Punjab Tourism Development Corporation Ltd vs Kirit P Doshi

THE three revisions mentioned above will be decided by this common order as they involve identical questions of law and fact.

THE petitioner in the revision petitions namely. The Headway Finance & Investment Co. Ltd., regd. office Agra had floated a guarantee money back investment scheme. Under this scheme any person could make a monthly payment of Rs. 100/ - for 100 months and upon maturity, an amount of Rs. 10,000/ - plus 4,500 was payable. Chandra Mohan Agarwal, Pramod Kumar Agarwal and Dinesh Chand Bansal had agreed to invest in the above saving scheme floated by the petitioner Company. Chandra Mohan Agarwal deposited 86 monthly instalments of Rs. 100/ -, Pramod Kumar Agarwal deposited Rs. 4,000/ - in quarterly instalments because the scheme to which he had contributed was quarterly. Dinesh Chand Bansal deposited a total amount of Rs. 4,000/ - by quarterly instalments under quarterly deposit scheme. The Reserve Bank of India issued a prohibitory order restraining the petitioner -company from accepting the deposits. All the three complainants then filed complaint cases before the District Forum, Dholpur. Complaint Case No. 84/92 out of which Revision No. 122/95 arises was decided by the District Forum, Dholpur on 29.4.93 and the Forum passed an order as against the opposite party -petitioner to pay to Chandra Mohan Agarwal Rs. 8,600/ - deposited by him, bonus amount of Rs. 4,500/ - and interest @ 12% from 25.9.92 (the maturity date) and Rs. 300/ - as compensation for mental distress and agony. The Complaint Case No. 43/92 filed by Pramod Kumar Agarwal was decided by the District Forum, Dholpur on 4.3.93 and the petitioner was directed to pay to Pramod Kumar Agarwal Rs. 6.000/ - and interest @ 12% p.a. w.e.f. January, 1992 till payment and Rs. 30/ - as postage expenses. Complaint No. 31/93 filed by Dinesh Chand Bansal was decided on 4.5.93 by the said District Forum and the petitioner was directed to pay to Dinesh Chand Bansal Rs. 6,000/ - with interest @ 12% p.a. w.e.f. January, 1991 till payment. Aggrieved by all these three orders passed in the aforesaid complaint cases, the opposite party -petitioner filed intitially appeals Nos. 50,51 and 52 of 1995 respectively. These appeals were reported to be barred by limitation. The State Commission dismissed the application for condonation of delay and treated the appeals as barred by limitation. However, they were ordered to be registered as revisions in order to examine the legality and propriety of the order of the District Forum, Dholpur in suo -motu revisional jurisdiction. Mr. Arjun Karnani, Advocate has appeared for the petitioner -Company in all the three revision petitions and Mr. S.C. Mittal, Advocate has appeared for complainant - respondent in Revision Petition No. 122/95. Complainants -respondents in other revisions have not appeared despite service. One of the objections which had been taken by the petitioner is that the complainants were not ''consumers'' within the definition of Consumer Protection Act, 1986 and payment of interest on deposit was not ''service''. There is no merit whatsoever in this contention. The National Commission in the case of Neela Vasantrajay v. Aamogh Industries and Another, reported in III (1993) CPJ 261 (NC) , has held that when a company or firm invites deposits on promise of attractive rates of interest and prompt re -payment of principal and interest on the expiry of the stipulated period with full security is rendering a service in the form of safe avenue for investment of funds for consideration. To the same effect is the another decision of the National Commission in the case of Dhanalakshmi Consolidates Industries Ltd. v. C.S. Menon and Others, reported in III (1993) CPJ 299 (NC). Other State Commissions have also held the same view. Reference in this connection may be made to the decisions reported in I (1992) CPJ 286 (Delhi State Commission), II (1992) CPJ 1018 (Delhi State Commission, II (1993) CPJ 916 (Karnataka State Commission). All the three complainants were, therefore, consumers. The next question raised on behalf of the petitioner is that the registered office of the petitioner company is located at Agra and in the application form signed and filled in by the complainant, It is also mentioned that it was agreed that in case of any dispute the same shall be settled at Agra. It is true that the registered office of the petitioner Company is located at Agra. It is also true that in the application form submitted by the complainants for the saving scheme, it is mentioned that the signatory agrees that in case of any dispute, the same shall be settled at Agra. However, it is clear that words used are not to the effect that the Agra Courts alone will have the jurisdiction or that the parties agreed that the exclusive jurisdiction will be that of Agra Court. All that it is said is that in case of any dispute, the same shall be settled at Agra. This does not create any exclusive jurisdiction in Agra Courts. Complainant, therefore, can file a complaint where part of cause of action arose. It is true that the proposal was sent to Agra and the certificate was also issued from Agra. It is clear that the amounts under the certificate had matured and became payable to the complainants. When a deposit matures, the Company becomes a debtor and on the basis of the principle that the debtor should seek the creditor, the amount was payable at Dholpur where the complainants resided. Dholpur District Forum had, therefore, the jurisdiction to entertain these complaints.

LEARNED Counsel for the petitioners referred to a decision of the National Commission in Consumer Unity and Protection Centre v. Laxmichand Bhagaji Ltd. & Others, reported in II (1992) CPJ 510 (NC) It is a very short order and does not contain any recital of factual background. It appears from the order that the Consumer Unity and Protection Centre, a voluntary organisation, had urged that the opposite party Company had taken substantial amounts by way of deposits from a very large number of people belonging mainly to the middle income group and even the poorer sections of society had defaulted in the manner of repayment of the amount after they had become due and, therefore, action should be taken against the Company compelling them to repay overdue deposits. After hearing the National Commission observed that they considered the proper course to be adopted by the petitioner was to file a petition for the winding up of the respondent -Company. We fail to understand as to what relevance this order has to the facts of the present case. That was a case by Consumer Unity and Protection Centre in the form of a representative action. It was not a complaint filed by any ''consumer'' claiming redressal under the Act. The voluntary organisation wanted that action should be taken against the Company compelling them to repay the deposits. It is clear from the order itself that the vountary organisation was raising the voice on behalf of several middle class and poor sections of the society. In such a litigation neither the question of jurisdiction was examined and nor it was decided that the complainant was a consumer or not.

THERE is, therefore, no force in all these three revisions and they are dismissed. The Counsel for the petitioner states that during the pendency of these revision petitions they have made some payments to two of the complainants. This was not a matter involved in these revisions. The fact of some payments to the two complainants can be raised by the petitioner when these complainants file any application under Section 25 or 27 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 and plead before the District Forum that some payments have been made. The District Forum will inquire into matter and will adjust the payments if they are proved to have been made to the complainants. Revisions dismissed. -