Punjab & Sind Bank vs Akash Timber Traders and Others

This revision calls in question an order passed by District judge, Jammu on 1010 1994 by virtue of which he has dismissed an application filled

by the petitioner/plaintiff before him for producing original documents to which reference was made and of which copies were produced by

witnesses during their crossexamination.

I heard this petition for admission on 7.11.1994 and today also. The reason given by Mr.S.P.Gupta for throwing a challenge to the order

impugned, are as under:

1) That the documents sought to be produced have great bearing upon the facts of the case and have a clinching force.

2) That these document are genuine and are not forged.

3) That copies of these document were produced by a witness who is an official of the defendant/Bank, during the course of his crossexamination.

4) That it was by virtue of court order dated 17.12.1993 that relevant record of which these documents formed a part was required to be

produced by the witnesses.

I have heard Mr. Gupta, at length. All the points of arguments reproduced above may be correct. This court at this stage is not concerned with

the legitimacy or otherwise of the documents nor with the amount of importance, they have for purpose of the case in hand. The only question that

this court is called upon to examine is , as to whether or not the order passed by the court below is fraught with any amount of illegality,

impropriety or error of jurisdiction. The court may also be persuaded by the question as to whether or not the same results in failure of justice.

I have gone through the order under revision. The trial court seems to have directed order xiii of Code of Civil Procedure by interpreting rule 1

and rule 2 distinctly. He has rightly maintained that the application in the present case could fall within the purview of rule 2 of order xiii supra. He

has declined to interfere only because the sinequanon for exercising the discretion of the court in terms of rule 2 supra, is the satisfaction of the

code with regard to a ""good cause"". He has digressed upon the inability of the plaintiff/petitioner in bringing home good cause which stood in its

way in producing the documents which admittedly were in his possession at an earlier stage.

In the instant case it is to be seen whether the plaintiff bank has been able to make out a case for production of documents at a belated stage in

terms of order xiii rule2 C.P.C. In order to bring his case within the ambit of said provision of C.P.C, the plaintiff has to show some reasonable

and plausible cause which prevented him from filling documents along with the plaint or before the framing of issues, where no good ground is

shown for not being able to produce the documents at a stage envisaged under rule 1, and no sufficient cause is made out for filling these

documents at a bleated stage. The court is justified in rejecting the application. No good cause in the present case has been shown by the plaintiff

for the nonproduction of the documents now sought to be produced in this application. The plaintiff has also not been able to show as to why he

could not produce these documents at the time of filling of suit or before striking of issues.

I have gone through the text of the application filed before the trial court. It does not even make a whisper as to why these documents were not

produced at a stage prescribed by order xiii, not is any ground spelled out which could sustain the application.

Before parting with, I would like to place on record one grievance flouted by Mr. Gupta, with respect to the order impugned. According to him

the record was required to be ""produced in terms of court order dated: 17.12.1993, therefore, that according to him could not have been refused

at a subsequent stage.

I do not agree with the learned counsel for the petitioner, because, the record was ordered to be produced while the statement of the

defendant's witness, who happened to be an official of the petitioners company was being recorded and the same was deferred. It was one for a

limited purpose. During the course of crossexamination, the copies of these documents also have been produced and exhibited. Such copies may

be of any help to the parties under law. I leave it for the trial court to decide the utility and adminisbility of these documents.

One thing is clear that production of record through the witness at the stage of cross examination would not ipsofacto relegate the position back

to a stage to which rules 1 and 2 of order xiii relates. Under this provision of law the parties to a suit are required to file their documents either with

the plaint, on the date when issues are farmed or before that. The court in its discretion may allow production of documents in terms of rule 2 supra

.Production of record or some documents in rebuttal or a reference to them is not production of documents envisaged by order xiii. The other side

has a right of a rebutting these documents by recording denial. Then the parties have a right of relying upon these documents after proving and

exhibiting the same. That procedure will not be available to the documents in question. The documents referred to by a witness even at the

direction of the court cannot be taken to bridge the lacunae which exist in the case. If that is done, this will amount to defeating the very scheme of

the code and setting at naught the object of the code in particular order xiii. The direction passed by the court on 17.12.1993 was to produce the

record and production of record does not mean production of documents. Even if that would have been so, such production would not allow the

court to go beyond the scope for which crossexamination of witnesses is meant. The order passed for production for record/documents at the

stage of crossexamination of a witness will not be a substitute for an order which the court has to pass in terms of order xiii per necessity is to be a

judicial order and is to be passed on reasoned grounds justifying the sufficiency of the case for allowing production of documents.

On the foregoing analogy, I do not find any substance. This order is well in order and without any infirmity under law. Therefore, the petition is

dismissed.