Puran Anand and Others vs The State of Haryana and Others

Harjit Singh Bedi, J.—By the present judgment, we propose to dispose of Letters Patent Appeal Nos. 762, 794,795, 1218, 1319 and 1609 of 1991 as somewhat similar questions of law and fact are involved therein. The facts are being taken from LPA No. 794 of 1991.

The appellants, in response to various advertisements issued by respondent No. 2-The Haryana Urban Development Authority (hereinafter referred to as ''HUDA''), applied for the allotment of different categories of plots at different stations in Haryana. In response to the applications made, respondent No. 2 required the appellants to deposit 10 per cent of the tentative price of the plots which was determined at the rate of Rs. 115/- per sq. mtr. as earnest money. This amount was duly deposited by the appellants and the other formalities enjoined on them were also duly complied with. Respondent No. 2 vide communication dated 5th April, 1990, Annexure P-8 to the petition, informed Pran Anand, appellant No. 1, that it had been decided to offer him an Industrial Plot measuring 2 kanals in the Industrial Estate, Phase-II, Panchkula, subject to certain additional formalities and on their completion, Annexure P 9 dated 29th May, 1990, offering him a plot was issued at a tentative price of Rs. 483.87 per sq. mtrs. Aggrieved by the cost of the plot as intimated by the letter Annexure P-9, the appellants filed Civil Writ Petition No. 8652 of 1990 in this Court and on the same having been dismissed, the present Letters Patent Appeal has been filed. The stand taken before the learned single Judge and duly repelled by him was that respondent No. 2 HUDA was not competent to charge any amount beyond Rs. 115/- per sq. mtr. as fixed by Annexure P-2 towards the price of the plot. The argument that the burden of enhanced price of the commercial site/plots had unjustifiably been passed on to the appellants and others similarly situated was found to be factually incorrect. The learned Judge also found that the appellants had accepted the offer of allotment in terms of Annexure P-9 and, as such, the question of not complying with the provisions could not now be raised.

It has been urged by Mr. A. L. Bahl, learned counsel appearing in Letters patent Appeal Nos. 762, 794 and 795 of 1991 that he did not seriously dispute the powers of respondent No. 2 to increase the tentative price, but has asserted that the price once having been fixed vide letter Annexure P-2 at the rate of Rs. 115/- per square metre there was no justifiable reason or material to enhance it to Rs. 483 87 per sq. mtrs. In support of his case, he has cited Ramana Dayaram Shetty Vs. International Airport Authority of India and Others, and P.N. Verma and Others Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others, . He has also asserted that the appellants have been discriminated against inasmuch as that vide Annexure P-10 to the petition, land had been allotted in the same area to M/s Sidhartha Polyster (Pvt.) Limited, Amritsar, at Rs. 127 per sq. mtr. and no additional amount had now been claimed from them.

The argument of the learned counsel for the appellants has been controverted by the respondents'' counsel by stating that no relief was available to the appellants by way of petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and reliance for this proposition has been placed on a judgment of the Hon''ble Supreme Court in Bareilly Development Authority and Another Vs. Ajay Pal Singh and Others, and duly followed by two Division benches 6f this Court in Chandigarh Housing Board v Baldev Singh Dhanju 1991 P. L. J. 443 and Air Chief Marshal Shivdev Singh v. Haryana Urban Development Authority 1991 P. L. J. 487.

We have heard the learned counsel at length and considered the arguments advanced but find no merit in the appeals. To take Mr. Bahl''s first argument, it is to be noted that Annexure P-2 could not by any stretch of imagination be called a letter of allotment which could fix the price for all times to come or to create a right in favour of the appellants. If any right did accrue to the appellants it was by virtue of Annexure P-9 although that too was only an offer of allotment and not a letter of allotment itself. It is also to be noted that both the letters Annexures P-2 and P-9 had fixed the price as being tentative, the logical inference being that future enhancements could not be ruled out. Had the appellants found that they were not in a position to accept the allotment at the price of Rs. 483.87 per sq. mtrs. as determined by Annexure P-9, they were at liberty to decline the offer of allotment but once having accepted it they could not turnaround and say that the price demanded was excessive or unjustified. Moreover we find that the matter in hand is covered fully by the decision of the Hon''ble Supreme Court in Bareilly Development Authority''s case (supra) and the two Division Benches to which reference has been made above. In Bareilly Development Authority''s case while dealing with an argument similar to the one addressed by Mr. Bahl, it was observed by the Court that once having accepted the terms of allotment which specifically provided that the price was tentative it did not lie with the appellants to argue that they were not bound by the terms of the contract. It was also held by the Court that a contract which was purely non-statutory and contractual and entered into between the State and a private party, the parties were governed only by the terms of the contract and no writ or order could be issued under Article 226 of the Constitution of India so at to compel the authorities to remedy any suspected breach. It will be seen that the case of the respondents before us is even on a yet stronger footing as in this case there was no question of seeking an enhanced price, as the letter Annexure P-9 had itself and for the first time stated the price, which the appellants bad by implication accepted. The judgments cited by the learned counsel for the appellants are clearly distinguishable on facts. In the International Airport Authority''s case (supra) the Supreme Court only laid down the general and broad principles directing the State authorities to be fair in public dealings whereas in P. N. Verma''s case (supra) the claim to the enhanced price was sought to be challenged after the letter of allotment had been accepted by the allottees at a higher rate and it was in that situation that the relief was granted to them. As already mentioned above, Annexure P-2 to which pointed reference has been made by the appellants'' counsel to indicate that the price was finally fixed at the rate of Rs. 115 per sq. mtr. is of no avail as that was merely a means of receiving earnest money so as to show that the appellants were serious in securing plots from the respondents.

The second argument of Mr. Bahl with regard to discrimination in favour of M/S Sidhartha Polyster (Private) Limited must also fail. In reply to the writ petition in the connected LPA No. 795 of 1991, it has been explained by the respondents that the allotment to M/S Sidhartha Polyster (Private) Limited was made on 24th May, 1989, i. e. prior to the revision of the price of the plots but the price had been refixed in the case of the appellants taking into consideration the factors such as cost of development work, cost of the acquired land, cost of raw materials etc. Moreover, we have held above that the offer was made to the appellants at the rate of Rs. 483 87 per sq. mtrs. and they cannot turnaround and say that because somebody else had received land at a lower price they were also entitled to secure allotment on the same terms.

In L. P. A. Nos. 1218 and 1319 of 1991 which pertained to the allotment of residential plots in Gurgaon, an additional argument has been raised by Mr. Ashok Gupta learned counsel appearing for appellants, that the allotment was made vide Annexure P-3 at Rs. 49,950/- for 220 sq. mtrs. (10 marlas) of plot but vide Annexure P-4 an enhanced amount at the rate of Rs. 83 50 per sq. yard is now sought to be recovered. He has challenged the aforesaid notice on the ground that as per Clause 9 of the allotment letter Annexure P-3 the tentative price fixed was subject to enhancement only in case the amount awarded towards the compensation of the acquisition of the land was enhanced and in no other circumstance. He has also asserted that the compensation awarded to the landowners vide Annexure P-l was substantially increased vide the award of the District Judge Annexure P-6 to the petition but even taking into account this enhancement, the price sought to be recovered i. e. 83 50 per sq. yard was not correctly calculated He has also asserted that in any case the enhanced amount awarded by the District Judge ought to have been adjusted against the sale of commercial property for which admittedly very high prices bad been received by the HUDA. He has finally urged that the interest could be claimed only in terms of clause 6 of Annexure P-3 i e. only from the date of the offer of possession of the plots in question and not from any date prior thereto and a claim to this effect made by HUDA should be negatived.

We have considered these arguments of the learned counsel but find no merit in them. In reply to the writ petition the stand of the respondents is clear that the enhanced price is being recovered on account of enhanced compensation given by the District Judge and in support of this assertion Annexure R-l has been appended with the reply in which a detailed statement justifying the additional demand has been set out. We have no reasons to doubt the correctness of this statement and, in any case, this is a matter which cannot be gone into in these proceedings. The argument of Mr. Gupta that the enhanced price claimed should have been set off against the sale of commercial property is also to be rejected in view of the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in CWP No. 1270 of 1985 (Charanjit Bajaj v. The State of Haryana and Ors., C. W. P. No. 1270 of 1985) dated 10th April, 1991. Mr. Gupta''s final argument with regard to the interest which he now alleges is claimed by the respondents is not a matter of challenge before us and no factual basis for that assertion has been made out.

Mr. R. S. Mittal, learned Senior Advocate, appearing in LPA No. 1609 of 1991 has, in addition, argued that the appellant in his case was denied allotment in the year 1986 but when the matter was taken to the Supreme Court it was directed that a plot be given to him at the price of Rs. 198 per sq. mtr. plus 50% more by virtue of the judgment of the Supreme Court reported in Haryana Urban Development Authority and Others Vs. Sunita Rekhi, . He has asserted that in view of the compromise order recorded by the Supreme Court it was not open to the respondents in his particular case to ask for further amount at the rate of Rs. 193.11 per sq. yard by virtue of Annexure P.2 dated 10th August, 1990. It has also been urged that as his client had already paid 50% more for this plot as compared to other allottees, he was at least entitled to set off this additional amount against the first demand.

The learned counsel for the respondents has, however, drawn our attention to clause 9 of the letter of allotment dated 7th September, 1989, in which it has been stated that the price of the land originally fixed was only tentative and subject to enhancement should the price of the land acquired be enhanced. It has been urged that the enhanced price now sought to be recovered was only on account of this factor. It has further been argued that the higher price paid by the appellant was because of his insistence on getting a plot in the original sector and, as such, this amount could not be adjusted against the demand of Rs. 193.11 per sq. yard.

We have heard the learned counsel on this aspect as well but find that the appellants cannot succeed. While rendering the judgment in Sunita Rekhi''s case (supra) the Supreme Court observed that the appellants and others similarly situated who were before the Court and had insisted that they be allotted plots at the initial place and not at the new Sectors carved out by the respondents, should pay 50% above the rate on which the plots were originally offered. This compromise order was recorded keeping in view the equities of the case as between the year 1986 to 1989 the price of the plots in the original sectors had risen substantially and the Court found that the allottees could not, therefore, have a double advantage i. e allotment of plots in the original sectors as well as at the old rates. It is, therefore, clear to us that the Hon''ble Supreme Court determined the price keeping in view the substantial increase in the price of land in the interregnum of three years but did not impliedly or in any other manner indicate that the price now fixed was final. Clause 9 of the letter of allotment, therefore, comes fully into play and the appellants would therefore be bound to pay the enhanced amount claimed vide Annexure P-2 by HUDA.

For the reasons recorded above, we find no merit in the appeals and dismiss the same but with no order as to costs.