Puthuparambil Raju vs Kachirayil Joseph

P. Krishna Kumar, J

The  petitioner  is  the  defendant  in  a suit  for  specific performance  of  an  agreement  for  sale  of  immovable  property. The suit was decreed on 21.11.2001, directing the petitioner to execute the sale deed upon the respondent/plaintiff depositing the balance sale consideration of ₹10,000/- within one month. The respondent, however, failed to deposit the  amount  within  the  stipulated  period.  He  deposited  the amount belatedly, and got the sale deed executed through the court.

Alleging  non-compliance  with  the  time  stipulation  in the decree, and contending that no extension of time had been granted by the Court, the petitioner filed Ext.P4 application seeking rescission of the contract. By the order impugned  in  this  petition,  the  learned  Sub  Judge  dismissed the application on the ground that it was barred by limitation.

Heard Sri. Sunil Nair (Palakkad), learned counsel for the  petitioner,  and  Sri.  V.T.  Madhavanunni,  learned  counsel for the respondent.

The learned counsel for the petitioner contended that no  notice  was  served  on  the  petitioner  in  the  application filed  by  the  respondent  for  execution  of  the  sale  deed,  and therefore, the delay in filing the application for rescission  cannot  be  attributed  to  the  petitioner.  Placing reliance  on  the  decisions  in  V  Alias  v.  Abraham  (AIR  2004 Ker. 344), Rajinder Kumar v. Kuldeep Singh (AIR 2014 SC 1155), and Prem Aggarwal v. Mohan Singh (2025 KHC OnLine 6860),  it  was  argued  that,  applying  the  doctrine  of actus curiae neminem gravabit, the court ought not to have dismissed  the  application  on  the  ground  of  limitation,  in the peculiar facts of the case.

The  learned  counsel  further  placed  heavy  reliance  on the  judgment  of  the  Hon’ble  Supreme  Court  in  Prem  Jeevan  v. K.S.  Venkata  Raman  (AIR  2017  SC  623),  to  contend  that  the time  stipulated  in  the  decree  does  not  stand  automatically extended merely because the defendant had not sought rescission of the contract, and thus the decree is not executable.

The learned counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, submitted that notice was duly served on the petitioner on I.A. No.2339/2002, which was filed by the respondent seeking execution and registration of the sale deed, and that the petitioner had entered appearance therein.  It  was  contended  that  the  belated  application  for rescission  lacks  bona  fides.  Reliance  was  placed  on  Ishwar (Since  Deceased)  Thr.  LRs  v.  Bhim  Singh  (AIR  2024  SC  4232) to contend that when the court accepts the balance sale consideration and permits execution of the sale deed, extension of time is implicit in such orders.

As regards the first contention, the records disclose that the Munsiff Court had issued notice in I.A. No.2339/2002  to  the  petitioner-defendant  on  11.11.2002,  and that the petitioner had entered appearance on 16.12.2002. In such circumstances, the plea founded on the doctrine of actus curiae neminem gravabit is factually untenable.

It is also pertinent to note that the decree was passed on 21.11.2001, whereas the application for rescission was filed only on 22.03.2010. In a suit for specific performance,  the  court  does  not  become  functus  officio  upon passing the decree; rather, such a decree partakes the character  of  a  preliminary  decree,  and  the  proceedings  are deemed to remain pending. Both parties are entitled to invoke the jurisdiction of the court under Section 28 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 for rescission of the contract upon  the  occurrence  of  contingencies  contemplated  therein. Therefore,  the  petitioner  was  not  required  to  await  notice in  any  application  filed  by  the  respondent  and  could  have independently sought rescission. Under Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963, the limitation period for an application  for  which  no  period  of  limitation  is  provided elsewhere  is  three  years  from  the  date  when  the  right  to apply accrues. The right to seek for rescission accrues upon the  expiry  of  the  time  stipulated  in  the  decree  for  deposit of the balance consideration, and not upon receipt of notice in the subsequent proceedings. In B.V. Gururaj v. M.R. Rathindran (AIR 2010 Mad 129), it was held that the cause of action for rescission arises from the date of decree for specific performance and the limitation for such an application  is  3 years.  Nevertheless,  as  the  decree  in  this case stipulates a specific period for deposit, the limitation period shall commence only from the expiry of the time so prescribed therein.

In the present case, the respondent failed to deposit the amount within the time stipulated in the decree. He made the deposit within one year and simultaneously filed an application  seeking  execution  and  registration  of  the  sale deed  through  court.  The  court,  after  issuing  notice  to  the petitioner,  allowed  the  application  and  the  sale  deed  was executed through its process. The petitioner, sought rescission only upon the respondent initiating execution proceedings for delivery of possession, by which time nearly eight years had elapsed. The application is, therefore, hopelessly barred by limitation. The application seeking recission, was rightly dismissed by the court.

It is also to be noted that even on the merits, the contention  of  the  petitioner  relying  on  Prem  Jeevan  v.  K.S. Venkata Raman and Another  (supra), that the court having not explicitly  extended  the  time,  the  decree  is  not  executable, is  not  sustainable.  In  Prem  Jeevan, the  question  that  arose for  consideration  was  whether  the  failure  of  the  judgment- debtor to seek rescission of the contract would amount to an automatic extension of the time fixed in the decree. In that case,  the  plaintiff  applied  for  execution  of  the  decree  by depositing the amount after the time stipulated by the court. The judgment-debtor objected to the execution, contending  that  the  balance  amount  had  not  been  deposited within  the  prescribed  period  and,  therefore,  the  decree  had become inexecutable in the absence of an order extending time. The Execution Court upheld the objection and held that the  execution  petition  was  not  maintainable  in  the  absence of such extension. The said decision was reversed by the High Court and was ultimately carried to the Apex Court. The Court held as follows:

“9.  Reference  to  Order  XX  R.12A  CPC  shows  that  in every decree of specific performance of a contract, the court has to specify the period within  which  the  payment  has  to  be  made.  In  the present  case,  the  said  period  was  two  months  from the date of the decree.

In  absence  of  the  said  time  being  extended, the  decree  - holder  could  execute  the  decree  only by  making  the  payment  of  the  decretal  amount  to the judgment - debtor or making the deposit in the court  in  term  of  the  said  decree.  In  the  present case, neither the said deposit was made within the stipulated  time  nor  extension  of  time  was  sought or granted and also no explanation has been furnished for the delay in the making of the deposit. No doubt, as contended by the learned counsel for the decree - holders, relying on judgment of this Court in Ramankutty Guptan v. Avara,  1994  (2)  SCC  642  : AIR  1994  SC  1699,  in  an appropriate case the Court which passed the decree could extend the time as envisaged in the Specific Relief,  1963. In  the  present  case  no  such  steps have been taken by the decree - holders.

In above circumstances, the contention, advanced on behalf of the decree - holders, respondents herein, that unless the judgment - debtor  seeks  rescission  of  the  contract  in  terms of S.28 of the Specific Relief Act, the decree remains executable in spite of expiry of period for  deposit,  with  the  only  obligation  on  the  part of the decree - holders to pay interest, cannot be accepted.”

(Emphasis added)

The factual matrix herein is materially different. Though the respondent failed to deposit the amount within the stipulated time, at the time of making such  deposit,  he  filed  an  application  seeking  execution  of the  sale  deed  through  the  court.  The  court  issued  notice  to the present petitioner-defendant and, thereafter, allowed the said application on merit. Even though the court did not explicitly extend the time fixed in the decree, it is implicit in the said order.

In this context, the law declared by the Apex Court in Ishwar (Since Deceased) Thr. LRs and Others v. Bhim Singh and  Another  (supra)  assumes  relevance.  In  the  said  case,  a decree for specific performance was granted on 12.01.2012 with a direction to pay the balance sale consideration within two months. Though the decree-holder filed an execution  application  on  20.03.2012,  since  the  judgment  was challenged in appeal, a further application was filed before the  Execution  Court  only  on  24.03.2014,  after  disposal  of the  appeal,  seeking  permission  to  deposit  the  balance  sale consideration. The judgment-debtor, on the other hand, filed an  application  for  rescission  of  the  contract  in  the  same proceedings on the ground that the deposit was not made within the stipulated time. The Execution Court rejected the said  application  and  permitted  the  decree-holder  to  deposit the  balance  sale  consideration.  Before  the  Apex  Court,  it was contended by the judgment-debtor that the Execution Court  had  no  jurisdiction  to  extend  the  time  for  depositing the balance sale consideration. It was further contended that, in the absence of a specific application for extension of  time,  the  court  could  not  have  granted  an  extension.  In the above circumstances, the Apex Court held that the Execution Court also has the power to extend time under Section 28 of the Act. Significantly, the Court further held as follows:

“29.  The  contention  of  the  learned  counsel  for the  appellant(s)  that  there  was  no  proper  prayer for condonation of delay in making the deposit of the  balance  consideration,  or  that  there  was  no proper  application  for  extension  of  time  to  make deposit,  is  unworthy  of  acceptance.  Because,  in the execution petition itself, which was promptly filed  after  expiry  of  60  days  from  the  date  of the appellate court decree, the decree-holder had sought permission to make deposit. Not only that, the application filed after dismissal of the second appeal also sought permission to make deposit.  The  prayer  to  extend  the  time  to  make deposit was, therefore, implicit in the prayer to permit  the  decree-holder  to  make  deposit  of  the balance consideration. In this view of the matter, we reject the submission of the appellants that, as there was no proper application for extension of time to make deposit,  the  Court  had  no  jurisdiction  to  extend the same.”

(Emphasis added)

In  K.  Kalpana  Saraswathi  v.  P.  S.  S.  Somasundaram  Chettiar (AIR  1980  SC  512),  the  Supreme  Court  held  that  even  at  the appellate stage, the time for making the deposit can be extended  so  as  to  enable  the  plaintiff  to  avail  the  benefit of  the  agreement  for  sale  in  his  favour.  As  held  in  Ishwar (supra),  this  power  can  be  exercised  even  by  the  Execution Court. Such power may, in appropriate cases, be exercised  ex post  facto  as  well  after  receiving  the  amount  that  ought  to have  been  deposited  earlier. Viewed  in  this  backdrop,  when the court ordered execution of the sale deed on the application filed by the respondent after receipt of the balance sale consideration and with notice to the petitioner, it amounts to implicitly extending the time fixed  in  the  decree  under  Section  28(1)  of  the  Act.  It  is true  that  extension  of  time  is  not  automatic  and  that  while doing  so,  the  court  must  consider  the  circumstances  under which  the  plaintiff  failed  to  deposit  the  amount  within  the stipulated  period.  However,  once  the  court  has  acted  upon the  request  of  the  plaintiff  on  merit  and  has  even  executed the sale deed, it cannot be contended that the absence of an express order extending time renders the decree inexecutable.

Hence,  the  impugned  order  is  liable  to  be  upheld, rejecting the contentions raised by the petitioner.

As a result, the original petition is dismissed.