High CourtsSingle Bench

Puran Chand vs Bishan Dass

Jammu And Kashmir High Court · Decided on 21 October 1998 · Citation: (1998) 3 Crimes 378 : (1998) CrLJ 3062 : (2000) KashLJ 84 : (1999) 1 SriLJ 198

HON’BLE JUDGES
G.D.Sharma, J
ACTS & SECTIONS REFERRED
Jammu and Kashmir Civil Procedure Code, 1977 — Section 100
CASE NUMBER
CSA No.21/89
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Judgment

62 paragraphs · 1,280 words
1.

This is a civil 2nd appeal filed against the judgment and decree dated 31 8.89 passed by the learned District Judge, Kathua whereby he

reversed the judgment and decree dated Jan.25,1989 passed by the learned Munsif, Hiranagar.

2.

The facts of the case briefly stated are that the appellants herein had filed suit for possession in respect of 15 marlas of land comprising of Kh.

1631/1161 situate in village Bhayia Teh. Hiranagar. the case of the appellants was that in the month of February 1986, the respondent over the

said land started forcible digging of the foundations of a room of the dimension of 12 X 12 ft. and constructed a Chun (cattle shed) of the same

dimensions alongwith fodder place for the cattle of the dimensions of 2 X 9 ft. It is also alleged that the land was situated in Abaddi Deh.

The trial court had framed the following issues:

1 .""Whether the defendant has unlawfully constructed a Chhun and a room 12 X 12 ft. dimensions each and equally, and a fodder placer in the

dimension of 2 X 9 ft. on the suit land of which the plaintiff is the owner ? OPP.

2.

Whether the defendant had laid foundation for another room at the suit land belonging to the plaintiff, and he is bent upon to raise construction ?

OPP.

3.

Whether court fee for the purpose of jurisdiction is not proper, if so, what should be the proper court fee ? OPD.

4.

Relief.

The trials court decided all the issues in favour of the plaintiff (appellant herein), and decreed the suit.

3.

The respondent filed the appeal before the learned District Judge, Kathua. The appeal was accepted and the judgment and decree of the trial

court was set aside. It was held that on the basis of evidence the appellants herein were not found in possession as owners of the suit land, where

the room as well as the shed and Fodder place were constructed.

Through the medium of this Second appeal, the judgment and decree of the district Judge, Kathua ( First Appellate Court ) had been challenged

on the following ground:

i) That the court below has misappreciated the evidence on the question of facts as well as law and has arrived at wrong conclusions,

4.

The court vide its order dated 6.4.90 had reckoned six questions as substantial questions of law, which were formulated in the Memorandum of

appeal and they are io the following effect:

i) What does the term ""Tasavvur Malkint"" m the revenue record connotes and means ?

ii) whether a person shown in possession of land on the strength of"" Tasavuur Malkiyat"" assumes the status of an owner and is entitled to maintain

suit for injunction in the event of trespass?

iii) whether the findings recorded by the first appellate court are perverse in law and on facts while reversing the judgment and decree of the trial

court on the ground that Tasavvur Malkiat does not confer any title in respect of the land despite entry in the revenue record?

iv) whether judgment and decree based on perverse reasoning recorded by 1st. Appellate court is sustainable in law?

v) what is the scope and effect in law of a revenue entry recorded by the Patwari?

vi) whether in absence of proof to the contrary revenue entries can be ignored? Heard the arguments.

5.

It is stated here that this 2nd appeal was decided on Sept. 9.1997 in the absence of counsel of respondent, who later approached that court

with the prayer that there was sufficient cause for his absence and this prayer was accepted in terms of order dated June 26,1998 passed in CMP

No. 46/97.

6.

Learned counsel appearing for the appellants has contended that the first appellate court had appreciated the evidence in a perverse manner by

not giving true legal meaning to the revenue entry of Tsasavvur Milkiyat"" (as figuring in the revenue record). That in the revenue record the land in

dispute has been shown as ""Abadhi Deh"" and from the year 1963 to 1985 the appellants continuously have been shown in possession thereof as

Tasawur Milkiyat"" which literally means considering themselves as owners. In support of this contention the learned counsel has referred the

copies o the Khasra Girdawaris EXPK2, EXPK3 a; 1 EXPK4 which show Hukarna (the predecessor of the appellants) in possession by the

virtue of ""Tasavvur Milkiyat"". Concluding his arguments it is asserted that the first appellate court had ignored the above state document or

evidence as well as oral evidence led in support thereof and placed reliance on the ocular account of the respondent and his witnesses and thus in

an illegal and perverse manner arrived at the conclusions which are not tenable under law.

7.

In rebuttal the counsel for the respondent has contended that no substantial question of law can arise in this 2nd appeal because substantial

questions of law formulated in the memo of appeal are questions of fact and this appeal should not have been admitted considering those questions

as no substantial questions of law arises. In support of his contention he has cited the case of Corporation of the city of Bangalore vs. M. Papaiah

and Anr. (AIR 1989 SC 1809)

8.

The learned counsel for appellants has contended that substantial questions of law as enumerated above (questions No. 1 to 6) were formulated

in the memo of appeal and after hearing the counsel for the parties the court on 6.4.90 had reckoned those questions as substantial questions of

law and now it is too late in the day to contend that they are not substantial questions of law.

9.

The only point worth considerations is whether the appreciation of evidence done by the 1st. appellate court in arriving at a reversal finding was

according to law or in derogation to the principles of appreciating the evidence. Documentary evidence which was of Khasara Girdawaris was in

favour of the appellants from the year 1963 to 1985 and it has been supported by the oral assertions of the witnesses including the version of the

appellants. Against this cogent and convincing evidence, the 1st. appellate court gave the finding on the oral bald assertions of the respondent and

his witnesses. Reverse appreciation of evidence gives rise to a substantial question of law for interfering in second appeal. The contention which is

being raised by the counsel of the respondent that interpretation of revenue record is not a question of law, has no bearing with the facts of the

present case. Undoubtedly, there cannot be said anything contrary to the view of the Apex Court (held in AIR 1989 SC 1809 (supra) that

interpretation of revenue record is not question of law, but on the facts of the present case, it is said that the Appreciation of the documentary

evidence as well as oral evidence is relevant and the same has been done not in a judicious manner, but ignoring intrinsic value and on this view of

the matter, the contention of Mr. Sangra does not hold good.

10.

On the evidence, it is established that the appellants and their predecessor were in possession of the disputed room (cattle shed) alongwith

fodder place of the dimensions stated above while considering themselves as owners and it is situated in Abadhi Deh qua (habitated area of the

village). Thus this is a substantial question of law arisen in the case and as the first appellate court has not given correct finding so the appeal is

accepted and the impugned judgment and decree of 1st. appellate court is setaside and that of the trial court maintained .