Pulikkot Kalliani Amma vs Edavanna Kovilagath Vikramanickan alias Valia Thirumalpad

Ramaswami, J.—This appeal involves the same point as in A.A.A.O. No. 125 of 1954 disposed of by me today. On the date on which the application for fixation of fair rent was filed in the Court of the District Munsif, an appeal was provided for to the learned Subordinate Judge. Subsequently, the jurisdiction of the learned District Munsif has been taken away to hear such applications and this has been vested in the rent Court. But an appeal has been provided for the decision of the rent Court to the self-same Subordinate Judge. In this case the appeal itself was pending at the time of the enactment of Act VII of 1954.

The view taken by the learned Subordinate Judge that the right to continue the proceedings in the civil Court had been taken away and on which ground he has allowed the appeal pending before him, is incorrect. The right of appeal is a vested and a substantial right which belongs to a suitor and to deprive him in a pending action of his right of appeal which belonged to him as of right is a very different thing from regulating procedure and is not a mere alteration of procedure: Rajah of Kalahasti v. Kamakshamma AIR 1916 Mad. 1035, Doraiswami v. Vaithilinga AIR 1918 Mad. 548, Ghansham v. Balakram AIR 1916 Lah. 145, Colonial Sugar Refining Co. v. Irving 1905 A.C. 369, Bhatele Ramesh Chand Vs. Dr. Shyam Lal and Others, , Ram Singha and Another Vs. Shankar Dayal and Another , Sheopujan Rai Vs. Bishnath Rai and Others , Secretary of State v. Mansey AIR 1930 Bom. 262, Nagendra Nath Bose Vs. Mon Mohan Singha Roy and Others, Sadar Ali and Others Vs. Doliluddin Ostagar, AIR 1934 1013a (Lahore) , Menges v. Sutlej Flour Mills AIR 1915 Lah. 71, Naga Pu v. K.E. AIR 1926 Rang. 205 and Nana v. Sheku 32 Bom. 337 .

A suit and all appeals arising from the decree made therein are really but steps in a series of proceedings connected by an intrinsic unity, constituting one legal proceeding. Therefore, an appeal being a mere continuance of the original proceedings initiated by the filing of the plaint, the right to continue that proceeding cannot be affected by a new Act unless it expressly says so which is not the case here and therefore the right of appeal would be governed by the law prevailing at the date of the institution of the suit or application and not by the law which prevailed on the date of its decision or on the date of the filing of the appeal.

In short, the institution of a suit carries with it the implication that all appeals then in force were preserved to it through the rest of its career, unless the legislature had either abolished the Court to which an appeal lay or had expressly or by necessary intendment given to the Act a retrospective effect: Chinto Joshi v. Krishnaji 3 Bom, 214 at 216, Janak v. Bishemkar Nath 1929 All, 745, Kirpa Singh v. Rassaldar 1928 Lah. 627 at 631, Nataraja v. Rengaswami 1924 Mad. 657=47 M. 324=19 L W. 358, In re. Vasudev Samiar 1929 Mad. 381=52 M. 361=29 L.W. 390, Canada Cement Co. v. Montreal East Corporation (1922) 1 A.C. 249=91 L.J.P.O. 113. In the result, as the appeal itself was pending at the time of the enactment of Act VII of 1954 and the petition out of which it arose having been filed long prior to the enactment, the parties had a vested right to continue the proceedings in the civil Court which could not be taken away by subsequent legislation except by very clear and express words, which is not the case here. Therefore, this appeal is allowed and the learned Subordinate Judge is directed to restore the appeal to file and dispose of it according to law. The costs to abide by and be provided for in the revised decree and judgment.