Punjab State etc. vs Onkar Nath and Another

Swatanter Kumar, J.—This regular first appeal preferred by the State of Punjab is directed against the judgment dated 30th October, 1995 passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Hoshiarpur. Vide this judgment the learned Additional District Judge relying upon L.A. case No. 21 of 1994 against the same acquisition enhanced the compensation from Rs. 5,528/- to Rs. 25,000/- per acre in respect of the barani land and from Rs. 2,820/- to Rs. 12,500/- per acre in respect of the Banjar Qadim land.

This appeal was filed on 20th May, 1997 and the same was returned by the Registry with the objection that the appeal was barred by time and was not accompanied by an application u/s 5 of Limitation act. The appeal was re-filed accompanied by the application u/s 5 of the Limitation Act on 15th October, 1997. However, again the appeal was returned by the Registry because there was delay in re-filing the appeal also. Thereafter the appeal was re-filed alongwith other application on 20th November, 1997.

In view of the above circumstances, it is inevitable for this Court to consider the application u/s 5 of the Limitation Act being Civil Misc. No. 4214-CI of 1997 before considering the merits of this appeal. Consequently, I would proceed to first dispose of this Civil Misc. application.

The judgment under appeal was pronounced on 30th October, 1995. The State through its District Attorney applied for the certified copy of the judgment on 31st October, 1995. The judgment was prepared by the copying agency on 31st January, 1996. Thus, limitation for filing the appeal in any case would expire on 29th April, 1996, while the present appeal, for the first time, was filed in the Registry of this Court on 20th May, 1997. As the appeal was not accompanied even at that stage with an application u/s 5 of the Limitation Act, the Registry had rightly returned the appeal as being barred by time and not entertainable in the absence of an application u/s 5 of the Limitation act. This appeal thereafter, as already noticed, after compliance of the objectors was re-filed on 20th November, 1997. In any case the delay which is to be explained by the State would be from 30th October, 1996 to 15th October, 1997 when the appeal was filed accompanied with the application u/s 5 of the Limitation act.

Upon notice, the non-applicants filed a reply to the application u/s 5 of the Limitation act and opposed the condonation of delay on the ground that no sufficient or good cause have been shown by the State in this application for condoning the delay of more than 385 days in filing the present appeal.

In the application, it has been admitted that the District Attorney, Hoshiarpur vide his letter dated 12th February, 1996 had informed the Director Prosecution that the judgment dated 30th October, 1995 was required to be taken up in appeal to the High Court as it was a fit case. There are no averments in the application as to what happened from 31st January, 1996 to 12th February, 1996. It was further averred in the application that the Director Prosecution and Litigation Punjab vide his letter dated 9th April, 1996 issued instructions to the Advocate General, Punjab for filing the appeal. It is stated that from that date till 16th February, 1997 the Advocate General office did not get any information or court fee from the concerned quarter. It is stated that on 20th February, 1997, the case was sent to the Executive Engineer Investigation, Hoshiarpur who further requested on 17th March, 1997, but no action was taken and no reply was sent. In April, 1997, the difference statement is stated to be incomplete by the office at the divisional level. What happened during this long period remains unexplained.

It is true that the State department cannot function like an individual. Certain office working is required to be completed before the cases are taken up in appeal or recourse to other legal remedy is taken by the State. But that certainly does not mean that the State can act at its leisure. The State and its officers are expected to work in accordance with the settled cannon of administration of justice and expected to act and work like any reasonable and prudent person working in the given facts and circumstances of the case.

In the application, there is not even a whisper as to what happened from 9th April, 1996 till 17th February, 1997. May be other delay could be said to be explained to some extent but no explanation is forth coming for the delay of this period. Thus, substantial part of the delay in filing the present appeal remains unexplained. To render an explanation which would constitute sufficient cause within the meaning and scope of the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation act, is the statutory obligation of every application irrespective of the fact that such an obligation is of an individual or state.

In the case of State of Haryana Vs. Chandra Mani and others, the Hon''ble Supreme Court has observed that the Court may add some-what liberal approach in accepting such explanation in the case of State. It is clear that the Hon''ble Apex Court did not intend nor has in fact held that State need not to explain the delay and any appeal preferred by the State would be entertained on merits, even if it is hopelessly barred by time.

At this stage, it may be more appropriate to make a reference to more recent judgment of the Hon''ble Supreme Court rendered in the case of P.K. Ramachandran v. State of Kerala and Anr. J.T. 1997 (8) S.C. 189 where the Hon''ble Supreme Court while setting aside the judgment of the High Court of Kerala, who had condoned the delay of 565 days without reasonable or satisfactory reason, observed as under;-

"Law of limitation may harshly effect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribe and the Courts have no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. The discretion exercised by the High Court was, thus, neither proper nor judicious. The order condoning the delay cannot be sustained. This appeal, therefore, succeeds and the impugned order is set aside. Consequently, the application for condonation of delay filed in the High Court would stand rejected and the Miscellaneous First Appeal shall stand dismissed as barred by time. No costs."

xx xx xx The High Court does not appear to have examined the reply filed by the appellant as reference to the same is conspicuous by it absence from the order. We are not satisfied that in the facts and circumstances of this case, any explanation, much less a reasonable or satisfactory one had been offered by the respondent State for condonation of the inordinate delay of 565 days.

Following the judgment of the Hon''ble Supreme Court in the case of P.K. Ramachandran (supra), this Court in the case of Gram Panchayat Vs. Prem Singh, declined to condone the delay in filing the appeal and dismissed the application preferred by the appellant u/s 5 of the Limitation Act in that case. Furthermore, the Court in the case of Mauria Udyog and Ors. v. Shubh Karan and Anr., R.S.A. No. 2340 of 1996, decided on 10.10.1996 held as under;-

" The term sufficient cause must receive liberal meaning and has to be incorporated so as to introduce the concept of reasonableness as it is understood in its general connotation. Certainly Limitation Act is a substantive law and its provisions have to be adhered to in a manner that once a valuable right accrues in favour of one party, as a result of unexplained sufficient or reasonable cause and directly as a result of negligence, default or inaction of the other party, such a right cannot be taken away lightly and in a routine manner."

Now reverting back to the facts of the present case, it is clear that the delay in filing the present appeal has not been explained properly and satisfactorily. Furthermore, the conduct of the department even after May, 1997, reflects total negligence and irresponsible attitude on the part of the officials concerned. There is no explanation on record as to why the appeal was not filed for the first time accompanying the application u/s 5 of the Limitation Act in October, 1995 when it was returned in May, 1997 itself. The preferential treatment to the State in terms of State of Haryana v. Chandra Mani''s case (supra) pre-supposes the bonafide act and responsible attitude on the part of the state and its officers. A remfedy when gets barred by time, a definite right is vested to other side and the State cannot be permitted to take away that vested right so lightly and specially keeping in view the fact and circumstances of the present case.

In view of the above discussion and settled position of law, I am of the considered view that the applicants/appellants have not been able to state any reason which would constitute sufficient cause as afore-indicated for condoning the delay. The applicants have failed to properly plead and give cogent reasons for condoning the delay, which would divest the other party of their right that has accrued in their favour.

Consequently, I find no merits in this application and the same is dismissed, though without any order as to costs. C.M. is accordingly dismissed.

R.F.A. No. 2410 of 1997.

Since the Civil Misc. No. 4214-CI of 1997 for condonation of delay in filing the appeal has been dismissed, the appeal does not survive for consideration and is accordingly dismissed.