Puran Chand Gupta vs The State of Punjab

S.S. Sidhu, J.—This judgment will dispose of Criminal Miscellaneous Applications Nos. 2818-M, 3158-M, 3544-M and 3877-M of 1930 which have been filed by the Petitioners for grant of anticipatory bail in case F.I.R. No. 81, dated 28th June, 1980, registered at Police Station, Saraba Nagar, Ludhiana, u/s 7 of the Essential Commodities Act, and for any offence arising out of that First Information Report and also in other cases likely to be registered against them. The first two applications have been presented on behalf of Puran Chand Gupta and his wife Mrs. Usha Gupta, respectively. In the third application, the aforesaid two persons along with Vinod Kumar Gupta, nephew of Puran Chand Gupta, are the Petitioners, while in the last application, one Tirivinder Pal Singh, employee of Puran Chand Gupta, and said three persons are the Petitioners.

From the allegations made by the Petitioners in all the four applications, it appears that Puran Chanel Gupta is a business man and political leader of repute residing at Ludhiana and that he has been an active worker of the Indian National Congress(I) Party for the last about 25 years. He was induced to enter into the bussiness selling, country liquor by accruing liquor vends with Roshan Lal as a partner and he invested Rs. 125,00/- while Keshan Lal invested Rs. 50,000/- in that bussiness. To start with, there was a third partner, namely, Bhagwan Dass Pawar, also with them in that bussiness but later on he ceased to be their partner. Roshan Lal also joined Puran Chand Gupta a partner in running Kailash Cinema at Ludhiana on lease basis. Thus Roshan Lal became quite friendly and thick with Puran Chand Gupta. Roshan Lal suggested a proposal to Puran Chand Gupta that if he could invest asum of Rs. 1,60,000/-, he himself would have a deal with M/s Jaipur Udyog Ltd., a cement manufacturing firm, which had its registered office at Sawai Madhopur in Rajasthan, and in this way he would acquire wagons of cement from the said firm. Roshan Lal also assured Puran Chand Gupta that he would return his principal amount along with interest. M/s. S.R. and Co., Ludhiana, of which Roshan Lal was one of the partners had not been working for the last five years and as such, that company needed funds which Puran Chand Gupta was able to advance. On the representation and inducement of Roshan Lal, Puran Chand Gupta secured draft No. 1772400/14/80, dated 15th February. 1980, in the sum of Rs. 1,60,000/-. from the Oriental Bank of Commerce, Ludhiana, in the name of Jaipur Udyog Ltd., Branch Office Sector 17-A, Chandigarh, and handed over the same to Roshan Lal on that date or soon thereafter for delivering the same to the said cement manufacturing firm. Puran Chand Gupta thereafter kept asking Roshan Lal about the deal and for the return of amount with interest. At last Roshan. Lal agreed that he would get the full quota of 5,000 bags of cement and keep the same in Puran Chand Gupta''s godowns as security for the amount of Rs. 1,60,000/-, advanced by him to the firm M/s S.R. and Co. As a result of this oral deal, the entire stock of 5,000/-bags of cement was brought to the godwons of Puran Chand Gupta and Vinod Kumar Gupta Petitioners. Puran Chand Gupta was again assured by Roshan Lal that the whole amount of Rs. 1,60,000/-with interest would be paid to him after selling the stock of cement lying in the godowns. Puran Chand Gupta remained busy throughout in the last general election to the Punjab Legislative Assembly. In his absence, Roshan Lal had been selling the cement to customers. Puran Chand Gupta had no concern with the method of selling the bags of cement by Roshan Lal. He was concerned only with the return of his principal amount of Rs. 1,60,000/- with interest thereon. In spite of the fact that Roshan Lal disposed of the stock of cement, he did not return the principal amount with interest to Puran Chand Gupta. Accordingly, on 23rd June, 1980, Puran Chand Gupta was compelled to file a suit for perpetual injunction against Roshan Lal, Saheb Lal, M/s. S.R. and Co., the Jaipur Udyog Co., Ltd., Sawai Madhupur and Jaipur Udyog Ltd., Branch Office Sector 17-A, Chandigarh restraining Roshan Lal, Saheb Lal, and M/s. S.R. and Co. from withdrawing, receiving and claiming any amount deposited with Jaipur Udyog Ltd., and also restraining the Jaipur Udyog Ltd. from making any payment and adjusting the said amount deposited with them, and standing in the name of M/s. S.R. & Co., vide Bank Draft No. 1772400/14/ 80, dated 15th February, 1980, draft on the Oriental Bank of Commerce Ltd., Ludhiana. That suit is still pending in the Court of the Senior Subordinate Judge, Ludhiana. Puran Chand Gupta also forwarded a complaint regarding Roshan Lal''s refusal to return the principal amount with interest to the Senior Superintendent of Police, Ludhiana, for inquity and consequently registration of the case under Sections 420/468/484/34, Indian Penal Code, on 23rd June, 1980. However, on 28th June, 1930, F.I.R. No. 81 was registered at Police Station, Saraba Nagar, Ludhiana, on the basis of secret information received by Sube Singh, Senior Superintendent of Police, Ludhiana. English translation of that First information Report reads as under:

Senior Superintendent of Police, Ludhiana''s special informant has given the information that S.R. Cement Company, Partap Bazar, Ludhiana, had purchased about 5000 bags of cement from Jaipur Udyog Limited, Sawai Madhopur (Rajasthan) and this cement was to be distributed to the people of Ludhiana City, on the basis of the permits to be obtained from the Deputy Commissioner, Ludhiana, and District Food Controller, Ludhiana. But the S.R. Cement Company, Ludhiana, did not give any information to the District Food Controller, Ludhiana, on the receipt of this cement of about 5000 bags nor did they make any entry cement in their stock register. This company has sold this 5000 bags of cement to some people of the Saraba Nagar in black market. The information is correct. To sell about 5000 bags of cement in this manner in black market is an offence u/s 7 of the Essential Commodities Act. After registering the case under the offence committed under section, of the Essential Commodities Act, the copies are being sent to to the competent officers I, S.I., am busy in the investigation.

Later on, it came to the notice of Puran Chand Gupta that Roshan Lal along with the other conspirators wanted to involve him in some false cases and also in connection with the above-mentioned First Information Report in connivance with the police authorities. It is also alleged by the Petitioners that there is a groupism in the Congress Party in Punjab, especially at Ludhiana; and that Shri Yoginder Pal Pande, M.L.A, and Shri Sat Pat Mittal, M.P., who are the political opponents of Puran Chand Gupta are determined to harass and malign him and other members of his family on one pretext or the other and that the First Information Report, mentioned above, is the result of political vendetta of the opponents of Puran Chand Gupta. According to the Petitioners, even the school going children of Puran Gupta were illegally confined in the Police Station in order to malign him and his family members. The police also conducted raids at the business promises and residential houses of Puran Chand and his relations. On the basis of above averments, the Petitioner/Petitioners in each petition has/have prayed that anticipatory bail in case F.I.R. No. 81, mentioned above, and also for any offences arising out of that F.I.R. and also in other cases likely to be registered against them be granted to him/them.

There is no dispute between the parties that the number and date of the Bank draft which was got prepared and delivered by Puran. Chand Gupta, as given above, are correct and the same have been so mentioned in the list two petitions; however, the number and date of the same have been incorrectly given as 1372400, 1480 and 3rd July 1980, in the first two petitions.

Shri Mohinder Singh Sethi, Additional Advocate-General. Punjab, appearing on behalf of the State-Respondent, has stated at the Bar that the investigation agency has no intention to arrest Vinod Kumar Gupta Petitioner in connection with the case registered as F.I.R No. 81, mentioned above, or for any offences arising out of the same. Thus, the last two petition, in which Vinod Kumar Gupta is one of the Petitioners become infrsctuous qua him. Accordingly, the orders in so far as those allowed interim anticipatory bail to him stand vacated to that extent. It has also been stated at the Bar by Shri Sethi that the investigation agency has no intention to arrest Puran Chand Gupta or his wife Mrs. Usha Gupta in connection with murder case or the former in connection with case relating to commission of rape, though so alleged by the Petitioners in some of the petitions. He has further made it clear that the only allegations in connection with which the Police want to arrest Puran Chand Gupta, Mrs. Usha Gupta and Tirvinder Pal Singh are that Puran Chand Gupta was in fact running a bogus company named and styled as M/s. S.R. and Co., Ludhiana, with the help of Roshan Lal and he procured 5,000 bags of cement from M/s Jaipur Udyog Limited and thereafter without informing the Deputy Commissioner or the District Food Controller, Ludhiana, about the receipt of those cement bags, sold the same in black market and for achieving that object he, forged certain documents, and Mrs. Usha Gupta aided him in the commission of those offences by making payment of freight charges either in cash or by issuing Cheques to the truck operators who had brought the bags of cement to the godowns and that Tirvinder Pal Singh, who was employee of Puran Chand Gupta, helped, the latter in selling some of the bags of cement in black market. All these allegations disclose commission of offences u/s 7 of the Essential Commodities Act and Sections 120-B, 420 and 468, Indian Penal Code, against Puran Gupta, Mrs. Usha Gupta and Tirvinder Pal Singh. Now, It is to be seen whether these Petitioners are entitled to the grant of anticipatory bail.

Section 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, hereinafter referred to as the Code, under which these applications have been presented reads as under:

(1) When any person has reason to believe that he may be arrested on an accusation of having committed non-bailable offence, he may apply to the High Court or the Court of Session for a direction under this section; and that Court may, if it thinks fit, direct that in the event of such arrest, he shall be released on bail.

(2) When the High Court or the Court of Session makes a direction under Sub-section (1), it may include such conditions in such directions in the light of the facts of the particular case, as it may think fit, including-

(i) a condition that the person shall make himself available for interrogation by a Police Officer as and when required;

(ii) a condition that the person shall not, directly on indirectly, make any inducement, threat, or promise to any person acquainted with the facts of the case so as to dissuade him from disclosing such facts to the Court or to any Police Officer;

(iii) a condition that the person shall not leave India without the previous permission of the Court;

(iv) such other condition as may be imposed under Sub-section (3) of Section 437, as if the bail were granted under that section.

(3) If such person is thereafter arrested without warant by an officer in charge of a police station on such accusation, and is prepared either at the time of arrest or at any time while in the custody of such officer to give bail, he shall be released on bail and if a Magistrate taking cognizance of such offence decide; that a warrant should issue in the first instance against that person, he shall issue a bailable warrant in conformity with the direction of the Court under Sub-section (1)-" The scope and ambit of Section 438 ibid has been discussed in detail in the latest famous judgment of the Supreme Court reported as Shri Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia and Others Vs. State of Punjab, . In this connection, it has been held, in the aforesaid judgment as under:

The legislature conferred a wide discretion on the Court of Session to grant anticipatory bail because it evidently felt, firstly, that it would be difficult to enumerate the conditions under which anticipator/ bail should or should not be granted and secondly, because the intention was to allow the higher court in the echelon a some what free hand in the grant of relief in the nature of anticipatory bail. That is why, departing from the terms of Sections 437 & 439, Section 438(1) uses the language that the High Court or the Court of Session ''May'' if it thinks fit'' direct that the applicant be released on bai. Sub-section (2) of Section 438 is a further and clearer manifestation of the same legislative intent to confer a wide discretionary power to grant anticipatory bail. It provides that the High Court or the Court of Session, while issuing a direction for the grant of anticipatory bail may include such conditions in such directions in the light of the facts of the particular case, as it may think fit'', including the conditions which are set out in Clauses (i) in (iv) of Sub-section (2). The proof of legislative intent can best be found in the language which the legislature uses. Ambiguities can undoubtedly be resolved by resort to extraneous aids but words, as wide and explicit as have been used in Section 438, must be given their full effect, especially when to refuse to do so will result in undue impairment of the freedom of the individual and the presumption of innocence. It has to be borne in mind that anticipatory bail is sought when there is a a mere apprehension of arrest on the accusation that the applicant has committed a non-bailable offence." It was also observed in that judgment as under:

The High Court and the Court of Session to whom the application for anticipatory bail is made ought to be left free in the exercise of their judicial discretion to grant bail if they consider it fit so to do on the particular facts and circumstances of the case and on such conditions as the case may warrant. Similarly, they must be left free to refuse bail if the circumstances of the case so warrant, on considerations similar to those mentioned in Section 437 or which are generally considered to be relevant u/s 439 of the Code.

Generalisations of matters which rest on discretion and the attempt to discover formulae of universal application when facts are bound to differ from case to case frustrate the very purpose of conferring discretion. No two cases are alike on facts and, therefore, courts have to be allowed a little free play in the joints if the conferment of discretionary power is to be meaningful. There is no risk involved in entrusting a wide discretion to the Court of Session and the High Court in granting anticipatory baill because, firstly, these are higher Courts manned by experience persons, secondly, their orders are not final but are open to appellate or revisio-nal scrutiny and above all because, discretion has always to be exercised by courts judicially and not according to whim, caprice or fancy. On the other hand, there is a risk in foreclosing categories of cases in which anticipatory bail may be allowed because life throws up unforeseen possibilities and offers new challenges. Judicial discretion has to be free enough to be able to take these possibilities in its stride and to meet these challenges.

It is in the light of the above findings given and observations made by the Supreme Court that decision on the present bail applications has to be given.

It has been urged by Mr. H.S. Brar, learned Counsel for the Petitioners in the first two bail applications, and Mr. O.P. Sharira, learned Counsel for the Petitioners in the subsequent two bail applications, that according to the provisions of Section 438(1) of the Code, when any person has reason to believe that he may be arrested on an accusation of having committed a non-bailable offence, he may apply to the High Court or the Court of Session for issuance of a direction that in the event of his arrest, he shall be released on bail, which is now commonly known as ''anticipatory bail.'' They have further contended that the Petitioners in all the four bail applications had reasons to believe that they might be arrested on accusations of having committed non-bailable offences and, therefore, their applications presented for grant of anticipatory bail u/s 438 of the Code are fully maintainable. I fully agree with their above contention because even Mr. Mohnderjit Singh Sethi, Additional Advocate-Geneal, Punjab, has frankly conceded that the police investigating the case in question have made up their mind to arrest Puran Chand Gupta, his wife Mrs. Usha Gupta and his employee Tirvinder Pal Singh, in connection with the case relating to F.I R. No. 81, mentioned above, and also for the commission of offences under Sections 120-B, 420 468, etc. Indian Penal Code, arising out of that First Inforrration Report. Thus, there is no doubt that the present bail applications filed u/s 438 of the Code are maintainable as none of the said three persons has been arrested so far.

Mr. Sethi has, however, raised a preliminary objection that as far as Puran Chand Gupta Petitioner is concerned, the learged Ilaqa Magistrate, oh the application of the police, ordered for issuance of non-bailable warrants for his arrest on 7th July, 1980, and with regard to Mrs. Usha Gupta, the learned Magistrate, on the application of the Police, passed a similar order for issuance of non-bailable warrants for her arrest. He has further contended that the intention of the Legislature in enacting Section 438 of the Code was that the power conferred on the Sessions Court or the High Court to grant anticipatory bail u/s 438(1) should be or could be exercised till the order regarding issuance of bailable or non-bailable warrants had been passed by the Magistrate and that if before this power is exercised, the Magistrate has already issued non-bailable or bailable warrants, the question of the Sessions Court or the High Court granting anticipatory bail does not arise as the Magistrate concerned has already applied his mind to the case and issued bailable or non-bailable warrants. He, in support of his contention, has cited the judgment of this Court in Ram Lal v. The State of Punjab 1976 C.L.R. (P&H.). With due respect for the aforesaid view taken in that judgment, it can safely be said that it no longer holds the field if it is seen in the light of the observations made by the Supreme Court in Shri Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia''s case (supra). The Supreme Court in that case, while clarifying some points, observed as under:

Fourthly, anticipatory bail can be granted even after an FIR is filed, so long as the applicant has not been arrested.

Had the said judgment of the Supreme Court been delivered prior to the decision given by this Court in Ram Lal''s case (supra), the view taken in that latter judgment would not have been taken at all. Sub-section (3) of Section 438 of the Code is quite clear on the point. According to it, if a person who has been granted anticipatory bail under Sub-section (1) of that section by the High Court or the Court of Session is arrested by the police, the police has no option but to release him on bail. Similarly, if a Magistrate taking cognizance of the offence decides that a warrant should be issued in the first instance against that person, he shall issue a bailable warrant in conformity with the direction of the Court under Sub-section (1). In the present case, since interim anticipatory bail u/s 438(1) of the Code was granted by this Court to Prem Chand Gupta on 4th July, 1980, and to Mrs. Usha Gupta on 25th July, 1980, the learned Magistrate had no option but to cancel the non-bailable warrants already issued for their arrest and to issue bailable warrants for their arrest in compliance with the provisions of Sub-Section 438 of the Code even if the police had applied to him for the issuance of non-bailable warrants for their arrest. Accordingly, I find no merit in the above-mentioned preliminary objection raised by Mr. Sethi.

The learned Counsel for the Petitioners have further argued that as alleged by the above-named three Petitioners in their petitions, Puran Chand Gupta, had nothing to do with the cement dealers, M/s S.R. & Co. of which only Roshan Lal and Saheb Lal were the partners and it were the partners of that company who obtained 5000 bags of 388 cement from the manufacturers and consequently they were responsible for giving an intimation about the same to the district authorities and and then selling those bags of cement only to those persons who had obtained permits for the same from the district authorities in accordance with the rules and regulations. They have further contended that the only part played by Puran Chand Gupta was that he, on the representation made by Roshan Lal, who was friendly and thick with him, advanced Rs. 1,60,000/-by means of the Bank draft so that M/s S.R. & Co. could carry on the business of selling cement. Puran Chand Gupta there after asked Roshan Lal about that deal and for the return of the principal amount with interest and at last Roshan Lal informed that he would get the full quota of 5,000/- bags of cement and keep the same in the godowns of Puran Chand Gupta as security for the amount of Rs. 1, 60,000 advenced by lim to his firm. Accordingly, the whole lot of 5,000 bags of cement was brought to the godowns of Vinod Kumar Gupta and Puran Chand Gupta, and thereafter it was Roshan Lal who then sold away those bags of cement lying in these godowns. The only anxiety of Puran Chand Gupta in keeping the bags of cement in those godowns was that the amount advanced by him through the above-mentioned Bank draft should remain secure so that he could be sure about the return of that amount along with interest thereon. Since subsequently he found, that Roshan Lal or his company was not returning the amount advanced by him along with interest thereon, he had no option but to file complaint to the Senior Superintendent of Police, Ludhiana, on 23rd June, 1980, against Roshan Lal and also to file a civil suit on that very date against Roshan Lal and others as already stated above with the sole object of getting back his principal amount with interest. It was thereafter that F.I.R. No. 81 was registered against M/s S.R. and Co. on 28th June, 1980, most probably at the instance of the political opponents of Puran Chand Gupta who had so done in connivance with Roshan Lal and the police and that was why the police did not care either to arrest Roshan Lal or to obtain warrants for his arrest. It is also contended by the learned Counsel for the Petitioners that in order to harass Puran Chand Gupta, the invstigating agency did not confine itself to the Act of involving in the case Puran Chand Gupta alone, but also his wife, children, relations and his employee, Tirvinder Pal Singh. With regard to the letters allegedly written by P.C. Gupta to the firm manufacturing cement, it is submitted by the learned Counsel for the Petitioners that the same are most probably forged document and that if for the sake of argument it be said that those letters were written by Puran Chand Gupta, even then he did not thereby commit any offence because his anxiety could only be that the amount advanced by him to M/s S.R. and Co. by means of the Bank draft should be utilised for procuring the bags of cement from the manufacturers and that these bags of cement should then be sold by the company so that rut of the sale proceeds of the same, he could get back his money along with interest thereon from that company. If Mrs. Usha Gupta paid the freight charges in cash or through cheques to the operators of the trucks bringing the leads of tags of cement to the godowns of Puran Chand Gupta or his nephew, Vinod Kumar Gupta, she thereby cannot be treated to have indulged in an illegal trade of selling those bags of cement in black market. In view of the above submissions, it has been prayed by the learned Counsel for the Petitioners that all the three Petitioners are entitled to the confirmation of interim anticipatory bail already allowed to them by this Court because they are being involved in the case relating to F.I.R. No. 81 mentioned above because of political vendetta and with the sole of object of causing humiliation Puran Chand Gupta and other members of his family and also to deprive him of his right to get back the money advanced by him along with interest thereon from M/s S.R. and Co., Roshan Lal, its partner, and others.

Mr. Mohinderjit Singh Sethi, learned Counsel for the State-Respondent, on the other hand, has argued that the investigating agency has been able to collect sufficient evidence which goes to show that it was Puran Chand Gupta who had obtained bags of cement by forging certain documents and those bags of cement were received by him at his residence ; freight charges for bringing those bags of cement in trucks were paid by his wife. Mrs. Usha Gupta and no information about the receipt of that stock of cement was given by him to the Deputy Commissioner or the District Food Controller, Ludhiana ; that cement was sold in black market; Tirvinder Pal Singh his employee, who had issued receipts with regard to the bags of cement brought in four trucks to the operators of the trucks, was instrumental in selling 60 bags of cement to Vir Singh son of Mangal Singh and 40 bags of cement to Hira Singh son of Gurcharan Singh; 897 bags of cement were recovered from the godown of M/s Inderjit Singh Hardev Singh of Cycle Industries, Ludhiana and Puran Chand Gupta sold 260 bags of cement to Mohinder Pal Singh co-accused, and in this manner 1157 bags of cement have already been recovered out of the whole lot of 5,000 bags of cement and, as such, none of these three Petitioners is entitled to the grant of anticipatory bail as prayed for by them.

I have given my thoughtful consideration to the above submissions made by the counsel for the either party. It will be very difficult for me to say as to which of the two versions put forth before me one by the learned Counsel for the Petitioners and another by the learned Counsel for the State-Respondent, is correct. The offences alleged to have been committed by the three Petitioners are not of such a nature that they should be denied the concession of anticipatory bail. The investigating agency, as already mentioned above, has already collected sourcing material even without putting the three Petitioners under arrest. It, therefore, appears that the investigating agency can still collect further material without taking the three Petitioners into custody. On my putting a direct question to Mr. Sethi as to for what purpose the investigating agency wants to arrest the three Petitioners, he has stated that recovery of 3,843 bags of cement is still to be made which can be possible only if the three Petitioners are takn into police custody. He has further added that since the administration wants that black marketing rackets should be smashed, it can be possible only when the persons indulging in black marketing are taken into police custody. It is also stated by him that the larger interest of the public and the State demand that in serious cases like selling the bags of cement in blaek market, concession of anticipatory bail should not be given. Reply to all these three submissions made by Mr. Sethi is to be found in the judgment given in Shri Gurhaksh Singh Sibha''s case (supra). In that judgment, it has been observed as under:

An order of anticipatory bail does not in any way, directly or indirectly, take away from the police their right to investigate into charges made or to be made against the person released on bail. In fact two, of the usual conditions incorporated in a direction issued u/s 438(1) are those recommended in Sub-section (2) (1) and (ii) which require the applicant to cooperate with the police and to assure that he shall not tamper with the witnesses during and after the investigation. While granting relief u/s 438(1), appropriate conditions can be imposed u/s 438(2) so as to ensure an uninterrupted investigation. One of such condition can even be that in the event of the police making out a case of a likely discovery u/s 27 of the Evidence Act, the person released on bail shall be liable to be taken in police custody for facilitating the discovery, Besides, if and when the occasion arises, it may be possible for the prosecution to claim the benefit of Section 27 of the Evidence Act in regard to a discovery of facts made in pursuance of information supplied by a person released on bail by invoking the principle stated by this Court in State of U.P. Vs. Deoman Upadhyaya, ) to the effect that when a person not in custody approaches a police officer investigating an offence and offers to give information leading to the discovery of a fact, having a bearing on the charge which may be made against him, he may appropriately be deemed to have surrendered himself to the police. The broad foundation of this rule is stated to be that Section 46 of the Code of Criminal Procedure does not contem late any formality before a person can be said to be taken in custody; submission to the custody by word or action by a person is sufficient. For similar reasons, we are unable to agree that anticipatory bail should be refused if a legitimate case for the remand of the offender to the police custody u/s 167(2) of the Code is made out by the investigating agency.

Thus, it is not necessary that simply because 3843 bags of comment are still to be recovered by the investigating agency, the Petitioners must be allowed to be taken into police custody for their interrogation in that behalf. They can be interrogated by the investigating agency and recovery can be effected in pursuance of information given by them even when they have been directed by this Court to be released on bail in the event of their arrest u/s 438(1) of the Code. With regard to the other two submissions made by Mr. Sethi, reference be made to the observation made by the Supreme Court in that very judgment when it was confronted with the following proposition:

The larger interest of the public and State demand that in serious cases like economic offences involving blatant corruption at the higher rungs of the executive and political power, the discretion u/s 438 of the Code should not be exercised." The Court, than observed as under:

How can the court, even if it had a third eye, asssess the blatant ness of corruption at the stage of anticipatory bail ? And will be correct to say that blaiantness of the accusation will suffice for rejecting bail, if the applicant''s conduct is painted in colors too lurid to be true ?" Accordingly, it can not be said that it would be in the interest of public and the State if the Petitioners are allowed to be taken into police custody because they had allegedly indulged in the offence of selling bags of cement in black market.

Mr. Sethi has raised two other points also; firstly, that the anticipatory bail should not be granted unless it is alleged and shown that the proposed accusations made by the investigating agency against the Petitioners are mala fide, and secondly, that the power given to the High Court and the Court of Session u/s 438 of the Code is of an extraordinary character and, therefore, it must be exercised in exceptional cases only. Both these points have been answered | in the negative by the Supreme Court in its above referred to judgment, wherein it has been observed that it is not easy to appreciate why an application for anticipatory fail must be rejected unless the accusations are shown to be mala fide. In that judgment, it has also been laid down as under:

It may perhaps be right to describe the power (conferred by Section 438 of the Code) as of an extraordinary character because ordinarily the bail is applied for u/s 437 or Section 439. These sections deal with the power to grant or refuse bail to a person who is in the custody of the police and that is the ordinary situation in which bail is generally applied for. But this does not justify the conclusion that the power must be exercised in exceptional cases only, because it is of an extraordinary character. We will really be saying once too often that all discretion has to be exercised with care and circumspection, depending on circumstances justifying its exercise. It is unnecessary to travel beyond it and subject the wide power conferred by the legislature to a rigorous code of self-imposed limitations.

For the reasons given above, the ad interim anticipatory bail already allowed to Puran Chand Gupta, Mrs. Usha Gupta and Tirvinder Pal Singh Petitioners in the case u/s 7 of the Essential Commodities Act registered vide F.I.R. No. 81, dated 28th June, 1980, at the Police Station, Saraba Nagar, Ludiana, and also for offences under Sections 120-B, 420 and 468, Indian Penal Code, or for any offence arising out of that First Information Report, with the direction that in the event of their arrest, they shall be released on bail, is confirmed. It is further directed these three Petitioners shall make themselves available for interrogation by the police officer as and when so required, that they shall not, directly or indirectly, make any inducement, thereat or promise to any person acquainted with the facts of the case so as to dissuade him from disclosing such facts to the Court or to any police officer; and that they shall not leave India without the previous permission of the Court. It is also directed that in the event of registration of other case or cases of similar kind against these three Petitioners, the investigating agency shall give to them adequate opportunity to approach the Court to apply for grant of anticipatory bail so that essence and spirit of this judgment is preserved. Thus, all these four applications stand disposed of in the terms of this judgment.