Public Prosecutor vs Illur Thippayya and Another

Subba Rao, J.—These are appeals by the Pub-lie Prosecutor against the acquittal of the accused in all the cases. The accused in all the

appeals were charged under Sections 7 and 8, Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act 1946, for having contravened the various orders

passed by the Government. The following tabular statement shows the orders contravened by the accused in the various cases:

The First Court Convicted all the accused but in appeal the conviction were set Mainly on the ground that there was no proof of the orders or their

due publication. The Public Prosecutor contended that the proof of the said fact was not necessary and the lower Court should have taken judicial

notice of the said facts u/s 67 (1), Evidence Act. The learned Counsel for the accused argued that that section of the Evidence Act has no

application to the facts to be proved in this case and in any view the lower Court had rightly, in the exercise of its discretion, refused to take judicial

notice of the facts without the production of the necessary documents.

the question to be decided in this case turns upon the construction of Section 67, Evidence Act. The relevant provisions of Section 57 read as

follows:

The Court shall take judicial notice of the following facts:

(1) All Indian laws....In all these cases and also on all matters of public history, literature, science or Article the Court may resort for its aid to

appropriate books or documents of reference.

If the Court is called upon by any person to take judicial notice of an; fact, it may refuse to do so unless and until such person produces any such

book or document as it may consider necessary to enable it to do so,

The scheme of the Evidence Act is clear. Generally all the facts alleged have to be proved in the manner provided by the Act but there are three

exceptions ; facts admitted, facts presumed and facts of which the Court should take judicial notice need not be so proved. Section 57 enumerates

the facts of which the Court should take judicial notice. u/s 67 (l) the Court should take judicial notice of all Indian laws.

""Indian laws"" is defined by the General Clauses Act u/s 3(27-a). It includes any law, ordinance, order, by-law, rule or regulation passed or

made at any time by any competent legislature, authority or person in British India. The question for consideration is whether the orders

contravened by the accused are orders within the meaning of this definition. If so, Section 57 (l), Evidence Act would apply. u/s 3(l) of Act xxiv

[24] of 1946, the Central Government so far as it appears to it to be necessary or expedient for maintaining or increasing supplies of any essential

commodity, or for securing their equitable distribution and availability at fair prices, may by notified order provide for regulating or prohibiting the

production, supply and distribution thereof, and trade and commerce therein. Under S. 4 of the same Act, the Central Government may by notified

order direct that the power to make orders under Sections shall be exercisable by such officer, or authority subordinate to the Central Government

or such Provincial Government or such officer or authority subordinate to a Provincial Government, as may be specified in the direction. Section

7(1) prescribes the penalties for contravention of the said orders.

The aforesaid orders in contravention whereof the accused acted in all the cases were issued in strict compliance with the provisions of this Act

by the Government or by authority or persons duly authorised by the Government and they have also been duly notified in the manner provided by

the Act. They are clearly orders made by a competent authority or person in British India within the meaning of Section 3(27-a), General Clauses

Act and therefore they are part of Indian law. If the said orders come under the definition of Indian laws, the provisions of Section 67 are attracted

and the Court should take judicial notice of the same.

But the question still remains whether this-is a fit case for interference in these appeals. Though a Court should take judicial notice of the facts

mentioned in Section 57 , it could only take such notice if unimpeachable books or documents are put before it or otherwise accessible for its

reference. Under the last paragraph of the section, the Court is given the discretion to refuse to take judicial notice of any fact unless such person

calling upon the Court to take any judicial notice '' of such fact produces any such book or document as it may be necessary to enable it to do so.

In this case, no such book or document was placed before the lower Court for its reference to enable it to satisfy itself that such order or

notification was in existence. In its discretion the lower Court refused to take judicial notice as neither the orders nor the documents showing, the

publication of such orders were placed before it. It is, therefore, impossible to say that the discretion exercised by the lower Court is either

perverse or illegal.

In the result all the appeals are dismissed.