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Judgment
D.J. Jagannadha Raju, J.—This is an appeal filed by the defendants against the judgment and decree dated 27th November, 1991 in O.S. No. 15 of 1979 on the file of the II Additional Judge, Kurnool. The suit was originally filed and numbered as O.S. No. 9 of 1976 on the file of the Additional Subordinate Judge''s Court, Kurnool. The plaintiff-temple represented by the Executive Officer filed a suit for recovery of possession of the temple lands shown in the schedule situated in Rangapuram, Gutupalle and Katikavanipalle villages from the defendants who claim to be the Poojaris of the temple. It is the claim of the temple that the temple is the absolute owner of the property and that it is a grant given to the temple. The defendants claim that it is a grant given to the Archakas burdened with service. They claim that as they have been performing services regularly and efficiently, they are entitled to be in possession of the properties. They also claim that no separate emoluments were fixed for their Archakatvam services and the income from the lands constitute their emoluments. Hence they cannot be evicted. The trial Court framed seven issues as indicated in the judgment and one additional issue. After an elaborate consideration, the trial Court recorded the following findings.
On Issue No. 1, the trial Court held that, on consideration of the entries in the Inam Fair Register and the Inam B-Register and other material on the record, the temple has got title to the suit lands. On Issue No. 2 which relates to the question whether the decision of the Inams Deputy Tahsildar and the appellate authority and the High Court judgment conferring the ryotwari in favour of the plaintiff-temple is final and conclusive, the Court held in favour of the defendants. Mainly relying upon the decision reported in Pedda Govindaiah v. Subba Rao 1969 (2) ALT 336, the Court held that the scope of the enquiry under the Inams Abolition Act is not conclusive, it does not bar the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts. On Issue No. 3, it held that the original grant of the suit lands was not made for the benefit of the defendants'' predecessors, namely, the Poojaris. On Issue No. 4, the Court held that the plaintiff is not estopped to contend that it is the owner of the plaint schedule lands. On Issue No. 5, the Court rejected the claim of the defendants making improvements to the plaint schedule lands and held that they are not entitled to recover Rs. 20,000/- which they claim to recover. On the additional issue framed on 27-1-1981, the Court held that the claim for recovery of the possession of the suit lands is not barred by res judicata. On the other hand, the decision of the Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Board determining that the suit lands belong to plaintiff-temple operates as res judicata in the present suit and the defendants cannot contend that the suit lands are not temple lands and that the plaintiff cannot take possession of the suit lands. Accordingly, the Court held on Issue No. 6 that the plaintiff would be entitled to evict the defendants from the suit lands. The suit was decreed directing defendants 1 to 10 and 12 to 28 to deliver vacant possession of the plaint schedule lands to the plaintiff.
In this appeal Sri R. Prasad, appearing for the appellants, contends that the entire matter hinges upon the entries in the Inam Fair Register and the effect of the earlier litigation. He contends that this is a case of grant being given to the Poojaris burdened with service and it is not a case of grant to the deity. He relies upon the entries in the Inam fair Register to substantiate his claim and points out that the names of the Poojaris existing at that time being entered in the clumns is a clear indication of this. He also contends that the decision of the Inams Deputy Tahsildar which has been confirmed in appeal and which has been affirmed in W.P. No. 4568 of 1972 is not conclusive and the Civil Court is certainly entitled to decide the same question once again. He also contends that the scheme suit and the scheme framed u/s 57 of the H.R. & C.A. Act (old Act) is no bar for the defendants contending that the property is the property of the Poojaris and it is a grant burdened with service. He places reliance upon a few decisions in support of his arguments.
On behalf of the respondent-temple, Sri R. Venugopal Reddy, the senior Counsel, argues that the documentary evidence, namely, the Inam Fair Register clinchingly establishes that it is a grant to the deity and it is not a grant to the Poojaris. This fact has been upheld both in the scheme as well as in the proceedings under the Inams Abolition Act. He contends that the trial Court relied upon Pedda Govindaiah v. Subba Rao (1 supra) ignoring the fact that there is a later Division Bench decision to the contra. The decision of the authorities under the Inams Abolition Act is conclusive and it operates as a bar of res judicata for the Civil Court dealing with the same issue. He placed reliance upon an unreported judgment dated 1-4-1976 in A.S. No. 71 of 1973 of a Division Bench consisting of Justice O. Chinnappa Reddy and Justice Punnayya. Mr. Venugopal Reddy contends that the Division Bench judgment of Justice O. Chinnappa Reddy explains how various observations in Pedda Govindaiah v. Subba Rao (1 supra) are obiter and are opposed to the principles laid down by the Supreme Court''s pronouncements.
The points that arise for consideration in this appeal are:
(1) Whether the grant is to the temple or whether it is a grant to the Poojaris burdened with service?
(2) Whether the defendants are entitled to contend that the decision of the authorities under the Inams Abolition Act is not conclusive and that they can re-agitate the matter in the civil suit?
(3) Whether the decision in is O.A. No. 81 of 1949 and the framing of the scheme u/s 57(1) of the Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act, 1926, which is now evidenced by Ex.B-25 is a bar for the claims of the defendants?
Point Nos. 1 and 2:
A perusal of Ex.A-1, the Inam Fair Register, clearly shows the following facts:
In Column No. 2, it is clearly mentioned that it is Devadayam. In Column No. 8, it is mentioned, "Granted for the worship of the deity Madduleti Swamy so long as the worship is performed." In Column No. 13, the name of the grantee is given as "Madduleti Swamy". In Column No. 16, the name Madduleti Swamy Varu is written and the present Poojaris are indicated and a few names are indicated. Thus it is clear from the entries in the Inam Fair Register that the grant is to the deity i.e., the temple and it is for the worship and upkeep of the temple. It is not a case of the grant being given to the Poojaris burdened with service to the temple.
When the proceedings under the Inams Abolition Act took place originally, the Inams Deputy Tahsildar, Nandyal, gave a decision without giving an opportunity to the Executive Officer of the temple and held that it is a grant to the Poojaris burdened with service. When an appeal was filed, on the ground that the appeal is barred by limitation, it was dismissed by the R.D.O. Then W.P. No. 322/64 was filed. The writ petition was allowed on 3-11-1967 and the Tribunals were directed to hear the Executive Officer and then dispose of the matter on merits. When the Archakas filed W.A. No. 28 of 1968 against the decision in the Writ Petition, it was dismissed. Then the Revenue Divisional Officer took up the matter afresh and remanded the matter to the Tahsildar for disposal. The Tahsildar, after giving an opportunity to the Executive Officer, passed orders in R.C.A. 14002/68 on 30th May, 1971, declaring that the suit lands are held by the Institution, Madduleti Swamy Varu of Rangapuram. Patta was granted to the deity. The appeal filed against in LA. No.1 of 1972 was dismissed and the order of the Tahsildar was confirmed. Then the Archakas filed W.P. No. 4568 of 1972 for quashing the order of the Tahsildar and it was dismissed on 15-3-1974. The High Court held that the Inam was granted in favour of the deity and not to Archakas or their predecessors-in-title. The order passed under the Inams Abolition Act has become final in every respect. Subsequently the Archakas filed O.S. No. 18 of 1964 for a declaration that they are the absolute owners of the plaintiff-temple and that they are the hereditary Poojaris or the trustees. That suit was ultimately dismissed and it became final. Thus it can be seen that the matter has been finally decided both by the High Court as well as the Civil Court and it was clearly held that the grant is to the deity and it is not a grant to the Archakas burdened with service. Subsequently ryotwari patta was granted to the temple as per the order. This decision cannot be upset in any manner.
The further question that crops up is whether the decision under the Inams Abolition Act is final and whether the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts is barred. Regarding this particular issue, dealing with Issue No. 2, in paragraph 19, the trial Court relied upon the decision reported in Pedda Govindaiah v. Subba Rao (1 supra) and came to the conclusion that the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts is not barred and the bar of jurisdiction of the Civil Courts cannot be readily implied. Accordingly it held Issue No. 2 in favour of the defendant-appellants. The decision in A.S. No. 71 of 1972 rendered by a Division Bench on 1-4-1976 clearly shows how the various observations in this decision are purely obiter and they are opposed to the principles laid down by the Supreme Court decisions. The Bench dealt with the scheme of the A.P. Inams (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act and after an examination of the procedure of the enquiry and the scope of the enquiry observed as follows:
"The Andhra Pradesh Inams (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act is intended to abolish and convert Inam lands other than those which constitute estates, into Ryotwari lands. Section 3(1) require the Tahsildar to first inquire and determine-
(i) whether a particular land in his jurisdiction is an Inam land; (ii) whether such Inam land is in ryotwari, zamindari or inam village; (iii) whether such inam land is held by an institution. Thus, one of the three essential questions to be determined by the Tahsildar is whether Inam land is held by any institution. Sections 3(2) and 3(3) provide for the publication of notice in the prescribed manner and a reasonable opportunity of adducing evidence of all persons or institutions concerned."
Then the Court dealt with Sections 3(4) and 3(5), 4(1), and 7 which prescribe the procedure for grant of a ryotwari patta, and Section 14 which deals with the bar of jurisdiction of the Civil Courts. After having set out the provisions, the Court observed as follows:
"When the statute expressly authorises the Revenue authorities to decide the particular question of title it is difficult to see how we can say that the Revenue authorities are not entrusted with the task of adjudication upon questions of title. It is true that the ultimate object of the Act is to abolish Inam Tenure and replace it by Ryotwari Tenure. But, in the process of achieving that object several questions fall to be decided under the Act and the Revenue authorities have been given exclusive jurisdiction to decide those questions. There is no getting away from the finality given to the decisions of the Revenue authorities by Section 3(5) and the exclusion of the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts u/s 14 of the Act. The jurisdiction of the Civil Court, however, is retained to the extent that there is any misrepresentation, fraud or collusion of parties."
Then the Court, dealt with the question of what are the type of suits that are barred u/s 14 and remarked that by a trick of pleadings or camouflage, the Civil Court cannot be conferred jurisdiction to decide the same question. The Court then observed as follows:
"In our view, where the very question to be decided between the parties was decided inter parties in a proceeding under the Inams (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act and that was a question which fell for the decision of the Revenue authorities u/s 3(1) of the Act, it must be held that the Civil Court''s jurisdiction is barred by Section 14 of the Act."
Then dealing with the various decisions of the Supreme Court and the Privy Council, the Court pointed out that the various observations made in Pedda Govindaiah v. Subba Rao (1 supra) can only be regarded as obiter. The Court observed in page 17 of the judgment that the learned judges who decided Pedda Govindayya vs. Subba Rao (1 supra) observed that it was not a suit simpliciter to set aside the sale held by the Revenue authorities but was a suit for a declaration and for recovery of possession against an auction purchaser which was not a matter which the Revenue authorities under tine Code were empowered to dispose of. What the Supreme Court actually said was something which was a little different, and the Division Bench extracted the Supreme Court''s observations which read as follows:
"Learned Counsel for the appellant contended that setting aside a sale has been specifically provided for by the Code, which the several authorities under the Code have been empowered to determine, decide or dispose of, within the meaning of the section. There is no doubt that the matter of the setting aside of a sale by payment of the arrears u/s 155, and on the specific grounds u/s 156, as discussed above, has been provided for in the Code, but, as already observed, the suit does not raise any ground which is covered by the specific provisions of the Code for setting aside a sale. Strictly speaking, this is a suit for a declaration that the sale held by the Revenue Courts, does not affect the interests which are in the custody of the Court through its Receiver, and for recovery of possession as against the auction-purchaser who is alleged to be in wrongful possession of the property which would have continued in possession of the Receiver, under the directions of the Bombay High Court. In short, this is not a suit simpliciter to set aside the sale held by the Revenue authorities but a suit for a declaration and a consequential relief. A suit for such a declaration on the grounds taken by the Receiver and for possession is not a matter, which the several authorities under the Code, have been empowered to determine, decide or dispose of."
The Court then observed that as a result of the above discussion, the Civil Court''s jurisdiction is also barred. In view of the various reasons given above, I hold on Point No. 1 that the grant is to the temple and it is not a grant to the Poojaris burdened with service. I hold on Point No. 2 that the defendants are not entitled to contend that the decisions of the authorities under the Inams Abolition Act is not conclusive. They cannot re-agitate the matter in the Civil Court. In view of the later judgment of the Division Bench dated 1-4-1976 in A.S. No. 71 of 1973, the law laid down in Pedda Govindaiah v. Subba Rao (1 supra) is not a correct interpretation of the law and many of the observations in that decision are obiter. The jurisdiction of the Civil Court is barred. The defendants cannot re-agitate the same question in the Civil Court when once it is decided by the authorities under the Inams Abolition Act.
Point No. 3:
The last question that remains to be considered is whether the framing of the scheme u/s 57(1) of the Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act of 1926 is a bar for the claim of the defendants. The fact that a scheme was framed was not disputed. This scheme had to be framed as the Board found that honourary trustees appointed to manage the temple for several years did not restore the endowment properties to the temple. The temple lands were allowed to be in possession of the Archakas who were not well-versed in Pooja Vidhanam and also to regulate the collection of offerings and to secure proper custody of the gold and silver ornaments offered by the devotees. Ex.B-25 is the scheme prepared by the Commissioners. In that scheme, it was clearly observed that the absolute incompetence of the Boya Archakas to look after the temple and the utter impossibility of obtaining any respectable persons to function as trustees necessitated the framing of the scheme and appointment of an Executive Officer by the Board. In fact, when the Executive Officer tried to obtain possession of this land by proceeding u/s 87 of the Endowments Act in M.C. No. 93 of 1962, the Boya Archakas claimed that the temples are private temples of the Archakas and hence Section 87 is not applicable. Those proceedings were decided against the Archakas. Crl. Rev. Case No. 602 of 1963 was also dismissed. The High Court observed that the Archakas are holding the lands on behalf of the temples and, therefore, their eviction from the lands is justified. It should be remembered that the scheme framed u/s 57 is final subject to the result of the suit contemplated under that Section. The trial Court elaborately dealt with this aspect in paragraph 17 of its judgment. The question relating to the scheme and the effect of framing of a scheme has been considered by the trial Court while discussing Issues 3 and 6 in paragraphs 20 to 25 of the judgment. The scheme framed earlier in O.A. No. 81 of 1949 is final and it is bar for the present claim of the defendants. See Sri Bhavanarayanaswamivari Temple Vs. Vadapalli Venkata Bhavanarayanacharyulu, The present claim of the defendants that they can re-agitate their title is not correct. I hold Point No. 3 against the appellants.
In the result, the appeal is dismissed with costs. The judgment and decree of the trial Court are confirmed.