Purshotam Lal vs State Of HP

Rakesh Kainthla, J

The petitioner has filed the present petition for quashing of FIR No.43 of 2020, dated 24.5.2020, registered at Police Station Fatehpur, District Kangra, H.P., for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 188, 269 and 270 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and Section 51 of the Disaster Management Act pending before the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Jawali, District Kangra, H.P.

Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present petition are that the police had set up a naka on 3.4.2020 at Gholi Chowk. A vehicle bearing registration No. HP-38F-6918 came from Khatiyar towards Fatehpur. The police signalled the driver to stop the vehicle. The driver identified himself as Purshotam Lal (the present petitioner). He was asked to produce a curfew pass. He produced an acknowledgment slip issued by the office of the District Magistrate. The police told the petitioner that it was merely an acknowledgment slip and not a valid pass. Golwan was declared a containment zone due to COVID-19 infection, and no person was permitted to move. The police registered the FIR and investigated the matter. The police filed the charge sheet after the completion of the investigation. Subsequently, the proceedings under Section 188 of the IPC and Section 51 of the Disaster Management Act were withdrawn, but they are continuing for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 269 and 270 of the IPC.

Being aggrieved by the filing of the charge sheet, the petitioner has filed the present petition asserting that the petitioner had gone to Chandigarh for the medical treatment of his brother. He apprised the police about this fact, but the police registered the FIR against him. The petitioner was kept under quarantine in a designated COVID Centre for 23 days. His report was found to be negative. The offence punishable under Section 188 of the IPC is non-cognizable, and the complaint by the public servant is mandatory. The petitioner was not suffering from any infection and could not have spread any disease. Therefore, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the FIR and consequential proceedings arising out of it be quashed.

A status report reproducing the contents of the FIR and the steps taken during the investigation was filed.

I have heard Mr Mohar Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General for the respondent State.

Mr. Mohar Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the petitioner is innocent and that he was falsely implicated. The petitioner was found to be negative for COVID-19, and he could not have spread any infection to anyone. The allegations in the FIR do not constitute the commission of any offence, even if they are taken to be correct. Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the FIR and consequential proceedings arising out of it be quashed. He relied upon the judgments of Sidak Singh Sandhu Vs. U.T. Chandigarh and another Cr.M-M-19407-2022 (O&M), decided on 27.7.2022 and Tanveer and another Vs. State of H.P. and another, Cr.MP(M) No.119 of 2022, decided on 13.5.2022 in support of his submissions.

Mr. Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General for the respondent-State, submitted that the State has already withdrawn the complaint regarding the commission of offences punishable under Section 188 of the IPC and Section 51 of the Disaster Management Act. The matter is pending regarding Sections 269 and 270 of the IPC. The petitioner had violated the COVID-19 protocol, and he is being rightly prosecuted. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed.

I have given a considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.

The law relating to quashing of criminal cases was explained by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in B.N. John v. State of U.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 7 as under: -

"7. As far as the quashing of criminal cases is concerned, it is now more or less well settled as regards the principles to be applied by the court. In this regard, one may refer to the decision of this Court in State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, wherein this Court has summarised some of the principles under which FIR/complaints/criminal cases could be quashed in the following words:

"102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised.

(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any oflence or make out a case against the accused.

(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.

(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.

(4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable oflence but constitute only a non-cognizable oflence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.

(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable based on which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.

(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings, and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.

(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to a private and personal grudge." (emphasis added)

Of the aforesaid criteria, clause no. (1), (4) and (6) would be of relevance to us in this case.

In clause (1), it has been mentioned that where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused, then the FIR or the complaint can be quashed.

As per clause (4), where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order dated by the Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155 (2) of the CrPC, and in such a situation, the FIR can be quashed.

Similarly, as provided under clause (6), if there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the CrPC or the concerned Act under which the criminal proceedings are instituted, such proceedings can be quashed."

This position was reiterated in Ajay Malik v. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 185, wherein it was observed:

"8. It is well established that a High Court, in exercising its extraordinary powers under Section 482 of the CrPC, may issue orders to prevent the abuse of court processes or to secure the ends of justice. These inherent powers are neither controlled nor limited by any other statutory provision. However, given the broad and profound nature of this authority, the High Court must exercise it sparingly. The conditions for invoking such powers are embedded within Section 482 of the CrPC itself, allowing the High Court to act only in cases of clear abuse of process or where intervention is essential to uphold the ends of justice.

It is in this backdrop that this Court, over the course of several decades, has laid down the principles and guidelines that High Courts must follow before quashing criminal proceedings at the threshold, thereby pre- empting the Prosecution from building its case before the Trial Court. The grounds for quashing, inter alia, contemplate the following situations : (i) the criminal complaint has been filed with mala fides; (ii) the FIR represents an abuse of the legal process; (iii) no prima facie offence is made out; (iv) the dispute is civil in nature; (v.) the complaint contains vague and omnibus allegations; and (vi) the parties are willing to settle and compound the dispute amicably (State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335).

A similar view was taken in Rajendra Bihari Lal v. State of U.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2265, wherein it was observed:

"70. The aforesaid decisions of this Court make it clear that where the High Court is satisfied that the process of any court is being abused or likely to be abused or that the ends of justice would not be secured, it is not only empowered but also obligated under the law to exercise its inherent powers. The provision does not confer any new power on the High Court but rather saves the power which the High Court already possesses, from before the enactment of the legislation, by reason of its very existence. In exercise of its power, it would be legitimate for the High Court to quash any criminal proceedings if the High Court finds that the initiation or continuation of it may lead to abuse of process of court, and quashing of the proceedings would serve the ends of justice."

The present petition is to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court.

The petitioner has specifically stated in his petition that he was found negative for COVID-29. The status report does not mention that the petitioner was found to be COVID-19 positive. The only allegation is that he was moving around without a valid curfew pass. It was laid down by the Punjab & Haryana High Court in Sidak Singh Sandhu (supra) that before a person can be prosecuted for the commission of offences punishable under Section 269 and 270 of IPC, it must be proved that he had knowledge that he is likely to spread infection of any disease. In the absence of any such evidence, he cannot be so prosecuted. It was observed: -

A Division Bench of Bombay High Court has held in Criminal Application No. 453 of 2020, decided on 21.09.2020, titled as HLA SHWE v. State of Maharashtra, that the person sought to be prosecuted under Sections 269 and 270 IPC must commit an act with the knowledge that he is likely to spread infection of any disease. The relevant extract of the observation recorded by the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court is extracted as under:

To attract ingredients of Sections 269 and 270, the person must commit any act which he knows is likely to spread infection of any disease which is dangerous to life. It is not in dispute that the applicants had undergone a COVID-19 test during their period of quarantine, i.e. from 03.04.2020, and their test report for infection with COVID-19 was negative. It is also not disputed that they were kept in isolation from 24.03.2020 till 31.03.2020 under the supervision of Dr Khawaj, NMC Zonal Officer, Mominpura, Nagpur. There is no material on record to prove that applicants had indulged in any act that was likely to spread infection of COVID-19. Therefore, from the material produced in the charge-sheet, there is no evidence to substantiate the fulfilment of the ingredients of Sections 269 and 270 of the Penal Code, 1860.

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Furthermore, the aforesaid issue was also examined by this Court in CRM-M-51595 of 2021 titled as Pawan Giri v. State of Haryana, which reads thus: -

A perusal of Section 269 IPC shows that in order to attract the same, the act of an accused must be one which is likely to spread infection of any disease dangerous to life. A perusal of the report filed by the respondent under Section 173 Cr. P.C. does not indicate any prima facie evidence collected by the Police as to whether the petitioner or the other members of the family were suffering from any infectious disease or would have caused the spread of any infectious disease. In the absence thereof, it cannot be assumed that the petitioners were either the carriers of infection or would have caused the spread thereof. Apart from that, the report also does not indicate the exact guideline purportedly alleged to have been violated. In the absence of any such specific guidelines that are alleged to have been violated, there is no presumption that the act of the petitioners was unlawful. Further, perusal of the notification dated 01.04.2020 shows that the said notification was in the nature of a prohibition imposed upon the shops selling medicines and was not against any other person. Hence, the action of the petitioners in seeking procurement of essential medicines during the permissible hours of operation cannot be held to be unlawful. In the absence of the respondents to refer to any order, the disobedience whereof is sought to be alleged against the petitioners, it cannot be perceived that the petitioners have committed an offence under Section 269 IPC.

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A perusal of the FIR and the final report fails to make out the essential ingredients of the offence under Section 269 IPC, and the case would fall in category (1) and (3)

A similar view was taken in Konan Kodio Ganstone v. State of Maharashtra, 2020 SCC OnLine Bom 869, wherein it was observed:

The chargesheet is filed for the offence punishable under section 269 of the IPC, which provides for a penalty when there is a negligent act which is likely to spread infection of a disease dangerous to life. For this offence, punishment of imprisonment for six months or a fine is provided. The chargesheet is filed for the offence punishable under section 270 of I.P.C., also, it shows that when a person malignantly does an act which he knows or he has reason to believe is likely to spread infection dangerous to life, and in such a case, the penalty provided is imprisonment for two years or fine. In respect of the offences punishable under sections 269 and 270 of the IPC, this Court has already discussed the relevant material, and it has already observed that it is not possible to infer under any circumstances that these persons were infected when they arrived in India. It is also not possible to infer that their acts amount to offences punishable under sections 269 and 270 of the IPC...

A similar view was taken by this Court in Tanveer (supra), wherein it was observed:

Section 269 of the IPC provides that whoever unlawfully or negligently does any act which is, and which he knows or has reason to believe to be, likely to spread the infection of any disease dangerous to life, shall be punished with imprisonment or fine or with both.

In the present case, as has been reported by the police, the petitioners were not suffering from Covid 19; therefore, there was no question of knowing or having reason to believe to be likely to spread the infection of any disease dangerous to life by the petitioners. Hence, provisions of Section 269 of the IPC are not attracted in the present case.

In the present case also, there is nothing on record to show that the petitioner had any disease or that he was likely to spread any disease. Hence, the allegations in the FIR, even if taken to be correct, do not show the commission of offences punishable under Sections 269 and 270 of the IPC.

The State has already withdrawn the charge sheet for the commission of offences punishable under Section 188 of the IPC and 51 of the Disaster Management Act. Hence, the proceedings against the petitioner will not survive.

In view of the above, the present petition is allowed and the FIR No.43 of 2020, dated 24.5.2020 registered at police station Fatehpur, District Kangra, H.P. for the commission of offences punishable and Sections 188, 269 and 270 of Indian Penal Code IPC and Section 51 of Disaster Management Act and consequential proceedings pending before learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Jawali, District Kangra, H.P. are ordered to be quashed qua the petitioner.

The observations made herein before shall remain confined to the disposal of the petition and will have no bearing whatsoever on the merits of the case.