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Judgment
Somayya, J.—The question involved in these two appeals is the same and that is whether for the purposes of the Madras Town-Planning
Act, an acquisition can be said to have been when an award was passed or only when possession was actually taken in pursuance of the award. A
notification of the intended acquisition was published in the Fort St. George Gazette on the 6th September, 1932. An award was made by the
Collector on the 26th August, 1935, and possession was taken on the 18th December, 1936. u/s 34 of the Madras Town Planning Act, if the land
is not acquired within three years from the date of the notification, it (the notification) shall cease to have effect as a declaration u/s 6 of the Land
Acquisition Act of 1894. It is common ground that if the land was acquired only on the date when possession was taken, more than three years
had elapsed from the date of the notification and the notification will cease to have effect as a declaration u/s 6 of the Land Acquisition Act of 1894
and the acquisition will be bad. In that case the plaintiffs'' suits for recovery of possession must be decreed. The trial Court held agreeing with the
plaintiffs'' contention that an acquisition under the Act can be said to have occurred only when possession was taken u/s 16 of the Act. The suits
were therefore decreed except as to damages claimed by the plaintiff. On appeal the District Judge held that the acquisition became complete
when the award was passed and that having been made within three years of the 6th of September 1932, the acquisition was valid. The appeals
were allowed and the suits were dismissed.
In this Court it is urged by Mr. Ramaswami Aiyangar, the learned advocate for the appellant, that the notification was really on the 10th August,
1932, as that is the date which the notification bears. It is not the date of the order of the Government proposing to acquire the land in question that
is material, but it is the date when it is actually notified. If, for instance, the order of the Government dated 10th August, 1932, was never
published, it could not be said that there was a notification u/s 6. Hence I agree with the Courts below that the relevant date is the 6th September,
1932, when the order of the Government was actually published in the Fort St. George Gazette.
The more important question is whether a land can be said to have been acquired until possession is actually taken. The question has been well
discussed on all its aspects by the Subordinate Judge. He has referred to the various provisions of the Madras Town-Planning Act and of the Land
Acquisition Act. The acquisition under the Madras Town-Planning Act is to be made substantially under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act
and therefore a reference to the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act is necessary. Chapter VII of the Madras Town-Planning Act provides for
land acquisition. Section 33 says that immovable property required for the purpose of a Town-Planning Scheme shall be deemed to be land
needed for a public purpose within the meaning of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, and that it may be acquired either under the said Act or under
the said Act as modified in the manner provided in that chapter. Even in cases in which the land is acquired under the Land Acquisition Act as
modified by Chapter VII of the Town-Planning Act, a notification has to be published u/s 14, Clause (5) of the Town-Planning Act. A notification
u/s 14, Clause (5) takes the place of a notification u/s 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, and no further declaration is necessary. Section 34 then says
that--
It shall not be incumbent on the Provincial Government, or officer authorised in that behalf, to take immediate steps for the acquisition of such land.
Then comes the proviso in the following words:
Provided that if the land is not acquired within three years from the date of the notification it shall cease to have effect as a declaration u/s 6 of the
Land Acquisition Act, 1894.
We are not concerned with the notification of the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act made by the Town-Planning Act and we may therefore
leave out those provisions of the Town-Planning Act from consideration. The provisions of the Land Acqsisition Act have now to be considered
and the question is whether a land can be said to have been acquired under the Land Acquisition Act directly when an award is passed u/s 12 of
that Act. Section 11 of the Land Acquisition Act provides for an enquiry and for determining the area, the compensation and the apportionment of
the compensation. Section 12 provides that the award is to be filed in the Collector''s office. Section 16 provides that possession may be taken at
any time after the award. Section 17 provides for a case of urgency. Even before an award is made, possession can be taken. Section 48 says that
the Government is at liberty to withdraw from the acquisition of any land of which possession has not been taken.
The wording of Section 16 is in my opinion very significant. It runs thus : "" When the Collector has made an award u/s II, he may take
possession of the land, which shall thereupon vest absolutely in the Crown free from all encumbrances.
Title vests absolutely in the Government on possession being taken. Similarly Section 17 provides that even before an award is passed,
possession may be taken and upon the Government taking possession title vests absolutely in the Government. Both these sections indicate when
title vests in the Government. If title vests in the Government only then, the acquisition cannot be said to have been made earlier. Acquisition is of
title to the property; in other words it is the vesting of title. Both Sections 16 and 17 lay down that upon taking possession title vests in the
Government. Section 48 puts the matter beyond all doubt. It says that the Government may withdraw from an acquisition at any time before
possession is taken. That means that acquisition is not complete until possession is taken.
The exact nature and effect of an award u/s 12 of the Land Acquisition Act was considered by the Judicial Committee in (1905) ILR 32 605
(Privy Council) . There the Judicial Committee pointed out that the award is a mere offer of a particular sum for the property proposed to be
acquired. The offer is binding on the Government, but it is not binding on the other party. The other party may, if he does not accept the amount
offered, require the question to be referred to the Civil Court and that Court is to decide the amount payable. This decision shows that an award is
nothing more than a binding offer. It cannot amount to "" acquisition.
It is argued that this view may cause great hardship. It is said that the local authority for whose benefit an acquisition is made under the Town-
Planning Act should not be asked to take up a property until the price it has to pay is finally determined, that this may take more than three years
from the date of the notification and that the construction compelling the authority to take up the land within three years of the notification may
involve serious loss. But we are not concerned with such difficulties. The Madras Town-Planning Act has definitely laid down that the acquisition
should be made within three years of the notification. Courts are not concerned with the wisdom or expediency of such a provision. As Mr.
Ramaswami Aiyangar, the learned advocate for the appellant, urges, it maybe that the Legislature wanted to compel local authorities to make up
their mind within a definite time either to take up the land trusting to the Courts not to compel them to pay more than a. fair price. The award gives
the authority concerned a fair idea of the sum which it may have to pay. The Courts may be trusted to act fairly, and the local authority must take
up the property within the time fixed. As I said before I am not concerned with the policy of the Legislature. The proviso to Section 34 is clear and
unambiguous. Sections 16 and 17 lay down when title vests in the Government and Section 48 gives a clear indication to this question.
The appellate Judge states that there is no provision compelling the Collector to take possession or to the effect that if he fails to take
possession the award would become null and infructuous or that the properties would cease to vest in the Government. Here the Judge forgets that
the vesting takes place only on taking possession. So before taking possession, there is no question of "" title ceasing to vest."" Title never vested
before then. The argument that there is nothing to compel the Collector to take possession is quite in conformity with the provision in Section 48
that the Government may withdraw from the acquisition at any time before taking possession and with the view laid down by the Judicial
Committee. in (1905) ILR 32 605 (Privy Council) that an award is nothing but an offer.
The decrees of the District Judge are reversed and those of the Subordinate Judge restored with costs throughout. Time for payment of costs
three months. No leave.