Punjab National Bank Services and Another vs Jaspal Singh

H.S. Bedi, J.—The present revision petition is directed against the Order of the Sub Judge, 1st Class, Amritsar dated October 30, 1991, whereby the preliminary issue with regard to the fact as to whether the jurisdiction of the Civil Court was barred in view of the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act has been held in favour of the workman and against the employer, the present petitioner.

The case of the workman-respondent before the trial Court was that he was entitled to the enhanced rate of subsistence allowance as he had remained under suspension for an inordinately long period. The objection taken by the employer that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction in the matter, was repelled by the impugned order. The Court found, after considering the judgments cited by the parties, that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court was not barred and it was open to the workman to choose his remedy either in the Civil Court or before the Industrial Court or Tribunal but once having made an option, he could not thereafter change his mind and opt for the other.

It has been urged by Mr. S.S. Nijjar, Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner, on the strength of the judgment reported as Jitendra Nath Biswas Vs. M/s. Empire of India and Ceylon Tea Co. and Another, and a single Bench judgment of this Court reported as Punjab National Bank v. Raj Kumar Duggal 1991 (1) S.L.R. 740, that the only remedy available to a workman to seek redress was under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 hereinafter called the ''Act'' and the jurisdiction of the Civil Court was emphatically barred.

This broad assertion of Mr. Nijjar has not been contravened by Mr.B.R. Mahajan, learned counsel appearing for the respondent. He has, however, urged that Section 10 of the Act provides that an industrial dispute which is either in existence or is apprehended, may be referred to the Labour Court or Tribunal for adjudication but the sinequonon for a reference is that the matter must be an industrial dispute. He then referred to Sub-clause (k) Section 2 of the Act which defines industrial dispute as under:-

"Section 2(k): "Industrial dispute" means any dispute or difference between employers and employers or between employers and workmen, or between workmen and workmen, which is connected with the employment or non-employment or the terms of employment or with the conditions of labour, of any person."

He has argued that this definition envisages an industrial dispute as a dispute between "employers and workmen", in other words, a dispute which is between an employer and a workman, that is an individual workman, is not really covered under that sub-section. He has then referred to Section 2A of the Act in which in cases of discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or termination of service of an individual workman, an industrial dispute can arise. He has urged that on a conjointed reading of Sections 2(k) and 2A of the Act, a dispute raised by a solitary workman can be referred to the Labour Court or Tribunal, where he challenges his discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or termination of service only and a dispute pertaining to the grant of enhanced subsistence allowance would, therefore, not be a matter which would be covered u/s 2A of the Act and for this purpose, a reference u/s 10 of the Act would have to be sought, which the appropriate Government may or may not, in its discretion, find it feasible. On this basis, he has urged that the Civil Court alone was competent to adjudicate upon the matter.

After hearing learned counsel for the parties, I find no merit in this petition. It would be seen from the definition of ''industrial dispute'' given in Section 2(k) that a dispute with regard to subsistence allowance would be covered as an industrial dispute and could be referred for decision u/s 10 of the Act, provided that it touched more than one workman, but a reference at the instance of a solitary workman would be possible only in case of a discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or termination of service as defined by Section 2A of the Act. As neither of these conditions exists in the present case, the matter could not be referred to the Labour Court at the instance of the respondent-workman.

Mr. S.S. Nijjar, next argued that the dispute between the parties had arisen out of a tripartite settlement arrived at between the parties which required to be interpreted and in case of any dispute arising therefrom, a remedy was available to the workman u/s 36A of the Act and the appropriate Government could refer the matter for adjudisction to the competent authority for decision. This argument too is Without any merit. Admittedly, in the present Case the dispute is not with regard to the interpretation of an award or settlement between the parties but the workman is claiming a higher subsistence allowance as envisaged by that settlement.

For the reasons recorded above, though patently different from the ones recorded by the trial Court, the present petition is dismissed without any order as to costs. The parties are directed to appear before the trial Court on December 3, 1992.