Punjab Singh vs Mangal Singh

P.C. Pandit, J.—There is a residential house situate in Mohalla Safal Rehman in Jullundur City. It appears that it was an evacuee property and consisted of two portions, Nos. N.G. 114 and N.G. 115. The former was allotted to Punjab Singh and the latter to Mangal Singh on a temporary basis by the Rehabilitation Department. Subsequently, both the portions were transferred on permanent basis to Mangal Singh with effect from (sic)0th September. 1955, and a conveyance deed was also executed in his favour by the District Rent and Managing Officer. By operation of law, Punjab Singh became the tenant of Mangal Singh with regard to portion No. N.G. 114 from 1st of October, 1955. In August 1961, Mangal Singh filed a petition u/s 13 of the East Punjab Rent Restriction Act, 1949, against Punjab Singh for his ejectment from portion No. N.G. 114 on three grounds. Firstly that Punjab Singh had not paid any rent for the portion occupied by him till the filing of the ejectment petition. The rent of the said portion was Rs. 1/- per month. Secondly, the premises were required bona fide by Mangal Singh for his use and occupation. Thirdly, the tenant was a source of nuisance to the neighbours.

This petition was resisted by Punjab Singh who denied that he was a tenant under Mangal Singh. His plea was that he was in possession of portion No. N.G. 114 and the same was purchased by him from the District Rent and Managing Officer, Jullundur, on instalment basis. According to him, Mangal Singh had wrongly included that portion in his own, which bore No. N.G. 115. Consequently, he was not required to pay any rent to Mangal Singh. The other grounds of ejectment were also controverted by him.

On the pleadings of the parties, the following two issues were framed by the Rent Controller on 15 of November, 1962.

Whether the relationship of landlord and tenant exists between the parties regarding the house in suit?

If issue No. 1 is proved, whether the respondent is not liable to ejectment on the ground of non-payment of arrears of rent?

It appears that Punjab Singh filed an appeal before the Deputy Chief Settlement Commissioner, with delegated powers of Chief Settlement Commissioner, against the order transferring port on No. N.G. 14 in favour of Mangal Singh. During the pendency of the appeal, according to Punjab Singh, a compromise was effected before the said officer on 5th of August, 1964, According to that compromise, Mangal Singh agreed not to claim any amount on account of arrears of rent from Punjab Singh. It was also agreed not to charge any rent, with regard to the portion in occupation of Punjab Singh, from him upto 31st August, 1964. Thereafter, he was liable to pay rent at the rate of Rs. 18.0 per month or any sum that may be fixed by the department. According to Punjab Singh. Mangal Singh agreed not to evict him from the premises in his occupation for a period of five years, provided he kept on paying rent and did not sublet the same. In return, Punjab Singh consented to withdraw his appeal. As a result of this compromise, the appeal filed by Punjab Singh was withdrawn. Thereafter, Punjab Singh made an application on 11th of May, 1965, before the Rent Controller and the following additional issues were then framed on 21st May, 1965:

Whether there is any valid compromise between the parties ? If so, what is its effect ?

Whether the respondent (tenant) is liable to ejectment on the ground stated in para 3 of the application ?

Relief.

On 15th of April, 1966, Shri Sunder Lal, P.C.S., who was the Rent Controller at that time, held that there was a relationship of tenant and landlord between the parties and that there was no valid compromise entered into between them. The parties were then directed to produce their evidence on the remaining issues. After the parties had led their evidence, Shri J.C. Nagpal, who succeeded the previous Rent Controller, held on 30th July, 1936, that Punjab Singh was guilty in making default in payment of the rent and was, therefore, liable to ejectment on that ground alone. It was also found that the accommodation with the landlord was sufficient for his -needs and he bona fide required the portion of the house in possession of the tenant for his own use and occupation. It was further held that the conduct of the tenant towards the landlord and the members of his family amounted to a nuisance and he was, therefore, liable to ejectment for that reason as well. On these findings, the ejectment application was granted and the tenant was ordered to vacate the premises within two months.

Against that decision, Punjab Singh went in appeal before the Appellate Authority, Jullundur. Before him, the first argument raised was that on the date when the ejectment application was filed by Mangal Singh, Punjab Singh was declared the owner of the portion No. N.G. 114 occupied by him with the result that he was not the tenant of Mangal Singh. This argument was negatived by the Appellate Authority by observing that the document relied on for the purpose by Punjab Singh was merely a letter dated 28th of February, 1959 (Annexure R. 1/A) from the Minister of Rehabilitation addressed to Punjab Singh to the effect that his application for compensation had been finalised and the Rehabilitation authorities had decided to adjust the compensation payable to him with property No. N.G. 114-115, Jullundur, and that a conveyance deed would be executed after all the instalments had been cleared. This document, according to the Appellate Authority, did not confer any title on Punjab Singh. On the other hand, by virtue of the letter dated 24th of July, 1963, Exhibit ''AY'', written by the Managing Officer (Property) Jullundur to Punjab Singh, he was informed that the portion of property No. N.G. 114-115 Jullundur, previously transferred to him against his claim, had been cancelled, as the entire property stood finally transferred in favour of Mangal Singh. The Appellate Authority also referred to the evidence of A.W. 6, Harnam Singh, a Clerk in the office of the District Kent and Managing Officer, who had deposed that both Punjab Singh and Mangal Singh were originally tenants of the disputed property in different portions. Due to an error in the office records, the portion under the occupation of Punjab Singh was erroneously transferred in his favour. However, when the mistake was detected, it was immediately corrected under advice to Punjab Singh. The Appellate Authority thus held that Mangal Singh was the owner of the entire property including the portion in the occupation of Punjab Singh.

Another argument raised before the Appellate Authority was that after the parties had entered into a compromise before the Deputy Chief Settlement Commissioner on 5th August, 1964, Mangal Singh recognised Punjab Singh as his tenant on a monthly rent of Rs. 1.8.0 paise on the condition that Punjab Singh did not make any default in the payment of rent or sublet the premises. On that basis, the previous ejectment petition filed by Mangal Singh in August 1961 should be rejected and he should bring a fresh application for eviction on the strength of a new tenancy created on 5th of August, 1964. This contention was also negatived by the Appellate Authority on two grounds. Firstly, that the only witness produced in proof of the compromise was R.W. 1 Bhagwan Dass. He had admitted in his evidence that there was neither any written compromise on the record nor had the parties signed the same in his presence. Further, Punjab Singh had himself produced a copy of the order dated 5th August, 1964, but no attempt was made by him to confront Mangal Singh with his statement dated 5th August, 1964, on the basis of which they said order was made. Secondly, in any case, a compromise of that kind, even if proved, did not benefit Punjab Singh, inasmuch as he had admittedly not paid any rent to Mangal Singh for the premises even after the date of that compromise. It was, therefore, held by the Appellate Authority that the relationship of landlord and tenant had been proved between the parties and Punjab Singh deserved to be evicted on the ground of nonpayment of rent.

As regards the other ground of ejectment mentioned in application, the finding of the Appellate Authority was that the premises in question were bona fide required by Mangal Singh for his own use and occupation So far as the ground of nuisance was concerned, the same was rejected. As a result of these findings, the appeal of the tenant was dismissed. Against this decision, the present revision petition has been filed by Punjab Singh.

The first argument raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner was that it had been proved on the record that on the date when the ejectment application was filed against Punjab Singh, Mangal Singh was not the owner of portion No. N.G. 114. That being so, the said application should have been dismissed on the ground that no relationship of landlord and tenant subsisted between the parties on that date.

There is no merit in this contention. It has been found both by the Rent Controller and the Appellate Authority that Punjab Singh had not been able to establish that he was the owner of portion No. N.G. 114 in August 1961, when the eviction application was filed. No sale-deed had been executed in his favour regarding the said portion by the District Rent and Managing Officer. The letter Exhibit R. 1/A did not in any way make him the owner of the premises in question It is also significant to mention that in the revision petition filed in this Court, no ground had been taken regarding this point.

The next contention raised by the learned counsel was that both, the Rent Controller and the Appellate Authority were in error in holding that no compromise had been effected between the parties before the Deputy Chief Settlement Commissioner on 5th August, 1984. The evidence on this matter has been misinterpreted by the Appellate Authority. R.W. 1 Bhagwan Dass, a clerk in this office of the Chief Settlement Commissioner, had proved the compromise by which the landlord had agreed not to charge any rent from the tenant upto 31st of August, 1964. Thereafter, the landlord had agreed to accept Rs. 1.8.0 as monthly rent from the tenant. The said compromise, according to the learned counsel had also been put to the landlord. A new tenancy had come into existence when the parties effected the compromise, and the application for eviction filed in 1961 was bound to be dismissed on that ground.

There is no substance in this contention as well. The evidence of Bhagwan Dass did not help the tenant, because he had admitted that there was no written compromise on the record and also that the parties had not signed any compromise in his presence. The landlord was not confronted with the original compromise. The file in which she statements of the parties had been recorded on 5th of August, 1964, was not in Court, when the landlord was giving evidence. The signature of the landlord on his statement had not been proved by any evidence. Secondly, even if it be held that the said compromise was proved, it was inadmissible in evidence for want of registration. According to the compromise, the landlord had undertaken not evict the tenant from the premises for five years, provided the latter kept on paying rent and did not sublet the same. This would be a lease of immovable property for a term exceeding one year and would be compulsory registrable u/s 17(i)(d) of the Registration Act. In Firm Karim Baksh Taj ud-din v. Natha Singh (1922) 66 I.C. 904 the lease was on a certain rental per month, payable monthly, but so long as the tenant occupied the shop the landlord was not to eject him except in case of refusal to pay rent. On those conditions, the learned Acting Chief Justice held that the lease was a totally fresh lease not being limited to one year, and was inadmissible in evidence for want of registration. Thirdly even if the compromise did not require registration, the same was not binding on the Rent Controller, because u/s 13 of the East Punjab Rent Restriction Act, it was he who was to be satisfied that one of the conditions for ejectment mentioned in the said section existed. Lastly, it was Punjab Singh who was setting up this compromise as a defence in opposition to the eviction application filed against him by Mangal Singh. If he himself had not complied with the terms of that compromise, namely, by not paying the rent regularly, after the coming into force of the agreement, he could not take advantage of the said compromise to the detriment of the landlord.

No other argument was raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner.

It might be mentioned that the Appellate Authority had also found as a fact that the premises in dispute were bona fide required by the landlord for his own use and occupation. On that ground also, the tenant was liable to be ejected.

In view of what I have said above, this revision petition fails and is dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, I will make no order as to costs. The tenant is however, allowed one month''s time to vacate the premises.