Puran Singh and others vs Sujit Kaur and another

V.S. Aggarwal, J.

Puran Singh (Petitioner No. 1) was married to Surjit Kaur respondent on 13.3.1988. Respondent filed a complaint in the Court of SubDivisional Judicial Magistrate, Fatehabad with respect to offences punishable under Sections 406/498A/494/109 Indian Penal Code. It was asserted that Petitioner No. 2 Dona Singh, father of petitioner No. 1, petitioner No. 3, Jamna Bai, mother of petitioner No. 1, petitioner No. 4, Mangal Singh, younger brother of petitioner No. 1, petitioner No. 5, Kartar Singh, maternal uncle of petitioner No. 1, petitioners No. 6 & 7 Veera and Jeera Singh, sister and brotherinlaw of petitioner No. 1, petitioners No. 8 & 9, Ramo and Tarlok Singh, sister and brotherinlaw of petitioner No. 1 were present at the time of marriage of petitioner No. 1 with respondent. Father of the respondent gave dowry articles and the same were handed over to petitioner No. 1 Puran Singh, Petitioner No. 2, Dona Singh and petitioner No. 3, Jamna Bai. The petitioners were not happy with the dowry and they forced the respondent to bring more dowry articles. She was harassed and physically assaulted. She was asked to bring a watch, radio and a fan. Ultimately on 12.4.1981 the respondent was beaten and turned out of the house. She started living with her parents at Fatehabad. Many a time the Panchayat went to the petitioners, but, they were not willing to give up their old demands, On 12.6.1990, Panchayat was convened. Petitioners No. 1 to 3 were also present, but they repeated their demand of dowry. They further demanded a motor cycle for settling the dispute with the respondent.

At the time respondent was staying in the house of petitioner No. 1, it is claimed that Sumitra Bai, Amir Singh and Rani Bai used to visit her and they knew that petitioner No. 1 is married to respondent. Despite their knowledge that petitioner No. 1 was legally married to respondent, Petitioner Puran Singh was married to Sumitra Bai. Petitioners 2 to 8 attended the marriage. On these broad facts, complaint was filed with respect to offences punishable under Indian Penal Code mentioned above.

Learned Sub Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Fatehabad vide order dated 18.4.1994 on consideration of evidence passed the order summoning the petitioners as accused. Relevant portion of the order is being reproduced below :

"So there is sufficient evidence that she is the legally wedded wife of accused No. 1 and was mercilessly beaten for demand of dowry and accused Nos. 1 and 4 have misappropriated the dowry articles to their own use. So, there is a prima facie case to summon the accused Nos. 1 to 4 under sections 498A and 406 IPC. It has also come in evidence that accused No. 1 has married with accused No. 10 knowing it fully well that accused Nos. 11 and 12 also knew this fact of first marriage, but inspite of that fact, the second marriage was contracted in presence of all the accused. They all have connived at with each other and with their abetment, the second marriage was contracted and the second marriage was seen by his own eyes by PW2 and PW4 has also stated so when he went to village Bhanewala. So, accused No. 1 has contracted second marriage with accused No. 10. So all the accused be summoned under section 494 read with section 109 I.P.C. on filing P.F., copies of complaint and list of witnesses within a week."

The petitioners seek quashing of the complaint and the proceedings before learned SubDivisional Judicial Magistrate, Fatehabad.

The main stage of the arguments, of the learned counsel for the petitioner was that allegations pertaining to entrustment and demand of dowry are vague and general. No date time and manner is being given when respondent was maltreated. The further points out that it has not been mentioned as to whom articles were entrusted. Consequently learned counsel urged that on the basis of these vague allegations, it cannot be held that offences under sections 406/498A Indian Penal Code even be prima facie published. (sic)

If taking the allegations of the complainant no case is made out, it is an abuse of process of Court or it is expedient and in the interest of justice proceedings ordinarily are to be quashed. It is not the rule of thumb that whatever has been stated in the F.I.R. should be accepted as gospel truth, even if it is altogether unacceptable to common sense.

Close at heels to the facts of the present case is the decision in the case of Pratibha Rani v. Suraj Kumar and another, AIR 1985 SC 628. The statement of fact that case is in paragraph 10 of the judgment, the relevant extract of the same is being reproduced below :

"It is further alleged that all the accused attended and actively participated in the marriage of the complainant and demanded dowry. The most important allegation made by the appellant was that the parents and relatives gave by way of dowry articles worth Rs. 60,000/ inclusive of gold ornaments, clothes and other things which were entrusted to accused Nos. 1 to 6 on 5.2.1972 which were taken into possession by them. Soon after the marriage, accused No. 1 started harassing, teasing and beating the complainant and ultimately turned out her along with her children sometime in the year 1977."

On perusal of this fact, the Supreme Court in paragraph 11 of the judgment held as under :

"A perusal of the allegation''s made in the complaint undoubtedly make out a positive case of the accused having dishonestly misappropriated the articles handed over to them in a fiduciary capacity. To characterise such an entrustment as a joint custody of property given to the husband and the parents is wholly unintelligible to us. All the ingredients of an offence under section 405 IPC were pleaded and a prima facie case for summoning the accused was made out. In such circumstances the complainant should have been given an opportunity by the High Court to prove her case rather than quashing the complaint. Such an exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is totally unwarranted by law."

In other words, assertions that entrustment is in the joint custody of parents and the husband is wholly unintelligible. On the basis of the allegations it was concluded that a prima facie case was drawn. Subsequently in Para 58 the Supreme Court again concluded and the relevant portion is being reproduced as under :

"Taking all the allegations made above, by no stretch of imagination can it be said that the allegations do not prima facie amount to an offence of criminal breach of trust against the respondent. Thus, there can be no room for doubt that all the facts stated in the complaint constitute an offence under Section 406 IPC and the appellant cannot be denied the right to prove her case at the trial by preempting it at the very behest by order passed by the High Court."

In the present case, specific allegations have been made that at the time of marriage of petitioner No. 1 with the respondent, dowry articles were handed over to petitioners 1, 2 & 3. Thereafter, it is alleged that on account of insufficient dowry, respondent was harassed and demand was made that she should be given more dowry. Keeping in view the ratio and reasoning in the case of Prathibha Rani (supra), it goes without saying that offence under Section 406/498A IPC would be drawn. The plea that the allegations are vague or that it is not mentioned as to whom articles were entrusted in the facts of the case must be repelled.

Faced with this situation, learned counsel for the petitioners urged that the learned SubDivisional Judicial Magistrate at Fatehabad had no jurisdiction to entertain the complaint. In this view, there was no harassment or demand of dowry within the jurisdiction of Fatehabad and if at all it would be within the jurisdiction of District Ferozepur. However, perusal of the facts which have already been mentioned above, reveal that entrustment of dowry articles was made at Fatehabad, District Hisar and it has also been specifically pleaded and alleged that in June 1990 there was a meeting at Fatehabad and petitioners 1, 2 and 3 repeated their demand of dowry. In other words, ingredients of both Sections 406 and 498A IPC had been pleaded and shown and the court at District Hissar had the jurisdiction to hear it. The arguments, thus, so much thought of by the learned counsel for the petitioners must fail.

No other argument was raised before me.

As a result of the reasons given above, the petition being devoid of merit must fail and is dismissed.