Pullayya and Others vs Appanna and Others

Bhimasankaram, J.—This is an appeal by the Plaintiffs against the dismissal of their suit for recovery of possession of the properties mentioned in the plaint schedule and for mesne profits. Their cast; was that they are the reversioners of one Kurella Subbanna who was the owner of all the properties involved in the suit. He died intestate in the year 1883 leaving behind him his widow Mangamma who came into possession of the properties and who died years later, on 1st April, 1936. There were three Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs 1 and 2 are the sister''s sons of the last male-holder while the 3rd Plaintiff has joined the suit in her capacity as the purchaser of certain items in the suit from the Plaintiffs 1 and 2 in consideration of a sum of lis. Section 000 needed by the latter for the purpose of carrying on the present litigation.

The plaint alleges that Mangamma at first got all the property she had inherited from. her husband mutated in the name of her brother Guravayya, upon which the then presumptive reversioners hied O. S. No. 319 of 1883 on the file of the District Munsifs Court,. Eluru, for declaration that the widow had only a limited estate therein and that the reversion) was not bound by her improper dealings with Ehe property. Later however, she alienated all her properties in her possession in favour of a number of persons of whom the nearest reversioner at the time was one. She purported to-have surrendered the properties in favour of the nearest reversioner and his sons and nephews and they, in their turn, conveyed or purported to confirm the previous conveyances of many items of property belonging to the estate in favour of persons in whom she was interested. All these transactions of the year 1925 covered by Exhibits A-2 to A-8 in the suit are attacked by the Plaintiffs as not binding-upon them who became the nearest reversioners under the Hindu Law of Inheritance (Amendment) Act, 1927.

The main defence of the contesting Defendants was that the surrender deed Exhibit A-2, dated 15th October, 1925, was binding upon the reversion and that the several transactions rested upon it are also valid. They also pleaded at the same time that the Plaintiffs were precluded, by their conduct in regard to certain of the transactions which followed the a surrender, from disputing the alienations. The-6th Defendant urged also a special defence in regard to item 5 of the plaint schedule. This item which was in his possession, he contended. was purchased under rent sales held in the year 1934 in execution of a decree obtained under the Madras Estates Land Act by the landholder against the then pattadar and that his title thereto so obtained cannot be impeached by the reversioners- Some of the Defendants also filed additional written statements in which particulars of the improvements effected by thorn on the lands in their possession as bona fide purchasers for value are mentioned and claimed to be entitled to the value of such improvements in case they were dispossessed.

There was a question also by the defence as to whether the Plaintiffs 1 and 2 are the nearest reversioners to the estate of Subbanna and whether the suit was in time. The finding on the first of these issues has not been questioned before us in this appeal. As regards the question of limitation, it may be pointed out that the suit having been filed before 12 years from the date of the death of Mangamma, it ig in time under Article 141 of the Limitation Act, though, if the transaction of surrender of the year 1925 was valid, the Plaintiffs'' case fails because they would have no cause of action whatsoever. There is therefore no question at limitation involved in the case.

The question as to the validity of the-surrender was covered by two issues, issues 2 and 7,. In the suit which are as follows :

Whether the surrender deed, date 15th October, 1925 by the widow of Subbanna is bona fide and valid and binding or whether It was only a device to divide the estate between the then reversionary?

Whether the surrender referred to in Issue No. 2 operates as a family settlement.

The plea as to the disability of the Plaintiffs to question the suit transactions was issue 8 in the suit and was worded in these terms:

Are Plaintiffs barred by estoppel, or election, or affirmation.

The special defence of the 6th Defendant as regards item 5 was involved in issue 4 which was in these terms;

Whether item 5 of suit schedule was sold in revenue sale.

It may be observed at once that this issue, ''though rightly framed with reference to the actual language used in the written statement of the 6th Defendant, was not properly framed having regard to the fact that the sale under which item 5 was purchased by the 6th Defendant were not revenue but rent sales, as the evidence disclosed. We shall therefore deal with this issue on the basis that the sales referred to therein were sales in execution of rent decrees obtained under the Madras Estates Land Act. The above issues cover all the points argued before us by the learned Counsel on both sides. It may be noted that no oral evidence on any of these issues was adduced by either side.

We shall, in the first instance dispose of. the question involved in the first two of the above issues, i.e" whether the transactions which took place in. the year 192!''} could be supported as constituting a valid surrender followed by proper alienations in their own right by the reversioners and whether in. any event, nearly all of them being in favour of close relations either of. the widow or her husband, they could not be supported as a family settlement. The alleged surrender itself is evidenced by Exhibit, A-2 dated 15th October, 1925, executed in favour of Kurella Padmanabhudu, who was the sole next reversioner his sons, grandsons and nephews. Padmanabhudu was only one of the Plaintiffs who filed O. S. No. 319 of 1883, the three others who were also parties to that suit having died between 1''184 and 1925. This document contains these recitals:

The hereunder schedule mentioned property belonged to my husband and it passed to me after his death. After- the said property came into my possession; I got the said property entered in the name of my brother Kondeti Gurayya in the village accounts. The said property was shown in the name of the said Gurayya during his lifetime and after his death, it is being shown in the name of his sou, Achar-yulu in the accounts- Out of you, Padmanabhudu K''orella Musalayya''s father Veukayya; Korella Subbarayudu''s father Bulli Ramanna and Kurella Musalayya''s senior paternal uncle Hanuttianthu had, in respect of the said property, previously filed a declaratory suit, O. S. No. 319 of 1883 on the file of the Court of the District Munsif at Eluru. In that suit, a decree was passed confirming your reversionary right and establishing my life interest only. Padmanabhudu out of you is the son of my -senior father-in-law Subbanna Garu. Venkata-ratnam Garu, Subbarayudu Garu and Ramanna -Garu out. of you are the sons of the said Pad tnanabhudu.

Ramarao outi of you is the sou of Subbarayudu who is the son of Padmanabhudu. Sub-'' barayudu out of you is the son of Ramanna,, Garu who is the son of my another senior . father-in-law Bulli Venkanna Garu. Musalayyajt out of you is the son of Venkayya Garu who is '' the son of my senior father-in-law, namely,'' Narasimhulu Garu. Veeranna Garu and Venkanna Garu out of you are the sons of the said L Vfusalayya. Kurella Krishnamma''s son Rama-yya out of you is the grand-son of my senior father-in-law, namely, Narasimhulu, Subbanna out of you is the son of the said Rama-yya. You are my nearest reversioners and the members of reversioners'' family. I have no reversioners other than you. Due to my inability and old age, I am not able to manage my husband''s property.

If I don''t properly manage the aforesaid property, it will gradually become deteriorated. Hence, I have relinquished my life interest in the entire schedule mentioned property which belonged to my husband, which has passed to me and surrendered the same to you this day itself and have delivered possession of the same to you. Therefore from now onwards, that is from after the present crops are over, all of you may freely enjoy the said property according to your mutual pleasure, from your sons to . grandsons and-so on in succession, exercising ;dl absolute powers of disposition by way of gift, transfer, exchange and sale .....

This is followed by a paragraph containing particulars of the properties surrendered, cultivable lands of the extent of 21 acres 3 cents and two small pati house sites of small extent.

We shall refer to the other transactions associated with Exhibit A-2 in the order in which the documents embodying them were marked as exhibits. Exhibit A-3 of even date was a transfer, by Padmanabhudu and the rest of the alienees under Exhibit A-2 in favour of the sister''s daughter of the widow of about 2 acres of the first item of the plaint schedule. It contains the following recitals:

You are the daughter of the younger sister of Kurella Subbanna Garu''s wife Mangamma who is the only sister-in-law of Kurella Padmanabhudu Gargu, out of us. The said Man-gamma has brought, you up from your childhood, celebrated (your) marriage, etc., and has been looking after your welfare. But we are closely related to the said Mangamma and we are her nearest reversioners. Previously that is, subsequent to the death of Mangamma''s husband we, namely, Padmanabhudu and others out of us had, in respect of Mangamma''s property file a declaratory suit O. S. No. 319 of 1883 on the of the Court of the District Munsif, Eluru But, for the reasons that we are the reversioners to Mangamma and that she has n ability to carry on the management in respect of her property, she has this day conveyed he entire property to us by means of a surrendc de''sd, after relinquishing her right (thereto'' For the reason that Mangamma to whom we a: the nearest reversioner brought you up, all us have yielding to the request of Mangamm wholeheartedly conveyed free to you this dc itself, towards Pasupu Kunkuma (pin money land of the extent of 2 acres (two acres) remai ing after excluding the land of the extent of acres 25 cents on the north conveyed by us Kondeti Acharyulu out of the Zamindj Jeroithi delta wet land of the extent of. 819 6-cents, bearing Resurvey No. 414 and situate Amberput village, out of the property con-,tyeyer;to us all by Mangamma under a surrender ileed.

Exhibit A-4 was executed by Padmanabhudu dared to us this day. So we too have agreed to the sale effected by the said Kondeti Gurayya, and have executed and delivered this deed of; ratification. So we and the claimants through, us shall never raise any disputes in respect hereof with you and the claimants through you;, and others favour of Acharyulu son of Gurayya constructed a tiled house who, as already mentioned, was Mangaiumu''s bro .there It bears the same date as Exhibits A-2 and " A-3 and conveyed Ac. 6-25 cents in his favour as appears from the recitals above extracted from Exhibit A-3. This document contains the following recitals;

Kurella Subbanna Garu''s wife Mangamma to whom all of us are the nearest reversioners conveyed to us the property mentioned in the schedule bcjr-in and some other property by means of a surrender executed and delivered by her this day in our favour. But both during the lifetime of Mangamma''s husband as well as subsequent to his dcalb, your father was residing in the said Mangamma''s iiouse and he had by undergoing troubles, effected repair etc., to the said Mangainma''.s property and improved the same after taking great pains. Subsequently, your father died. You too are residing in the said Mangamma''s house and are being maintained by her.

The said Mangamma attained old age. During the lifetime of your father, this property was entered in the name of your father the accounts. Subsequently it was entered in your name. We are the nearest reversioners to the said Mangjimma. Under these circumstances some mediators had,, at the request of us, both parties, settled the dispute relating to Mangamma''s properly and decided that the property mentioned in the schedule hore in should be conveyed to you. Alter relinquishing the entire rights possessed by us in the lauds mentioned in the schedule hereunder, we have (or the reasons that you are the son of Mangamma''s younger brother and a near relation of us, executed and delivered this dakhal deed in your favour, as per the aforesaid decision. Therefore, you shall maintain the "aid Mangamma during her lifetime and freely enjoy the schedule-mentioned property from your sum to grandson and so on in succession exercising all absolute powers of disposition by way of gift, transfer, exchange and sale.

The next transaction is evidenced by Exhibit A-5 which is a deed of confirmation of a side dated (5th April, 1916, effected in favour of one Kurella Krish-namurthy - not a relation- by Gurayya. It recites thus:

The hereunder mentioned schedule property is mentioned in the surrender deed executed and delivered this day in favour of us by Kurella Sub-anna''s wife Mangamma, resident of Kurellagudem village, hamlet of Amberpeta. But, in respect of this property, Kurella Mangamma had, for tlie reason that she was devoid of worldly knowledge and for the.reason that she should have to go to Sub-Registrar''s office and have the registration donecaused! a sale deed to be executed previously, that '' is, on 6th April, ,1916 by her brother, namely Kondeti Acharyulu''s son Guravayya for a sum of Rs. 292-30 (rupees twp hundred and ninety-two and annas eight in favour, your father Andeyya Garu and fiisbsrheflielf received the said sale consideration and l&deliYered possession of tlie said site under sale to Loll. This sale was effected only for proper cones that Tnoiint'' was utilised for effecting pair Y''etc to''he lands which have been'' surren (Nov.) 1957 Andh. Pra. D.F./54 in this site-by spending a lot of money

Exhibit A-6 is the document next in order and it is a conveyance of about 77 cents of the suit, property to Atchaya, daughter (sic.) of Hanu-nianthu, a nephdw of P Edmanabhudu. This document contains the following recitals:

As you are the daughter of the elder brother of Padmanabhudu out of us and the daughter of the senior paternal uncte of Musalayya Garu and Subbarayudu Garu, as you were very young at the time of your father''s death, we have together, out of the affection we have for you from your childhood given to you this day itself free by way of Pasupu Kumkuma (pin money) the hereunder schedule mentioned property. Henceforth, you may freely enjoy the same, as you please, from your son to grandson and so on in succession with all absolute powers of disposition by way of gift, transfer, exchange and sale". Exhibit A-ri which is dated 12th November, 1925, is described as a sale deed arid was executed by Padmanabhudu and others in favour of one Kurella Scshayya- also not a relation. It recites:

We have sold to you this day the hereunder schedule mentioned property for a sum of Rs. 05 (rupees sixty-five) and we have taken the sale amount at the time of the sale itself, and so the same has been received". The property is described as having passed to live vevidors from Kurella Mangamma, Exhibit A.-o is; also dated 12th November, 1925 and is described as a dakhal deed and purports to confirm an alleged gift by the last male-holder in favour o� his sister, also called Mangamma, who is the mother of the present Plaintiffs 1 and 2. The main recitals in this document may be extracted;

In respect of the property mentioned in the schedule hereunder and some other property" Mangamma, wife of Kurella Subbanna Garu, resident of Kurellagudem, had previously executed a surrender deed in favour of all of us and delivered possession of the same to us. But, you are the younger sister of Subbanna who is the husband of the said Mangamma, your elder brother had, at the time of your marriage, given to you the hereunder schedule mentioned property towards Pasupu Kumkuma (pin money) and delivered possession of the same to you. Ever since you have been enjoying the same.

Neither at that time nor subsequently a document was executed and even before a document could be executed and delivered your elder brother died. After his- death, the entire property belonging to him devolved on his wife, Mangamma and she has been enjoying the same. Subsequently in respect of Mangamma''s property,'' Padmanabhudu and Ors., out of us, the reversionary filed a suit in the Court at Eluru, whereupon the Court held that the suit might be filed after the death of Mangamma and that we were reversioners. Ever since Mangamma has been enjoying the property and she, being, unable-; to manage the same and apprehending that it would become deteriorated, surrendered the seigneur favour your property also'' is included therein. As, it is proper that you'' should .enjoy the proper given'' (to you) by your elder brother, we have, out of affection towards you who too are our near relation, executed and delivered this dakhal deed after relinquishing all the rights possessed by us in the said property this day. This property is already in your possession, be, hum now onwards you may freely enjoy the same, as you please from your son to grandson and- so on in succession, exercising powers of disposition by way of gift and sale."

Now, all these documents were registered on the same day, though, as abovenoted, Exhibits A-7 and A-8 purport to have been drawn upon 12-11-1925 while the other documents were prepared on 15-10-1925. There are subsequent transactions by some of these alienees in favour of other persons whose succes-sors-in-title appear as Defendants in this suit and as Respondents before us. ''But, it is unnecessary for the purpose of disposing of this appeal to go into the details of thesc subsequent alienations.

Mr. Somasundaram has raised three contentions before us, one of them relating only to item 5 of the plaint schedule in the possession of the Gth Defendant which, as already noted, shall deal with this later. The first of his other two; contentions is that Exhibit A-2, having been executed not only in favour of the nearest presumptive reversioner then in existence but also others who, though Guatis, must be counted for this purpose as strangers, cannot be treated as a valid surrender. He relies for this position on the decision of the Supreme Court in Musammat Phool Kuer Vs. Musammat Pem Kuer and Another, . The relevant passage in that decision is at page 806 (of SCR): (at p. 212 of AIR) and is as follows:

The principle underlying the doctrine of surrender is that it cannot possibly be made in. favour of anybody except the next heir of the husband. Vesting of the estate in the next reversioner takes place under operation of law and it is not possible for the widow to say that she is withdrawing herself from the husband''s estate in order that it may vest in somebody other than the next heir of the husband. It was held by this Court in Mummareddi Nagi Reddi and Others Vs. Pitti Durairaja Naidu and Others, : Mummareddi Nagi Reddi and Others Vs. Pitti Durairaja Naidu and Others, , that so far as the next heir is concerned, there cannot be a surrender of the totality of the interest which the widow had, if she actually directs that a portion of it should be held or enjoyed by somebody else other than the husband''s heirs and that the position is not materially altered if the surrender''is made in favour of the next heir with whom a stranger is associated and the widow purports to relinquish the estate in order that it may vest in both of them." In their earlier decision referred to in this passage, the Supreme Court declined to "accept the view that a transfer made by a widow of her ten.ti.re estate in favour of the nearest reversioner and an outsider jointly would operate as a surrender of the whole estate to the immediate reversioner and transfer of a half share in it to the stranger.'''' In that case, they were dealing with a. deed, which was described as a deed of release, executed by a Hindu widow of her husband'' estate i in favour of her daughter, the next reversioner and her husband jointly.

Their Lordships refused to validate the transaction, by treating it as a surrender in favour of the next heir followed by a transfer by Ithe latter to her husband. The Respondents however;rely upon a passage in Mummareddi Nagi Reddi and Others Vs. Pitti Durairaja Naidu and Others, "which is'' in these terms: "It would be quite consistent with established principles of law if the widow relinquishes he. interest in the husband''s estate and the reversioner in whom the estate vests transfers the estate either in whole or in part to another person.. If tne transfer is of the entire estate, the two transactions may be combined in one document and the widow and the reversioner might jointly transfer the whole estate to a stranger, but the implication in such cases must always be that the alienee derives his title from the reversioner and not the widow." It is � true that this passage, standing by itself might be understood as endorsing the validity of a transaction by which the widow in the first instance transfers her interest to the reversioner and the .reversioner follows it up by transferring it in whole or in part to any other person.. As pointed out by Subba Rao, C. J., in Abbireddigari Rami Reddi and Others Vs. Atla Rosamma and Others, at p, 337: ((S) AIR 1955 AP 232 at p. 236)(C) "The Supreme Court, in making the aforesaid observations, was not considering the question whether, if such alienations were part of a scheme to divide the estate between the reversioners and the widow''s nominee, they would be. valid or not. The observations/therefore, must, be confined to a case where the alienations are, not part of any scheme to divide the estate. If there was a bona fide relinquishment of the widow''s interest in the enitre property in favour'' of the next reversioner the next reversioner who-becomes the owner would certainly be at liberty to alienate the said property to whomsoever he liked. The Supreme Court did not say anything: more than that.

It may also be remarked that the passage purports rather to sum up the reasoning upon which the decision in Nobokishore v. Harinath'' ILR Cal 1102 (FB)''(D), was based, than to embody the views of the Supreme Court. They hclct that that decision even if it was correct was not applicable to the case before them. It was indeed, stated later in Mummareddi Nagi Reddi and Others Vs. Pitti Durairaja Naidu and Others, & (B): y "For the purpose of the present case we will proceed on the assumption that the law laitt down in ILR Cal 1102 (FB)(D) is correct." The whole process of reasoning in that as well as the subsequent decision of the Supreme Court militates against.any suggestion that they were inclined to support the proposition that a transaction of transfer in favour of the next reversioner and others could be validated as a voluntary self-effacement of the widow resulting in the acceleration of succession to her husband''s estete. It was observed by one of us in the Full Bench case already referred to that "asurrender could hot be in favour of the actual reversioner who, in the eye of law are strangers.'''' On this point therefore we are in agreement with the contention of the learned Counsel for the Appellants,

The learned Counsel for. the Appellants has also attacked.all the transactions evidenced by Exhibits A-2; to A8 as constituting no more than a device to divide the estate between ttye persons in whom the widow was interested antf the next reversioner Padmanabhudu. '' Having" regard - to the fact that'' all these-documents came into existence at or about the same time and registered on the same day and having x-gard also to the several recitals therein perfectly .clear that the widow purchased W Osent. of . the nearest reversioner by giving and; a portion of the property in order that she Bay-.grant; other portions of the estate to her brother''s son, her husband''s sister, the daughter her own sister and also confirm certain prior alienations made by her brother. It is argued for the Respondent that these transactions could be supported on the ground of family settlement and that some of them could even be supported on the ground of necessity. It seem to us impossible to hold that these transactions could be validated on any theory of a bona lido'' settlement of family disputes. It is attempted to, be urged that no disputes are necessary to validate a family settlement.

That may be true in regard to the members of a family. But, a Hindu widow in posses-sion of her husband''s estate, cannot, under the, guise of a family settlement, alien-do it in favour of her. or her husband''s near relations. She can, of course, represent the estate and enter into a valid settlement binding upon the inheritance in cases where the estate as such or any portion of it is threatened by a serious dispute bona fide raised by a relation of her husband or even by a stranger. Strictly speaking, such a settlement is not, in the ordinary sense, a family settlement. It can only be supported as a reasonable compromise entered into, in the'' interests of the estate and therefore unassailable by any person subsequently claiming to be entitled thereto.

The attempt to sustain some of these alienations on grounds of necessity or benefit or as being reasonable gifts is, in our opinion, equally futile. It is argued for instance that Exhibit A-4 which is a transaction in favour of Mangamnia''s brother''s son, Acharyulu, recites that Guravayya his father, had done considerable services to the estate as manager when Mangamma was a young and helpless widow and that the gift of Ac. 6-58 cents made under Exhibit A-4 to Acharyulu could therefore be treated as remuneration for past services rendered by his father. Reliance is also placed on the term in Exhibit A-4 which enjoins the alienee to support the widow during her life time. It is argued that this alienation in favour of Acharyulu could be treated also partly as a reasonable provision for the maintenance of the widow.

We cannot agree with the contention that Exhibit. A-4 could be validated on either basis. Assuming that the recitals are true, we do not think it is permissible for a widow to give away something like a third of the whole estate to a ''person for having managed the estate. In this case, the alienation is not even in favour of the person who rendered the services but in favour of his son. If it were to be considered as a provision for the maintenance of the widow, there should have been a document directly in her favour and conveying this property absolutely to her in lieu of maintenance. If that had been done, it would be certainly invalid on the ground that it represented much more; than a reasonable provision for her maintenance, because it would be leaving the widow an absolute interest in a third of Hie estate as and by way of a maintenance grant. We cannot therefore accede to the contention that Exhibit-A-4 could be held to be bintling upon the reversioners.

So far as Exhibit A-8 is eoncernpd, "iierV'' is the recital, it is true, of an anterior gift having been made by the last male-owner in favour of the transferee. - It is even recited that Mangarnma, his sister, was already in pos1-; session of this property under that gift. This is certainly. Inconsistent with the recital in EXK hibit A-2 that Padmanabhtfdu and others, were put in possession of all ,the property surrendered. Further, there was no need for Padn manabhudu and others executing Exhibit A-8 if there had been an anterior gift by Subbanna, himself. If a document was necessary, it could, have been executed by the widow. If the recital as to possession having been given to the sister even during Subbanna''s life time was true, then, the property was effectively lost to the estate because the donee''s possession would be adverse to the estate and even the reversioners could not* have recovered it, as such adverse possession would have started even during the full owner''s life time.

As was pointed out at the outset, there is no oral evidence in support of this assertion and there can be little doubt that the burden is upon the persons in possession to establish the circumstances under which they are entitled to retain any portion of Subbanna''s estate to which the Plaintiffs are prima facie entitled as reversioners after the widow''s life time. We cannot also accept the recitals as true, because the circumstances indicate that they were inserted with a view to validate the transaction somehow or other. It is true that recitals in ancient alienations might, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, be accepted as true. But, having regard to the fact that this is one of a series of transactions entered into at one and the same time manifestly constituting an attempt to parcel out the estate between the objects of the widow''s bounty and the next reversioner, we are disinclined to assume that this particular recital as to possession is true - apart, of course from the circumstances already pointed out.

We are, thus, clearly of the opinion the transactions in question could be (sic) supported as� binding upon the Plaintiffs. We cannot therefore uphold the finding of the trial Court that Exhibit A-2 is either a bona fide family settlement or surrender and that hence the other alienations are also good against the reversionary interest.

But that does not dispose of the appeal because the Respondents seek to support the decree of the lower Court by attacking its finding on issue 8. It is argued that there is, in this case, sufficient .evidence to indicate that Plaintiffs 1 and 2 have affirmed all these transactions and that having done so, they aire concluded now from attacking them.

The argument runs thus: The property which was given to their mother was inherited by the Plaintiffs in 1934, when she died. They got into possession of the property so inherited, partitioned it between themselves and alienated portions of it under Exhibits B-l and B-2. Exhibit B-l dated 26th March, 1934 is a sale deed by the 1st Plaintiff in favour of his wife for Rs. 50 of a portion of the property which the 1st. Plaintiff obtained at the partition between the brothers. Exhibit B-2 dated 6th June, 1935 is a transfer by the 2nd Plaintiff of rimming character in favour of a deceased brother''s daughter-in-law. Exhibit B-3 is a sale deed dated 22nd May, 1936 executed by the 1st Plaintiff''s wife, in favour, of the vendee "un-"; der Exhibit B-2 ; within less than two months after the death of the widow Manfamma, of property got by former under Exhibit B-l.

The 14th Defendant in the suit is the vendee under Exhibits B-2 and B-3. But no relief. is asked against her so far as the property covered by these two sale deeds is concerned. Further, the Plaintiffs were lying by when the alienees under Sixhibit A-5 and A-6 were raising buildings upon the sites got by them under those delays and while the alienees of lands were making improvements. Moreover, the suit was filed only a few days before it would be barred. The Respondents maintain that the Plaintiffs 1 and 2 must be deemed to have affirmed or ratified or elected to stand by Exhibit A-2, which was the root of title of all. the alienees under Exhibits A-3 to A-8, and that therefore they are debarred from maintaining their present claim; They refer in this connection to the decision in Seetharamayya v. Chandrayya (1954) 2 MLJ 162 : ((S) All! 1955 AP 68), (E).

It was contended in that case that the Plaintiff who sought to set aside certain alienations made by the widow of the last male-owner to whom he claimed to be the heir was estopped from questioning them. It was said that he along with his brothers came into possession and enjoyed a portion of the estate obtained by their father under a sale deed executed by the alienees in pursuance of. a compromise entered into between them and him in a suit filed by him impeaching the transactions and seeking a declaration that they were not binding upon the reversion; and that further after coming into possession the brothers partitioned the said property along with their joint family properties and had disposed of what fell to their shares in favour of third parties. That contention was upheld. The following passage from the judgment of the learned Chief Justice is relevant to the present purpose: (at page 167 of Mad LJ , Andhra): (at pp. 72 and 73 of AIR).

During the life time of the widow a presumptive reversioner has only a spes successions in the estate of the last male-holder and he cannot, therefore, purport to convey the said interest or otherwise deal with it. His rights in the oroperty would be crystallised only after succession opens. But after succession opens or even during the widow''s lifetime, he may elect to stand by the transaction entered info by the widow or otherwise ratify it, in which case he would be precluded from questioning the transaction. In this connection, the cases have dealt with three different aspects on the principle of estoppel (1) that which embodied in Section 115 of the Evidence Act, (2) election in the strict sense of the term, whereby the person electing takes a benefit under the transaction, and (3) ratification, i. e., agreeing to abide by the transaction. A presumptive reversioner, coming under any one of the aforesaid categories, is precluded from questioning the transaction when succession, opens and when he becomes the actual reversioner.

The Plaintiff in that case was a minor, at the time when he inherited the property. Discussing the question as to whether the above principles would apply to the cose of a person who is a minor when he takes a benefit under that transaction, the learned Chief Justice observed as follows:

A minor obviously cannot be compelled to take the benefit of a transaction, which will have the effect of depriving him of his legal rights when succession opens. But a minor can certainly, after attaining majority, ratify a transaction entered into" on his behalf by the guardian. If he so ratifies the transaction entered into by his guardian and accepts the benefit there under, there cannot be any difference in the application of the principle of election. The effect would be the same Whether, after attaining majority, the quondam minor accepted the benefit or disowned it is a question1 to be decided on the facts of each case ........

The mere act of succession to the father may not amount to ratification as the son''s enjoyment is consistent with his fight of inheritance to the father. But he can either expressly or by necessary implication ratify the transaction entered into by the father.

Applying the above principles to the case before him, the learned Chief Justice concluded as follows:

As the Plaintiff enjoyed the properties after he attained majority absolutely for 35 years and sold the same as an absolute owner, it is unreasonable to hold that he had no knowledge of Exhibit D-l, D-2 and D-28 (Exhibits D-l and D-28 being the sale deeds impeached and Exhibit D-2 the sale in favour of the Plaintiff''s father) and that he dealing with the property only as the heir of his father, who would be entitled to enjoy the property during the lifetime of the widow. I have no hesitation on the evidence to hold that the Plaintiff had knowledge of Exhibit D-2 and that with that knowledge he enjoyed the property as an absolute owner till he sold the same in the year 1938. He clearly ratified the transaction Exhibit D-2,'' under which he got the benefit after he attained majority. He cannot, therefore, question the sale deeds Exhibits D-l and D-28.

Reference has also been made to the decision of the Supreme Court in Dhiyan Singh and Another Vs. Jugal Kishore and Another, . The facts of that case were as follows: S and B were sons of two brothers. S died in 1884 leaving a daughter M. There were, disputes between B and M, B claiming the entire, estate by survivorship and M alleging division between B and her father. There was a reference to arbitration followed by an award. Under the award certain properties were given to M while the rest of the estate went to B. The award further recited that each of the parties was to become absolute owner of his or her share.

The branch of each sharer continued in possession of the properties alloted to each ever'' since and was dealing with them as absolute owner. After the death of M, B''s grandsons instituted a suit, in 1941 in the right of their father K, claiming the properties alloted to M on the ground that on the death of S, M succeeded only to a limited estate and that as the re--version opened on her death in 1929 they were entitled thereto as the next reversioners. The Defendants who were claiming the property under M contended that the Plaintiffs were bound by the award and were in any event estopped from challenging it. The Supreme Court held that the award gave an absolute estate to M, that it was valid and that even if the award be assumed to be invalid, the Plaintiffs'' claim was barred by the plea of store}. In dealing with this last plea, their Lordships observed at page 485 (of SCR): (at p. 147 of "When B''s conduct is analysed it will be found to entail an assertion by him that he admitted and recognised facts which would in, give- M an absolute interest in the lands warded to her.

They continued to say:

It was because of that assertion of fact, namely his recognition and admission of the "existence of facts which would give M an absolute interest that she was induced to part with about one-third of the property to which B, on a true estimate of the facts as now known, had Ro right. There can be no doubt that she acted to her detriment and there can, we think, be equally no doubt that she was induced to do seen the faith of B''s statements and conduct which induced her to believe that he accepted all the implications of the award. But in any event, we are clear that B would have been stopped. The nature of the dispute and the description of it given in the award show that there was considerable doubt, and certainly much dispute, about the true state of affairs. Even if the arbitrator was wholly wrong and even if he had no power to decide as he did, it was open to both sides to accept the decision and by their acceptance recognize the existence of facts which would in law give the other an absolute estate in the properties they agreed to divide among themselves and did divide. That, in our opinion is a representation of an existing fact or set of facts.

Discussing the question whether estoppels would apply also to B''s sons of whom K was the last surviving, and through'' whom the Plaintiffs claimed the properties, their Lordships remarked as follows:

Bdied in 1889 or 1890. At that date. M''s Shri Krishna Dash was alive and was the next presumptive reversionary. B''s sons therefore had no more right to that portion of his estate which was assigned to B than B himself. But they took possession and claimed through their father. They did not claim an independent title in themselves, and, as we know, they had no other title at that date. They were-, therefore, in no better position than B and as B would have been stopped, the estoppels descended to them also because they stepped into his shoes...... But, apart from this, there was also independent estoppel in Kishan Lai. We have said he had no right to this part of the estate when his father died apart from that award. But nevertheless he took possession along with his brother and the two of them treated the property as their own and derived benefit from it. They partitioned the estate between themselves and sold away parts of it to third parties, K knew of the award.

He knew that mutation had been effected in accordance with it and possession taken by B under it and that the rest had been retained by M His retention of the property therefore and his continuing to deal with it on the basis of the award. indicated his own acceptance of the award, and therefore by his acts and conduct, he represented that he also, like his father, admitted the existence of facts which would in law give M an absolute estate; and further, he allowed M to deal with the estate as her own, for she, on her part, also acted on the award and claimed absolute rights in the property assigned to her. She dealt with it on that footing and gifted it in that right to her grandsons, the contesting Defendants .v... Mutation was effected and Kishan Lal raised no objection.

We see then that B: retained possession of property to which he was not entitled for a period of five or six years from 1884 to 1889 or 1890 and induced M to. part with it by representing that he accepted the award and her absolute title to the rest, and after him Kishan Lai and his brother between them enjoyed the benefit of it from 1889 or 1890 down to October, 1929, when M died, that is, for a further forty years, and led M to believe that they also acknowledged her title to an absolute estate. We have no doubt that down to that time Kishan Lal was also stopped for the reasons given above. Had he questioned the award and- reopened the dispute M would at once have sued and would then for forty years have obtained the benefit of property from which she was excluded because of her acceptance of the award on the faith of B''s assertion that he too accepted its inactionoxer these years with full knowledge of facts and his acceptance of the estate with all its consequential benefits, unquestionably creates and Estoppels in him.

It is true that their Lordships were dealing with a case which falls directly u/s 115 of the Evidence Act. But, as pointed out by the learned Chief Justice of this Court in the decision already cited there is the wider principle of election or ratification, as it is variously called, which has the- same legal effect.

In the present case, the Plaintiffs 1 and 2 became the presumptive reversionary in thet year 1929, four years after the transactions now impeached.

Five years later, their mother died, They then came into possession of the properties conveyed to her under Exhibit A-8. They not only enjoyed the properties which came to them horn their mother, dealing with them as they did with their joint family properties, but they unequivocally showed by their conduct that they stood by the transactions of which Exhibit A-8 was one, by disposing of portions of that property. They could not have done so except in, their right as the heirs of their mother. Indeed they do not now attack their own dispositions. Further, for quite a long time they allowed the alienees under the several deeds to dc al as absolute owners with the properties they had obtained thereby. It seems to us that the reasoning of the decision in Seetharamayya J. Vs. Sarva Chandrayya and Others, , applies to tha facts of this case and that the Plaintiffs are therefore precluded from questioning the alienations in dispute.

We shall now deal with the third point raised by Mr. Somasundaram. It relates to item 5 of the plaint schedule now in the possession of the 6th Defendant. Strictly speaking, it is unnecessary to deal separately with his argument in the view we have taken, the Plaintiffs suit must certainly fail. But, as both sides have addressed arguments on this point, we should like to express our view on it, too. Mr. Somasundaram contends that the rent sales conveyed to the purchaser only the widow''s interest in tho holding and that the"6th Defendant, therefore, is liable to be dispossessed by the Plaintiffs. We are not inclined to uphold this contention. In Covinda Malavarayan v. Vein Mazhavaryan 12 MLW 530 : AIR 1920 Mad 245 (2)) (G), it was held that "in a revenue sale what is sold is the portion But, if the conditions laid down in the secretary interest in the land and not merely the are complied with, it enables the transferee interest which the registered pattadar actually to defend his possession if the transferor seeks had." to enforce his rights against the property. This The learned Judges decided in that case that

when the registered pattadar was a Hindu widow who had succeeded to the land as heir to her husband, a sale of the land for arrears of revenue passes to the purchaser not merely the widow''s interest but the full proprietary interest in the land. They referred to the fact that revenue is made a first charge on the land u/s 2 of the Revenue Recovery Act and said that the landholder whose interest was sold was a full proprietor of the land and that what is sold is the proprietary interest in the land and not merely what interest the registered pattadar actually had. Mr. Somasundaram urges that this decision cannot apply to rent sales which take place under the Madras Estates Land Act. (We can sec no difference, however, between the two cases. Even, in the case of runt sale there is a first charge in favour of the landholder and the sale is free of all encumbrances except such as the landholder had recognized.

His right to sell the holding for non-payment of rent is absolute and is not dependent upon whether the registered pattadar is a full or a limited owner. To hold otherwise would., in our opinion, be making an unauthorized inroad upon the statutory provisions of the Estates Land Act. We cannot think that a rule of personal law can control or limit the operation of an enactment of the Legislature. We arc inclined to accept the contention urged on behalf of the Respondents that a landholder''s right to sell a root�s holding under the Estates Land Act is unaffected by the circumstances that the registered patted at the time is a Hindu widow with a limited interest. It follows, in our opinion, that the 6th Defendant would be absolutely entitled to the properties which he had obtained under the rent sales, even if the Plaintiffs were held entitled to a decree in respect of other properties involved in the suit.

In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.