PUNJAB STATE ELECTRICITY BOARD vs Ajmer Singh

-THE important point of law involved in the present connected six appeals is: "Whether the terminus a quo for reckoning limitation under Section 15 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 for filing an appeal in the State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission against the order of the District Forum, runs from the date thereof and not from any actual or presumed date of receipt of its copy by the party concerned, as defined under Rule 4, sub-rule (10) of the Consumer Protection (Punjab) Rules, 1987 ? "

THE appellants before us are Punjab State Electricity Board and its Sub Divisional Officer. THEy have challenged the order of the District Forum, Ropar in Consumer Case No. 63 of 1993, decided on 26-11-1993 vide which it has ordered the release of tube-well connections under general category to the complainants. It is not disputed at the bar that the facts involved in these cases are identical and the District Forum has disposed of all the six complaints in the same terms by similar orders. In all these cases (Misc. Application No. 6 of 1994 and Appeal No. 4 of 1994; Misc. Application No. 7 of 1994 and Appeal No. 5 of 1994; Misc. Application No. 8 of 1994 and Appeal No. 6 of 1994; Misc. Application No. 9 of 1994 and Appeal No. 7 of 1974; Misc. Application No. 10 of 1994 and Appeal No. 8 of 1994 and Misc. Application No. 11 of 1994 and Appeal No. 9 of 1994) copy of order of the District Forum is dated 26-11-1993 which was despatched to the parties by its office on 10-12-1993. It is the admitted case of the appellant-Board that certified copy of the impugned order was not applied for and these six appeals were filed in this Commission on 11-1-1994. Along with Memorandum of Appeal, separate applications for condonation of delay in all these cases have been moved, stating that the copy of the impugned order was despatched, with an endorsement dated 10-12-1993. It was received in the Office of the Executive Engineer of the Board on 12-12-1993 and the appeals are, thus, within the period of limitation from the date of communication thereof and even if there is any delay, it is inadvertant. In support of the application for condonation of delay, no affidavit whatsoever has been filed.

We have heard Sh. S.S. Brar, learned Counsel for the appellants.

TO begin with, Sh. Brar has strenuously contended that under Rule 4, sub-rule (10) of the Consumer Protection (Punjab) Rules, 1987 (in brief ''the Punjab Rules''), it has been mandated upon the District Forum to communicate the orders to the parties free of charge. The impugned order dated 26-11-1993 was despatched to the appellant-Board on 10-12-1993. The appeals in the Registry of this Commission were presented on 11-1-1994. Hence, these are within the period of limitation after commuting the prescribed period of thirty days for filing the appeal from the date of the receipt of the order. We have considered the contention of Sh. Brar in depth and reject the same, finding that it sans merit. Section 15 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (''the Act'' in short) categorically mandates that "any person aggrieved by an order made by the District Forum may prefer an appeal against such order to the State Commission within a period of thirty days from the date of the order". The language of the section is crystal clear and places it beyond doubt that the prescribed period of thirty days for preferring an appeal, has to be commuted from the date of the order. More so, in the present cases the impugned order of the District Forum has been pronounced in the presence of the parties. Section 15 of the Act only the appeal may be preferred in such form and manner as may be prescribed. Under Section 2, sub-section (1) clause (n), "prescribed" means prescribed by rules made by the State Government or as the case may be, by the Central Government under this Act. In any way, the State Government is competent to frame rules to prescribe the form and manner in which the appeal may be presented before the State Commission against the order of the District Forum. By no stretch of imagination, it can be construed that the State Government is competent to extend the period of limitation of thirty days for filing appeal against the order of the District Forum. Nor does a bare reading of Rule 4, sub-rule (10) of the Punjab Rules make it so. The sub-rule has only conferred a duty on the District Forum to sent a copy of the order to the parties free of charge. It does not lay down that the period of limitation for preferring an appeal u/Sec. 15 of the Act would commence from the date of receipt of the order of the District Forum by the parties. If construction of sub-rule is placed the way Sh. Brar wants us to do, we are afraid the constitutional validity of delegated legislation of Rule 4, sub-rule (10) itself will be in doubt, faced with clear language of Section 15 of the Act, unambiguously prescribing the period of limitation for preferring an appeal within thirty days, commencing from the date of the order. Hence, we hold and answer the question posed that the period of limitation for filing an appeal u/Sec. 15 of the Act would run from the date of the order and not from the date of receipt of the impugned order of the District Forum by the parties.

SH. Brar, learned Counsel for the appellants then submitted that the delay, if any, in presenting the appeals is inadvertant. We find that the application for condonation of delay clearly lacks the averments, constituting the chain of facts to make out that the delay, if any, in filing the appeals is not advertant. It is well s settled that under the rules of limitation, every day delay has to be explained. This, indeed, has not been done in the present case. Sub-rule (4) of Rule 8 reads as under : "(4). When the appeal is presented after the expiry of the period of limitation as specified in the Act, the memorandum shall be accompanied by an application supported by an affidavit setting forth the fact on which the appellant relies to satisfy the State Commission that he has sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal within the period of limitation."

The application for condonation of delay has to be supported by an affidavit. This Commission has held in a number of cases that the affidavit in support of the application for condonation of delay is mandatory. No such application unsupported by affidavit is maintainable. No affidavit in support of the applications for condonation of delay has been filed and hence, these deserve to be dismissed on that ground alone. The learned Counsel, turning the table has adversely affected the functioning of the Registry of this Commission and has further submitted that in the impugned order of the District Forum, it has not been mentioned that it was pronounced by it on 26-11-1993 and he has whipped up the frenzy on the omission of the word ''pronounced'' therein. We have gone through the application for condonation of delay and grounds of the appeals filed before this Commission and therein we find that no grouse whatsoever has been made therein regarding the ''pronouncement''. We find it difficult to believe that the District Forum has not pronounced the impugned order on 26-11-1993. The plea of the learned Counsel is a plea of frustration and has arisen out of sentiment. However, we do observe that the machinery of the Consumer For as established under the Act has built up efficacious alternative remedy of adjudication of consumer disputes and the Act confers upon hapless consumers the remedial machinery for speedy redressal of their grievances and the access to the adjudicatory Forums is not impeded by the levy of any Court-fee or any other charge and the process of dispensation of justice has to be completed within a period of 3/5 months after affording to both the parties full opportunity of being heard when they are being subjected to unscrupulous, exploitation by manufacturers, traders and also by organisations, providing various forms of service for consideration. The time limit for disposing of the cases within a framework of 3 to 5 months, as prescribed under the statute, will include the period of preparation of judgments and sending copies free of charge to the parties. If after pronouncement of judgments, these are not to be dictated for weeks together and thereafter the offices attached to the District Forums take weeks together for sending copies of their orders free of costs to the parties, as prescribed by the rules, then the time limit fixed by the Legislature for speedy and inexpensive remedy would become illusory. The Act expects from the machinery of various for as to move with utmost expedition. Section 2(1)(g) describes that "deficiency" means that any fault, imperfection, short coming or inadequacy in the quality, nature and manner of performance in relation to any service. Delay in the performance of service has been held to be a deficient service. The for as established under the Act award compensation in case of erring deficient service. They, in their own turn for rendering service of adjudication to the hapless and exploited consumers cannot errode efficiency and corrode quality of service. All the infrastructure and machinery placed at the disposal of the For as are meant for speedy justice and not for the satisfaction or consumption of any individual. While discharging their pious function of adjudication, they are pilgrimage to the Temple of Justice. They are supposed to follow the legacy of the best traditions of the Judiciary and to shun the legacy of delay.

FOR all the aforesaid reasons, individually and collectively there is not the least merit in these miscellaneous applications which are, therefore, dismissed. Inevitably, the main appeals also must founder on the ground of limitation and are hereby rejected.

OTHERWISE also, we have, gone through the impugned order of the District Forum. It has held that the appellant-Board has adopted the policy of pick and choose in granting electric connections to the agriculturists and on that account alone , has ordered the release of tubewell connections under general category to each of the complainant-respondents and we find no infirmity in the impugned order of the District Forum on merit as well. Appeal dismissed.