High CourtsDivision Bench

Public Prosecutor vs Vadakattu Jogiraju

Madras High Court · Decided on 12 January 1944 · Citation: AIR 1944 Mad 317 : (1944) 57 LW 106

HON’BLE JUDGES
Kuppuswami Ayyar, J · Kuppuswami Aiyar, J
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Judgment

28 paragraphs · 674 words

Kuppuswami Ayyar, J.—This is an appeal by the Crown against the order of the learned Sessions Judge of East Godavari acquitting the

accused in C. C. No. 14 of 1943 on the file of the Sub-divisional Magistrate, Coconada, who was convicted by that Magistrate for an offence

punishable under Rule 90 (3) read with Rule 90 (2) (d) of the Defence of India Rules. The charge against him was that he had acquired more coins

than required for his business. The accused and three of his brothers were all trading. They had a stationery shop, a hardware shop, grocery shop

and fancy goods shop. Of these four businesses, the, accused was in charge of only one. The house and shops of all these brothers were searched

and small change of the value of Rs. 111-2-101/2 was found; but the accused alone was prosecuted and in the charge it was stated that he had

acquired this amount of Rs. 111-2- l01/2 in excess of his requirements. Later on, in the appellate Court, the ease proceeded as if the charge was

for being in possession of change for Rs. 17-14-5 which was the amount found in the room of the accused and that was the amount which he is

said to have had for his stationery shop. There is no finding as to whether this amount was more than what was required for his business, namely,

the stationery shop. The evidence that was let in was in respect of all the businesses together and according to the Village Munsif the change that

might to required will be about fifty rupees. But then it is in evidence that the annual turn over of the business was Rs. 48,000. I am not sure

whether the estimate of the Village Munsif was not low. Whatever it may be, there is no evidence to show that the requirements of the accused did

not require him to have change for Rs. 17 odd. Being a stationery shop, most of the purchases will be made by litigant and school boys and other

sundry persons. They would be paying only in change and if they pay in rupee coins or notes they will have to be given change. Rupees 17 does

not therefore appear to my mind to be in excess of the requirements of a stationery shopkeeper. So I do not think it could be said that the learned

Sessions Judge was wrong in having acquitted him.

2.

But then the appeal has been filed because the learned Sessions Judge disposed of the appeal on the ground that the'' accused cannot be said to

have acquired the change which he was in possession of because he got them in the course of his trade. This matter had to be considered by me in

the case reported in In Re: Kalappa Mandayya AIR 1943 Mad. 683 and I have pointed out there that a person who gets coins by vending his

articles acquires such coins. As I have stated there, it is not the acquisition that is made an offence but the acquisition beyond a particular limit,

namely, beyond the amount required for his daily needs. My attention is drawn to the ruling of the Allahabad High Court in Emperor Vs. Charan

Das, . But there even in that judgment the process of getting money by a shop keeper in exchange of his wares is described as an acquisition in the

following sentence:

A shop keeper however may acquire coin in a legitimate and normal way, for example, if a shop keeper has got a flourishing retail business, he

may acquire coins of various denominations of considerable value every day.

So even that Judge described that process as one of acquisition. It is acquisition beyond a limit that has been prohibited by the statute. In these

circumstances the learned Sessions Judge was not justified in finding that the getting of coins by a shop keeper in exchange of his ware is not an

acquisition contemplated by the statute. The appeal is accordingly dismissed.