High CourtsDivision Bench

Public Prosecutor vs T.P. Shanmuga Nadar and Another

Madras High Court · Decided on 28 February 1934 · Citation: AIR 1934 Mad 435(1) : (1934) ILR (Mad) 827 : (1934) 39 LW 777

HON’BLE JUDGES
Bardswell, J
ACTS & SECTIONS REFERRED
Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) — Section 485, 486
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Judgment

26 paragraphs · 612 words

Bardswell, J.—This is an appeal by Government against the acquittal of the two respondents. There was a private complaint made against

them to the Joint Magistrate of Shermadevi of offences punishable under Sections 485 and 486, I.P.C. The Joint Magistrate after hearing, the

prosecution witnesses found that a prima facie case was made out only of an offence u/s 482 which offence is triable by a Second Class

Magistrate and so, having framed a charge of an offence punishable under that section, he transferred the case to the file of the Second Glass

Stationary Sub-Magistrate at Ambasamudram. The Stationary Sub-Magistrate proceeded with the case and acquitted the respondents.

2.

If the transfer could be effeoted at all it must have been u/s 192, Criminal P.C., Clause 1 which runs as follows:

Any Chief Presidency Magistrate, District Magistrate or Sub-Divisional Magistrate may transfer any case, of which he has taken cognizance, for

inquiry or trial, to any Magistrate subordinate to him.

3.

The learned Public Prosecutor argues that the words ""for inquiry or trial"" are merely put in so far as to cover both warrant and summons oases,

that it is permissible for a Magistrate empowered under this clause only to transfer a case when he first takes cognizance of it and that he cannot

transfer it at any later stage even though in the matter of a warrant case the stage of trial is not reached till the charge is framed. I cannot see

anything in the clause itself which indicates that any such restriction is intended to be made. Nor is any authority shown me for there being such a

restriction. The learned Public Prosecutor has referred me to two rulings. One of these is that in Tata Venhanna (1900) 2 Weir 152. In that case a

Joint Magistrate inquired into a case that was brought as one of robbery but found that the prosecution evidence could make out only offences

punishable u/s 353, I.P.C. and Section 24, Cattle Trespass Act. He therefore transferred it to the file of the Stationary Sub-Magistrate who

proceeded to dispose of it from the point at which it reached him without taking evidence afresh. It was held that he acted illegally in so doing; but

clearly the point of the illegality was the fact that under the law as it was then understood in this Court, it was the duty of the Sub-Magistrate on the

case being transferred to him, to take the evidence afresh.

4.

This however is no longer the law, by reason of Clause 3 to Section 350. This ruling therefore is not in point. The other case to which I have

been referred to is that of Mahabir Singh and Another Vs. Giribala Dassi, . That case too has no application. What it decides is that the provisions

of Section 192 do not entitle a Magistrate after he has proceeded u/s 202, Criminal P.C., to make an order transferring the case for the purpose of

being dealt with u/s 320 or Section 204, without a fresh investigation as contemplated by Section 202, Criminal P.C., and that Section 192 does

not empower him to transfer a case simply for the purpose of considering the report of an investigation u/s 202, Criminal P.C., which he has

himself ordered. In the absence of any authority to the contrary I must take it that Clause 1, Section 192 means what it clearly appears to mean

and that the action of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate in transferring the case to the file of the Stationary Sub-Magistrate was perfectly correct. There

is no other possible ground for interference with the order of acquittal. The appeal is therefore dismissed.