Registration Act.

Learned Counsel for the appellant relied upon the decision of the Travancore-Cochin High Court in Subramania Iyer v. Chinnu Pillai AIR

1952 T.C. 179. The head-note in the said decision is as follows:

If the Court proposes to dispose of the petition to set aside the execution sale, not on the merits but on the basis of the compromise entered into by

the parties, the order should be in accordance with the terms of the compromise. The Court will be acting without jurisdiction if it embodies in the

order any provision not agreed to by the parties.

I am not able to see the relevancy of the citation. The compromise recorded in O.S. No. 137 of 1950 is undoubtedly valid and binding upon the

parties. There is evidence to show that the appellant himself brought about the compromise and even attested the written razinama.

It follows that the decision of the Courts below is correct. The Second Appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. No leave.